healthy4u: GHIT

Good HIT, Bad HIT, HIMSS And Reckless Technology Advocacy: Will This Hurt President Obama?

HIMSS, the <a href="http://www.himss.org/" target="_blank">Health Information Systems Management Society</a>, is the large vendor trade group representing healthcare IT sellers. At the HIMSS blog entitled "Health IT is an essential element to transform the Nation’s healthcare system" (<a href="http://blog.himss.org/2012/10/05/health-it-is-an-essential-element-to-transform-the-nations-healthcare-system/" target="_blank">link</a>), <a class="url fn n" href="http://blog.himss.org/author/carlamsmith/" rel="author" title="View all posts by Carla M Smith, MA, CNM, FHIMSS">Carla M Smith, MA, CNM, FHIMSS</a> writes this with regard to the House  <a href="http://waysandmeans.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=310498">letter</a> to HHS Secretary Sebelius asking her to suspend payments for the EHR Incentive Payments authorized in the American Recovery & Reinvestment Act of 2009: <blockquote class="tr_bq">HIMSS opposes halting the Meaningful Use EHR Incentive Program. Health IT is an essential, foundational element of any meaningful transformation of the Nation’s healthcare delivery system.  </blockquote> (Of course, not mentioned is "transformed" into what, exactly; this utopian ideation is a topic for another time.) A chart is then presented as to "how US civilian hospitals have, since the first incentive payments were made in second quarter, 2011, matured in their use of health IT."  Then this statement is made: <blockquote class="tr_bq">Healthcare providers are adopting certified EHRs and using them for meaningful purposes; thus, achieving Congressional intent to improve the quality, safety, and cost-effectiveness of care in U.S. </blockquote> Really?  (See my Feb. 2012 post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/02/hospitals-and-doctors-use-health-it-at.html" target="_blank">Hospitals and Doctors Use Health IT at Their Own Risk - Even if Certified</a>.") This non-evidence based, amoral advocacy by HIMSS for health IT may cost the President the November election.  HIMSS has beguiled the president into similar unquestioning advocacy for the technology in its present form, which his opponents are now (rightfully) seizing upon as in the House letter. The reckless mistakes made by HIMSS and their advocates include these two: 1.   The unquestioned belief that this expensive technology would save billions of dollars in healthcare costs, instead of depleting precious healthcare resources better spent on, say, improvement of healthcare services for the poor. 2.  More importantly, the appallingly naïve belief that any health IT is good health IT, and that any health IT is only capable of good, not bad. HIMSS has thus failed to recognize - or perhaps worse, recognized but recklessly ignored - the profound difference between good health IT (GHIT) and bad health IT (BHIT). As I defined at my <a href="http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/" target="_blank">teaching site on Medical Informatics</a>: <blockquote class="tr_bq">Good Health IT ("GHIT") is defined as IT that provides a good user experience, enhances cognitive function, puts essential information as effortlessly as possible into the physician’s hands, keeps eHealth information secure, protects patient privacy and facilitates better practice of medicine and better outcomes. Bad Health IT ("BHIT") is defined as IT that is ill-suited to purpose, hard to use, unreliable, loses data or provides incorrect data, causes cognitive overload, slows rather than facilitates users, lacks appropriate alerts, creates the need for hypervigilance (i.e., towards avoiding IT-related mishaps) that increases stress, is lacking in security, compromises patient privacy or otherwise demonstrates suboptimal design and/or implementation.   </blockquote> I am an advocate of the former, and an opponent of the latter. Bad health IT is prevalent in 2012 due to lack of meaningful quality control, software validation, usability standards and testing, and regulation of any type - a situation HIMSS long favored.   (The failed National Programme for HIT [NPfIT] in the NHS <a href="http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/?loc=cases&sloc=granger_speaks_out" target="_blank">learned this the hard way</a>, as will Australians <a href="http://sydney.edu.au/engineering/it/~hitru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=91&Itemid=146" target="_blank">needing emergency care</a>, I predict.) Put bluntly, in the end BHIT maims and kills patients, squanders precious healthcare resources, and drains the treasury into IT industry pockets (see my Oct. 3, 2012 post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/10/honesty-and-good-sense-on-electronic.html">Honesty and Good Sense on Electronic Medical Records From Down Under"</a> and this query link on <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/healthcare%20IT%20risks" target="_blank">health IT risks</a>).  