"Why Do We Always Need to Blame Somebody?" - An Investment Banker Pushes Back Against Health Care Leadership Accountability

One of the many dramatic stories generated by the destructive Hurricane Sandy illustrated, oddly enough, the influence of big finance on American academic medicine.<br /><br />Vivid video showed patients being carried down darkened stairways after flooding and a power failure at Langone Medical Center in New York (for example, see<a href="http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/30/health/sandy-hospital/index.html"> this CNN story</a>.)  Amazingly, all the patients survived, thanks to heroic work by health care professionals and first responders.  CNN noted, "Some 1,000 staff members -- doctors, nurses, residents and medical students -- along with firefighters and police officers evacuated the patients."<br /><br />The medical center suffered significant damage beyond that caused by the blackout.  A New York Times <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/10/nyregion/damage-from-hurricane-sandy-could-cost-nyu-langone-millions.html">story</a> about the problems was entitled, "A Flooded Mess that was a Medical Gem."  It noted the hospital's basement flooding destroyed major equipment like MRI machines, a linear accelerator and a gamma knife.  An animal research facility was destroyed and most of the animals died.  A renovated lecture hall and the library were ruined.<br /><br /><b>What Went Wrong?</b><br /><br />However, soon after the debate began about why the hospital flooded and power failed.  A Bloomberg <a href="http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-10-30/new-york-hospital-evacuates-patients-as-sandy-hits-power">story</a> stated, <b> </b><br /><br /><blockquote class="tr_bq">New York University Langone Medical Center, the 705-bed hospital in lower Manhattan <i>that assured city officials it was ready for Hurricane Sandy, stood dark and empty a day after the storm</i> rolled through. </blockquote><br />That story raised questions whether hospital leadership gave adequate priority to infrastructure like generators, or put too much emphasis on spending likely to produce more rapid rewards.<br /><br /><blockquote class="tr_bq">Blame is being placed on the building’s outdated backup power system, which has raised concern that aging infrastructure at U.S. hospitals has created a risk for similar outages that jeopardize patient care.<br /><br /><br /><i>'Hospitals are careful to get the latest and greatest medical equipment, but then they don’t spend on the infrastructure,'</i> Michael Orlowicz, a principal at consulting company Lawrence Associates LLC, said....</blockquote><br />A story on ProPublica (<a href="http://www.salon.com/2012/11/01/why_do_hospital_generators_keep_failing/">available on Salon</a>) noted,<br /><br /><blockquote class="tr_bq">Experts say such failures are troubling but not entirely surprising. Dr. Arthur Kellermann founded the emergency department at Emory University and headed it from 1999 to 2007. Now, he’s Paul O’Neill-Alcoa Chair in Policy Analysis at RAND Corporation think tank.<br /><br /><br />The other night, as the NYU evacuation was unfolding, he tweeted, <i>'Hospital preparedness and well-functioning backup systems are a <b>costly distraction from daily business, until they are needed.</b> Like now.'</i><br /><br /><br />In an email interview with ProPublica, Kellermann elaborated: 'I have no doubt when the hospital assured the Mayor that their backup systems were ready, they believed they were. They were wrong. What I find most remarkable about this story is that [more than seven] years after Hurricane Katrina, major hospitals still have critical backup systems like generators in basements that are prone to flooding.'</blockquote><br />Similarly, a <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/03/storm-sandy-hospitals-idUSL1E8M1LR620121103">Reuters story</a> included another quote from Dr Kellermann, <br /><span id="articleText"></span><br /><blockquote class="tr_bq"><span id="articleText"><span id="articleText">'I've been asking hospitals to look at their own survivability' after a natural or manmade disaster, 'and I just can't get it on their radar screens,' said Dr. Art Kellerman,...</span></span></blockquote><span id="articleText"></span>  <br />It added, <br /><br /><blockquote class="tr_bq">For hospital administrators trying to keep their institutions in the black, <i>disaster-resistant infrastructure is expensive and lacks the sex appeal of robotic surgery suites and proton-beam cancer therapy to attract patients. </i><br /><br />'People don't pick hospitals based on which one has the best generator,' Kellerman said. </blockquote><br />The notion that hospital leaders may put short-term revenue ahead of long-term infrastructure development, even when such development might be critical for patient safety, should not surprise <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/">Health Care Renewal</a> readers.  Hospitals are often lead or influenced by those who believe maximizing short-term revenue should be the main goal of all management, an over-generalization of the idea promoted in business schools for a generation that business leaders should maximize "shareholder value," which has come to be defined as short-term stock price (see <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/04/health-care-dysfunction-explained-by.html">this post</a>).