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VA / DoD EHR Interface Debacle: Will It Take the Luminosity Of A Dozen Supernovas To Shed Light On The Obvious About Healthcare IT?

<div style="text-align: center;">(Note: Academic/military readers of this post, I would enjoy your comments. Email sms88 AT drexel DOT edu. Thank you -- SS.) </div><div style="text-align: center;"> (Dec. 2010 note: I have observed a large number of "hits" on this post from multiple offices of the Mitre Corporation in the past several weeks. Dear Mitre, I ask that if you use my materials in your proposals or writings, that you please let me know. Thank you. My email address is in my profile under "Contributors." -- SS) </div> The VA and DoD have been working for a number of years on interfacing the VistA EHR system and the military's EHR, AHLTA (why anyone would want to interface to AHLTA <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/06/if-military-cant-get-electronic-health.html">in its present state</a> is of concern to me, but...) [Note: this is not to denigrate the military, and I am very thankful to all who serve and defend our country and freedoms. HIT problems seem unfortunately universal - ed.] The interface attempt, likely done by the usual actors in the traditional "business IT" manner has resulted in the predictable: <blockquote><a href="http://www.nextgov.com/nextgov/ng_20100304_9977.php?oref=topstory" style="font-weight: bold;">Glitch prompts VA to shut e-health data exchange with Defense</a> NextGov.com By Bob Brewin 03/04/2010 The Veterans Affairs Department closed off access to the Defense Department's huge electronic health record system on Monday because it found errors in some patients' medical data clinicians downloaded from the Defense network, according to a departmental patient safety alert, which Nextgov obtained. Although no patient was injured, the errors shed light on how software glitches could affect the accuracy of electronic medical records and a planned national system that has been backed by the Bush and Obama administrations.</blockquote> "Shed light on how software glitches could affect the accuracy of electronic medical records?" As my early medical mentor, Hahnemann cardiothoracic surgery pioneer Victor P. Satinsky would have said about purveyors of such wisdom: they are Masters of the Obvious. I ask: Why do we keep needing to "shed light" on the blatantly obvious, in your face, computer science 101 reality about electronic information systems? The light was shed when the first stored-program computers <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UNIVAC_I">were developed in the late 1940's</a>. Exactly how much light do we need to shed before IT personnel "get it" about the need for the most extreme diligence in IT-based medical records? Perhaps the light of a dozen <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iE_5hqcWT-o">supernovas</a>? <div style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iE_5hqcWT-o" onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}"><img alt="" border="0" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5445180060915623778" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiW8VRMIxeVW719b0j7uAZXO__OGwOUG8YL9fPlUhFbl9KGy5RRmhhqryN-YOQONtQjn9yQw-JdENCo3YThiw77-umpum9EdV1yNSURRliXeAfljqKc19Rd8CTCGfApr3nYrNcsCi3BfxFa/s320/crab.jpg" style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer; width: 336px; height: 219px;" /></a>Is this the amount of light it will take before the IT world "gets it" about the need for the utmost engineering rigor in healthcare IT? (click image to play video). </div> ------------------------------------ *** Nov. 2011 addendum: I now personally face the aftermath of the worst-case "perfect storm" caused by health IT that began in May 2010, just two months after I wrote this post - <div style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjlTFolp_-A1Gxo803a7L8VUsrFqJgvj7eUgCJ0i5unI6z-9-sbzWJiZf9erCNWiEOWv70OqhfdHlSLbAxrpnjmoeMemFcU0kfJV15moPS0Y5Nb8e8utTBI5hstfBv94s92aquZi6zIKoLK/s1600/Marker.bcs.jpg"><img alt="" border="0" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5670400994172634594" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjlTFolp_-A1Gxo803a7L8VUsrFqJgvj7eUgCJ0i5unI6z-9-sbzWJiZf9erCNWiEOWv70OqhfdHlSLbAxrpnjmoeMemFcU0kfJV15moPS0Y5Nb8e8utTBI5hstfBv94s92aquZi6zIKoLK/s320/Marker.bcs.jpg" style="display: block; margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; cursor: pointer; width: 320px; height: 185px;" /></a>Here is what EHR dysfunction caused to me, personally </div> ------------------------------------ It's fortunate the error was found in a somewhat less than life-threatening manner: <blockquote>VA first discovered the problem in late February, when one of its doctors accessed the Defense health records system, called AHLTA, to review the prescription information of a female patient. The data showed a Defense physician had prescribed her an erectile dysfunction drug. The VA doctor suspected the system displayed erroneous information [although females have been known to use these drugs- ed.] and a check with the Defense medical facility that supposedly prescribed the drug informed VA that the data was wrong and the VA query had returned information for another patient. ... When doctors queried the Defense system for patient information, they received no data, a portion of the data, incorrect information, or the complete, correct data for the patient, according to the alert.</blockquote> [Where have I seen these types of patient data errors mentioned recently? Perhaps at my recent post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/02/fda-on-health-it-adverse-consequences.html" style="font-weight: bold; font-style: italic;">FDA on Health IT Adverse Consequences: 44 Reported Injuries And 6 Deaths In Two Years, Probably Just Tip of Iceberg"</a> ? - ed.] <blockquote>The glitch did not cause harm to any patient, but "the potential exists for decisions regarding patient care to be made using incorrect or incomplete data," said Jean Scott, director of the Veterans Health Administration's Information Technology Patient Safety Office, in the alert issued on Wednesday.</blockquote> Indeed. <blockquote> "The VA clinician may see the patient's data during one session, but another session may not display the data previously seen," the alert noted. "This problem occurs intermittently and has been reported when querying DoD laboratory, pharmacy and radiology reports."</blockquote> I would add that "intermittent errors" are by definition unpredictable. This is the most dangerous type of IT malfunction of all. <blockquote>Until those systems are reactivated, VA doctors will have to obtain a patients' health information from their paper medical files, faxes or PDF attachments that are e-mailed to the physicians, Scott said.</blockquote> What? That old-fashioned, unreliable <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Papyrus">5,000 year old artifact</a> upon which the foundations of modern medicine were built, and favored by Luddites? <blockquote> The errors occurred in the Bidirectional Health Information Exchange, a project started in 2004 that allows clinicians in VA and Defense to view health information in patient files. Older code in the system became stressed at peak periods when clinicians were making the most number of queries, said Roger Baker, chief information officer at VA. At these times, the system did not clear out a memory cache, resulting in memory leaks "so that information from one patient is presented as it is from another," he explained.</blockquote> Good software and information architecture engineering practices call exactly for testing under stress. Failure to clear caches, memory leaks, etc. are fundamental flaws that should never be permitted to see the light of day in clinical settings. That is what acceptance testing is designed to do. That's what mission critical software undergoes in other sectors. That is what drug and device clinical trials are designed to do. At <a href="http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20040014965_2004000657.pdf">this link</a>, for example, is NASA's Certification Processes for Safety-Critical and Mission- Critical Aerospace Software from 2003 (PDF). From that document: <blockquote>... Since safety-critical aerospace software is prevalent and important to human life, what is the rationale behind certification of such software? In other words, how do engineers know when a new software product works properly and is safe to fly? In the United States, software must undergo a certification process described in various standards by various regulatory bodies including NASA and the Requirements and Technical Concepts for Aviation (RTCA) which is enforced by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).