Further, the failure to recognize that the technology's downsides need to be understood and remediated before national deployment occurs and under controlled conditions, not after (which uses patients as non-consenting experimental subjects for software debugging), speaks to gross corporate negligence on the part of HIMSS.  It's not as if they did not have advance warning of all of healthcare IT's deficiencies.  BHIT also permits record alterations after the fact that may be to <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/09/sweet-death-that-wasnt-very-sweet-how_24.html" target="_blank">conceal medical error</a>.  I am aware of numerous instances of such alterations, fortunately caught by critical-thinking, detail-minded attorneys.  However, like health IT harms, the incidences of known alteration attempts likely reflect the "tip of the iceberg." HIMSS and its fellow travelers have thus led this administration down the Garden Path of health IT perdition. I warned of this in a Feb. 18, 2009 Wall Street Journal <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123492035330205101.html">letter to the editor:</a> <blockquote class="tr_bq">Dear Wall Street Journal: You observe that the true political goal is socialized medicine facilitated by health care information technology. You note that the public is being deceived, as the rules behind this takeover were stealthily inserted in the stimulus bill. I have a different view on who is deceiving whom. In fact, it is the government that has been deceived by the HIT industry and its pundits. Stated directly, the administration is deluded about the true difficulty of making large-scale health IT work. The beneficiaries will largely be the IT industry and IT management consultants. For £12.7 billion the U.K., which already has socialized medicine, still does not have a working national HIT system, but instead has a major IT quagmire, some of it caused by U.S. HIT vendors. [That project, the NPfIT in the NHS, has now been abandoned - ed.] HIT (with a few exceptions) is largely a disaster. I'm far more concerned about a mega-expensive IT misadventure than an IT-empowered takeover of medicine. The stimulus bill, to its credit, recognizes the need for research on improving HIT. However this is a tool to facilitate clinical care, not a cybernetic miracle to revolutionize medicine. The government has bought the IT magic bullet exuberance hook, line and sinker. I can only hope patients get something worthwhile for the $20 billion. Scot Silverstein, MD </blockquote> Mr. President, again, quite bluntly, the health IT industry took you for a ride, and the damage is done and is continuing due to lack of any meaningful health IT post market surveillance.   (As I wrote <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/10/house-ways-and-means-notes-ehrs-not.html" target="_blank">here</a>, the untoward results have already been used against the current administration, with more perhaps to follow.) In the U.S. we have the 1938 <a href="http://www.fda.gov/regulatoryinformation/legislation/federalfooddrugandcosmeticactfdcact/default.htm" target="_blank">Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act</a> (FD&C Act) in place: <blockquote class="tr_bq">The introduction of this act was influenced by the death of more than 100 patients due to a <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sulfanilamide" title="Sulfanilamide">sulfanilamide</a> medication where <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diethylene_glycol" title="Diethylene glycol">diethylene glycol</a> was used to dissolve the drug and make a liquid form.<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Food,_Drug,_and_Cosmetic_Act#cite_note-3">  </a>See <a class="mw-redirect" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elixir_Sulfanilamide_disaster" title="Elixir Sulfanilamide disaster">Elixir Sulfanilamide disaster</a>. It replaced the earlier <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pure_Food_and_Drug_Act" title="Pure Food and Drug Act">Pure Food and Drug Act</a> of 1906. </blockquote> It should be honored, not ignored via special accommodation to the health IT industry and its trade group. HITECH also needs to be put in dormancy until the problems with these <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/04/fda-decides-regulating-implantable.html" target="_blank">unregulated medical devices</a> get worked out in relatively small, controlled settings to minimize risk, with patient informed consent.  This is in accord with human rights documents dating at least to the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuremberg_Code" target="_blank">Nuremberg Code</a>, as in any new, experimental or partly-experimental medical device, pharmaceutical, or therapy. -- SS

Good HIT, Bad HIT, HIMSS And Reckless Technology Advocacy: Will This Hurt President Obama?