<br /><br />  <b>Who Defended the Disaster Planning</b><br /><br /> In response to this or anticipated criticism, leaders of Langone Medical Center deployed.  Not unexpectedly, one was Richard Cohen, the vice president for facilities, as reported by ProPublica, <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sheri-fink/nyu-hospital-evacuation_b_2072362.html">via the Huffington Post,</a>   <br /><blockquote class="tr_bq">After Hurricane Irene, officials at NYU Langone Medical Center spent several million dollars protecting its backup power system from flooding, according to Richard Cohen, vice president of facilities operations. <br /><br />The hospital removed a fuel tank and a set of emergency generators at street level and chose to depend on what Cohen termed an 'extremely modern, extremely reliable' system of rooftop generators.<br /><br />The hospital also built a new, flood-resistant house for pumps that draw fuel from the hospital's sealed underground tank and feed it to the generators that make electricity when New York City's power fails.<br /><br /><i>One vulnerability remained, and it proved to be the system's Achilles Heel. A portion of the hospital's power distribution circuits, which direct the generated electricity out into various areas of the hospital, were located in the hospital's basement.</i><br /><br />'It's like what happens when you have a flood in your basement and the electrical panel is in your basement,' Cohen said.</blockquote><br />Oops.  Why a crucial component of the system meant to protect the back up power system from threats including flooding was placed in an area at risk from flooding was not clear.   Only one story I could find (<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/10/nyregion/damage-from-hurricane-sandy-could-cost-nyu-langone-millions.html?smid=tw-nytimeshealth&seid=auto">in the NY Times</a>) included a response by the Dean of the Medical School and CEO of the Medical Center Dr Robert I Grossman.<br /><br /><br /><blockquote class="tr_bq">At this point, Dr. Grossman said, he could only theorize as to why the generators had shut down. All but one generator is on a high floor, but the <i>fuel tanks are in the basement. The flood, he said, was registered by the liquid sensors on the tanks, which then did what they were supposed to do in the event, for instance, of an oil leak. They shut down the fuel to the generators.</i></blockquote><br />Oops again.  Why an effort to flood proof the hospital included an undeground fuel tank which could not be operated if water got near it was also not clear.  <br /><br />The most voluble defender of the hospital's management proved to be one Mr Kenneth Langone.  As noted in a <a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/metropolis/2012/10/30/among-the-patients-at-evacuated-hospital-a-benefactor/">blog post</a> in the Wall Street Journal, Mr Langone is the medical center's "board chair and benefactor."  In fact, as the NY Times <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/16/nyregion/16donate.html">reported</a> in 2008, <br /><br /><br /><blockquote class="tr_bq">Kenneth G Langone, a billionaire financier and founder of Home Depot, is giving another $100 million donation to New York University Medical Center, matching the one he made anonymously in 1999.  <br /><br />In return, the university plans to name the medical center the N.Y.U. Langone Medical Center,....</blockquote><br />The WSJ blog post asserted,<br /><br /><br /><blockquote class="tr_bq">Langone said the hospital 'frequently' tested its generators and they had passed the tests, and the hospital was prepared for a 12-foot storm surge. 'We anticipated 12-foot surges, which we knew we could handle. We got 14-foot surges,' he said.<br /><br /><br />Some of the hospital generators were in the basement, which flooded. Langone acknowledged that the generators were 'not in the right location,' but that was an artifact of aging facilities undergoing an extensive upgrade. <i>'They’ve been there for years,'</i> he said of the generators in the basement. As part of a $3.2 billion modernization, NYU Langone was planning on buying new generators and locating them in better locations than the basement, Langone said.</blockquote><br />Oops one more time.  Mr Langone seemed to only offer inertia as an excuse for why some generators remained in the basement after an effort to flood proof the back up electrical system. <br />Langone was quoted in the CNN story mentioned above,<br /><br /><blockquote class="tr_bq">Kenneth Langone, the chairman of the hospital's board of trustees who also happened to be a patient there until he was discharged Tuesday morning, said that regulations require the generators to be tested regularly and that they've worked every time.<br /><br /><br />Langone said the hospital is in the midst of an 'enormous' building campaign. The generators are going to be replaced in a renovation, he said.