</blockquote> There are no analogous requirements or enforcement in the healthcare IT sector. None. In fact, the VA, of all places, should have been exceptionally wary of these types of malfunctions and exercised the highest levels of engineering rigor. Why? See "IT Vulnerabilities Highlighted by Errors, Malfunctions at Veterans Medical Centers" <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/03/it-vulnerabilities-highlighted-by.html">at this link</a>. From that posting, reflecting a March 4, 2009 JAMA article by the same title by Bridget M. Kuehn (<a href="http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/extract/301/9/919">JAMA 2009;301(9):919-920)</a>: <blockquote>... After a software update of the electronic medical records system at VA hospitals in August [2008], health care workers at these facilities began to report that as they moved from the records of one patient to those of a second patient, they would sometimes see the first patient's information displayed under the second patient's name. [If not for the diligence of the users then, that type of error could have led to dead patients -ed.] This records-scrambling problem was reported at 41 of the 153 VA medical centers, said Gail Graham, deputy chief officer of Health Information Management at Veterans Health Administration Headquarters in Washington, DC. Graham explained that the jumbling of records was an uncommon occurrence that only occurred after a particular sequence of events. ... Health care workers at the VA medical centers were notified about this potential problem in October, and on December 20, the centers received a software "patch" to fix the problem. Nine VA medical centers reported another type of problem related to their electronic records system: physician orders to stop medication were missed, causing some patients to receive intravenous medications longer than necessary. The problem occurred because after the software upgrade, physician orders to discontinue such medications, which had previously appeared at the top of the screen, were not displayed. In 3 cases, patients received infusions of drugs such as heparin for up to 11 hours after their physician had ordered the drug to be discontinued. Graham said the affected patients were not notified because they had not been harmed by the oversights. This software problem was corrected on December 8. </blockquote> As I noted in that post: "... if this type of error occurs once too often, your patient's dead." Back to the current VA / DoD interface "glitch": <blockquote>... The VA has fixed the [current] bug and plans to bring the BHIE back online on March 9. Baker emphasized the bug's effect on the medical records of patients that VA and Defense clinicians share was sporadic and occurred in one out of 100 queries. The glitch caused errors only in the records that VA clinicians accessed. Defense doctors still have access to records Veterans Affairs stores.</blockquote> "Only" 1 out of 100? ... that's only 10,000 errors per million EHR queries. Not too bad at all ... how many soldiers are in a military <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Division_%28military%29">division</a>? <blockquote>Baker said the department's response to the glitch showed VA's overall health system worked "because there is always a doctor in the loop" who checks the accuracy of a patient's health data in combination with a well established patient safety organization that quickly alerts clinicians to any errors.</blockquote> The "system worked" because luck prevailed that fallible, busy human clinicians were not deceived by erroneous information provided by a computer? I fall back on <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/02/forgotten-first-principles-in.html">first principles of IT</a>: <blockquote>A computer can free professionals from tedious, repetitive work which does not require judgment. It can provide facts and figures with lightning speed, giving domain experts more time to exercise their judgment thoughtfully </blockquote> The system is not working when computers add to the tedium, and having to expend precious cognitive capacity in ferreting out computer errors is certainly in that category. This excuse reminds me of a recent quote from our Homeland Security secretary about how the "<a href="http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/12/28/napolitano-acknowledges-security-failed-allowing-terror-suspect-plane/">system worked</a>" when an airplane nearly was blown out of the sky. These failure excuses, possibly written by a public relations 'spin doctor' in an effort at damage control, remind me of a humorous sign I bought in a novelty store once, for placing on the wall: "Our policy is to <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2006/01/our-policy-is-to-always-blame-computer.html">always blame the computer</a>." Perhaps clinicians need to stand up for this motto: No more alpha and beta software rollouts in healthcare. <blockquote>Robert Charette, a risk management consultant and president of the ITABHI Corp. in Fredericksburg, Va., which consults with Defense, said VA was lucky it discovered an error as obvious as prescribing an erectile dysfunction drug for a female patient. He wondered if VA would have detected the error if it were for drugs with similar names, adding that despite the low error rate, "it's the one out of 100 that can bite you."</blockquote> It's also the one out of fifty thousand that can bite you, for instance as <a href="http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/scotsilv/vioxx1.htm">Merck recently discovered</a>. <blockquote> Baker said the complexity of medical records systems like BHIE would make regulating such networks [by agencies such as FDA - ed.] a daunting task.</blockquote> I thought we were just at the point of transforming health with one thunderous click of a mouse after another per our prior HHS secretary at the <a href="http://www.himss.org/ASP/ContentRedirector.asp?ContentId=65039&type=HIMSSNewsItem">2005 HIMSS summit</a>. Perhaps not... <blockquote>Dave deBronkart, a patient advocate in Nashua, N.H., who spoke at last week's Health IT Policy Committee meeting, said in an interview with Nextgov that the glitch paralleled the problems he encountered last year when he tried to transfer information from his hospital medical record to Google Health, an online electronic health record database the search giant launched in 2008.</blockquote> I wrote about that at "Should Google Seek the Resignations of Those Responsible for This Healthcare IT Debacle?" <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/04/should-google-seek-resignations-of.html">here</a>. <blockquote>If the United States wants to develop a national health electronic record system, it needs to make sure heath information exchanges work correctly, said deBronkart, who added VA should be commended for reacting quickly to the software problem and issuing the patient safety alert.</blockquote> I believe this is not possible under the current leadership, organizational and regulatory structures found in the healthcare IT sector. As I've written before, healthcare cannot be 'reformed' or even improved by IT, until IT and its culture are themselves reformed. For more on these issues, see my site below. -- SS <div style="text-align: justify;">For more on HIT challenges see "Contemporary Issues in Medical Informatics: Common Examples of Healthcare Information Technology Difficulties" - <a href="http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/">http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/</a> </div>

