healthy4u: deception

Fool Me Twice? - Boehringer Ingelheim, Medtronic Settle Lawsuits Alleging Deceptive Marketing

It seems like it has been really quiet on the legal settlement front in the US, but maybe corporate executives wanted to wait until things calmed down after the unofficial start of summer to let out news that some people might not think reflected well on them.  So this week it was time to announce two new legal settlements of allegations of bad behavior by corporate health were announced, as we will list in alphabetical order.... Boehringer Ingelheim Settles Suits Alleging it Hid Data About Pradaxa Harms As <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-28/boehringer-pays-650-million-to-end-blood-thinner-cases.html">per Bloomberg</a>, <blockquote class="tr_bq">Boehringer Ingelheim GmbH, the German family-owned drugmaker, agreed to pay $650 million to settle the majority of lawsuits filed over its blood thinner Pradaxa, which has been linked to more than 500 patient deaths.</blockquote> The major allegations were about deception, <blockquote class="tr_bq"> Patients and their families alleged Boehringer executives knew Pradaxa posed a deadly risk to some consumers when they brought it to the U.S. market in October 2010.</blockquote> In particular, as we <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2014/02/cant-this-be-avoided-how-corporate.html">discussed</a> in more detail in February, 2014, <blockquote class="tr_bq">Documents made public as part of patients’ Pradaxa suits showed Boehringer officials didn’t disclose to U.S. regulators a data analysis that indicated the blood-thinning drug may have caused more fatal bleeding after it was cleared for sale than in a study used to win approval.  </blockquote> <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/29/business/international/german-drug-company-to-pay-650-million-to-settle-blood-thinner-lawsuits.html">Per </a>the New York Times, Boehringer Ingelheim executives continued to maintain <blockquote class="tr_bq">that it stood behind the safety and efficacy of Pradaxa and continued to believe that the lawsuits lacked merit, but that settling the case allowed the company to move on. 'Time and again, the benefits and safety of Pradaxa have been confirmed,' said Desiree Ralls-Morrison, senior vice president and general counsel of Boehringer Ingelheim USA.</blockquote> This is typical of most legal settlements involving large health care organizations, whether they end lawsuits brought by private parties or by the US government.  The settlements often allow the parties to continue to disagree, do not establish guilt or innocence, but leave one to wonder why executives would pay so much of admittedly other peoples' money just to "move on" without upholding their or their companies' honor, especially when documents revealed and legal findings made in cases prior to settlement remain unchallenged. So this settlement also comes after December, 2013, as we discussed <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/12/a-second-order-cover-up-judge-finds.html">here</a>, December, when a judge <blockquote class="tr_bq">ordered Boehringer to pay a $931,000 fine in December for failing to preserve 'countless' files on Pradaxa’s development and marketing. Patients’ lawyers say Boehringer should have placed an effective 'litigation hold' on the documents, forcing employees to preserve them.</blockquote> (The above <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-28/boehringer-pays-650-million-to-end-blood-thinner-cases.html">per Bloomberg</a>.)  That finding, which the settlement does not dispute, does not fill one with confidence about the openness and transparency of Boehringer Ingelheim managers. Also the settlement does not refute documents released during this litigation which suggested that Boehringer Ingelheim personnel tried to influence, or manipulate a company sponsored research paper to prevent it from contradicting the company's official marketing message that Pradaxa administration does not require monitoring of patients with blood tests (as we discussed <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2014/02/cant-this-be-avoided-how-corporate.html">here</a>).     Note further that this case comes only a few years after a case in which Boehringer Ingelheim settled allegations of deceptive marketing of drugs other than Pradaxa, as we discussed <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/10/just-another-day-at-office-boehringer.html">here</a>. Medtronic Settles Suit Alleging Kickbacks to Physicians The most extensive and colorful <a href="http://www.startribune.com/business/260978651.html">report</a> was in the Minneapolis Star-Tribune, <blockquote class="tr_bq">Medtronic Inc. will pay the U.S. Justice Department $9.9 million to settle a whistleblower lawsuit that accused the company of paying kickbacks to doctors for using its defibrillators and pacemakers. The alleged kickbacks, according to the newly unsealed suit, included 'gifts of wine and alcohol' and 'trips to strip clubs' paid for by the Fridley-based company. The lawsuit also says Medtronic paid to fly doctors to events in San Francisco, Las Vegas, New Orleans, New York, Minneapolis and other cities that some physicians used as 'a free vacation.'</blockquote> More colorful details, <blockquote class="tr_bq">The lawsuit, whose details remained secret until Tuesday, describes Medtronic business plans with names such as 'Project Wildfire' that had sales representatives offer 'cash payments, expensive trips and meals, expensive gifts and entertainment to physicians as kickbacks in exchange for the physicians’ agreement to implant Medtronic devices.' The lawsuit alleged that Medtronic 'funneled millions of dollars in unrestricted grant money to physicians' to get them to encourage the use of Medtronic defibrillators and pacemakers in patients whose 'mild heart failure symptoms did not meet [Food and Drug Administration] criteria for an implantable device.' Those procedures were not only unnecessary, the suit alleged, but potentially dangerous. The suit describes payments of thousands of dollars in speaking fees to doctors for attending dinners at which they spoke for only a few minutes, if at all. In other cases, Medtronic allegedly prepared entire presentations that physicians offered almost verbatim. The suit talks of a plan that 'instructed sales representatives to personally review patient charts in friendly doctor’s offices' and to flag those patients the sales representative 'felt should receive an implant.'</blockquote> Note that commercially supplied "unrestricted grant money" is now the lifeblood of many ostensibly academic continuing medical education (CME) programs, but this case suggests that corporate executives may believe they are paying such money to get doctors to use their products.  Note further that many physicians defend their receipt of money in payment of talks they have given on behalf of commercial firms as fair payment for providing unbiased education, but this case suggests that corporate executives may believe they are paying such money for marketing, and/or to get the supposedly unbiased physician speakers to use their products.  Once again, the settlement did not resolve the allegations. <blockquote class="tr_bq"> Medtronic said it did not admit that any of its activities were improper or illegal and that the settlement would bring to a close a long-running review of events dating from 2001 to 2009.</blockquote> Also, <blockquote class="tr_bq"> Asked to comment specifically on the strip club allegations and the accusation that it financially facilitated unnecessary implantations, Medtronic reiterated that its $9.9 million payment was not an admission that it had done anything illegal or improper.</blockquote> See my comments above.  Why would executives with even the slightest ability to feel shame not contest such allegations if they were untrue?  But maybe many of today's corporate health care executives are not capable of feeling shame, and of course they get to pay off these lawsuits with other peoples' money. By the way, this is just one of many Medtronic settlements.  As Bloomberg <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-28/medtronic-settles-suit-over-heart-device-kickback-claims.html">summarized</a>, <blockquote class="tr_bq"> Medtronic agreed in 2007 to pay about $130 million to settle consumer suits accusing the device maker of hiding defects in its defibrillators. The company agreed to a $268 million settlement of suits in 2010 over allegations that fractured wires in another line of defibrillators caused at least 13 patient deaths.</blockquote> In fact, Medtronic has provided our blog with <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/Medtronic">lots of material</a>.  We first <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2006/01/medtronics-payments-to-doctors-too.html">discussed</a> detailed and vivid allegations that Medtronic had been paying off doctors starting in 2003 here in 2006.  Medtronic has been involved in other lawsuits alleging various kinds of deception. -  In 2011, it settled for $23.5 million two other federal lawsuits alleging it paid kickbacks to encourage physicians to implant its devices (look <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/12/medtronic-settles-yet-again.html">here</a>).   - In 2008, Medtronic subsidiary Kyphon settled a suit for $75 million and signed a corporate integrity agreement for allegations that it defrauded Medicare through a scheme that lead to excessive hospitalization for patients who received the company's spine surgery device (link <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/05/corporate-integrity-agreement-for.html">here</a>) - In 2006, Medtronic subsidiary Sofamor Danek settled for $40 million allegations that it gave kickbacks to doctors in the form of sham consulting fees and lavish trips (look <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/12/medtronic-settles-yet-again.html">here</a>). Yet we are now writing at the end of May, 2014, and Medtronic is still settling lawsuits involving vivid allegations of payoffs to physicians, and its executives are still saying nothing to see here, move on. Summary These sorts of cases provide evidence that large health care corporations, including not just pharmaceutical companies, but biotechnology and medical device companies, commonly use deceptive and unethical practices to market their products.  Such marketing lets them charge high, even outrageous prices and sometimes results in patients getting expensive treatments that do them no good, or worse, that do more harm than good.  Some of the executives of these companies doubtless got large bonuses, and may have gotten millions in compensation partially because of the sales generated by these practices.  However, they get to walk away from such lawsuits without any personal accountability, just by paying out a few millions, or billions, of the company's, that is, other peoples' money.  They get do pay that money without any other explanation that it eliminates distractions and allows them to move on (with whatever they have already made). The more this goes on, the more health care dysfunction continues, and the more the health care oligarchy prospers.  As we have written many times, <blockquote class="tr_bq">penalties that only appear to be (relatively small) costs of doing business are unlikely to deter future bad behavior. Until the people who actually authorized, directed and implemented the bad behavior have to suffer some negative consequences, expect the bad behavior to continue.  Note that each of the companies discussed above have had their previous ethical lapses discussed in previous Health Care Renewal posts. The continuing march of <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/legal%20settlements">settlements</a>, and sometimes <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/crime">criminal</a> convictions involving major health care organizations should be regarded merely as providing a floor to estimates of the extent of bad behavior by large health care organizations. Bad behavior may not be reported, or lead to legal action, and legal action may not lead to settlements or convictions. However, it is amazing how many organizations that were once regarded as exemplary have had to settle, or plead guilty, or been convicted. When it comes to health care's leadership, society seems to have acceded to defining deviancy down. Until we start holding health care leaders to high standards, expect their organizations not to uphold high standards.</blockquote> (That version was from 2010, posted <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/10/last-weeks-scandals.html">here</a> re Medtronic's 2010 settlement. You heard it here first.  Medtronic is still settling, and according to its <a href="http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=76126&p=IROL-secToc&TOC=aHR0cDovL2FwaS50ZW5rd2l6YXJkLmNvbS9vdXRsaW5lLnhtbD9yZXBvPXRlbmsmaXBhZ2U9OTAwMDI5NiZzdWJzaWQ9NTc%3d&ListAll=1">most recent proxy</a>, from 2013, the annual total compensation of its CEO was last reported to be $8,975,886.)