</blockquote><br />In a Bloomberg <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-30/chairman-langone-was-nyu-hospital-patient-in-storm-evacuation.html">story</a>, Langone was quoted again,<br /><blockquote class="tr_bq">'We believed the machines would work, and we believed everything we were told about the scope and size of the storm,' Langone said.</blockquote><br /> In that story, he tried to deflect attention from tha apparent infrastructure failure, and presumably the responsibility of the organization's leadership for it, to the efforts of health professionals,<br /><br /><blockquote class="tr_bq">'The backup generators failed, it’s that simple, but the story here is the magnificence of the effort of all of our people and what they did,' Langone, 77, said yesterday.... </blockquote><br />He also defended the relatively silent Dean and medical center CEO,<br /><br /><blockquote class="tr_bq">'What this dean has done is nothing short of spectacular, in every respect,' Langone said of Grossman. 'So last night God decides to give us a test and our machines failed.' </blockquote><br />The story ended with yet another of his attempts to deflect attention to management's responsibility,<br /><br /><blockquote class="tr_bq">'Machines fail, airplanes take off in great shape and they have malfunctions,' Langone said. <i>'Why do we always need to blame somebody for something that could just have happened?</i> Why not write a story about what people did because things happened? Let’s be a little positive once in a while.' </blockquote><br />And in the <a href="http://www.wnyc.org/blogs/wnyc-news-blog/2012/nov/10/nyu-chairman-says-hospital-shut-down-sandy-was-configured-code/">WNYC News Blog</a>, Langone appeared yet again with this apologia,  <br /><br /><blockquote class="tr_bq">He said hospital pumps failed, because they were overwhelmed by an event that was 'unprecedented' and 'an act of god.'<br /><br /><br />'The generators are on the seventh floor, and the fuel supply is in cement vaults in the basement, where they're supposed to be according to code,' Langone said. 'Moisture sensors shut down the pumps, but they did what they're supposed to do.'</blockquote><br /><b>Summary</b><br /><br />Certainly the survival of all the former patients at Langone Medical Center due to brave efforts by health care professionals and first responders ought to be celebrated.  From the discussion so far, it is not clear whether the infrastructure failures were unavoidable due to the scope of a huge natural disaster, or whether the failures were the results of poor planning and insufficient attention to and investment in infrastructure.  Celebration of personal and professional dedication, however, ought not to distract from determining what lessons could be learned about making health care infrastructure safer in cases of natural disaster.  <br /><br />It also ought not to distract from concerns about management accountability.  In this day and age, it is not surprising that no executive at Langone Medical Center would accept any responsibility for an effort to protect its electrical back-up power from flooding that included an underground fuel tank which would be shut down if any water affected it.  However, these executives are rewarded handsomely supposedly for their "spectacular" leadership.  (Dean Grossman received $1,744,780 in the 2010-2011 period according to the NYU Hospitals Center 2010 form 990.  That document listed four other executives who made over $1 million.)  One would think they would at least try to substantively address how their patients got put into such a precarious situation.<br /><br />It is surprising that the silence from management was supplanted by the opinions of a very wealthy board chairman who paid hundreds of millions for some of the improvements to the hospital that were destroyed by the storm, but improvements that may not have included fully flood proofing the hospital's back up electrical system.  Why he may well be disappointed about the loss of what he spent so much to build, it is not clear why his opinions about technical aspects of disaster preparation should replace responses from those who were responsible for disaster preparedness.  After all, Mr Langone, while very wealthy, has no evident expertise in engineering, science, or anything pertaining to protecting infrastructure from natural disasters.  (Mr Langone's <a href="http://csis.org/expert/kenneth-g-langone">biography</a> showed his background seems to be only in investment banking and finance.)  One wonders whether Mr Langone's prominence in the discussion suggests how influential the views of investment bankers, versus those of health care professionals, engineers and scientists, have become in the operation of health care systems.<br /><br />Again, it appears that the culture of <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/finance">finance</a> has intruded progressively into the cultures of health care and academics during an era in which finance has been increasingly irresponsible, as shown by the global financial collapse and our current economic woes.  Instead, true health care reform would develop leadership and governance that upholds health care professionals' values rather than worshiping short term revenue.