VA / DoD EHR Interface Debacle: Will It Take the Luminosity Of A Dozen Supernovas To Shed Light On The Obvious About Healthcare IT?

(Note: Academic/military readers of this post, I would enjoy your comments. Email sms88 AT drexel DOT edu . Thank you -- SS.) (Dec. 2010...

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FDA Criminal Division to Increase Prosecutions

In many posts on this blog, Roy Poses has lamented the fact that there are no personal repercussions for healthcare executives embroiled in malfeasance and scandals. He <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/03/sacks-medical-kv-pharmaceutical-plead.html">recently wrote</a>: <blockquote>So, here we go again ... To repeat, seemingly ad infinitum, these are just the latest in a now long parade of <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/legal%20settlements">settlements</a> and guilty pleas and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/crime">criminal</a> convictions, sometimes involving charges like <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/bribery">bribery</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/fraud">fraud</a>, or <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/kickbacks">kickbacks</a>, that serve as reminders of poor behavior by myriad health care organizations. As we have previously noted, these settlements seem to have little deterrent effect on future bad behavior. (Note that many large health care organizations have settled or plead guilty in several major cases since we started commenting on such settlements.) Usually, the companies involved only need to pay fines, and no individual who performed, directed or approved unethical or illegal acts will suffer any negative consequences. I submit once again that such fines are viewed merely as costs of doing business by the affected companies, and do not deter future bad behavior. Until the people who approve, direct, and perform unethical or illegal acts pay some penalties, expect such acts to continue. I again suggest that to truly reform health care, we need rigorous regulation of health care organizations that has the power to deter unethical behavior that may risk patients' health.</blockquote> The companies of the bad actors are fined; the fine is considered a "cost of doing business"; but personal actions against the responsible executives engaged in malfeasance do not usually occur. Dr. Poses feels healthcare reform cannot occur under these conditions, and I agree. Apparently, so do others at high levels: <blockquote><a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703862704575099942109582112.html" style="font-weight: bold;">FDA Criminal Division to Increase Prosecutions</a> Wall Street Journal March 4, 2010 By ALICIA MUNDY WASHINGTON—The Food and Drug Administration plans to increase prosecutions of pharmaceutical and food industry executives as part of an effort to refocus its criminal division, which has been under attack in Congress and is criticized in a new government report. In a letter to Sen. Chuck Grassley (R., Iowa), the FDA says an internal committee has recommended that the FDA and its Office of Criminal Investigations "increase the appropriate use of misdemeanor prosecutions, which allows responsible corporate officials to be held accountable and is a valuable enforcement tool."</blockquote> Misdemeanor prosecutions are a start; however, some of the behaviors seem to my uninformed legal mind to perhaps be more felonious in nature... <blockquote>An FDA official said the agency has the authority to prosecute corporate executives for criminal actions within their companies under a provision called "strict liability." He said the government doesn't have to show intent to defraud in order to get a conviction. He added that the provision is an important tool that hasn't been used much in recent years.</blockquote> As has been noted repeatedly on this blog. <blockquote> A report set to be released Thursday by the Government Accountability Office, Congress's watchdog arm, says the Office of Criminal Investigations has operated autonomously for years with little or no accountability to top FDA officials ... The report said the FDA "has relied largely on the OCI director to determine which aspects of OCI's operations and investigations are made known to FDA's top management." The GAO also said the FDA's criminal unit has fallen short compared with other agencies in developing performance standards.</blockquote> This clearly must be corrected. <blockquote>The FDA officials largely agreed with the assessment and in the letter said the agency is "developing meaningful performance measures" for the criminal office as part of an initiative begun in August. The FDA said it wants the criminal office to share information with FDA leaders regularly, and to do a better job picking cases.</blockquote> I know where they can look to find cases ... <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/">here</a>, for example. <blockquote>... In 2008, Rep. Joe Barton (R., Texas) criticized the Office of Criminal Investigations, saying its budget had increased while its workload stagnated. </blockquote> I think the many posts on healthcare corruption here and elsewhere suggest that the workload of the Office of Criminal Investigations needs to pick up quite substantially, if the behaviors are to be discouraged and the actors shown that the penalties are not just a "cost of doing business" (unless one is willing to acquire a criminal record or go to jail for one's company as a "cost of doing business", that is). It is my hope that one day this increased vigilance will be extended to the healthcare IT industry. -- SS

