healthy4u: AMIA

From a physician and former USAF air traffic controller/pilot on the state of healthcare IT

From a colleague, a physician and blogger and fellow AMIA member with an eclectic background, on the state of healthcare information technology.  Reposted with his permission. Emphases in bold are mine: <div id="divRpF835024" style="direction: ltr;"></div><blockquote class="tr_bq">To restate the old joke, the nice things about medical informatics standards, are their are so many of them too chose from… don’t think we necessarily need to invest even more time and energy on ever more sophisticated data models or ever more exhaustive standards (which are then largely ignored).  <div> </div><div>The fact of the matter is that the EMR remains in the United States a tool for maximization of reimbursement and as such is not a  technological destination but rather a technological dead end. The driver for proliferation of this ‘dead end’ is the government being willing to fund its expansion with their fervent hope that it will be their magic bullet for finding the cheats and cheaters of Medicare. </div><div> </div><div>When I was in the USAF, I was trained to be a software and systems engineer at their great expense and at my great pleasure. Additionally, I was for several years prior to my medical school career a USAF Air Traffic Controller and so I was intimately familiar with perhaps the most perfect of all known systems engineering efforts the Worldwide Air Traffic Control System, and most remarkably (from the wellsprings of my fading memories) I have 50 hours of stick time in the F-16. </div><div> </div><div>The flying environment of the F-16 which is ‘eyes outside the cockpit’ was made possible by advanced human engineering efforts that resulted in Heads Up Displays of both intense rational and aesthetic beauty that made the machine a joy to fly. </div><div> </div><div>Fast forward 20 years and what am I given as a clinician to work with…. to keep my head out of the cockpit…… spreadsheets…… designed by engineers who like spreadsheets and think in spread sheets…..  and who don’t even take the 30 minutes it takes to articulate the logic of presentation of clinical data, i.e., present the serum salts together with the BUN/Creatinine, present the RDW with the RBC indices and the hematocrit and hemoglobin … present the last 3 d’s worth of data together aggregated by type rather than alphabetized and homogenized and distributed in clinically illogical boxes. </div><div> </div><div>The F-16 was designed by engineers, but pilots oversaw its development and the display of its information systems were always the results of intense end user interaction with the design teams. This type of intense physician interaction and veto power of poor information design efforts does not exist in [the health IT] industry. Their goal is feature proliferation and uniqueness (not commonality) of function as a market differentiation tool and to avoid suits for ‘look and feel’ viz a viz the Apple vs Microsoft suits of the 80’s. </div><div> </div><div>The reality is the train has left, those of us addicted to patient care watch in dismayed horror as our productivity plunges and we struggle to restructure not our workflows but our clinical thought processes to badly designed, logically flawed, and obscenely overpriced documentation tools that distract the expert clinician from a high quality clinical encounter. </div><div> </div><div>Quite honestly gentleman and gentlewomen of the jury, I don’t give a ‘rats a**’ about superior documentation, I am obsessed with superior outcomes, and as somebody who actually has to work with this junk, it all sucks………. and will continue to suck until such time as real world clinicians have veto power over the efforts of systems design teams with respect to their information design efforts…. What information design efforts?  My point precisely……. </div><div> </div><div>As always Acerbically Yours, </div><div> </div><div> </div><div>frnk m (Frank Meissner)</div><div> </div><div>“I am not a pessimist, I am an optimist who has not arrived’ </div><div>                                                                      Mark Twain</div></blockquote> My reply back was: <blockquote class="tr_bq">Frank, on a related note, I was at a fleamarket yesterday looking for radio & electronics stuff (my hobby) and came across a man selling copies of "Aviation Week" from 1960.  He had the entire year's set. I looked through them and was STUNNED. The engineering prowess described in not just the articles but in the advertisements as well - bearings, servos, instrumentation, etc. for aircraft and spacecraft was stunning.  There was even an ad for a desktop computer, a Packard Bell PB-250 with "microsecond add time, 350 transistors and 46 (or so) instructions" for a mere $30,000. What you are describing - and what I have been trying to describe for over a decade and a half - is an intellectually impoverished industry that ignores our specialty [Medical Informatics] and good engineering practices in general. That AMIA has made itself appear comfortable with that status quo has been a disappointment to say the least.  What you just wrote should have come from the leadership, and years ago, not from the grass roots. If physicians could refuse use of clinical IT without sanction, I believe in 2014 that most would walk away. The fact that this technology is now forced on clinicians is not what the pioneers in informatics intended, I am confident; our medical leadership, furthermore, should be ashamed of this set of affairs. As a former medical manager for the Southeastern PA Transportation Authority, even bus drivers and porters in public transit had more rights to determine what equipment they would or would not use in their work, and its configuration, than physicians have in theirs.</blockquote> -- SS

From a physician and former USAF air traffic controller/pilot on the state of healthcare IT

From a colleague, a physician and blogger and fellow AMIA member with an eclectic background, on the state of healthcare information technol...