"Why Do We Always Need to Blame Somebody?" - An Investment Banker Pushes Back Against Health Care Leadership Accountability

One of the many dramatic stories generated by the destructive Hurricane Sandy illustrated, oddly enough, the influence of big finance on American academic medicine.Vivid video showed patients being ca…

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Did Toxic Effects of an EHR Kill Rory Staunton?

A stunning story about the death of a young man from sepsis (blood poisoning by infection), missed in an ED, appeared in the New York Times:<br /><br /><blockquote class="tr_bq"><b><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/12/nyregion/in-rory-stauntons-fight-for-his-life-signs-that-went-unheeded.html" target="_blank">An Infection, Unnoticed, Turns Unstoppable</a></b><br /><br />By JIM DWYER<br />New York Times<br />Published: July 11, 2012<br /><br />For a moment, an emergency room doctor stepped away from the scrum of people working on Rory Staunton, 12, and spoke to his parents. <br /><br />“Your son is seriously ill,” the doctor said.<br /><br />“How seriously?” Rory’s mother, Orlaith Staunton, asked.<br /><br />The doctor paused.<br /><br />“Gravely ill,” he said.<br /><br />How could that be?<br /><br />Two days earlier, diving for a basketball at his school gym, Rory had cut his arm. He arrived at his pediatrician’s office the next day, Thursday, March 29, vomiting, feverish and with pain in his leg. He was sent to the emergency room at NYU Langone Medical Center. The doctors agreed: He was suffering from an upset stomach and dehydration. He was given fluids, told to take Tylenol, and sent home.<br /><br />Partially camouflaged by ordinary childhood woes, Rory’s condition was, in fact, already dire. Bacteria had gotten into his blood, probably through the cut on his arm. He was sliding into a septic crisis, an avalanche of immune responses to infection from which he would not escape. On April 1, <b>three nights after he was sent home from the emergency room, he died in the intensive care unit.</b> The cause was <b>severe septic shock</b> brought on by the infection, hospital records say.  </blockquote><br />Rory Staunton, age 12, 5 feet 9 inches tall and 169 pounds, had suffered a cut on his arm.  He presented with a marked fever of 102 F (39 C), pulse markedly elevated at 131, respiratory rate elevated at 22; reported to have hit as high as 36 breaths per minute (in essence, panting).  It was reported by the NYT that before the ED visit his parents said his temperature had reached 104 F (40 C).<br /><br />That alone should have set off some level of concern.  (It is possible narrative details of his history never made it into the ED chart; ED EHR's are often templated point-and-click affairs that can impair or discourage capture of narrative.)<br /><br />Per the NYT, the bacteria <a href="http://pyogenesgonewild.com/">Streptococcus pyogenes</a> normally dwells in the throat or on the skin, areas where the body is well defended.  Also known as Group A streptococcus, the strain typically causes strep throat or impetigo.  However, if it gets into the blood stream (e.g., via a cut in the skin, as this patient suffered playing ball), the results can be devastating.<br /><br />The lab results from the first ED visit are <i>particularly</i> stunning:<br /><br /><br /><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEipLbK3DLugjbsbvM8pGrbG_NaVc9WeUrAm2PSATK9oeoyzPyBzQ2yMKufnd0St8g9gMqH-Gqzk1dBmfp2KIbN1DseGU2gQVrJRrCrPyzViWxs3c9sRl2p1VYb5hW4cHh4wtIFglMGBGmVk/s1600/labs.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="395" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEipLbK3DLugjbsbvM8pGrbG_NaVc9WeUrAm2PSATK9oeoyzPyBzQ2yMKufnd0St8g9gMqH-Gqzk1dBmfp2KIbN1DseGU2gQVrJRrCrPyzViWxs3c9sRl2p1VYb5hW4cHh4wtIFglMGBGmVk/s400/labs.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">(From NYT article; click to enlarge)</td><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><br /></td><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><br /></td></tr></tbody></table><br />The white blood cell count is markedly elevated at 14.7, meaning 14,700 cells per microliter of blood (cubic millimeter or 1 mm³).  