FDA Criminal Division to Increase Prosecutions

In many posts on this blog, Roy Poses has lamented the fact that there are no personal repercussions for healthcare executives embroiled in ...

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On the "Wickedness" Of Healthcare IT (And Is CPOE Just a "Typewriter For Orders?")

Large-scale implementation of comprehensive healthcare IT, especially if meaningful ROI on the hundreds of billions of dollars spent is to be attained, is more of a wicked problem than a tractable one, as I have written <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/10/washington-post-article-electronic.html#c8760904644296861584">on this site</a> and in a number of presentations (such as this one on <a href="http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/EHR_benefit_peril_final.ppt">HIT challenges and perils</a> - PDF). A "<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wicked_problem">wicked problem</a>" describes a problem that is difficult or impossible to solve because of incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements that are often difficult to recognize. Moreover, because of complex interdependencies, the effort to solve one aspect of a wicked problem may reveal or create other problems. In the current environment of <a href="http://www.healthbeatblog.org/2008/12/irrational-exuberance-over-electronic-medical-records-.html">irrational exuberance</a>, healthcare IT has been presented as a ready-for-prime-time, "mouse click away from great healthcare", put-it-in-and-reap-the rewards technology. An example of this 'HIsTeria': <div style="text-align: center;">“We have the capacity to transform health with one thunderous click of a mouse after another,” said (former) HHS Secretary Michael Leavitt - <a href="http://www.himss.org/ASP/ContentRedirector.asp?ContentId=65039&type=HIMSSNewsItem">2005 HIMSS Summit</a> </div> "Transform" healthcare via "one thunderous mouse click after another?" On an irrational hyper-ebullience having taken over in healthcare IT, I rest my case. <div style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj5_2X9eOTYBdSsQEmVsYvSq6S7fFAjOLQRoZ_49Ail_dthnUugp-p6NMKf8dOKbb5gorF7UeItBajVHVEoGMZ6wKLwtummpbOeX4eIqlXMJBXe7fXJgqDLTQzWGimEMFKxRSCrjhGc2xyQ/s1600-h/nart0004.jpg" onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}"><img alt="" border="0" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5444488107139424706" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj5_2X9eOTYBdSsQEmVsYvSq6S7fFAjOLQRoZ_49Ail_dthnUugp-p6NMKf8dOKbb5gorF7UeItBajVHVEoGMZ6wKLwtummpbOeX4eIqlXMJBXe7fXJgqDLTQzWGimEMFKxRSCrjhGc2xyQ/s320/nart0004.jpg" style="display: block; margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; cursor: pointer; width: 197px; height: 146px;" /></a>Thunderous computing! Oh my! </div> Unfortunately, realizing the capabilities of healthcare IT is not simple. It is in fact devilishly complex. For instance, is CPOE a "typewriter for orders", as it's sometimes represented in this industry to de-emphasize its potential hazards? Far from it. In recent testimony submitted at the HIT Policy Committee, Adoption/Certification Workgroup of HHS on February 25, 2010, a <a href="http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt?open=512&objID=1473&&PageID=17117&mode=2&in_hi_userid=11673&cached=true">meeting on HIT safety</a>, Geisinger medical informaticist/CMIO James Walker, MD <a href="http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_11673_910718_0_0_18/3Walker_Testimony022510.pdf">wrote</a> (PDF) the following (emphases and red comments mine): <blockquote>... In 2005, <a href="http://www.geisinger.org/">Geisinger</a> was preparing for its first inpatient EHR implementation. Several months into the project, the project director informed the CIO and me that the EHR team’s business analysts were unable to map safe and effective workflows between the new order-entry system and our existing pharmacy system (provided by another vendor). [As an aside, one might question why "business analysts" were attempting a clinical mapping such as this - ed.] They and the project director believed that the only safe approach was to de-install the existing pharmacy system and replace it with the pharmacy system provided by the order-entry vendor—at a cost of several hundred thousand dollars and a nine months’ delay in the project. Pharmacy’s management was pained by the need to remove what was indisputably the best pharmacy system on the market [yet, even so, it needed to be removed and replaced with something that may, or may not, be equivalent in safety, ease of use, customizability, lifecycle maintenance, etc. - ed.] (which they had used very effectively to improve safety and efficiency). Nevertheless, they agreed with the workflow analysis and supported the change. Executive leadership approved the change and we proceeded. Two years later (2007), when I reported this experience to an EHR-safety conference, David Classen noted that the results of the Leapfrog CPOE test in 62 carefully studied hospitals confirmed that this hazard ... appears to be present regardless of which vendors’ products are used. (Classen, in press). [The effects of the disruptions at those 62 carefully studied hospitals might likely increment the "tip of the iceberg" HIT-related injury/death figures <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/02/fda-on-health-it-adverse-consequences.html">cited at the same meeting</a> by FDA official Dr. Jeffrey Shuren- ed.] </blockquote> In other words, any organization that implements a CPOE system needs to throw away whatever IT system is being used in pharmacy, with all of the familiarity and experience of pharmacy staff, and safety improvements that software might have provided because interfacing the systems is (allegedly) impossible and/or impractical. Then, after a learning curve characterized by disruptions in service, it is hoped the new pharmacy system will provide similar benefits to the old, and that the CPOE itself will work well (and not do <a href="http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/abstract/293/10/1197">this</a>). This disruption, caused by software dependencies in a complex biomedical setting and perhaps other reasons (see below), certainly represents a complex interdependency, the "solution" to which creates new problems, such as: <ul><li>What if the new CPOE vendor-sourced pharmacy system is inferior to the old? </li><li>What does the organization due if the single-source vendor folds, now causing orphaned software over two, not one, critical functions?</li><li>What other software-to-software interdependencies and bottlenecks exist that are not easily remedied by interfaces? CPOE-diagnostic imaging (radiology)? CPOE-laboratory? CPOE-O.R.? CPOE-dietary? CPOE-bed control? And so forth for CPOE and other systems to be installed. </li><li>What happens if the CPOE fails (as <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2005/03/wash-post-on-cedars-sinai-cpoe-failure.html">here</a>)? </li></ul> As to causation of the allegedly irremediable incompatibility between CPOE's and Pharmacy IT, Dr. Walker submitted the following testimony: <blockquote> ... hazards arise due to failures in health IT design, implementation, and maintenance. (While many of these failures are due to a lack of skill or vigilance, many more are due to the interactions of complex healthcare processes and the necessary complexity of IT systems capable of supporting those processes.)</blockquote> While I await the aforementioned Classen in-press paper on 62 hospitals, I take a more saturnine view and would argue that most of the interfacing problems probably have more to do with "lack of skill and vigilance" as opposed to some "organic" problem in interfacing these systems. My view is based on experience in the IT backwater of hospitals and HIT, where bureaucrats and IT personnel largely are working far outside their core competencies; where straightforward software adaptations in complex subspecialties can be <a href="http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/failurecases/?loc=cases&sloc=Cardiology%20story">completely and repeatedly bungled</a> until appropriate expertise is leveraged; where expert advice may simply be ignored <a href="http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/failurecases/?loc=cases&sloc=lawsuit">and worse</a>; and <a href="http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/failurecases/?loc=cases">other pathologies</a>. (See more on ONC Director Blumenthal's call for correction of the healthcare IT skills problem at "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/12/onc-defines-taxonomy-of-health-it.html">ONC Defines a Strategy of Robust HIT Leadership</a>".) The CPOE interface difficulties may also be in part due to vendor strategies of closed and overly complex software and information architectures, and vendor unwillingness to assist in interfacing to "alien" pharmacy IT products through ominous cost structures and halfhearted attempts. These matters could be strategic business decisions in a highly competitive market. (The supposed incompatibilities might actually be another argument supporting open source in healthcare...) ------- In either case regarding interface difficulties, i.e., human-based vs. "organic" IT issues, however, one can see that health IT is no easy "plug and play" affair. There is no predetermined benefit nor ROI. The complexities and "wicked problem" nature of HIT argue that benefits and ROI will not come short term - and never if the technology and its mass implementation are treated as easily tractable, not experimental and "wicked." Finally, CPOE a typewriter for orders? Perhaps, if this is the kind of typewriter being referred to: <div style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjOB2O_L14BVbYlDxrozy5UQLnq7cD2Q7-PXuGUMqJdP-SeJpCIM5bqtjFPr6gXwGDLKkVfriJr-Z9IRr4SMG1KWn-uPscbJozDffBj5eKJZW1_aHu-xaYnYyUSsjPa289XJRCWJy-HqRS9/s1600-h/typewriter.jpg" onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}"><img alt="" border="0" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5444473952079546130" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjOB2O_L14BVbYlDxrozy5UQLnq7cD2Q7-PXuGUMqJdP-SeJpCIM5bqtjFPr6gXwGDLKkVfriJr-Z9IRr4SMG1KWn-uPscbJozDffBj5eKJZW1_aHu-xaYnYyUSsjPa289XJRCWJy-HqRS9/s320/typewriter.jpg" style="display: block; margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; cursor: pointer; width: 265px; height: 199px;" /></a>Typewriter for <a href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/pengin/340943701/">Japanese language</a> </div> -- SS <div style="text-align: justify;">For more on HIT challenges see "Contemporary Issues in Medical Informatics: Common Examples of Healthcare Information Technology Difficulties" - <a href="http://tinyurl.com/healthITfailure" style="font-style: italic;">http://www.tinyurl.com/healthITfailure</a></div>