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"EHRs: The Real Story" - Sobering assessment from Medical Economics

From Medical Economics - "EHRs: The Real Story",  pg. 18-27, Feb. 10, 2014, available <a href="http://www.cci.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/EHRs_Real_Story_Medical%20Economics.pdf">here</a> (PDF). Full issue at <a href="http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/sites/default/files/images/MedicalEconomics/DigitalEdition/Medical-Economics-February-10-2014.pdf">http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/sites/default/files/images/MedicalEconomics/DigitalEdition/Medical-Economics-February-10-2014.pdf</a> - it is large, 12 MB: <blockquote class="tr_bq">... "Despite the government’s bribe of nearly $27 billion to digitize patient records, nearly 70% of physicians say electronic health record (EHR) systems have not been worth it. It’s a sobering statistic backed by newly released data from marketing and research f rm MPI Group and Medical Economics that suggest nearly two-thirds of doctors would not purchase their current EHR system again because of poor functionality and high costs."</blockquote> Here are other key findings from this national survey: <ul><li>73% of the largest practices would not purchase their current EHR system. The data show that 66% of internal medicine specialists would not purchase their current system. About 60% of respondents in family medicine would also make another EHR choice. </li></ul><ul><li>67% of physicians dislike the functionality of their EHR systems. </li></ul><ul><li>Nearly half of physicians believe the cost of these systems is too high. </li></ul><ul><li>45% of respondents say patient care is worse since implementing an EHR. Nearly 23% of internists say patient care is significantly worse. </li></ul><ul><li>65% of respondents say their EHR systems result in financial losses for the practice. About 43% of internists and other specialists/subspecialists outside of primary care characterized the losses as signifcant.</li></ul><ul><li>About 69% of respondents said that coordination of care with hospitals has not improved.</li></ul><ul><li>Nearly 38% of respondents doubt their system will be viable in five years. </li></ul><ul><li>74% of respondents believe their vendors will be in business over the next 5 years.</li></ul> <div>My own views are: While some might dismiss such surveys as well as reports of harms as "anecdotes" (those same persons conflating scientific discovery with risk management, see <a href="https://exchangeweb.drexel.edu/owa/redir.aspx?C=LYQ0kvWIAEGlr6MBedQBY4tGF9IZCNEIO-wCybP0fwH6J_hSfD2Oiv3jiryTYaXcgidWN-ajWas.&URL=http%3a%2f%2fhcrenewal.blogspot.com%2f2011%2f08%2ffrom-senior-clinician-down-under.html" target="_blank"></a><a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/08/from-senior-clinician-down-under.html">http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/08/from-senior-clinician-down-under.html</a>), I observe that such articles/surveys are increasing in frequency the past few years and are coming from reasonably capable observers - clinicians - .unlike, say, a Fox News survey of pedestrians on complex political matters. Another physician survey is here:  <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/01/honest-physician-survey-on-ehrs.html">http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/01/honest-physician-survey-on-ehrs.html.</a> Here's an interesting ad hoc survey of nurses:  <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/07/candid-nurse-opinions-on-ehrs-at.html">http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/07/candid-nurse-opinions-on-ehrs-at.html</a>. . This is not what the Medical Informatics pioneers intended, and is not due to physicians being Luddites (a topic I addressed at <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/03/doctors-and-ehrs-reframing-modernists-v.html">http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/03/doctors-and-ehrs-reframing-modernists-v.html</a>). In my opinion, organizations that have the expertise to change the current trajectory of this technology such as the American Medical Informatics Association (<a href="http://www.amia.org/">AMIA</a>) needs to leave its tweed-jacket academic comfort zone and become more proactive - or perhaps I should say aggressive - in combating the industry status quo.  </div><div></div><div> The health IT industry trade associations such as <a href="http://www.himss.org/">HIMSS</a> have no such qualms about aggressively and shamelessly pushing their version of EHR utopia, an agenda that has led to massive profits for the industry... but to clinician survey results such as above.  And to injured and dead patients.</div><div></div><div> -- SS </div>

"EHRs: The Real Story" - Sobering assessment from Medical Economics

From Medical Economics - "EHRs: The Real Story" , pg. 18-27, Feb. 10, 2014, available here (PDF). Full issue at http://medicale...