Further, there is a plain evidence of greatly accelerated new white cell production, in the form of <b>"bands"</b>, at <b>53% </b>of the total (normally 5-15%).  <b><b>Bands</b> </b>are immature white blood cells that are seen in the blood, being produced as part of the body's response to infection.<br /><br />Herein is a significant issue.  The NYT noted that:<br /><br /><blockquote class="tr_bq">"Three hours later <i style="color: red;"><b>[i.e., after the ED visit, which reportedly only lasted 2 hours - ed.]</b></i>, Rory’s blood tests came back. High levels of neutrophils and “bands” – immature white blood cells – are evidence of infection. <b>But nobody called the Stauntons, and by the time Rory returned to the hospital the next day, his infection was unstoppable. He died two days later.</b>"</blockquote><br />Not getting into the issue regarding the patient apparently being discharged before the labs got back (itself an invitation to disaster), and the other abnormalities such as low sodium, low platelets, elevated glucose all pointing to a very sick patient... <b>nobody called the Stantons with white cell results like these?   </b>Nobody entertained the thought of ...<b> antibiotics as a precaution?</b><br /><br />It is possible - dare I say likely - that no clinical person in the ED ever saw these results.<br /><br />EHR's that are poorly designed or implemented can have a toxic effect on care.  For instance, EHR's can cause user confusion if the user interface is complex, data can be lost due to poor relational design.  Data from the wrong patient's data can be presented (misidentification), or data from a lab can come back to the system after a patient has left, and despite being abnormal, <b>just sit there in a silo without being looked at ("out of sight, out of mind"; a "silent silo" syndrome).</b><br /><br />It is usually difficult to ascertain exactly which EHR product is being used at a particular hospital.  I note this medical center actively promoted its EPIC EHR<b> </b>in a June 2011 press release "<a href="http://communications.med.nyu.edu/media-relations/news/nyu-langone-medical-center-launches-next-phase-its-electronic-health-record-sys" target="_blank">NYU Langone Medical Center Launches Next Phase of Its Electronic Health Record System</a>", although another system "ICIS"  (for <i>Integrated Clinical Information System</i>, "<i>a state-of-the-art healthcare information management system that connects all NYULMC caregivers involved in patient care</i>") is mentioned <a href="http://icis.med.nyu.edu/about/whatis.html" target="_blank">here</a>.  The ICIS may also contain the Eclipsys Sunrise Clinical Manager, per <a href="http://icis.med.nyu.edu/about/history.html" target="_blank">this link</a>. (I'd noted some clinically relevant problems with the latter in an FDA report <a href="http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfmaude/Detail.CFM?MDRFOI__ID=1729552" target="_blank">here</a>.)<br /><br />In any case, magical powers are attributed to the technology that are not strongly or uniformly supported by the literature (<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/02/updated-reading-list-on-health-it.html" target="_blank">link</a>), but strongly pushed by industry marketing memes of deterministic health IT benefits and absolute beneficence:<br /><br /><blockquote class="tr_bq">“... Our electronic health record system is an integral part of our ongoing efforts to leverage technology and enhance our ability to provide patient-centered care and enable the highest level of quality care management,” said Bernard A. Birnbaum, MD, senior vice president and vice dean, chief of hospital operations at NYU Langone. “These front-end and back-end services are an important step in assuring our patient’s experience from beginning to end is a seamless one.”