On the "Wickedness" Of Healthcare IT (And Is CPOE Just a "Typewriter For Orders?")

Large-scale implementation of comprehensive healthcare IT, especially if meaningful ROI on the hundreds of billions of dollars spent is to...

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Sacks Medical, KV Pharmaceutical Plead Guilty, Mariner Health Care, SavaSeniorCare Settle

The march of legal settlements and guilty pleas by health care organizations just keeps going.  The most recent participants were: Sacks Medical Corp The <a href="http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/business/s_668630.html">Pittsburgh Tribune-Review reported</a>: <blockquote>A Butler County drug company pleaded guilty in federal court in Pittsburgh to international money laundering and violating federal drug laws in an investigation that involved the now-defunct Monsour Medical Center Research Institute. Sacks Medical Corp. of Evans City was fined $500,000 and ordered to forfeit an additional $500,00 by U.S. District Court Judge Gustave Diamond on Monday. The firm was placed on one year's probation. The research institute was not charged in the investigation. According to federal prosecutors, Sacks in 2004 obtained pharmaceutical drugs at discount prices, which were then resold to other drug wholesalers in violation of the Prescription Drug Marketing Act. Sacks persuaded officials at the Monsour Medical Center in Jeannette to create the research institute, which was nothing more than a shell company, according to the charges. The institute joined two group purchasing organizations and began buying large amounts of medical supplies that should have been designated only for the hospital's use and not resold, according to the charges. Purchases were made from major drug companies, AmerisourceBergen of Valley Forge and McKesson Corp. San Francisco. Monsour then sold the medications to Millenia Hope Healthcare Inc., which was located at Monsour. Millenia then sold the drugs directly to Sacks or to San Med Development Group, which is owned by Sacks, according to prosecutors. Sacks supplied Monsour with the money to buy the discounted drugs. The company then tried to disguise the transaction by wiring the money to a Canadian bank, which in turn wired the money back to Monsour, according to the plea agreement. </blockquote> The novel element here seems to be the charge of international money laundering. KV Pharmaceutical <a href="http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-02-25/kv-pharmaceutical-unit-to-pay-fine-plead-guilty-update1-.html">Bloomberg reported</a>: <blockquote>KV Pharmaceutical Co. agreed to pay a $25.8 million fine and forfeit $1.8 million to resolve a U.S. Justice Department investigation of its generic pharmaceutical marketing and distribution unit, which will cease operations. That unit, Ethex Corp., will also enter a plea of guilty to criminal charges arising from its actions in 2008, according to a statement issued today by St. Louis-based KV. The agreement requires court approval, the company said. Under the terms of the accord, Ethex will plead guilty to two felony counts stemming from its failure to make and submit to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration a report on its discovery of undistributed pills that 'failed to meet product specifications,' KV said separately in a filing today with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.</blockquote>Note that these first two cases both involved guilty pleas to criminal charges, felonies in the latter case.  Further note, however, that in the latter case, the felony pleas were made by a subsidiary of the corporation, which will then be dissolved, leaving the parent corporation intact.  Although in both cases organizations pleaded guilty to criminal charges, there were no reports that any individuals who worked for or were otherwise involved in these organizations pleaded guilty to any charges. Mariner Health Care, SavaSeniorCare (and Omnicare) Again, from a report <a href="http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-02-26/doj-says-mariner-health-settles-alleged-kickbacks-update1-.html">by Bloomberg</a>: <blockquote>The U.S. reached a $14 million settlement with nursing home chains Mariner Health Care Inc. and SavaSeniorCare Administrative Services LLC over allegations of kickbacks from a supplier of drugs to nursing home patients. The accord resolves claims that the companies and their principals, Leonard Grunstein, Murray Forman and Rubin Schron, solicited kickbacks from Omnicare Inc., the U.S. Justice Department said in an e-mailed statement. The defendants conspired to have Omnicare pay $50 million in exchange for agreeing to use the supplier for 15 years, the government said last March in a complaint in Boston. The alleged kickback scheme involved Omnicare’s paying $40 million to buy a Mariner unit whose only assets were less than $3 million in accounts receivable, according to the complaint.</blockquote> Note that we discussed another settlement involving Omnicare and kickback allegations <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/11/omnicare-ivax-settle.html">here</a>.  It appears, however, that Omnicare paid any additional penalty in this case, despite allegations that it provided the kickbacks. Summary Again, another week, another series of colorful legal settlements and/or guilty pleas and/or convictions involving health care organizations.  Again, although organizations settled or pleaded guilty, no individuals seemed to be held accountable for authorizing, directing, or implementing the actions that lead to these pleas and settlements. So, here we go again ... To repeat, seemingly ad infinitum, these are just the latest in a now long parade of <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/legal%20settlements">settlements</a> and guilty pleas and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/crime">criminal</a> convictions, sometimes involving charges like <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/bribery">bribery</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/fraud">fraud</a>, or <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/kickbacks">kickbacks</a>,  that serve as reminders of poor behavior by myriad health care organizations. As we have previously noted, these settlements seem to have little deterrent effect on future bad behavior. (Note that many large health care organizations have settled or plead guilty in several major cases since we started commenting on such settlements.) Usually, the companies involved only need to pay fines, and no individual who performed, directed or approved unethical or illegal acts will suffer any negative consequences. I submit once again that such fines are viewed merely as costs of doing business by the affected companies, and do not deter future bad behavior. Until the people who approve, direct, and perform unethical or illegal acts pay some penalties, expect such acts to continue. I again suggest that to truly reform health care, we need rigorous regulation of health care organizations that has the power to deter unethical behavior that may risk patients' health.