HIMSS, the Health Information Systems Management Society , is the large vendor trade group representing healthcare IT sellers. At the HIMSS ...

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UK: Another Example of IT Malpractice With Bad Health IT (BHIT) Affecting Thousands of Patients, But, As Always, Patient Care Was "Not Compromised"

<div class="post-title entry-title" itemprop="name">At my Dec. 2011 post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/12/yet-another-glitch-affecting-thousands.html" target="_blank">IT Malpractice? Yet Another "Glitch" Affecting Thousands of Patients. Of Course, As Always, Patient Care Was "Not Compromised</a>" and others, I noted:</div><div class="post-title entry-title" itemprop="name"> </div><blockquote class="tr_bq">... claims [in stories regarding health IT failure] that "no patients were harmed" ... are both misleading and irrelevant: Such claims of 'massive EHR outage benevolence' are misleading, in that medical errors due to electronic outages might not appear for days or weeks after the outage ... Claims of 'massive EHR outage benevolence' are also irrelevant in that, even if there was no catastrophe directly coincident with the outage, their was greatly elevated risk. Sooner or later, such outages will maim and kill.</blockquote> Here is a prime example of why I've opined at my Sept. 2012 post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/09/good-health-it-v-bad-health-it-paper-is.html" target="_blank">Good Health IT (GHIT) v. Bad Health IT (BHIT): Paper is Better Than The Latter</a>" that a good or even average paper-based medical record keeping system can facilitate safer and better provision of care than a system based on bad health IT (BHIT). Try this with paper: <blockquote class="tr_bq"><a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-news/nhs-coverup-over-lost-cancer-patient-records-8191066.html" target="_blank">NHS 'cover-up' over lost cancer patient records</a> Thousands awaiting treatment were kept in the dark for five months when data disappeared Sanchez Manning The Independent Sunday 30 September 2012 Britain's largest NHS trust took five months to tell patients it had mislaid medical records for thousands of people waiting for cancer tests and other urgent treatments. Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust discovered in January that a serious computer problem and staff mistakes had played havoc with patient waiting lists.</blockquote> It's quite likely the "serious computer problem" far outweighed the impact of "staff mistakes", as disappearing computer data does so in a "silent" manner.  One does not realize it's missing as there's not generally a trail of evidence that it's gone. <blockquote class="tr_bq"> About 2,500 patients were forced to wait longer on the waiting lists than the NHS's targets, and the trust had no idea whether another 3,000 suspected cancer patients on the waiting list had been given potentially life-saving tests. Despite the fact that the trust discovered discrepancies in January and was forced to launch an internal review into the mess, including 74 cases where patients died, it did not tell GPs about the lost records until May.</blockquote> That is, quite frankly, outrageous if true and (at least in the U.S.) might be considered <a href="http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Criminal+Negligence" target="_blank">criminally negligent</a> (failure to use reasonable care to avoid consequences that threaten or harm the safety of the public and that are the foreseeable outcome of acting in a particular manner). <blockquote class="tr_bq">Revelations about the delay prompted a furious response yesterday from GPs, local authorities and patients' groups. Dr Tony Grewal, one of the GPs who had made referrals to Imperial, said doctors should have been told sooner to allow them to trace patients whose records were missing. "The trust should have contacted us as soon as it was recognised that patients with potentially serious illnesses had been failed by a system," he said. "GPs hold the ultimate responsibility for their patient care."</blockquote> That is axiomatic. <blockquote class="tr_bq">The chief executive of the Patients Association, Katherine Murphy, added: "This is unacceptable for any patient who has had any investigation, but especially patients awaiting cancer results, where every day counts. The trust has a duty to contact GPs who referred the patients. It's unfair on the patients to have this stress and worry, and the trust should not have tried to hide the fact that they had lost these records. They should have let the GPs know at the outset."</blockquote> Unfair to the patients is an understatement,  However, if one's attitude is that computers have more rights than patients, as many on the health IT sector seem to with their ignoring of patient rights such as informed consent, lack of safety regulation, and lack of accountability, then it's quite acceptable. <blockquote class="tr_bq">The trust defended the delay in alerting GPs, arguing that it needed to check accurately how much data it had lost before making the matter public. It said a clinical review had now concluded that no one died as a result of patients waiting longer for tests or care.