Fool Me Twice? - Boehringer Ingelheim, Medtronic Settle Lawsuits Alleging Deceptive Marketing

It seems like it has been really quiet on the legal settlement front in the US, but maybe corporate executives wanted to wait until things c...

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Turnabout is Fair Play - Why University of Illinois Students, Faculty and Alumni Should Question the Dean of Medicine about Novartis' Ethical Misadventures

Since 2006, we have posted repeatedly about  what was then a new species of severe conflicts of interest.  This occurred when leaders of academic medical institutions or other health care non-profit organizations or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also serve as members of <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/boards%20of%20directors">boards of directors</a> of for-profit corporations  whose products and actions have major effects on health care. Most recently, we <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2014/03/american-board-of-internal-medicine.html">discussed </a>the cases of the current CEO of the National Quality Forum and past CEO of the American Board of Internal Medicine who was found to be on the board of for-profit hospital group purchasing organization Premier Inc, and had been on the board of its privately held but for-profit predecessors.  We also <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2014/02/incoming-president-of-iom-outed-as.html">discussed</a> the case of the incoming president of the US Institute of Medicine and former Chancellor of Health Affairs at Duke University who was on the boards of Alnylam Pharmaceuticals, Medtronic and Pepsico. We also recently <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2014/03/better-late-than-never-jama-article.html">posted</a> about the first time these sorts of severe conflicts of interest issue have been addressed in a large circulation medical journal.  A commentary in JAMA called for many such conflicts to be banned. The JAMA article, and much of the discussion surrounding the NQF and IOM cases focused on how loyalties to outside for-profit corporations could affect leaders of academic and other non-profit organizations.  However, we also noted (e.g., <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2014/02/the-carefusion-dr-denham-nqf-leapfrog.html">here</a> and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2014/02/incoming-president-of-iom-outed-as.html">here</a>) how company directors should be accountable for the actions of their companies, even if they also happen to also be academic or non-profit leaders.  Thus, academic and non-profit leaders may find themselves in the awkward position of being held accountable for unethical or even illegal actions of the companies on whose boards they sit.  Such corporate actions may contradict the mission of the institutions whose leadership is their primary job, and whose mission they are supposed to uphold.  While we were writing about these somewhat convoluted, but very important issues, a fellow blogger discovered yet another academic leader serving on the board of a health care corporation, while simultaneously the media reported multiple examples of that corporation's ethical misadventures on his watch.  Those who care about that academic institution ought to question whether a leader accountable for such misadventures is fit to continue to lead.  Yet so far, no one has publicly juxtaposed this leaders' responsibilities to his institution's mission and how the corporation over which he is supposed to exercise stewardship has been taking actions that contradict that mission The Dean of the College of Medicine at the University of Illinois Is a Director of Novartis Paul Levy, blogging on Not Running a Hospital, <a href="http://runningahospital.blogspot.com/2014/01/time-to-fire-somebody.html">noted </a>a print advertisement for the Intuitive Surgical daVinci robot.  The advertisement implied endorsements by academic surgeons at the University of Illinois.  Levy suggested that surgical faculty acting as salespeople for a device company appeared to violate the university code of conduct.  This <a href="http://runningahospital.blogspot.com/2014/01/where-is-ui-board-of-trustees.html">concern was heightened</a> by the status of several of the surgeons in the advertisement as clinical and academic leaders.     Mr Levy then <a href="http://runningahospital.blogspot.com/2014/01/how-fish-rots.html">discovered</a> that the Dr Dimitri Azar, Dean of the University of Illinois College of Medicine, to whom these surgeon report, was on the board of Novartis, the multinational pharmaceutical and device company.  Dr Azar's position is easily verified by consulting the <a href="http://www.novartis.com/about-novartis/people/board-directors.shtml">Novartis web-site</a>.  Mr Levy further discussed the case <a href="http://runningahospital.blogspot.com/2014/02/how-much-should-dean-be-paid-who-should.html">here</a> and <a href="http://runningahospital.blogspot.com/2014/02/all-in-days-work-700000-450000.html">here</a>.  Then he  <a href="http://runningahospital.blogspot.com/2014/03/a-matter-of-public-trust.html">reviewed</a>  the extensive dealings between the University of Illinois and Novartis and its subsidiaries, raising suspicion that the Dean's known involvement with the company may have lead to its favorable treatment by the university. But wait, there is another major dimension to this problem.  Novartis' Recent Ethical Misadventures Novartis, over which Dr Azar is supposed to be exerting stewardship, has made a series of ethical missteps according to recent media reports.  I will summarize them in chronological order according to the date of media publication. Novartis, Roche Fined for Anti-Competitive and Deceptive Practices in Italy to Encourage Sales of Lucentis According to a March 5, 2014 <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/06/business/international/italy-fines-novartis-and-roche-in-collusion-case.html">article</a> in the New York Times, Novartis was fined for anti-competitive and deceptive practices,  <blockquote class="tr_bq">Italian antitrust authorities said on Wednesday that they had fined two Swiss pharmaceutical companies, Novartis and Roche Holdings, a total of $250 million for colluding to keep doctors from prescribing a relatively inexpensive eye treatment in favor of a more expensive drug. <div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="436" data-total-count="723" itemprop="articleBody">The authorities said the two companies had sought to steer doctors away from Avastin, an anticancer drug developed by Genentech that has been used for years as an off-label treatment for common eye problems. Instead, they said, the companies had tried to 'channel demand toward the much more expensive drug Lucentis, through an artificial distinction between the two products,' essentially by overstating the dangers of Avastin use.</div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="235" data-total-count="958" itemprop="articleBody"> </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="235" data-total-count="958" itemprop="articleBody">It is not the first time such substitution efforts have brought an unwanted spotlight: Genentech got into trouble in the United States in 2010, when it was found to be offering doctors <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/business/04eye.html?pagewanted=all" title="Previous coverage of the rebates.">secret rebates</a> to prescribe Lucentis over Avastin.</div> Novartis, which holds the rights to market the two drugs outside the United States, has been fined 92 million euros by the Italian regulators. And Roche, which acquired Genentech in 2009, was fined 90.5 million euros, for a total of about $250 million in the Italian case. </blockquote> Given that many drug companies have been cited for marketing their products for unapproved, or off-label uses, it is ironic that in this case, Novartis managers said they were shocked, shocked by the ruling because it could encourage off-label use: <blockquote class="tr_bq"> Novartis said in a statement that the Italian decision 'openly encourages and promotes the widespread unlicensed intravitreal use of Avastin contrary to the requirements of European and Italian regulatory law,' and 'undermines the European regulatory framework designed to protect patient safety.'</blockquote> The NY Times also reported that one method the two companies were alleged to use to encourage Lucentis rather than Avastin use was to launder their message through patient advocacy groups, <blockquote class="tr_bq"><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="230" data-total-count="4756" itemprop="articleBody">The Italian authorities discovered numerous messages between Roche and Novartis in which the two companies discussed what kinds of communications would be needed to induce doctors and hospitals to adopt the more expensive product.</div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="230" data-total-count="4756" itemprop="articleBody"> </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="313" data-total-count="5069" itemprop="articleBody">According to one such message from early 2013, cited in documents in the case released Wednesday, growing cost pressure in Italy and France to use Avastin had 'reinforced the political dimension of the debate,' and 'further reinforcement of the Lucentis value proposition to all stakeholders is critical.'