Sacks Medical, KV Pharmaceutical Plead Guilty, Mariner Health Care, SavaSeniorCare Settle

The march of legal settlements and guilty pleas by health care organizations just keeps going. The most recent participants were: Sacks Med...

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FDA on Health IT Adverse Consequences: 44 Reported Injuries And 6 Deaths In Two Years, Probably Just 'Tip of Iceberg'

<div align="left">The Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT held a meeting of the HIT Policy Committee, Adoption/Certification Workgroup on February 25, 2010. The topic was "HIT safety." The agenda, presenters and presentations are available <a href="http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt?open=512&objID=1473&&PageID=17117&mode=2&in_hi_userid=11673&cached=true">at this link</a>. At this meeting FDA testimony was given by Jeffrey Shuren, Director of FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiological Health. Dr. Shuren noted several categories of health IT-induced adverse consequences known by FDA. This information was striking: He wrote: </div><blockquote><div align="left">... In the past two years, we have received 260 reports of HIT-related malfunctions with the potential for patient harm – including 44 reported injuries and 6 reported deaths. Because these reports are purely voluntary, they may represent only the tip of the iceberg in terms of the HIT-related problems that exist.</div><div align="left">[I'd call that a likely <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/02/health-it-caused-death-injury-extent.html">understatement</a> - ed.] Even within this limited sample, several serious safety concerns have come to light. The reported adverse events have largely fallen into four major categories: (1) errors of commission, such as accessing the wrong patient’s record or overwriting one patient’s information with another’s; (2) errors of omission or transmission, such as the loss or corruption of vital patient data; (3) errors in data analysis, including medication dosing errors of several orders of magnitude; and (4) incompatibility between multi-vendor software applications and systems, which can lead to any of the above.</div></blockquote><div align="left"> This is a technology almost universally touted as inherently beneficial, right up to our most senior elected leaders, who are now pushing this unproven technology under threat of penalty for non-adopters - certainly a precedent, especially in a supposedly democratic country. I have given examples on this blog about how this belief about the universal goodness of healthcare computing is itself inherently idealistic - and unrealistic. Now, here are some very striking, discrete examples of HIT-related adverse consequences, the tip of a larger iceberg, size unknown but quite possibly very large (where's <a href="http://l.yimg.com/eb/ymv/us/img/hv/photo/movie_pix/paramount_pictures/titanic/_group_photos/kate_winslet9.jpg">Kate Winslet</a> when you need her?): (1) Errors of Commission </div><blockquote><div align="left">Example 1: An error occurred in software used to view and document patient activities. When the user documented activities in the task list for one patient and used the “previous” or “next” arrows to select another patient chart, the first patient’s task list displayed for the second patient. Example 2: A nuclear medicine study was saved in the wrong patient’s file. Investigation suggested that this was due to a software error. Example 3: A sleep lab’s workstation software had a confusing user interface, which led to the overwriting and replacement of one patient’s data with another patient’s study.</div><div align="left">[I covered other examples of confusing or "mission hostile" interfaces at an eight part series <a href="http://www.tinyurl.com/hostileuserexper">here</a> - ed.]</div></blockquote><div align="left"> (2) Errors of Omission or Transmission </div><blockquote><div align="left">Example 1: An EMR system was connected to a patient monitoring system to chart vital signs. The system required a hospital staff member to download the vital signs, verify them, and electronically post them in the patient’s chart. Hospital staff reported that, several times, vital signs have been downloaded, viewed, and approved, and have subsequently disappeared from the system. Example 2: An operating room management software application frequently “locked up” during surgery, with no obvious indication that a “lock-up” was occurring. Operative data were lost and had to be re-entered manually, in some cases from the nurse’s recollection. [I experienced <a href="http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/failurecases/?loc=cases&sloc=Cardiology%20story">similar problems</a>: a decade ago - ed.] Example 3: An improper database configuration caused manual patient allergy data entries to be overwritten during automatic updates of patient data from the hospital information system.</div></blockquote><div align="left"> (3) Errors in Data Analysis </div><blockquote><div align="left">Example 1: In one system, intravenous fluid rates of greater than 1,000 mL/hr were printed as 1 mL/hr on the label that went to the nursing / drug administration area. Example 2: A clinical decision support software application for checking a patient’s profile for drug allergies failed to display the allergy information properly. Investigation by the vendor determined that the error was caused by a missing codeset. Example 3: Mean pressure values displayed on a patient’s physiological monitors did not match the mean pressures computed by the EMR system after systolic and diastolic values were entered.</div></blockquote><div align="left"> (4) Incompatibility between Multi-Vendor Software Applications or Systems </div><blockquote><div align="left">Example 1: An Emergency Department management software package interfaces with the hospital’s core information system and the laboratory’s laboratory information system; all three systems are from different vendors. When lab results were ordered through the ED management software package for one patient, another patient’s results were returned. Example 2: Images produced by a CT scanner from one vendor were presented as a mirror image by another vendor’s picture archiving and communication system (PACS) web software. The PACS software vendor stipulates that something in the interface between the two products causes some images to be randomly “flipped” when displayed.</div></blockquote> <div align="left"> The above is from FDA (2010 internal memo <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/08/smoking-gun-internal-fda-memorandum-of.html" target="_blank">here</a>) and by their own admission under-represents the problems, perhaps massively. Most of these errors are inexcusable from an engineering and quality perspective. Unfortunately, there actually is no comprehensive data on the true magnitude of the problems.</div><div align="center"> </div><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgFEzoM3D2qeDBIM7QqlgIiUHeUjlfgNIs_LNki0ZyN6JKglIVxisfhW8DDYytiw2x5yjHKCzdOtp11Rw3n6liPDe7AMrW6n6qY2TvJpSivredvNhqzCbsqMASEZmDi76t0Z4Rdxh2FzeGF/s1600-h/TipOfIceberg.jpg"><img alt="" border="0" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5443389824535309074" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgFEzoM3D2qeDBIM7QqlgIiUHeUjlfgNIs_LNki0ZyN6JKglIVxisfhW8DDYytiw2x5yjHKCzdOtp11Rw3n6liPDe7AMrW6n6qY2TvJpSivredvNhqzCbsqMASEZmDi76t0Z4Rdxh2FzeGF/s320/TipOfIceberg.jpg" style="display: block; height: 182px; margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; width: 140px;" /> </a><div align="center">44 injuries and 6 deaths: tip of the iceberg?</div><div align="left">Merely writing about this scarcity can bring opposition. For instance, a recent paper I wrote about lack of data on unintended adverse consequences of HIT and remediation of the data paucity was rejected. (The paucity itself might be considered an 'unintended consequence' of HIT, since secrecy about pros/cons of HIT was not the intention of the medical informatics pioneers.)</div><div align="left">One of the reasons given by an anonymous reviewer justifying rejection of the paper was itself striking: The paper "adds little that is new or that goes beyond what a reader might find in a major city newspaper", the reviewer wrote. Little that is new to whom, exactly? Where are the extant papers on the scarcity of such data?</div><div align="left">I am also highly uncertain as to which "major city newspapers" the reviewer was referring to, as I've rarely if ever read articles in newspapers about the paucity of data on adverse consequences of HIT or the remediation of the paucity. One reason for writing the paper was due to the fact the "major newspapers" - and the medical and medical informatics journals - largely avoid such issues entirely. (The scarcity was noted by organizations such as the Joint Commission, however, in their 2009 <a href="http://www.jointcommission.org/SentinelEvents/SentinelEventAlert/sea_42.htm">Sentinel Events Alert on HIT</a> - "There is a dearth of data on the incidence of adverse events directly caused by HIT overall.") This reviewer continued with the frivolous comment that "proposing a classification of sources of unintended consequence and analysis of reasons for undereporting of each type in the resulting classification could be a useful addition to the field."</div><div align="left">Ironically, I actually devoted an entire section of the paper to reasons for under-reporting and scarcity of unintended consequences, broadly speaking, although that this wasn't the paper's main purpose. Its purpose was to point out the dangers inherent in such an information scarcity. It is also hard to granularly classify variants of a phenomenon on which there is scarce data to begin with. Rather than revise the paper, I may simply put it in the public domain and send it to my elected representatives involved in healthcare IT policy. I'd done this with another paper I'd written in 2007 on EMR's and <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/12392184/A-Medical-Informatics-Grand-Challenge-the-EMR-and-PostMarketing-Drug-Surveillance-">postmarketing drug surveillance</a> that had received a mysteriously similar "could have read this in any newspaper" critique. In summary, the light is starting to shine on HIT dangers. It is also increasingly recognized by regulators such as FDA that "data scarcity" is a problem of major significance ("tip of the iceberg"), although there are those in this sector who would prefer to keep physicians and patients in the dark on this issue and keep such data scarce.</div><div align="left">Finally, while Shuren presented a number of options regarding FDA involvement in HIT regulation, he wrote that "in light of the safety issues that have been reported to us, we believe that a framework of federal oversight of HIT needs to assure patient safety." This itself represents a major change in the culture of HIT.</div><div align="left">Addendum: the Huffington Post Investigative Fund wrote about this meeting in an article entitled "Experts: Safety Oversight Needed as Patient Records Go Digital" <a href="http://huffpostfund.org/stories/2010/02/experts-safety-oversight-needed-patient-records-go-digital">here</a>.</div>-- SS <div style="font-weight: bold; text-align: justify;"><div style="font-style: italic;"> <div align="left">For more on HIT challenges see "Contemporary Issues in Medical Informatics: Common Examples of Healthcare Information Technology Difficulties" - <a href="http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/">http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/</a></div></div></div>