</blockquote> That would be perhaps OK if the subjects whose "data had been lost" through IT malpractice were lab rats. <blockquote class="tr_bq">Despite this, three London councils – Westminster, Kensington and Chelsea, and Hammersmith and Fulham – are deeply critical of the way the trust handled the data loss. Sarah Richardson, a Westminster councillor who heads the council's health scrutiny committee, said that trust bosses had attempted to "cover up" the extent of the debacle. "Yes, they've done what they can but, in doing so, [they] put the reputation of the trust first," she said. "Rather than share it with the GPs, patients and us, they thought how can we manage this information internally. They chose to consider their reputation over patient care."</blockquote> As at my Oct. 2011 post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/10/cybernetik-uber-alles-computers-have.html" target="_blank">Cybernetik Über Alles: Computers Have More Rights Than Patients?</a>", to be more specific, they may have put the reputation of the Trust's computers first.  <blockquote class="tr_bq">Last week, it was revealed that Imperial has been fined £1m by NHS North West London for the failures that led to patient data going missing. On Wednesday, an external review into the lost records said a "serious management failure" was to blame for the blunder.</blockquote> Management of what, one might ask? <blockquote class="tr_bq">Imperial's chief financial officer, Bill Shields, admitted at a meeting with the councils that the letter could have been produced more quickly. He said that, at the time, the trust had operated with "antiquated computer systems" and had a "light-touch regime" on elective waiting times.</blockquote> Version 2.0A will, as again is a typical refrain, fix all the problems. <blockquote class="tr_bq">Terry Hanafin, the leading management consultant who wrote the report, said the data problems went back to 2008 and had built up over almost four years until mid-2011. Mr Hanafin said the priorities of senior managers at that time were the casualty department and finance.</blockquote> Clinical computing is not business computing, I state for the thousandth time.  When medical data is discovered "lost", the only response should be ... find it, or inform patients and clinicians - immediately. <blockquote class="tr_bq">He further concluded that while the delays in care turned out to be non-life threatening, they had the potential to cause pain, distress and, in the case of cancer patients, "more serious consequences" ... The trust said it had found no evidence of clinical harm and stressed that new systems have now been implemented to record patient data. It denied trying to cover up its mistakes or put its reputation before concerns for patients. "Patient safety is always our top priority," said a spokesman.</blockquote> "More serious consequences" is a euphemism for horrible metastatic cancer and death, I might add.  The leaders simply cannot claim they "found no evidence of clinical harm" regarding delays in cancer diagnosis and treatment until time has passed, and followup studies performed on this group of patients. This refrain is evidence these folks are either lying, CYA-style, or have no understanding of clinical medicine whatsoever - in which case their responsibilities over the clinic need to be ended in my opinion. I, for one, would like to know the exact nature of the "computer problem", who was responsible, and if it was a software bug, how such software was validated and how it got into production. -- SS Oct. 1, 2012 Addendum: What was behind the problems, according to another source?    Bad Health IT (BHIT): <blockquote class="tr_bq"><a href="http://www.ehi.co.uk/news/EHI/8094/poor-it-behind-imperial-cancer-problems" target="_blank">Poor IT behind Imperial cancer problems</a> e-Health Insider 28 September 2012 Rebecca Todd An independent review of data quality issues affecting cancer patient referrals to Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust has identified “poor computer systems” as a key cause of the problem. The review’s report highlights the trust’s use of up to 17 different IT systems as causing problems for patient tracking. However, it says the trust should be aware of the risks of [replacing the BHIT and] moving to a single system, Cerner Millennium, because of reported problems in providing performance data after similar moves at other London trusts. In January 2012, the report says the NHS Intensive Support Team was reviewing the way reports on cancer waiting times were created from Imperial’s cancer IT system, Excelicare. The team discovered that almost 3,000 patients were still on open pathways who should have been seen within two weeks. In May, letters were sent to GPs to try and ascertain the clinical status of around 1,000 patients.</blockquote> BHIT must be forbidden from real-world deployments, and fixed rapidly or dismantled (as Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust appears to be doing), although the "solution" might be just as bad, or worse, than the disease. -- SS