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JAMIA: Reduction in medication errors in hospitals due to adoption of computerized provider order entry systems

A new article appeared online 20 February 2013 in the Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association entitled "Reduction in medication errors in hospitals due to adoption of computerized provider order entry systems" (<a href="http://jamia.bmj.com/content/early/2013/01/27/amiajnl-2012-001241.full" target="_blank">link to fulltext</a>) by David C Radley, Melanie R Wasserman, Lauren EW Olsho, Sarah J Shoemaker, Mark D Spranca and Bethany Bradshaw. The authors performed a meta-analysis of the literature on Computerized Practitioner Order Entry (CPOE) systems in inpatient settings and concluded: <blockquote class="tr_bq">"Processing a prescription drug order through a CPOE system decreases the likelihood of error on that order by 48% (or in  a range of 41% to 55% with ninety five percent confidence).  Given this effect size, and the degree of CPOE adoption and use in hospitals in 2008, we estimate a 12.5% reduction in medication errors, or ∼17.4 million medication errors averted in the USA in one year." </blockquote> It is important to know the potential benefits of CPOE, as the government has been pushing this technology since the foundation of the <a href="http://www.healthit.gov/newsroom/about-onc" target="_blank">Office of the National Coordinator</a> (for health IT) within HHS since 2004.  Indeed, reimbursement penalties on Medicare will start in 2015 for non-adopters of government <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/03/on-oncs-proposed-establishment-of.html" target="_blank">certified</a> health IT. It is especially important to get to the truth about CPOE specifically, and health IT in general, in terms of risks, benefits, return on investment, improvements, and alternatives. Not long before this new JAMIA article appeared, an active study of EHR problems with voluntary reporting by members of the <a href="https://www.ecri.org/Pages/default.aspx" target="_blank">ECRI Institute's</a> Patient Safety Organization (PSO) <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/02/peering-underneath-icebergs-water-level.html" target="_blank">produced some concerning data</a>.  Namely, that over a 9-week period starting April 16, 2012, and ending June 19, 2012, 171 health information technology-related problems were reported from just 36 healthcare facilities, primarily hospitals. Eight of the incidents reported involved patient harm, and three may have contributed to patient deaths. Obviously, extrapolating those number to:  1)  a much higher number of hospitals, of which the U.S. alone has <a href="http://www.aha.org/research/rc/stat-studies/fast-facts.shtml" target="_blank">approximately 5,700</a> plus other facilities such as long-term care, and private physician offices; 2)  over a full year, not just 9 weeks;  3) accounting for the perhaps 5% voluntary reporting level (per Koppel) of issues such as medication errors; 4) plus accounting for (per FDA) the issue of lack of recognition of IT as contributing to medical incidents (this list is not all-inclusive) - the results are of concern. Thus, work such as in this new JAMIA article on CPOE is important.  The article can be downloaded in its entirety as of this writing from the link above.  The article describes a methodology that is quite complex, and obviously a great deal of time and effort was put into it.  It appears to be a valiant effort to get us one step closer to the truth.  This should be applauded. I was impressed on first reading of this literature meta-analysis and its statistical calculations. (Actually I needed to read it several times to fully grasp the methodologies involved.) The question arose in my mind, however: can this article's conclusions be true, and the ECRI PSO Deep Dive study be true, at the same time? Prior to going into an analysis and perhaps detailed critique of the methodology, and knowing the difficulties and contradictions the literature on this topic presents, I decided first to look at the source articles selected from the literature for inclusion in the JAMIA meta-analysis. In doing so, issues became apparent that shed light on the difficulties of meta-analyses on topics such as this. The only methodological issue I will mention at this time is that the study used a <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/06/criticism-of-surrogate-endpoints-in.html" target="_blank">surrogate endpoint</a> - medication "error" rates before, and after, implementation of CPOE, rather than patient outcomes.  (The reason I put "error" in quotes is that, as the authors describe regarding study limitations, the exact definition varies from site to site and study to study.  They also acknowledge the limitations of using such an endpoint.)  Surrogate endpoints, however, may or may not reflect the actual information being sought regarding outcomes. As Roy Poses noted in a June 2008 post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/06/criticism-of-surrogate-endpoints-in.html" target="_blank">Criticism of Surrogate Endpoints in Whose Interests?</a>": <blockquote class="tr_bq">... The problem with surrogate endpoints is that they are surrogates for the real thing. In many cases, a treatment may appear beneficial when measured by its affect on such endpoints, but not turn out to be beneficial when measured by its affect on real clinical outcomes, e.g., alleviation of symptoms, improvement of function, and prolongation of survival. There are many reasons why this may be the case. </blockquote>This weakens the present study as a basis for social re-engineering.  The authors responsibly acknowledge that via the statement in the conclusion that: <blockquote class="tr_bq">Future research in this area will be critically important to inform policy and funding decisions regarding the development and implementation of CPOE in care delivery. </blockquote> When I reviewed the studies that were used for the meta-analysis, however, my enthusiasm for the results was diminished. The authors write: <blockquote class="tr_bq">Using the search terms of Ammenwerth et al, we updated the search using PubMed in February 2009, identifying 390 studies. Each was reviewed by two study authors (MRW and DCR). After applying the a priori inclusion/exclusion criteria, 10 studies were retained. [Listed in footnotes 10–19 - ed.]</blockquote><div id=":1cb"> Here are the 10 studies retained, as per footnotes #10 - 19.  Short excerpts (I am trying to keep this post relatively short) and my very brief comments about each of them are as follows.  Hyperlinks to the summaries and in some cases to fulltext are present in the online study itself at the full text link at top of this post. First, I note no randomized, controlled clinical trials, the gold standard of medical research.  That lack is not the fault of the authors; it is a general feature in the domain of healthcare information technology. That said:  Included study #1 (footnote 10): </div><div id=":1cb">Bates DW, Teich JM, et al, The impact of computerized physician order entry on medication error prevention. Brigham and Women's Hospital, J Am Med Inform Assoc 1999;6:313–21.</div><div id=":1cb"> <blockquote class="tr_bq">... During the study, the non-missed-dose medication error rate fell 81 percent, from 142 per 1,000 patient-days in the baseline period to 26.6 per 1,000 patient-days in the final period (P < 0.0001). Non-intercepted serious medication errors (those with the potential to cause injury) fell 86 percent from baseline to period 3, the final period (P = 0.0003). Large differences were seen for all main types of medication errors: dose errors, frequency errors, route errors, substitution errors, and allergies. For example, in the baseline period there were ten allergy errors, but only two in the following three periods combined (P < 0.0001).  The study periods were as follows: baseline, 51 days, Oct-Nov 1992; period 1, 68 days, Oct-Dec 1993; period 2, 49 days, Nov-Dec 1995; and period 3, 52 days, Mar-Apr 1997. </blockquote> I note that this was a highly advanced setting with long-standing Medical Informatics expertise, performed by Medical Informatics experts of the highest caliber.  This was an ideal environment for the implementation of good health IT.  The results may thus not be generalizable to facilities without that level of experience.  </div><div id=":1cb"></div><div id=":1cb">Also, the study was a considerable number of years ago, some of it two decades ago.  While one might assume the technology has improved, the increased commercial sector involvement since the 1990's, and especially after the HITECH incentives of 2009, may be creating an increased occurrence of bad health IT, and/or implementation in facilities with far less (if any) informatics expertise. Thus, in my view the study's applicability to current times and to all medical organizations is not extremely strong.  