FDA on Health IT Adverse Consequences: 44 Reported Injuries And 6 Deaths In Two Years, Probably Just 'Tip of Iceberg'

The Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT held a meeting of the HIT Policy Committee , Adoption/Certification Workgroup on Febru...

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Bring Back the DSI*? - the Avandia Case as Spy Novel

Starting in 2007, we posted quite a bit about the "Avandia case," which centered on whether Avandia (rosiglitazone, by GlaxoSmithKline), a glucose lowering drug for type 2 diabetes, presented excess cardiovascular risks, and how evidence about these risks was handled.  Summary The Nissen and Wolski meta-analysis [Nissen SE, Wolski K. Effects of rosiglitazone on the risk of myocardial infarction and death from cardiovascular causes. N Engl J Med 2007; 356, online <a href="http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/NEJMoa072761">here</a>] was to be the first published article to combine data from all relevant clinical trials of rosiglitazone then available.  Although two major trials of Avandia had been published, its manufacturer, GlaxoSmithKline, had performed many other smaller trials of the drug which remained unpublished.  These results eventually appeared on a <a href="http://www.gsk-clinicalstudyregister.com/">web-site run by GSK</a>. However, this web-site was relatively obscure.  It had not been created voluntarily, but in response to a settlement of legal action that alleged GSK had suppressed clinical research about its antidepresant paroxetine (Paxil). (See Steinbrook R. Registration of clinical trials - voluntary of mandatory. N Engl J Med 2004; 351: 1820-1822, link <a href="http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/351/18/1820">here</a> and our post <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/01/not-something-we-want-to-publicise-spin.html">here</a>). Nissen and Wolski found the site, compiled the results of trials on Avandia it contained, and combined their results with those of the few published trials in their meta-analysis. It is to the credit of Nissen and Wolski that they were able to figure out how to do this. It is not to the credit of GSK that they sat on the data from these trials, only put it on this web-site when compelled to do so, did not make any effort to publicize the web-site, and did not publish a meta-analysis done by company scientists that showed qualitatively similar results to that eventually done by Nissen and Wolski (see post <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/05/dream-turns-to-nightmare-avandia-and.html">here</a>).   I originally <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/06/avandia-spin-cycle-continues.html">thought</a> the case raised two questions:  1 - what are the benefits and harms of rosiglitazone as a treatment of Type 2 diabetes, and therefore for which patients under what circumstances should this drug be used?  2 - what barriers have prevented physicians and patients from getting the best possible answer to the first question, and what can be done about them?   But the immediate response to the Nissen and Wolski meta-analysis was a spin cycle that seemed to obfuscate these questions, and the answers to him (see posts <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/06/more-on-avandia-why-we-need-to-call-off.html">here</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/06/wall-street-journal-gives-avandia-whirl.html">here</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/06/avandia-spin-cycle-continues.html">here</a>, and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/11/silencing-avandia-whistle-blower.html">here</a>)   A Reconsideration   In the last few weeks, several articles about Avandia have appeared in the media, and in medical journals, that reconsider the issues, and in particular, the "Avandia Spin Cycle."  First was a commentary in the European Heart Journal by Dr Steven E Nissen, the first author of the meta-analysis [Nissen SE. The rise and fall of rosiglitazone. Eur Heart J 2010: published online <a href="http://eurheartj.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2010/02/11/eurheartj.ehq016.long">here</a>.]  Dr Nissen provided a narrative history of the Avandia case from his viewpoint, and summarized it thus: <blockquote>What were the key mistakes and lessons learned from the rosiglitazone affair? 1. The FDA rushed to approve rosiglitazone because of hepatotoxicity concerns about troglitazone, resulting in failure to consider the ‘signals’ suggesting cardiovascular toxicity. 2. An early critic of rosiglitazone was intimidated by company representatives and effectively silenced, a process antithetical to the principals of open scientific discourse. 3. Although early warnings were issued for the risk of heart failure, these warnings went largely unheeded in the face of aggressive marketing and promotion suggesting cardiovascular benefits. 4. No well-designed cardiovascular outcome trials were ever conducted for rosiglitazone, despite evidence suggesting increased cardiovascular risks. The only cardiovascular outcome trial was an open label study driven by a soft endpoint (hospitalization) with low adherence to randomized medications, seriously underpowered, and not completed until 10 years following launch. 5. Although both the FDA and the company were aware of evidence of an increased risk of adverse cardiovascular outcomes, certainly by 2005, neither warned physicians nor the public. 6. When a meta-analysis of rosiglitazone was eventually submitted for publication, the company subverted the editorial review process by stealing a copy of the manuscript and used this advance knowledge inappropriately to unblind an ongoing randomized trial. 7. Approval of diabetes drugs based exclusively upon their glycaemic effects has been short-sighted and scientifically unwise. Drugs that lower blood sugar may have other adverse effects that overcome any inherent benefits. 8. The failure of  50 other PPARs, many for adverse cardiovascular effects, went largely unreported because of negative publication bias. Such knowledge might have warned the medical community about the potential risk of these agents.</blockquote> Meanwhile, the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/20/health/policy/20avandia.html">New York Times published </a>conclusions of some internal US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) reports, and of an investigation by the US Senate Finance Committee. FDA safety officials suggested that Avandia should be taken off the market. Some key points from the Senate investigation were: <blockquote>The bipartisan multiyear Senate investigation — whose results are expected to be released publicly on Monday but which were also obtained by The Times — sharply criticizes GlaxoSmithKline, saying it failed to warn patients years earlier that Avandia was potentially deadly. 'Instead, G.S.K. executives attempted to intimidate independent physicians, focused on strategies to minimize or misrepresent findings that Avandia may increase cardiovascular risk, and sought ways to downplay findings that a competing drug might reduce cardiovascular risk,' ....</blockquote>In combination, the Nissen commentary, and the Senate report nicely summarized what I called the "Avandia spin cycle" above.  It appears that research was suppressed, marketing was deceptive, and critics and whistleblowers were intimidated.  Finally, Dr Harlan Krumholz published a commentary about the thiazolidinedione drugs (a group that includes rosiglirazone) in Circulation Cardiovascular Quality and Outcomes [Krumholz HM. A perspective on the American Heart Association Presidential Commission Advisory on thiazolidenedione drugs. Circ Cardiovasc Qual Outcomes 2010; 3 available online, link <a href="http://circoutcomes.ahajournals.org/cgi/rapidpdf/CIRCOUTCOMES.110.936070v1.pdf">here</a>], and <a href="http://www.forbes.com/2010/02/24/diabetes-glaxosmithkline-avandia-business-healthcare-heart-attack.html">an op-ed in Forbes</a>. The latter sums it all up nicely: <blockquote>I want to believe in America's pharmaceutical companies. I want to believe that people in these companies believe that the best strategy for success is to do what is best for patients. I want to believe that they are interested in scientific truth and eager to know of any safety issues and ready to share that information with the public. This week I was disappointed again. Over the years GlaxoSmithKline ( GSK - news - people ) has repeatedly reassured the public about the safety of its blockbuster diabetes drug Avandia. But this weekend the Senate Finance Committee released a report revealing that inside the company Glaxo's own experts and advisors were raising concerns about whether the drug could cause heart problems all along. The report, based on more than 250,000 internal documents, provides a rare and unsettling glimpse into the decision by company executives to deflect safety issues--even as their own experts agreed with conclusions of outside researchers who were warning the public about possible harms. The documents reveal that company researchers were deeply concerned about the cardiovascular safety of the drug as far back as 2003. The pages of the Senate report read like a spy novel: Glaxo receiving confidential documents leaked by a sympathetic academic who consulted for the company; the company embarking on a campaign to intimidate critics who warned about potential safety issues with the drug; and executives pulling strings to release data early from a scientific study that was supposedly controlled by an 'independent' committee of researchers.</blockquote> So, <blockquote>The story here is less about the drug--the Senate report breaks no new ground about Avandia's safety issues (even among experts there remains some controversy)--and more about the ethical behavior of a company. What is clear: Glaxo failed to disclose its own concerns even as it sought to discredit outside researchers who were raising questions about the drug. This type of behavior is eroding the public trust in the pharmaceutical industry.</blockquote>Policy Implications Finally, Dr Krumholz concludes with some solutions with which I heartily agree: <blockquote>The fix is simple: Once a drug is approved, all data relevant to drug safety should be placed in the public domain and independent investigators across the country should be able to use it. There should be big financial penalties for withholding relevant information. Drug studies sponsored by industry must be truly independent--outside of company control. Companies should give outside investigators independence over every aspect of the study. There are too many examples of companies wresting control of clinical studies from their consultant investigators for reasons that seem more related to product promotion than clinical science. And on all sides there should be a commitment to protect against the intimidation of academics who are willing to raise questions about the safety and effectiveness of company products. The free flow of information about the effects of drugs and medical devices will best serve the public's interest.</blockquote>Here in the US, the debate over health care reform has reached a new phase. Today the President is hosting an attempt to get bipartisan discussion of reform going again. Now that there is a new opportunity for discussion, I submit that would be health care reformers ought to think about the underlying causes of our continuing problems with rising costs, declining access, stagnant quality, and demoralized health care professionals. One set of causes that is rarely discussed has to do with the distortion of clinical research by commercial research sponsors with vested interests in the results turning out in favor of their products, and the further distortion of clinical discourse and decision making by the deceptive marketing practices of these same organizations. If we started introducing steps like those suggested by Dr Krumholz into health care reform, maybe we really could decrease costs, increase access, improve quality, and renew professionalism. *Bring Back the DSI? To lighten things up a bit, and to explain the title... When I was in school in the 1960s, I first became a fan of the <a href="http://hardyboys.bobfinnan.com/">Hardy Boys</a> mysteries, then the slightly more mature <a href="http://www.aandc.org/research/biblio_pease_h.htm">Tod Moran series</a>.  While on the <a href="http://www.oceanlinermuseum.co.uk/nieuw_amsterdam.htm">Neiuw Amsterdam</a> (the 1938 version) one day out of Kingston, Jamaica, I viewed <a href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0055928/">Dr No</a>, the first James Bond movie, a sophisticated spy thriller, not a spoof like some later entries in the series.  I later read all the classics, like those by <a href="http://www.agathachristie.com/">Agatha Christie</a>, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erle_Stanley_Gardner">Earl Stanely Gardner</a>, <a href="http://www.nerowolfe.org/">Rex Stout</a>, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ellery_Queen">Ellery Queen</a>, etc.  So it should be no surprise that I, like many other schoolboys and girls, collaborated to form an amateur detective and intelligence agency.  But this was the sophisticated 1960s, so we called it the Department of Scientific Investigation (DSI).  We skulked around New York City and its suburbs looking for spies, saboteurs, and common criminals.  Luckily, we never really found any.  As more realities intruded, I gave up any ideas about becoming an investigator or intelligence agent (although I still read mysteries, spy novels, and thrillers to this day, but mainly on airplanes.)  Once I became a physicians, those days in the DSI seemed very remote (although the title does now seem like it ought to be part of the NIH ;-) ). However, after reading Dr Krumholz's article above, maybe we need to resurrect the DSI.  At least, maybe we health professionals ought to consider how we can become better and more organized watchdogs for the kind of problems revealed in the Avandia case, and in many other cases discussed on <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/">Health Care Renewal</a>. But if any of my old DSI colleagues want to set up a reunion, it would be fine with me.  ADDENDUM (25 February, 2010) - see also comments by Dr Howard Brody <a href="http://brodyhooked.blogspot.com/2010/02/avandia-story-failures-of-regulation.html">on the Hooked: Ethics, Medicine and Pharma blog</a>.

Bring Back the DSI*? - the Avandia Case as Spy Novel

Starting in 2007, we posted quite a bit about the "Avandia case," which centered on whether Avandia (rosiglitazone, by GlaxoSmithK...

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The Argument Over Insurance Rate Hikes: A Systemic Problem with Health Care Organizations' Leadership and Governance?