</div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="239" data-total-count="5308" itemprop="articleBody"> </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="239" data-total-count="5308" itemprop="articleBody">Another message called for the companies to 'work with diabetes patient groups to increase voiced concerns about safety risks of unlicensed therapies' — a reference to Avastin — for an eye condition known as diabetic macular edema.</div></blockquote><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="239" data-total-count="5308" itemprop="articleBody"> </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="239" data-total-count="5308" itemprop="articleBody">Novartis Paid Doctors to Act as Marketers for Starlix and Other Drug</div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="239" data-total-count="5308" itemprop="articleBody"> </div>After the New York state attorney general filed suit against Novartis, a March 15, 2014 Newsday <a href="http://www.newsday.com/news/health/novartis-gave-doctors-thousands-to-prescribe-pills-feds-allege-1.7404245">article</a> included interviews with physicians that suggested how the company turned them into disguised marketers: <blockquote class="tr_bq">Dr. Howard Brand says he had one goal when he gave a speech at a Miami hotel in the early 2000s -- to tout the diabetes pill Starlix for the pharmaceutical company Novartis.  The giant Swiss drugmaker, which reported $57.9 billion in global sales in 2013, paid the Stony Brook endocrinologist $1,500 for his talk at a doctors' meeting, Brand said in an interview. Novartis also paid for Brand's airfare and his weekend hotel stay, he said. 'It was self-serving, but I also thought it was a benefit to patients,' said Brand,...</blockquote> Furthermore, <blockquote class="tr_bq"> Brand, the Miami speaker, said in an interview that investigators had not approached him about the payments he accepted. He said Novartis paid him a total of $10,000 to $12,000 for speeches, mostly at restaurant dinners it sponsored. The payments, which Brand said he received before 2010, are not reflected on the Novartis website. ' Even [with] the notion that we were paid solicitors, I think people really paid attention,' he said. 'Of course, a lot of doctors just enjoyed going to dinner.' Brand said he accepted more than $60,000 in speaker's fees from drugmakers, including Novartis, in one two-year period. </blockquote> Another physician allowed that Novartis furnished the material for his "educational" talks, <blockquote class="tr_bq">Dr. Howard Hertz, a Babylon internist, confirmed that he had received $4,000 from Novartis in 2010 and 2011 for talking about its hypertension drugs to colleagues. Hertz said he dealt with a Novartis sales rep who brought information about the company's pills to his office. 'He would educate me about the product, give me slides to study,' he said. Hertz said the slides were on CDs and made him an expert on Novartis drugs such as Diovan, a blood pressure pill, Lotrel and Valturna. He said he spoke mostly about Diovan and Lotrel. 'We had dinners whereby I would speak about the products and speak to the colleagues,' Hertz said. 'I became somewhat of an expert in these products.'</blockquote> Note that Dr Hertz's expertise seemed to come exclusively from information provided by a company salesperson, making it obvious that he was not hired for his prior expertise as a physician. The prosecutors allege that Novartis' payments of some $65 million amounted to illegal kickbacks.  This is only an allegation.  However, it seems obvious that Novartis paid physicians to act as salespeople.  Newsday asked bioethicist Arthur Caplan about these actions, <blockquote class="tr_bq">'To even hear about it just takes my breath away,' Caplan said. 'It sounds like egregious, inexcusable violations of agreed upon legal and ethical standards . . . with an inexcusably complicit group of physicians,' Caplan said.</blockquote> Japanese Hospital Investigation Alleged Novartis Manipulated Research A March 17, 2014 <a href="http://www.fiercepharma.com/story/tokyo-hospital-exec-says-novartis-employees-deeply-involved-leukemia-drug-t/2014-03-17">article</a> in FiercePharma stated that Japanese investigators found that Novartis had manipulated clinical research to make its results appear more favorable to the company's products, <blockquote class="tr_bq">Novartis employees were more involved in a Japanese drug study than previously suspected, a Tokyo hospital official said. In an investigative report released last week, the University of Tokyo Hospital said doctors not only let Novartis  employees collect patient data from various trial sites but also allowed the Swiss drugmaker into its records on all 255 trial participants, Japanese media reports. Plus, at least one Novartis employee was involved in planning the trial, designed to compare side effects of multiple leukemia treatments, the hospital found, according to Japan's Mainichi news. Those treatments included Tasigna<a href="http://www.fiercepharma.com/tags/tasigna"></a>, the company's follow-up to the hugely successful Gleevec (imatinib). In fact, according to NHK World, hospital director Takashi Kadowaki said Friday that Novartis employees were 'virtually managing the study.' </blockquote> <a href="http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20140315p2a00m0na006000c.html">According to Mainichi</a>, this sort of clinical research manipulation is taken very seriously in Japan, <blockquote class="tr_bq"> Senior Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare officials called the case a serious situation and said the researchers involved showed a lack of ethics. They called for a detailed investigative report from the hospital and are considering punitive measures. The ministry will consider a new law to prevent corruption in clinical tests in the wake of a scandal involving the clinical trial of antihypertensive drug Valsartan.</blockquote> It is obvious this story is not from the US, because the drug company has already apologized, <blockquote class="tr_bq"> A representative for Novartis Pharma's PR division said, 'We want to apologize to patients and doctors. We must refrain from comment on the investigation, which is being handled outside our company.'</blockquote> Indian Regulator Cancels Import License Alleging Fraud by Novartis to Market Veterinary Drug A March 18, 2014 <a href="http://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/novartis-might-face-legal-action-penalty-for-faking-documents-114031800760_1.html">article</a> in the New Delhi Business Standard told how Indian regulators accused Novartis of fraud, opening with, <blockquote class="tr_bq">Swiss drug maker Novaris is likely to face legal action for allegedly faking documents to seek registration of its veterinary product Tiamulin Hydrogen Fumarate (80 per cent granules) in India. The drug regulator, Drugs Controller General of India (DCGI)), has already cancelled the company’s import licences as well as existing registration certificate for the product.</blockquote> Summary So in just the last few weeks, evidence appeared that Novartis engaged in collusive anti-competitive and deceptive practices marketing drugs in Italy, paid physicians to act as marketers in the US, manipulated drug studies in Japan, and lost an import license in India due to alleged fraud.  By the way, in 2013, Novartis was fined for anti-competitive practices in its marketing of Fentanyl by the European Commission (look <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/12/the-camels-aching-back-johnson-and.html">here</a>), and in 2011 its Sandoz subsidiary settled allegations of misreporting prices in the US for $150 million (look <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/12/legal-settlements-have-become-so-common.html">here</a>)   Other Novartis misadventures from 2010 and earlier appear <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/Novartis">here</a>.  So Novartis has quite an impressive, if not infamous record of ethical failures. While he is Dean of medicine at the University of Illinois, Dr Dimitri Azar is also a director of Novartis, and hence has a fiduciary duty for the company's stewarship.  While questioning Dr Azar's role in the participation of his faculty in advertising for Intuitive Surgical, perhaps those who care about the reputation of the University of Illinois and its ability to fulfill its mission ought to ask how the poor ethical track record of the company Dr Azar is supposed to be overseeing reflects on his ability to defend the mission of the university and the medical school. While parties that enable or enter into arrangements that create conflicts of interest in health care may be thinking mainly of the advantages that they may accrue, many of these arrangements create accountability and obligations, even if they are honored mainly in the breach.  If leaders of academic medicine and health care non-profit organizations insist on becoming directors, and hence stewards of for-profit health care corporations, they ought to be held accountable for the actions of these corporations, and how these actions reflect on their primary obligations to the academic and non-profit organizations they have also pledged to serve. True health care reform would make health care leaders accountable for putting patients' and the public's health ahead of their own self-interest.