Included study #2 (footnote 11): Medication Administration Variances Before and After Implementation of Computerized Physician Order Entry in a Neonatal Intensive Care Unit, Pediatrics 2008;121:123–8 <blockquote class="tr_bq">... Data on 526 medication administrations, including 254 during the pre-computerized physician order entry period and 272 after implementation of computerized physician order entry, were collected. Medication variances were detected for 19.8% of administrations during the pre-computerized physician order entry period, compared with 11.6% with computerized physician order entry (rate ratio: 0.53). Overall, administration mistakes, prescribing problems, and pharmacy problems accounted for 74% of medication variances; there were no statistically significant differences in rates for any of these specific reasons before versus after introduction of computerized physician order entry.</blockquote> Here, 'n' is very small, and there is a finding that the CPOE had no effect on administration mistakes, prescribing problems, and pharmacy problems.  Thus, a ringing endorsement for national CPOE implementation this study is (unfortunately) not.  Included study #3 (footnote 12): The effect of computer-assisted prescription writing on emergency department prescription errors, Acad Emerg Med 2002;9:1168–75.<cite></cite> Without even a summary, my concern here is that ePrescribing and CPOE are different entities.   Inclusion of ePrescibing in a study of CPOE is not entirely without some risk of conflation of results of one with the other.  Included study #4 (footnote 13): Impact of computerized physician order entry on clinical practice in a newborn intensive care unit, J Perinatol. 2004 Feb;24(2):88-93. This article studies gentamicin dosing and turn around times and found that: <blockquote class="tr_bq">"...the accuracy of gentamicin dose at the time of admission for 105 (pre-CPOE) and 92 (post-CPOE) VLBW infants was determined. In the pre-CPOE period, 5% overdosages, 8% underdosages, and 87% correct dosages were identified. In the post-CPOE, no medication errors occurred. Accuracy of gentamicin dosages during hospitalization at the time of suspected late-onset sepsis for 31 pre- and 28 post-CPOE VLBW infants was studied. Gentamicin dose was calculated incorrectly in two of 31 (6%) pre-CPOE infants. No such errors were noted in the post-CPOE period. </blockquote> My comments are that a NICU is a specialized environment with a high ratio of clinicians/staff to patients.  Findings in such an environment again may not be generalizable.  Also, one should ask if complex CPOE systems are really needed for dosing calculations and turn around time improvements.  Simpler and cheaper human/technological solutions might have achieved similar or better results.  Thus, again, while not demeaning the results achieved by this study's interventions in 2004, I have my concerns that this study is not strong evidence of generalizability of even the CPOE surrogate measurement, namely decrease of med "errors."  Included study #5 (footnote 14): A computer-assisted management program for antibiotics and other antiinfective agents. N Engl J Med 1998;338:232–8. <blockquote class="tr_bq">We have developed a computerized decision-support program linked to computer-based patient records that can assist physicians in the use of antiinfective agents and improve the quality of care. This program presents epidemiologic information, along with detailed recommendations and warnings. The program recommends antiinfective regimens and courses of therapy for particular patients and provides immediate feedback. We prospectively studied the use of the computerized antiinfectives-management program for one year in a 12-bed intensive care unit. RESULTS: During the intervention period, all 545 patients admitted were cared for with the aid of the antiinfectives-management program. Measures of processes and outcomes were compared with those for the 1136 patients admitted to the same unit during the two years before the intervention period. The use of the program led to significant reductions in orders for drugs to which the patients had reported allergies (35, vs. 146 during the preintervention period; P less than 0.01), excess drug dosages (87 vs. 405, P less than 0.01), and antibiotic-susceptibility mismatches (12 vs. 206, P less than 0.01). There were also marked reductions in the mean number of days of excessive drug dosage (2.7 vs. 5.9, P less than 0.002) and in adverse events caused by antiinfective agents (4 vs. 28, P less than 0.02).  [Several other benefits omitted for brevity - they can be seen at the JAMIA footnote hyperlink -  ed.]</blockquote></div> My thoughts here are that, while the results were commendable, once again this study took place 15 years ago, and was in a high-staff-to-patient specialized ICU environment.  I also wonder if complex, expensive CPOE is needed to accomplish these tasks as opposed to, say, an online DSS and appropriate workflows and process.  