There has been a tremendous amount of news coverage of a large rate increase proposed by Anthem Blue Cross, a subsidiary of WellPoint, in California.  For example, the <a href="http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-anthem10-2010feb10,0,2234973.story">Los Angeles Times reported</a> last week, <blockquote>Congress opened an investigation Tuesday into Anthem Blue Cross' impending rate increases in California as President Obama cited the premium hikes -- some as high as 39% -- in his bid to pass national healthcare legislation. The House Committee on Energy and Commerce and its Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations announced they were examining the increases, which are set to take effect March 1. The subcommittee has scheduled a Feb. 24 hearing in Washington, while an Assembly committee in Sacramento has set a hearing for Feb 23. 'Reports of premium increases up to 39% are deeply troubling,' Rep. Henry A. Waxman (D-Beverly Hills), who chairs the energy committee, said in a statement. 'At a time when millions of Americans are struggling to keep their health insurance, we need to know what possible justification there could be for increases of this magnitude.' Anthem of Woodland Hills is the state's largest for-profit insurer and a unit of Indianapolis health insurance giant WellPoint Inc. At issue are increases in monthly premiums for many of Anthem's estimated 800,000 customers with individual health insurance policies who are not part of group coverage. Anthem began informing individual policyholders last month that prices would go up March 1 and could be adjusted 'more frequently' than typical yearly increases. The company would not say how high the rates could go or how many customers would be affected. Brokers and policyholders said many of the anticipated increases were 30% to 39%, the largest they could recall. The brokers said other insurers also were raising rates by double digits. Anthem maintains that its increases are necessary to meet growing healthcare costs, even as it voices sympathy for policyholders whose premiums are rising.</blockquote>In addition, per again a <a href="http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-insure24-2010feb24,0,2866459,print.story">Los Angeles Times article</a> this week, <blockquote>Executives from California health insurance giant Anthem Blue Cross, under fire for scheduled rate hikes of up to 39%, insisted Tuesday that their premiums were fair and legal, and they told lawmakers they expected that the increases would go forward. Appearing before the state Assembly's health committee, the officials said that they believed rate increases for individual health insurance policies, delayed until May 1 while being reviewed by the Department of Insurance, would survive scrutiny by regulators In Sacramento, Anthem's president, Leslie Margolin, told the committee that much of the public frustration over the rate hikes was misdirected and should be aimed at the nation's healthcare system. 'This debate and this inquiry cannot and should not be just about the insurance industry or the delivery system or regulators or legislators or customers or brokers,' Margolin said. 'We have wasted precious time and precious resources doing battle with each other,' she added. 'We must come together collaboratively and strategically to address the distressing symptoms of our troubled system -- rising premiums, for example -- and to address the fundamental underlying causes of our collective failure.'</blockquote> As we have discussed time after time on <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/">Health Care Renewal</a>, there are multiple fundamental problems with health care in the US (and around the world.) The Anthem President above did not apparently specify what she thought these problems are. We have discussed in particular problems that arise out of abuse and concentration of power in health, particularly problems with the leadership and governance of health care organizations. We have suggested that such problems are major causes of the ever rising costs of, declining access to, and stagnant quality of health care in the US. These problems do not seem to particularly afflict WellPoint more than most other organizations, and certainly do afflict the other organizations with which WellPoint has to deal.  On the other hand, WellPoint has certainly had its own share of issues. These have been sufficient to raise questions about the organization's leadership's transparency, ethics, and management abilities. While WellPoint perhaps should not be singled out for these sorts of problems, the extent they may have contributed to the costs it imposes, and its ability to manage its relationships with other organizations should be a source of skepticism about the idealized pronouncements of its leaders. For a recent example, the Los Angeles Times also just <a href="http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-anthem-claims23-2010feb23,0,186309.story">reported</a>, <blockquote>California's largest for-profit health insurer violated state law more than 700 times over a three-year period by failing to pay medical claims on time and misrepresenting policy provisions to customers, the state's insurance commissioner said Monday. Anthem Blue Cross of Woodland Hills could face fines of up to $7 million stemming from the alleged violations from 2006 to 2009. Commissioner Steve Poizner said the insurer repeatedly failed to respond to state regulators in a 'reasonable time' as they investigated complaints over the last year. 'We believe there is evidence to suggest there are serious issues with how Anthem Blue Cross pays claims,' Poizner said at a Sacramento news conference. 'Most disturbing to us is that they don't even respond' to the Department of Insurance 'in a timely way.' </blockquote> Furthermore, WellPoint... <ul><li>settled a RICO (racketeer influenced corrupt organization) law-suit in California over its alleged systematic attempts to withhold payments from physicians (see post <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2005/07/wellpoint-settles-rico-law-suit.html">here</a>).</li><li>subsidiary New York Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield misplaced a computer disc containing confidential information on 75,000 policy-holders (see story <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/14/business/14insure.html">here</a>).</li><li>California Anthem Blue Cross subsidiary cancelled individual insurance policies after their owners made large claims (a practices sometimes called rescission).  The company was ordered to pay a million dollar fine in early 2007 for this (see post <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/03/wellpoint-fined-1-million-for-canceling.html">here</a>).  A state agency charged that some of these cancellations by another WellPoint subsidiary were improper (see post <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/07/more-than-half-of-wellpoints-policy.html">here</a>).  WellPoint was alleged to have pushed physicians to look for patients' medical problems that would allow rescission (see post <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/02/wellpoint-halts-attempts-to-have.html">here</a>).  It turned out that California never collected the 2007 fine noted above, allegedly because the state agency feared that WellPoint had become too powerful to take on (see post <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/07/wellpoint-settles-but-has-it-become-too.html">here</a>). But in 2008, WellPoint agreed to pay more fines for its rescission practices (see post <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/07/fines-re-statements-and-more-fines-just.html">here</a>).  In 2009, WellPoint executives were defiant about their continued intention to make rescission in hearings before the US congress (see post <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/06/managed-care-executives-will-not-limit.html">here</a>).</li><li>California Blue Cross subsidiary allegedly attempted to get physicians to sign contracts whose confidentiality provisions would have prevented them from consulting lawyers about the contract (see post <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/11/physicians-and-contracts-cautionary.html">here</a>).</li><li>formerly acclaimed CFO was fired for unclear reasons, and then allegations from numerous women of what now might be called Tiger Woods-like activities surfaced (see post <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/01/more-managed-care-management-mumbo.html">here</a>).</li><li>announced that its investment portfolio was hardly immune from the losses prevalent in late 2008 (see post <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/10/if-this-is-how-wellpoint-has-managed.html">here</a>).</li><li>was sanctioned by the US government in early 2009 for erroneously denying coverage to senior patients who subscribed to its Medicare drug plans (see post <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/01/wellpoint-sanctioned.html">here</a>).</li><li>settled charges that it had used a questionable data-base (builty by Ingenix, a subsidiary of ostensible WellPoint competitor UnitedHealth) to determine fees paid to physicians for out-of-network care (see post <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/02/wellpoint-settles.html">here</a>).  </li></ul>So, WellPoint's subsidiary Anthem President Margolin was right in that her company, or insurance and managed care companies should not be blamed for all of our health care woes.  But I submit that her company should no less have to address concerns about the transparency, honesty, and skill of its management, and how problems in these areas have driven up costs, decreased access, threatened quality, and demoralized health care professsionals  than do leaders of other health care organizations.  At the moment, such concerns are at best peripheral to the ongoing debate on health care reform in the US.  I suggest they ought to be central. ADDENDUM (24 February, 2010) - see also comments <a href="http://covertrationingblog.com/healthcare-reform/why-efficiency-is-bad-for-health-insurance-companies">on the Covert Rationing Blog</a>, and <a href="http://www.joepaduda.com/archives/001749.html">on the Managed Care Matters blog</a>.

The Argument Over Insurance Rate Hikes: A Systemic Problem with Health Care Organizations' Leadership and Governance?

There has been a tremendous amount of news coverage of a large rate increase proposed by Anthem Blue Cross, a subsidiary of WellPoint, in Ca...

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