Turnabout is Fair Play - Why University of Illinois Students, Faculty and Alumni Should Question the Dean of Medicine about Novartis' Ethical Misadventures

Since 2006, we have posted repeatedly about what was then a new species of severe conflicts of interest. This occurred when leaders of aca...

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Clinical Trial Prestidigitation - Making Old Data Look Worse So New Data Looks Better

Prestidigitation, also known as <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sleight_of_hand">sleight of hand</a> or legerdemain, is a form of stage magic which uses dextrous manipulation and misdirection to distract the viewer from seeing it. The example, <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-25/boehringer-kept-pradaxa-analysis-from-fda-records-show.html">reported</a> by Bloomberg on 26 February, 2014, is discussed late because the nature of the trick meant it took me a while before I understood how it was done. Background Pradaxa, a new anticoagulant, was approved by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 2010 for use by patients with atrial fibrillation to prevent strokes.  We <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2014/02/cant-this-be-avoided-how-corporate.html">discussed</a> previously the release of documents during litigation that showed how marketers from its manufacturer, Boehringer - Ingelheim, attempted to manipulate the results of a clinical study of the drug.  The study results initially seemed to suggest that blood tests should be used to monitor therapy with it.  However, that would have contradicted a key marketing message, that Pradaxa was more convenient than warfarin because it did not require blood tests for monitoring. Litigation by patients alleging that Boehringer-Ingelheim concealed the severity of the bleeding risks caused by the drug continues.  The Bloomberg <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-25/boehringer-kept-pradaxa-analysis-from-fda-records-show.html">report</a> dealt with how the company responded to requests by the FDA for data about these risks.     The Question from the FDA As per Bloomberg, <blockquote class="tr_bq">In the Pradaxa case, the regulators asked Boehringer to compare fatal bleeding reports received by the FDA against the number of patients using the drug in order to establish a death rate. The request was made to allow the FDA to 'evaluate the need for modifications to the Pradaxa label or future study,' according to a letter made public as part of the court files. The company reported back that 6.1 of every 10,000 patients who used the drug after approval developed fatal bleeding, the court documents showed. The regulators also asked Boehringer to reanalyze results from an earlier study used to gain approval to see how that rate compared. </blockquote> So, in other words, the FDA wanted to assess the rate of bleeding reflected by reports received after the drug had gone on the market (that is, the FDA was evaluating data from post-marketing surveillance.)  To do so, it wanted to calculate the proportion of patients who took the drug who developed fatal bleeding.  Then it wanted to compare this rate to the rate of fatal bleeding found in the previous controlled trials of the drug done by the manufacturer to secure drug approval.  Note that these trials are also considered the major source of clinical research evidence about the benefits and harms of the drug. The major source of clinical evidence about Pradaxa (dabigatran) was the RE-LY trial (Randomized Evaluation of Long-Term Anticoagulation Therapy), sponsored by Boehringer-Ingelheim, published in the New England Journal of Medicine [Connolly SJ, Ezekowitz MD, Yusuf S et al.  Dabigatran versus warfarin in patients with atrial fibrillation.  N Engl J Med  2009; 361:1139-1151.  Link <a href="http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa0905561">here</a>.]   The trial reported that the rates of life-threatening bleeding were 1.8% per year for warfarin, 1.45% for high dose dabigatran, and the rates of major bleeding of 3.36% versus 2.21%.  However, the trial report did not include rates of fatal bleeding per se, nor the rates of patients with major bleeding who then died.   Presto Chango According to Bloomberg, here is how Boehringer-Ingelheim responded to the question from the FDA about the rate of fatal bleeding. <blockquote class="tr_bq">That effort produced two separate analyses by the company, according to the unsealed court documents. One, looking only at people whose primary cause of death was bleeding, found 5.8 of 10,000 patients died per year. The other, which included anyone who had a major bleeding event and died for any reason, found a rate of 19.5 fatal events per 10,000 patients per year, the documents show.  The report sent to the FDA, though, contained only the analysis indicating the death rate from the earlier research was much higher than the numbers seen after approval, according to the court filings. Potentially, such a finding could head off any after-market action by the FDA because the data showed the drug was safer after it was approved and widely used.   </blockquote> So, to recapitulate, Boehringer-Ingelheim used results from the RE-LY trial to persuade the FDA that its new drug was safe and effective.  However, the company did not include, at least in the results reported publicly, any measure of fatal bleeding in patients given the drug.  It now appears that the rate of major bleeding in patients who subsequently died was high, perhaps high enough to have raised questions about the safety of the drug prior to approval, had it been revealed. However, after the drug had been approved, when the question was about rates of severe bleeding after the drug had been marketed, the company furnished an analysis of data from the clinical trial that now showed a very high bleeding rate. That was the major misdirection, the sleight of hand.. It would make the rate of fatal bleeding in the post-marketing surveillance data appear low.  But apparently this data also kept the eyes of the FDA focused on the question of bleeding in the post-marketing period.  Did no one in the FDA notice that while this high rate of bad bleeding in the trial made the post-marketing surveillance look good, it also raised questions about whether the drug should have been thought to have been safe enough to be approved in the first place?   By the way, Bloomberg also reported that Boehringer-Ingelheim performed a trick for European regulators,  <blockquote class="tr_bq">Selective disclosure of Pradaxa information may have camouflaged a serious safety signal, according to an assessment report from <a href="http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/" rel="external" title="Open Web Site">European Medicines Agency’</a>s Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use in August 2012. That agency is the European Union’s drug regulator. Boehringer also didn’t give the EMA the figures showing that real-world bleeding rates were higher when the committee conducted a similar review and published a report in August 2012. The panel’s analysis, which concurred with Boehringer’s, concluded that Pradaxa’s bleeding risks among the general population were 'substantially less' than the rates seen in the study the drugmaker used as the basis for approval. It didn’t have the analysis showing the risk was higher using a different approach, according to the unsealed files. 'If the reporting rate in the post-marketing phase had been higher than in' Boehringer’s study, 'there would clearly have been a safety concern,' agency officials wrote. </blockquote> Summary We have discussed a variety of ways that companies that sell health care goods (like drugs or devices) and services may <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/manipulating%20clinical%20research">manipulate clinical research</a> to make their products look better than they may actually be.  It appears that these companies may hire very clever people who are very knowledgeable about the design of clinical research to game the system to aid marketing, but meanwhile obfuscate the clinical research data that clinicians and patients rely on to make clinical decisions in the best interests of patients, and that policy makers rely on to make decisions in the best interests of the public.  So far, the hands of the corporate marketers seem to be quicker than the eyes of the clinicians, patients, and policy makers. I wonder, though, how those very clever people sleep well at night knowing that their talents for legerdemain are being used to increase revenues and make corporate insiders rich, at the expense of patients, and of patients' health? As I have said before, and most recently in the context of <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2014/02/cant-this-be-avoided-how-corporate.html">discussing</a> the previous example of manipulation of clinical research to support Pradaxa marketing,  I strongly advocate that those who author authoritative systematic reviews, meta-analyses, and clinical practice guidelines base their work on extremely rigorous, skeptical reviews that assume the likelihood that all commercially sponsored published clinical research has been manipulated (and that research that even post manipulation could not be twisted to support marketing many have been <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/suppression%20of%20medical%20research">suppressed</a>)  Reviews, meta-analyses, and guidelines that were not so based on extremely critical review should also be viewed with a jaundiced eye.  Perhaps it is possible to devise legal and regulatory methods to at least make such manipulation more transparent.  Maybe this case, however, should again suggest that clinical research, that is, research on human beings, should be completely separated from those with vested interests in selling products or services which could be better hyped were the research turn out in their favor.  Hat tip to <a href="http://1boringoldman.com/index.php/2014/02/26/foot-in-mouth-disease/">1BoringOldMan</a>.

Clinical Trial Prestidigitation - Making Old Data Look Worse So New Data Looks Better

Prestidigitation, also known as sleight of hand or legerdemain, is a form of stage magic which uses dextrous manipulation and misdirection ...

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American Board of Internal Medicine Policy Condones Keeping Conflicts of Interest Secret