UK: Another Example of IT Malpractice With Bad Health IT (BHIT) Affecting Thousands of Patients, But, As Always, Patient Care Was "Not Compromised"

At my Dec. 2011 post " IT Malpractice? Yet Another "Glitch" Affecting Thousands of Patients. Of Course, As Always, Patient C...

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Good Health IT (GHIT) v. Bad Health IT (BHIT): Paper is Better Than The Latter

An unspoken running assumption of the health IT enthusiast crowd seems to be that any health IT is better than no health IT, because using paper results in mistakes. I offer a different view. At the introduction to <a href="http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/" target="_blank">my Medical Informatics teaching site</a> I've defined good health IT and bad health IT as follows: <blockquote class="tr_bq">Good Health IT ("GHIT") is defined as IT that provides a good user experience, enhances cognitive function, puts essential information as effortlessly as possible into the physician’s hands, keeps eHealth information secure, protects patient privacy and facilitates better practice of medicine and better outcomes.  Bad Health IT ("BHIT") is defined as IT that is ill-suited to purpose, hard to use, unreliable, loses data or provides incorrect data, causes cognitive overload, slows rather than facilitates users, lacks appropriate alerts, creates the need for hypervigilance (i.e., towards avoiding IT-related mishaps) that increases stress, is lacking in security, compromises patient privacy or otherwise demonstrates suboptimal design and/or implementation.  .     </blockquote> There are also good paper systems and bad paper systems. I opine that the elephant in the living room of health IT discussions is that BHIT is infrequently, if ever, made a major issue in healthcare policy discussions. I also opine that BHIT is far worse, in terms of diluting and decreasing the quality and privacy of healthcare, than a very good or even average paper-based record-keeping and ordering system.   This is a simple concept, but I believe it needs to be stated explicitly.  In today's healthcare world, where health IT is dominated by <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/03/doctors-and-ehrs-reframing-modernists-v.html" target="_blank">hyper-enthusiasts</a> of one motive or another, such an axiomatic statement will probably be viewed as controversial if not heretical.  This blog has numerous postings about health IT debacles, e.g., query links <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/glitch" target="_blank">here</a> and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/medical%20record%20privacy" target="_blank">here</a>, that could not occur with paper systems.  The defects of just one company's products, the only one that publicly reports them to FDA (<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/01/maude-and-hit-risk-mother-mary-what-in.html" target="_blank">link</a>) are frightening in terms of potential consequences. GHIT needs to be promoted and BHIT needs to be eliminated.  That implies a major transformation of the health IT industry and its oversight. -- SS

Good Health IT (GHIT) v. Bad Health IT (BHIT): Paper is Better Than The Latter

An unspoken running assumption of the health IT enthusiast crowd seems to be that any health IT is better than no health IT, because using p...

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