</blockquote><br />I've documented examples of situations where EHR's and other IT components of clinical ERP systems <i>(enterprise resource planning and management systems, a term that more accurately describes what exists in many hospitals now than the misleading, file cabinet-evoking term "EHR")</i> contributed to or caused patient harm, such as at "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/06/babys-death-spotlights-safety-risks.html" target="_blank">Babies' deaths spotlight safety risks linked to computerized systems</a>" - a computer error caused a central line placement x-ray to have gone unread, leading to death; "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/09/sweet-death-that-wasnt-very-sweet-how_24.html" target="_blank">The Sweet death that wasn't very sweet</a>" - a missing "difficult intubation" EHR flag led to a middle-aged man suffocating during an intubation attempt; and others.  An Australian researcher thoroughly studied the potential risks of an EHR meant specifically for ED's ("<a href="http://sydney.edu.au/engineering/it/%7Ehitru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=91&Itemid=146" target="_blank">A Study of an Enterprise Health information System</a>", PDF executive summary <a href="http://sydney.edu.au/engineering/it/%7Ehitru/essays/Pt%200%20-%20Executive%20Summary.pdf" target="_blank">at this link</a>).<br /><br />The following passage in the NYT article also offers another clue:<br /><br /><blockquote class="tr_bq">... Two hours later, though, he had three [signs of sepsis]: his temperature had risen to 102, his pulse was 131 and his respiration rate was 22. But by the time those vital signs were recorded, at 9:26 p.m., they had no bearing on his treatment. In fact, the doctor had already decided that Rory was going home. <b>Rory’s “ExitCare” instructions, signed by his father, were printed 12 minutes before those readings.  </b></blockquote><br />Did those readings escape notice due to delayed charting (data entry), a common problem with EHRs in busy clinical environments?<br /><br />The Institute of Medicine in its 2011 <b>IOM report on health IT safety</b> admitted harms are reported but the magnitude of harms is unknown due to multiple reporting impediments, as did the FDA in its 2010 <b>internal memo on "H-IT Safety Issues"</b> divulged by the Huffington Post Investigative Fund (see <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/11/iom-report-on-health-it-safety-nix-fda.html" target="_blank">here</a> and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/08/smoking-gun-internal-fda-memorandum-of.html" target="_blank">here</a>).  The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) admits in its <b>2011 report on HIT usability</b> that EHR usability is often poor and may lead to "use error" (error caused or promoted by poor design, as distinguished from simple user error, see <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/10/nist-on-ehr-mission-hostile-user.html" target="_blank">here</a>), magnitude of problem also unknown.<br /><br />In a startling medical situation such as Rory Stanton's, where crucial labs seem to have evaporated causing or contributing to delayed treatment of a devastating and obvious illness, <b>I believe EHR-related factors need to be examined and ruled out <u>first</u>.</b><br /><br />For, quite simply, if the EHR caused or contributed to this tragic debacle, <i>the public could be at risk</i>. <b><br /></b><br /><br />-- SS<br /><br />Additional thought:  could this be the "cybernetic <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libby_Zion_law" target="_blank">Libby Zion</a> case" I've written of?<br /><br />-- SS<br /><br /><b>July 18, 2012 Addendum:</b><br /><br />The Stauntons, who appeared on the NBC Today Show are seeking to create a “Rory’s Law” in New York to ensure that parents have full access to blood and lab tests done on their children as soon as results are available, and that a doctor will be present to assess the findings. Story <a href="http://www.irishcentral.com/news/Rorys-Law---major-effort-underway-to-ensure-kids-kept-safe-in-ER-162842926.html" target="_blank">here</a>.<br /><br />-- SS <br />

Did Toxic Effects of an EHR Kill Rory Staunton?

A stunning story about the death of a young man from sepsis (blood poisoning by infection), missed in an ED, appeared in the New York Times:An Infection, Unnoticed, Turns UnstoppableBy JIM DWYERNew Yo…

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