The latest complication of the CareFusion/ Dr Denham/ NQF/ Dr Cassel/ ABIM case was the revelation that the current president of the NQF, Dr Christine Cassel, after resigning her position on the board of directors of for-profit publicly held group purchasing organization Premier Inc, was found to have been on the board of for-profit privately held predecessor of Premier Inc since 2008 (see post<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2014/03/the-plot-of-carefusion-dr-denham-nqf.html"> here</a>).  Before Dr Cassel was CEO of NQF, she had been the president and CEO of the American Board of Internal Medicine for 10 years.  So apparently she was on the board of the predecessor of Premier Inc for about five years while she was leading the ABIM. This relationship appears to be as serious a conflict of interest for Dr Cassel in her previous role as leader of the ABIM as it was for her current role as leader of the NQF.  Since she had this conflict for so long as leader of the ABIM without public disclosure, it seems logical to ask whether she was a long-term violator of ABIM policy, and hence sort of a long-term rogue CEO? To answer that, one needs to review the ABIM <a href="https://www.abim.org/conflict-of-interest-policies.aspx">conflict of interest policy</a>. What Sort of Conflicts of Interest Does the ABIM Ban? The official wording is: <blockquote class="tr_bq">It is the policy of the Board that Directors, Subspecialty Board and Committee members, consultants and other individuals involved in developing ABIM products will not be employed (as staff or as a consultant) at greater than fifty percent by a commercial entity, except in such instances where explicit exceptions to the policy have been made by the Board. Unless a compelling reason is presented for granting an exception, such individuals will be asked to resign their position of service to the Board.</blockquote> Let us parse that a bit.  The policy applies to the leadership of the ABIM, Directors, Subspecialty Board and Committee members, consultants, and individuals involved in developing products, so it applies broadly. However, conflicts are only banned when they exceed a 50% time commitment.  But the time commitments required by many sorts of relationships among physicians and health care corporations are ill-defined.  For example, in the initial public offering <a href="http://investors.premierinc.com/common/download/download.cfm?companyid=AMDA-24J90L&fileid=694238&filekey=8152d7d0-9413-4cdb-920c-e10edc2d3c05&filename=Premier_IPO_Prospectus.pdf">prospectus</a> for Premier Inc, the public document that announced her membership on the new public company's board, there is no information about the time commitment required by this position. Also, physicians can earn large amounts of money for relatively small investments of time.  For example, not only can members of boards of directors make hundreds of thousands of dollars for ill defined time commitments unlikely to approach 10% full time equivalent, but also, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/key%20opinion%20leaders">key opinion leaders</a> acting as primarily marketing consultants can also earn hundreds of thousands of dollars for undocumented time commitments, and physicians can earn hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars from royalty payments from patent holdings that require no current work (look<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/11/orthopedic-device-makers-reveal.html"> here</a> for example).  So a physician could easily earn hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars from health care corporations without approaching a nominal 50% time commitment.  I suspect that this ban would apply to almost no one other than a full-time corporate employee. Furthermore, the policy is not absolute.  Exceptions can be made for "compelling reasons," which are not further defined.  This is thus a very weak element of the policy  How are Conflicts of Interest that are Not Banned Managed? The policy states, <blockquote class="tr_bq">Given that prohibition of all financial interest in commercial entities would excessively restrict the pool of eligible candidates for Board membership, the Board's policy to regulate conflicts of interest consists of disclosure, self-monitored (and Chair-overseen) abstention from participation in decision-making that relates to the conflict, and adjudication of potential conflicts of interest situations by the Conflict of Interest Committee of the Board of Directors. Individuals (non-staff) involved in developing ABIM policy and products — ABIM Directors, Subspecialty Board Directors and Committee members, consultants, the President and relevant staff members will be requested at the time of their appointment and annually thereafter to execute a disclosure.</blockquote> I would note that the rationale is highly questionable.  One often hears from apologists for conflicts of interest that all competent doctors are conflicted because health care corporations identify all the most expert doctors and hire them as speakers, consultants, etc (look <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/09/latest-version-of-argument-that-we-are.html">here</a> for example).  We have shown examples on this blog of some less than stellar individuals with extensive financial involvements with health care corporations.  For example, we have posted (<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/06/which-physicians-pharmaceutical.html">here</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/10/not-best-and-brightest-drug-marketers.html">here</a>, and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/01/im-not-here-to-sell-drugs-then-why-use.html">here</a>) about physicians dubbed key opinion leaders by pharmaceutical companies who lacked board certification, had been subject to sanctions by state medical boards, had received warnings from the FDA, had lost hospital privileges, and had been convicted of crimes. On the other hand, there probably are quite a few smart, dedicated, expert physicians who eschew major financial involvement with health care corporations. The policy goes on to state that for some individuals, the management would be recusal from participation in relevant decisions, <blockquote class="tr_bq"> Test Committees and other policy committees will be expected to discuss the conflict of interest policy, and to share relevant disclosures, with the expectation that committee members will disclose any significant actual or perceived conflicts and abstain from discussion where such conflicts exist. In the event that a potential conflict of interest situation arises about which explicit policy does not exist, the Conflict of Interest Committee of the Board will hear and judge the appeal.</blockquote> Note that recusal may be inadequate management.  Committees tend to learn to get along with each other.  The views of committee members who have to recuse themselves may be well known, and may be supported by their fellow members even when their recused colleagues are not in the room. Worse, the policy says nothing about whether higher level ABIM leaders even need to recuse themselves.  The recusal policy apparently only applies to committee members.  There seems to be no policy about management of conflict affecting So the management of conflicts of interest proposed by the ABIM document seems to be rather minimalist. Who Makes Decisions about ABIM Conflicts of Interest? The policy states that disclosures will be made to, <ul><li><blockquote class="tr_bq">President and Chair of the Board;</blockquote></li></ul><blockquote></blockquote><ul><li><blockquote>The chairs of the relevant Subspecialty Boards, Test-Writing Committees, and other Committees of the Board, members who serve on the relevant Boards and Committees, and staff working with the respective committees;</blockquote></li></ul><blockquote></blockquote><ul><li><blockquote>The Conflict of Interest Committee members and Conflict of Interest Committee staff,</blockquote></li></ul>As noted above, <blockquote class="tr_bq">adjudication of potential conflicts of interest situations[would be] by the Conflict of Interest Committee of the Board of Directors.</blockquote> However, again it is not clear whether they can adjudicate conflicts affecting anyone other than test and policy committee members.  Furthermore, whether anyone oversees conflicts affecting members of the Board of Directors is not clear. Thus it is not clear who, if anyone, manages conflicts of interest affecting the top ABIM leaders, particularly the CEO and members of the board of trustees.  This aspect of the policy seems ambiguous. How are Conflicts of Interest Publicly Disclosed? The short answer is they are not.  The relevant wording is: <blockquote class="tr_bq">Information that is disclosed will be kept confidential except to the <ul><li>President and Chair of the Board;</li><li>The chairs of the relevant Subspecialty Boards, Test-Writing Committees, and other Committees of the Board, members who serve on the relevant Boards and Committees, and staff working with the respective committees;</li><li>The Conflict of Interest Committee members and Conflict of Interest Committee staff,</li></ul>except as required for the purposes of continuing medical education.</blockquote> Let me reiterate, conflicts of interest are NOT PUBLICLY DISCLOSED.  They are kept confidential, secret, hidden, opaque.  Only the insiders listed above may know about them. We have been discussing the prevalence and severity of <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/conflicts%20of%20interest">conflicts of interest </a>affecting health care professionals and policy-makers, and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/institutional%20conflicts%20of%20interest">institutional conflicts of interest </a>affecting health care organizations for years.  Based on the principle that sunlight is the best disinfectant, many now agree that disclosure of these conflicts of interest is a necessity, although there is considerable discussion about whether the current movement to make conflicts of interest public will reduce their effects.  However, in my humble opinion, concealing conflicts of interest is inherently dishonest.   Yet that is the policy of the American Board of Internal Medicine. Summary So, while it appears that the former president and CEO of the ABIM had a severe conflict of interest generated by her membership on the board of directors of a privately held for-profit group purchasing organization, her failure to disclose it publicly did not violate ABIM policy. The reason is that the ABIM policy on conflicts of interest appears to be extremely weak and ambiguous.  Worse, it condones keeping conflicts of interest secret, which to me appears inherently dishonest and unethical. This is very disturbing given that the ABIM has great influence on medical practice and health policy, previously was regarded as prestigious and trustworthy, and has been expanding the scope of its activities to make it even more influential, e.g., by now requiring physicians to participate in periodic ABIM sanctioned or sponsored activities and take repeated ABIM exams to "maintain" their board certification. In my humble opinion, if the ABIM wants to continue to be trusted as it has been in the past, it needs a wholesale revision of its conflict of interest policies, and meanwhile needs to completely make public in detail the conflicts of interest affecting individuals who lead it, make its policy, write its examinations, construct its educational and maintenance of certification activities, and produce its other "products."  The ABIM ought to consider suspending attempst to expand its influence, e.g., by intensifying its requirements for maintenance of certification, until it has disclosed all relevant conflicts and improved its conflict of interest policies. As we have said again and again, the web of conflicts of interest that is pervasive in medicine and health care is now threatening to strangle medicine and health care.  For patients and the public to trust health care professionals and health care organizations, they need to know that these individuals and organizations are putting patients' and the public's health ahead of private gain.

American Board of Internal Medicine Policy Condones Keeping Conflicts of Interest Secret

The latest complication of the CareFusion/ Dr Denham/ NQF/ Dr Cassel/ ABIM case was the revelation that the current president of the NQF, Dr...

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To Die in Texas - Dr Mahmood's Apparently Fatal Stealth Hospital System Collapses Nearly Anechoically

I would bet that most people in the US still think our health care system is highly regulated.  Some may thus conclude that the system is basically safe, because, for example, drugs have to be proven safe and effective to be approved by the government, and hospitals must be licensed and run by competent people who are thoroughly vetted.  Of course, some people still think that the US has, or had until recently, the best health care system in the world (look <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-care/best-health-care-system-really-john-boehner-f2D11598594">here</a>). Furthermore, the view that less regulation is always better is no quite popular in the US and elsewhere.  For example, after the chemical spill threatened water supplies in the capitol of West Virginia, the Dallas News <a href="http://www.dallasnews.com/news/west-explosion/headlines/20131221-despite-crises-from-salmonella-outbreak-to-west-blast-rick-perry-s-pushed-freer-rein-for-business.ece">reviewed</a> Texas Governor Rick Perry's consistent attacks on government regulation.    <blockquote class="tr_bq">'American business in general, and American agriculture specifically, have had enough of bureaucracy at both the federal and state levels, but especially bureaucracy out of Washington,' Perry said at a congressional hearing. 'The men and women who feed and clothe this nation are suffocating under the weight of mounting federal regulations.' That was back in 1993, when Perry was Texas’ agriculture commissioner. Now Texas’ longest-serving governor, Perry has remained steadfast in his opposition to government regulations. </blockquote> Some who take such a neoliberal stance may say the health care system is over-regulated, and thus is inefficient and not innovative, leading to our high costs and poor access. However, an amazing case out of Governor Perry's Texas that was made public last year, and I regret I just heard about recently, suggests how little health care may be regulated, and how unregulated health care, whether or not it is efficient, may be deadly. As <a href="http://www.dallasnews.com/investigations/patient-safety/headlines/20130713-patients-died-amid-federal-state-regulatory-inaction.ece">reported</a> in the Dallas News, July, 2013, in the last few years there seems to have been an epidemic of quality problems in a number of seemingly unrelated small rural Texas hospitals.  The report focused first on one hospital, Renaissance Hospital Terrell After for-profit hospital corporation Renaissance Healthcare declared bankruptcy in 2008 (look <a href="http://www.bizjournals.com/houston/stories/2008/09/08/story6.html">here</a>), it sold its hospital in Terrell, Texas to RH Terrell Management LLC owned by one Dr Tariq Mahmood.  Almost immediately, however, there was trouble.  First Edwina Henry, the quality director, spied a doctor making questionable entries in patients' charts: <blockquote class="tr_bq">from her office, she had a clear view of doctors’ foot traffic through the medical records department. When she saw [Dr Tariq] Mahmood jotting in patient charts, she knew he wasn’t seeing patients. Mahmood himself had not been credentialed to treat patients — a process in which management vets backgrounds and competencies of doctors. Part of Henry’s job was tracking such evaluations. She also knew it was a breach of privacy laws to review patients’ medical records. 'I immediately questioned some of the clerks and [insurance billing] coders,' she said. They were deeply concerned, saying he was altering the patients’ records to help boost reimbursements for insurance claims, Henry said.</blockquote> When Ms Henry complained, things did not go well, <blockquote class="tr_bq">Henry made her confidential call to the bankruptcy court in early November 2008, alleging potential fraud and threats to patient care that were eluding government notice [Ed - note that the hospital was going through bankruptcy proceedings and had just been acquired by a new owner]. The court forwarded her complaint to the U.S. Justice Department, the Texas attorney general’s office and the state health department, officials confirmed. Later that month, the state health department sent an inspector to the hospital. However, the visit was brief, Henry said, and the inspector didn’t interview her or seek her help in obtaining records. Williams, the health department spokeswoman, told The News her agency’s records show the inspector was unable to substantiate violations at the time. Henry was terminated from Renaissance as part of a 'restructuring'.... </blockquote>Then the hospital was cited for turning patients away from the emergency department, <blockquote class="tr_bq">At Renaissance, two women in labor, one bleeding, were refused treatment. The inspection reports don’t reveal whether the women suffered complications because of the delays. A Renaissance employee told one of the women that if she 'could stand there and have a conversation with them then (she) wasn’t about to have a baby,' reports say.</blockquote> Then there were problems with infection control, <blockquote class="tr_bq">At Renaissance, no supervision over infection control could be found. For three months in the summer of 2010, no one was in charge of tracking infectious diseases or preventing their spread.</blockquote> The next year, the problem was blood transfusions <blockquote class="tr_bq">Inspectors returned to Renaissance in September 2011 to investigate a botched blood transfusion procedure. They found that a registered nurse had not supervised the patient’s care. In another case, an inspector witnessed an unsupervised vocational nurse administering blood to a patient, despite no evidence that she was competent to do so — another violation.</blockquote> In 2012, <blockquote class="tr_bq">During the summer, the Texas secretary of state had revoked Renaissance’s business charter for failure to pay franchise taxes. That office didn’t share the information with the health department; it isn’t required to do so. In September, state health regulators notified Renaissance that they were proposing a $35,050 fine for 13 violations, including the nursing supervision failures, dating as far back as 2010. Williams, the health department spokeswoman, could not explain why the fine process took nearly two years since the first violation. </blockquote> Finally, in 2013, patients started to die, <blockquote class="tr_bq">In January of this year, when state inspectors returned to Renaissance, they found nursing supervision failures yet again. This time, the failures had led to three deaths: All ER patients. All with severe breathing difficulties. All receiving little to no intervention as their conditions worsened.</blockquote> In particular, <blockquote class="tr_bq">[Eve] McCallum sought her own care after complaining of shortness of breath during a family dinner. McCallum had chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. When she was admitted, nurses were ordered to monitor her vital signs and oxygen levels. Her breathing soon improved, said her niece, Lou Ann Sims. 'We were fully expecting to pick her up the next morning,' Sims said. Instead, they watched helplessly as her condition deteriorated. On Christmas Day, a physician explained to McCallum’s family that she had to be transferred to the intensive care unit. Later, Sims witnessed a scene she can’t let go of: Her aunt lay connected to a ventilator while a nurse stood smoking a cigarette just outside the door. The nurse had propped open the door with an IV pole. The family immediately sought to have McCallum transferred to another hospital. But hospital officials told them 'this would be a lateral move and was not allowed,' according to a transcript of an interview the family later conducted with state officials. McCallum died two days later. Inspectors wrote that a licensed vocational nurse had been left in charge of her treatment, without a registered nurse’s oversight. There was no evidence an RN had assessed her condition on admission or was watching over her in the ICU. They could find no doctor orders to place her on oxygen, no order for medications administered to her, 'nor evidence of communication with the M.D.' Suspecting more than just care breakdowns at Renaissance, McCallum’s family reported her death to the Texas attorney general’s fraud-control unit.</blockquote> So partially in response to this egregious case, <blockquote class="tr_bq">By February, the state health department had moved to revoke Renaissance’s operating license, and CMS had ordered its federal funding terminated — only the ninth time nationally in the last three years CMS had taken such a step.</blockquote> Even those steps could not shut down the hospital, but city officials took that last step due to the failure to pay taxes. Other Hospitals Dallas News reporter Miles Moffeit found several other cases of severe problems at small hospitals owned by Dr Mahmood, with at least one patient death apparently resulting, . Shelby Regional Medical Center This hospital was owned by Tenet Healthcare, but was sold to another of Dr Mahmood's companies, Shelby Medical Holdings, in 2007 (look <a href="http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-management-administration/shelby-regional-medical-center-in-texas-closes-its-doors.html">here</a>).  In 2009, this hospital was also cited for providing insufficient treatment in the emergency department. In 2012, things were really falling apart, <blockquote class="tr_bq">In October 2012, inspectors were at Shelby chronicling dirty, clogged air-conditioners and failures to prevent ceiling plaster 'from falling into the patient food service line and contaminating food.' Those problems put patients’ safety in 'immediate jeopardy,' they wrote. As inspectors roamed Shelby’s halls in December, the power suddenly went out in four buildings, though not in the main hospital facility itself. The electric bill hadn’t been paid. They found other debts stacking up, too — as much as $190,442 owed to as many as 79 service providers. Signs of neglect were everywhere. Only three of 20 patient rooms inspected were 'fully functional for patient care,' they wrote. They found holes in walls, dirty and tattered curtains, and patients complaining of heat pouring from the faulty A/C system.</blockquote> Finally, in 2013, another patient died, <blockquote class="tr_bq">On Wednesday, CMS cut off federal funding to ... Shelby Regional Medical Center in Center in East Texas after regulators said a patient rushed there by ambulance never received treatment from a doctor. The ER physician wouldn’t leave his 'sleep room,' the inspection report said, resulting in the patient’s death. Regulators also cited the hospital for failing to vet backgrounds of doctors and nurses. </blockquote>Apparently soon thereafter Dr Mahmood shut the hospital down due to "legal issues that ... [he] is facing," <a href="http://lightandchampion.com/article/003856-mahmood-closes-shelby-regional-medical-center-staff-volunteers-time-until-doors-shut">per</a> the Shelby Light and Champion. Lake Whitney Medical Center Dr Mahmood apparently purchased this hospital from a struggling local hospital authority in 2007.   In 2009, it was cited for inadequate care in the emergency department, <blockquote class="tr_bq">At Lake Whitney, a nurse acknowledged to inspectors that she had shredded records of a patient who was denied care following a fall, according to a report. The 'patient wasn’t going to pay anyway,' the nurse was quoted as saying in the document.</blockquote> In 2010, there was evidence of major infrastructure problems, <blockquote class="tr_bq">At Lake Whitney, patients were served food on rusty 'over-the-bed tables that were a source of possible infections for open wounds.' Bulging ceiling tiles exposed pipes. Pavement outside a main hospital door was 'cracked and unlevel,' putting patients at risk of injury. </blockquote>As Dr Mahmood's legal troubles mounted, the hospital was sold to Frontier Hospitals Inc (look <a href="http://watchdogblog.dallasnews.com/2013/08/florida-company-takes-over-lake-whitney-medical-center-effectively-dissolving-embattled-owners-troubled-chain.html/">here</a>). Cozby-Germany Hospital  I have been unable to discover when Dr Mahmood purchased this hospital.  In 2010, it became apparent that the hospital was not properly licensed, <blockquote class="tr_bq">'The administrator reported the new owner had not notified (CMS) … and has not applied for hospital licensure with the state licensing agency,' a report said. [The owner] ... also was found to have appointed his own employees to the hospital’s governing board of directors, instead of independent outsiders.</blockquote> And there were more severe problems with credentialing, <blockquote class="tr_bq">At Cozby-Germany hospital, hospital inspectors discovered that the chief of staff and another doctor had expired medical licenses. There were no 'functional' nurse and doctor credentialing processes, and clinical policies had not been updated since 2008, they said. The hospital pledged reforms.</blockquote> But in May 2011, records show, Cozby hired one of Texas’ most notorious doctors, Rolando Arafiles. <blockquote class="tr_bq">At the time, Arafiles had been placed on probation by the medical board for allegations of harming nine patients, overbilling and improper coding at a Winkler, Texas, facility, according the board. He also was disciplined for intimidating the Winkler nurses who blew the whistle on his practices. In November, Arafiles would be convicted of two felonies linked to the retaliation and would surrender his license.</blockquote> In 2013, two local doctors purchased the hospital. The Vanishing Owner What made this series of cases all the more amazing is that it was really one interlinked case.  All these hospitals, plus a few more, had the same owner.  Yet no one, especially  no one in state or federal government knew that until 2013 when the facts were uncovered by Mr Moffeit. <blockquote class="tr_bq">[Dr Tariq] Mahmood, a Pakistan-trained doctor, obtained his Texas medical license in 1978. Since 2008, he has practiced medicine only at his Central Texas Hospital in Cameron, south of Waco, records with the Texas Medical Board show. Older documentation is not available. Over the last two decades, he has purchased at least six hospital companies and two home-health care agencies, according to filings with the Texas secretary of state. He also has invested his money outside health care, acquiring the historic Hotel Lawrence in downtown Dallas, property records show. In addition to Renaissance, Shelby and Central Texas Hospital, Mahmood owns the Lake Whitney Medical Center in Whitney and Cozby-Germany Hospital in Grand Saline. He sold Community General Hospital in Dilley around the time of his arrest in April. The hospitals have no common corporate identity and little or no website presence, making it difficult for anyone to know they are owned by Mahmood or are part of a chain.</blockquote> However, much bout Dr Mahmood was mysterious, and the deliberate cultivation of mystery might have slowed the response to this case. <blockquote class="tr_bq">Mahmood is rarely seen in the communities where his hospitals are located, say business associates and city officials. Sometimes they catch a glimpse of him passing by in a chauffeur-driven car. 'He’s almost impossible to track down' to discuss business matters, said Tom Elliott, a director for a nonprofit company that owns the hospital building in Grand Saline. 'He lets his people do the talking.' Mahmood is a mystery to many of his own employees. He works almost entirely behind the scenes, they say, focusing largely on the business side of his operations. He often is traveling or spending time at his 10,000-square-foot gated estate in Cedar Hill, they say. 'We see him maybe once a year,' said one of his hospital physicians. 'The employees say he doesn’t like confrontation. I say he just doesn’t like to communicate. He seems to live in a different world.'</blockquote> Aftermath  At some point, the shadowy Dr Mahmood may have to answer for all this, at least to some extent, <blockquote class="tr_bq">In April, federal authorities charged the 62-year-old Cedar Hill resident with defrauding Medicare and Medicaid programs through $1.1 million in false billings. Mahmood is accused of directing employees at his Central Texas Hospital in Cameron to alter underlying information in insurance claims from his other hospitals. 'In many cases,' the indictment alleges, these were 'for patients he had never seen.' Mahmood pleaded not guilty, and his attorney said he denies all charges. He has declined repeated interview requests from The Dallas Morning News. </blockquote> Note, however, that these are charges of financial fraud.  They do not obviously have to do with poor quality care, risks to patients' safety, or the deaths of at least three patients as discussed above. This case was so bad that even the current Governor of Texas, Rick Perry, a politician known for taking a small government, minimal regulation stance, at least said he was going to take some action, as <a href="http://www.dallasnews.com/investigations/patient-safety/headlines/20130719-perry-orders-investigation-into-oversight-of-troubled-rural-hospital-chain.ece">reported</a> again in the Dallas News, <blockquote class="tr_bq">The governor’s office has ordered a 'deep and comprehensive look' at health care facilities owned by Dr. Tariq Mahmood, whose chain of rural Texas hospitals avoided serious regulatory action despite years of endangering patients. The inspector general for the state Health and Human Services Commission and one of the agencies it oversees, the state health department, will conduct separate investigations, officials said Friday.</blockquote> And in February, 2014, the Dallas News <a href="http://www.dallasnews.com/investigations/20140206-texas-hospitals-chief-faces-fraud-charges-over-use-of-stimulus-grants.ece">reported</a> that the chief financial officer of the Dr Mahmood's stealth hospital chain was also in hot water, <blockquote class="tr_bq">The top administrator of a chain of hospitals that collapsed under the ownership of a North Texas physician faces charges that he defrauded the federal government of nearly $800,000 in stimulus funds. Joe White of Cameron rose from maintenance man to head administrator and chief financial officer over hospitals once owned by Dr. Tariq Mahmood. Now he joins Mahmood in facing the possibility of prison time. Like Mahmood, who pleaded not guilty, White is accused of identify theft and bilking the federal government of health care dollars. White has yet to enter a plea.</blockquote> Note that the CFO and apparently COO was not even a professional generic manager.  He was a former maintenance man  and operator of a Radio Shack store..  Dr Mahmood has not yet come to trial.  Many questions about the case remain unanswered:  -  Did Mahmood the only person besides his CFO cum maintenance man in charge of all this, or did he have other backers,  cronies, associates? -  What happened to the rigorous state investigation promised by Rick Perry? -  Given that what went on harmed patients, and hence was not just financial manipulation, are there any civil lawsuits pending?  Are there any other criminal investigations?\ Furthermore, despite its egregious nature, this case was amazingly <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/anechoic%20effect">anechoic</a>  The only national recognition I could find was i<a href="http://runningahospital.blogspot.com/2013/07/hospital-slumlord.html">n Paul Levy's Not Running a Hospital blog.</a>  Seven months later, I could find nothing in the national media, nothing in medical and health care literature.  Despite the amazingly poor quality of care in evidence, despite the fact that patients died, I could find no cries of outrage from those who proclaim to support quality health care or patient safety.  Summary Dr Mahmood and his chief operating and financial officer collectively displayed leadership that was ill-informed (the COO/ CFO was a former maintenance man), incompetent (see the egregious health quality problems listed above), self-interested (note the size of Dr Mahmood's mansion versus how little was obviously spent on his hospitals), opaque and dishonest (note how Dr Mahmood's ownership of the hospitals was obscured), and allegedly criminal.  This leadership persisted over at least eight years until it culminated in cases of apparently needless patient deaths.   The amazing case of the stealth for-profit hospital system run by Dr Mahmood, and how its combined problems failed for so long to get systemic regulatory notice hardly suggest that our health care system is heavily regulated, or that current regulation can be relied upon to reassure patients that all is well and that the system is safe. In fact, in the case of Dr Mahmood, government regulators did not seem to even want to know too much about hospital ownership, <blockquote class="tr_bq">Top health regulators weren’t even aware Mahmood owned several hospitals until The News sought information about them earlier this year. Regulatory agencies aren’t set up to track problem hospital owners or hold them accountable. Nor do they look for patterns of care breakdowns inside hospital chains. 'We just don’t have that authority,' said David Wright, deputy regional administrator for CMS. The federal agency oversees the state health department’s inspections of federally funded hospitals. 'We can only address problems in stand-alone facilities.'</blockquote> Furthermore, it appears that modern regulators have decided to become hospital managers' and owners' best friends, <blockquote class="tr_bq">The process allows hospitals to avoid sanctions if they cooperate. Hospitals submit “corrective action plans” to remedy failures. It can take months for state regulators to bring penalties such as fines against a facility. In the case of Renaissance, it took years. 'We want to do what’s in the best interest of the patients, and our regulatory philosophy is to get hospitals into compliance,' said Carrie Williams, spokeswoman for the Texas Department of State Health Services. 'We’re not in the business of shutting down hospitals. We will give them some leeway and work with them.'</blockquote> Of course, this minimalist, light touch regulatory methodology may have made some sense in an earlier era when nearly all hospitals were small community not-for-profit organizations, non-profit academic institutions, or were run by local governments.  It seems quaint, and hopelessly out of date in an era when most hospitals are part of <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/hospital%20systems">ever larger systems,</a> now often owned for-profit corporations, and when hospital system CEOs who are professional, and thus <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/generic%20managers">generic managers</a>, not health care professionals, in an era of <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/financialization">financialization</a> and "maximizing shareholder value," that is, making short-term revenue the most important outcome. Instead, the current minimalist regulatory system seems insufficient to prevent patients from dying of poor care allowed by poor leadership of health care organizations.  Much of the content of this blog has been about bad health care leadership, i.e., leadership that is <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/ill-informed%20management">ill-informed</a>, incompetent, unsympathetic or <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/mission-hostile%20management">hostile to health care professionals' values</a>, self-interested, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/conflicts%20of%20interest">conflicted</a>, dishonest, or even <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/health%20care%20corruption">corrupt</a>.  In my humble opinion, health care regulation ought to be sufficient to promote competent, caring, unconflicted, honest leadership that is accountable for putting patients' interests ahead of self-interest.  Regulation needs to be more intense, and much smarter, geared to the reality of a health care system that is now largely for-profit in an era when management dogma puts revenue ahead of all other concerns. Maybe the deaths of some patients in Dr Mahmood's Texas hospital will finally let the air out of the mindlessly anti-regulatory bubble, and start some discussion of intelligent regulation to improve patient safety. However, that cannot happen if this case remains anechoic.  I regret it took me so long to find it, but now I have done my part to start some echoes.  But where are the media, where are the journal editors, and where are those who so loudly proclaim their interest in patient safety and health care quality? In particular, there are several prominent organizations that claim to promote health care quality and patient safety.  These organizations make these claims- <a href="http://www.jointcommission.org/topics/patient_safety.aspx">Joint Commission</a> <blockquote class="tr_bq"> For more than 60 years, The Joint Commission has been a champion of patient safety by helping health care organizations to improve the quality and safety of the care they provide. </blockquote> <a href="http://www.leapfroggroup.org/about_leapfrog">Leapfrog Group</a> <blockquote class="tr_bq"> The Leapfrog Group is a voluntary program aimed at mobilizing employer purchasing power to alert America’s health industry that big leaps in health care safety, quality and customer value will be recognized and rewarded.</blockquote> <a href="http://www.qualityforum.org/who_we_are.aspx">National Quality Forum</a> <blockquote class="tr_bq"> Transforming our healthcare system to be safe, equitable, and of the highest value will take time and the work of many, but the potential rewards are great. The National Quality Forum (NQF) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan, public service organization committed to this transformation. </blockquote> <a href="http://www.rwjf.org/en/about-rwjf/our-mission.html">Robert Wood Johnson Foundation</a> <blockquote class="tr_bq">Our efforts focus on improving both the health of everyone in America and their health care—how it's delivered, how it's paid for, and how well it does for patients and their families. </blockquote> These  organizations should the ones to start the conversation about improving rather than forever shrinking regulation.   I have not heard anything from them about the deadly hospitals of Dr Mahmood.  Are they listening now?  Will we ever hear from them?  Time will tell....   Note: the entire Dallas News series on the Mahmood hospitals can be found <a href="http://res.dallasnews.com/interactives/collapseofcare/">here</a>.

To Die in Texas - Dr Mahmood's Apparently Fatal Stealth Hospital System Collapses Nearly Anechoically

I would bet that most people in the US still think our health care system is highly regulated. Some may thus conclude that the system is ba...

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"Can't This be Avoided?" - How Corporate Marketers Manipulated a Clinical Research Report to Avoid "Undermining" Marketing Messages

Documents newly made public in the course of litigation about the drug Pradaxa show granular details about how clinical research may be manipulated by corporate research sponsors intent on marketing their products. Background As <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/06/business/study-of-blood-clot-drug-pradaxa-unnerved-its-maker-documents-suggest.html">reported</a> by the New York Times, the litigation is over allegations by thousands of patients and families that privately held Boehringer Ingelheim concealed the bleeding risks of the anticoagulant drug Pradaxa.  <blockquote class="tr_bq">Pradaxa and two other recently approved drugs, Xarelto and Eliquis, are in a race to gain market share from warfarin, a generic drug that for decades has been the standard treatment for preventing blood clots and strokes. Many patients viewed the older warfarin as a nuisance because it requires frequent blood tests and careful attention to diet and other drugs. <div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="190" data-total-count="2310" itemprop="articleBody">The new drugs do not require such monitoring, yet claim to be as good, or better, at preventing strokes and blood clots in patients with a heart-rhythm disorder known as atrial fibrillation.</div></blockquote><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="190" data-total-count="2310" itemprop="articleBody"> </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="190" data-total-count="2310" itemprop="articleBody">However,</div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="190" data-total-count="2310" itemprop="articleBody"></div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="190" data-total-count="2310" itemprop="articleBody"> </div><blockquote class="tr_bq"><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="180" data-total-count="747" itemprop="articleBody">Since its approval in 2010, the drug, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/03/business/a-rising-anti-stroke-drug-is-tied-to-risk-of-bleeding-deaths.html" title="From the archives.">which can cause fatal bleeding</a>, has brought in more than $2 billion in sales in the United States, according to the research firm IMS Health. </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="96" data-total-count="843" itemprop="articleBody"> </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="96" data-total-count="843" itemprop="articleBody">It has been prescribed to 850,000 patients, but has also been linked to more than 1,000 deaths. </div></blockquote><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="96" data-total-count="843" itemprop="articleBody"> </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="96" data-total-count="843" itemprop="articleBody">Internal Documents Show the Influence of Marketers on a Clinical Research Report</div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="96" data-total-count="843" itemprop="articleBody"> </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="96" data-total-count="843" itemprop="articleBody">As summarized by the NY Times, </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="96" data-total-count="843" itemprop="articleBody"> </div><blockquote class="tr_bq"><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="96" data-total-count="843" itemprop="articleBody"> The makers of the blood-thinning drug Pradaxa were so worried that an internal research paper would damage drug sales that some employees not only pressured the author to revise it, but suggested it should be quashed altogether, according to newly unsealed legal documents.</div></blockquote><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="96" data-total-count="843" itemprop="articleBody"> </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="96" data-total-count="843" itemprop="articleBody">In particular,</div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="96" data-total-count="843" itemprop="articleBody"> </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="96" data-total-count="843" itemprop="articleBody"> </div><blockquote class="tr_bq"><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="463" data-total-count="2773" itemprop="articleBody">The documents show that Boehringer Ingelheim employees openly fretted when it appeared that the results of the research paper, written by Paul A. Reilly, a clinical program director at the company, indicated that some patients could benefit from monitoring of their blood. A certain segment of patients, the paper found, absorb too little of the drug to effectively prevent strokes, while another group absorbs so much that they are at a higher risk for bleeding.</div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="463" data-total-count="2773" itemprop="articleBody"> </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="272" data-total-count="3045" itemprop="articleBody">In a draft version of the paper included in the court records, Dr. Reilly and his co-authors detailed specific levels of how much Pradaxa should be in a patient’s bloodstream, and said that keeping some patients within that range would help prevent strokes and bleeding.</div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="149" data-total-count="3194" itemprop="articleBody"> </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="149" data-total-count="3194" itemprop="articleBody">As Dr. Reilly’s draft paper circulated within the company, some employees questioned what the marketing implications of such a conclusion would be.</div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="269" data-total-count="3463" itemprop="articleBody"> </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="269" data-total-count="3463" itemprop="articleBody">One company supervisor, Dr. Jutta Heinrich-Nols, wrote in an email to other employees that she could not believe the company was planning to publish research that would negate a decade’s worth of work proving that patients taking Pradaxa would not need regular tests.</div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="185" data-total-count="3648" itemprop="articleBody"> </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="185" data-total-count="3648" itemprop="articleBody">Publishing the research results, she warned, could make it 'extremely difficult' for the company to defend its long-held position to regulators that Pradaxa did not require testing.</div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="183" data-total-count="3831" itemprop="articleBody"> </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="183" data-total-count="3831" itemprop="articleBody">And, Dr. Heinrich-Nols added in the email, the research, if known, would 'undermine' the company’s efforts to compete with other new anticoagulants, such as Xarelto and Eliquis.</div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="183" data-total-count="3831" itemprop="articleBody"> </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="116" data-total-count="3947" itemprop="articleBody"> 'I would like to ask you to check again whether this is really wanted,' she wrote about publishing the research.</div></blockquote><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="116" data-total-count="3947" itemprop="articleBody"> </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="116" data-total-count="3947" itemprop="articleBody">A second NY Times <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/08/business/new-emails-in-pradaxa-case-show-concern-over-profit.html">article</a> added more details,</div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="116" data-total-count="3947" itemprop="articleBody"> </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="116" data-total-count="3947" itemprop="articleBody"></div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="176" data-total-count="2486" itemprop="articleBody">In one email, from June 2012, an employee wonders about the implications of internal research showing that blood levels of Pradaxa could vary significantly in a single patient.</div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="269" data-total-count="2755" itemprop="articleBody"> </div><blockquote class="tr_bq"><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="269" data-total-count="2755" itemprop="articleBody">'This may not be a onetime test and could result in a more complex message (regular monitoring), and a weaker value proposition … vs. competitors,' wrote the employee, whose name was redacted in accordance with privacy laws in Germany, where the company is based.</div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="269" data-total-count="2755" itemprop="articleBody"> </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="453" data-total-count="3208" itemprop="articleBody">In another, an employee — whose name was also removed — asks about whether a newly available blood test in the United States might be useful for doctors treating patients with Pradaxa, which is also known as dabigatran. Another replies that such a test could be developed 'in-house,' but '2 years ago there was an informed decision NOT to develop this.' The employee continued, 'this would go against the ‘no monitoring’ idea/claim.'</div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="453" data-total-count="3208" itemprop="articleBody"> </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="231" data-total-count="3439" itemprop="articleBody">Employees also continued to question the merits of allowing a research paper to be published showing that some patients could benefit from monitoring of their blood. The paper was <a href="https://content.onlinejacc.org/article.aspx?articleid=1748241&resultClick=24">published on Tuesday</a> but with some details removed.</div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="231" data-total-count="3439" itemprop="articleBody"> </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="198" data-total-count="3637" itemprop="articleBody">'This publication will more harm than be useful for us, neither in the market but be especially harmful in the discussions with regulatory bodies,' one email read. 'Can’t this be avoided?'</div></blockquote><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="116" data-total-count="3947" itemprop="articleBody"> </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="116" data-total-count="3947" itemprop="articleBody">So, in summary, Pradaxa has been marketed basically on its convenience, as a drug whose dosage need not be customized according to frequent blood tests, in contrast to cheaper generic warfarin whose dosage may need adjustment according to frequent blood tests.  Yet a clinical trail sponsored by Boehringer Ingelheim, the manufacturer of Pradaxa, seemingly showed that its risk of bleeding might be dependent on its blood level, and hence perhaps that its dosage should be varied according to blood test.  </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="116" data-total-count="3947" itemprop="articleBody"> </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="116" data-total-count="3947" itemprop="articleBody">However, the manuscript reporting the results of this trial was apparently subject to vetting by multiple company managers whose specific concerns were whether the results of this research "undermined" the marketing message, and hence whether these results should be changed or suppressed to avoid contradicting the company's intended marketing message.   </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="116" data-total-count="3947" itemprop="articleBody"> </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="116" data-total-count="3947" itemprop="articleBody">Let me try to add some context, based on my experiences in academic medicine writing research papers, commenting on colleagues' papers, and reviewing papers for journals.  Considerable discussion among the researchers and clinicians involved in research projects about how manuscripts are worded is the norm.  However, working a perhaps more innocent era, input from people with vested interests in the project producing a particular result was unheard of.  Many health care professionals thus may still act based on the idealistic assumption that clinical research reports are all about science, and not about marketing. </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="116" data-total-count="3947" itemprop="articleBody"> </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="116" data-total-count="3947" itemprop="articleBody">Was the Manipulation Successful?</div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="116" data-total-count="3947" itemprop="articleBody"> </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="116" data-total-count="3947" itemprop="articleBody">A Medscape <a href="http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/820324">article</a> noted that the published version of the research article </div><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="116" data-total-count="3947" itemprop="articleBody"> </div><blockquote class="tr_bq"><div class="story-body-text story-content" data-para-count="116" data-total-count="3947" itemprop="articleBody">found ischemic stroke and bleeding risks were correlated with plasma concentrations of the drug in 9183 patients treated with dabigatran 110 mg or 150 mg twice daily (the available European doses). In their logistic regression analysis, the risk of ischemic stroke was inversely associated with trough concentrations of dabigatran. </div> The researchers concluded that 'the magnitude of the effect of dabigatran plasma concentrations on outcomes in atrial-fibrillation patients in <a href="http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/708133" target="_blank">RE-LY</a> depends strongly on demographic factors, most importantly increasing age.' However, the results also confirmed a wide therapeutic range among those treated with dabigatran, with a more than fivefold variation in plasma concentrations. The researchers concluded there might be a subset of patients who could improve their risk/benefit profile by tailoring the dose of dabigatran. </blockquote> However, <blockquote class="tr_bq">In the paper, there are no references to the optimal plasma concentration of dabigatran, although such statements were in various drafts that circulated throughout the company, according to the New York Times.  When the paper was published online in October, Reilly told Reuters news  that the 'there is no single plasma concentration range that provides optimal benefit-risk for all patients" and that "no monitoring is necessary.' [see relevant Medscape article <a href="http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/812871">here</a>.]</blockquote> So it does appear that the final version of the article included a discussion that was influenced by the marketers' wishes that the results would not appear to contradict the marketing party line.  A rigorous review of the article might have suggested that varying the dosage of the drug according to its blood level might reduce bleeding risk, and hence increase its benefits versus its harms.  However, a casual reading might not have revealed that the data in the study undermined the marketing message that Pradaxa is a better drug than warfarin because it can be given at a fixed dose without the need for inconvenient blood tests.  Thus, the efforts by the marketers to alter the dissemination of the clinical research to support marketing messages and increase sales of the drug and resulting revenues - never mind what the data showed - appeared to be successful.  Conclusions This case study, only made possible by the public release of internal corporate documents in the course of litigation, suggests that in retrospect the dissemination of the results of one particular clinical trial were manipulated in a somewhat subtle way so that the data would not contradict a marketing message that now appears rather fictional. In the absence of litigation, and of a judge willing to make public documents that one party to the litigation doubtless wanted to hide, the manipulation of this particular study might never have been apparent.  Most clinical research is now sponsored by health care corporations with vested interests in how the research turns out.  Much of this research could be manipulated by corporate marketers who wish it to support their marketing messages, the truth be damned.  We (and others) have discussed many <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/manipulating%20clinical%20research">examples of apparent manipulation of clinical research</a>,  However, it is unlikely that we, physicians, health care professionals, health care researchers and policy makers, and the public, will ever know for such which studies were manipulated.  At best, very critical, skeptical, rigorous review can suggest which studies might have been manipulated. In the absence of such review, we are in danger of being swamped in a morass of manipulated research, and thus lead to make clinical decisions that are based mainly on hucksterism, not science. Thus, I strongly advocate that those who author authoritative systematic reviews, meta-analyses, and clinical practice guidelines base their work on extremely rigorous, skeptical reviews that assume the likelihood that all commercially sponsored published clinical research has been manipulated (and that research that even post manipulation could not be twisted to support marketing many have been <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/suppression%20of%20medical%20research">suppressed</a>)  Reviews, meta-analyses, and guidelines that were not so based on extremely critical review should also be viewed with a jaundiced eye.  Perhaps it is possible to devise legal and regulatory methods to at least make such manipulation more transparent.  Maybe this case, however, should again suggest that clinical research, that is, research on human beings, should be completely separated from those with vested interests in selling products or services which could be better hyped were the research turn out in their favor.

"Can't This be Avoided?" - How Corporate Marketers Manipulated a Clinical Research Report to Avoid "Undermining" Marketing Messages

Documents newly made public in the course of litigation about the drug Pradaxa show granular details about how clinical research may be mani...

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