Included study #6 (footnote 15): Impact of computerized prescriber order entry on medication errors at an acute tertiary care hospital. Hosp Pharm 2003;38:227–31. <blockquote class="tr_bq">The authors analyzed medication errors documented in a hospital's database of clinical interventions as a continuous quality improvement activity. They compared the number of errors reported prior to and after computerized prescriber order entry (CPOE) was implemented in the hospital. Results indicated that in the first 12 months of CPOE, overall medication errors were reduced by more than 40%, incomplete orders declined by more than 70%, and incorrect orders decreased by at least 45%. Illegible orders were virtually eliminated but the level of medication errors categorized by drug therapy problems remained significantly unchanged. The study underscores the positive impact of CPOE on medication safety and reemphasizes the need for proactive clinical interventions by pharmacists.</blockquote> This study appears reasonable for inclusion in a meta-analysis, although ideally there might have been accounting for possible influence of non-intervention (computer)-related pre-post interval changes.  The transition to CPOE, training, increased awareness, etc. can influence results, especially short term.  Included study #7 (footnote 16): Error reduction in pediatric chemotherapy: computerized order entry and failure modes and effects analysis. Arch Pediatr Adolesc Med 2006;160:495–8. <blockquote class="tr_bq">Before-and-after study from 2001 to 2004. After CPOE deployment, daily chemotherapy orders were less likely to have improper dosing (relative risk [RR], 0.26; 95% confidence interval [CI], 0.11-0.61), incorrect dosing calculations (RR, 0.09; 95% CI, 0.03-0.34), missing cumulative dose calculations (RR, 0.32; 95% CI, 0.14-0.77), and incomplete nursing checklists (RR, 0.51; 95% CI, 0.33-0.80). There was no difference in the likelihood of improper dosing on treatment plans and a higher likelihood of not matching medication orders to treatment plans (RR, 5.4; 95% CI, 3.1-9.5).</blockquote> Again, the results appear commendable.  However:  there was no difference in the likelihood of improper dosing on treatment plans, and worse, there was found a higher likelihood of not matching medication orders to treatment plans. In fact, this article was accompanied by a letter in response entitled "Primum non nocere", David Dickens, MD; Dianne Sinsabaugh, RPh; Brenda Winger, PharmD, Arch Pediatr Adolesc Med. 2006;160(11):1185-1186 (after some digging, text found at <a href="http://archpedi.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=486317" target="_blank">http://archpedi.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=486317</a>): <blockquote class="tr_bq">Kim et al. demonstrated that in the practice of pediatric oncology, computerized physician order entry (CPOE) reduced improper dosing, missing cumulative doses, and incomplete nursing checklists.  In contrast to these benefits, however, CPOE also resulted in a 5-fold increase in “not matching medication orders to treatment plans.” Although little detail was provided on the nature of these medication order/treatment plan “mismatches,” it implies that chemotherapy ordered through CPOE deviated more often from intended protocol therapy as compared with paper-ordered chemotherapy. While CPOE ostensibly led to more precise chemotherapy dosing, it increased the risk of that chemotherapy being the wrong chemotherapy.</blockquote> The author did respond: "Mismatches between treatment plan and orders at point of therapy increased, but were intercepted and clarified at POC. [By people - ed.].  No incorrect meds were given. On its face, this is not an entirely dispositive proof of CPOE beneficence and raises significant concern that, sooner or later, a person might miss the discrepanc(ies) resulting in unintended adverse consequences.  Included study #8 (footnote 17): Effects of an integrated clinical information system on medication safety in a multi-hospital setting. Am J Health Syst Pharm 2007;64:1969–77. <blockquote class="tr_bq">This study took place at Lifespan health care system that includes Rhode Island Hospital (RIH), a private, 719-bed, not-for-profit, acute care hospital and academic medical center that has a pediatric division, the Hasbro Children’s Hospital; and The Miriam Hospital (TMH), a 247-bed, not-for-profit, acute care general hospital. Methods. The integrated systems selected for implementation included computerized physician order entry, pharmacy and laboratory information systems, clinical decision-support systems (CDSSs), electronic drug dispensing systems (EDDSs), and a bar-code point-of-care medication administration system. The indicators for CPOE with inherent CDSSs demonstrated a significant effect of this functionality on reducing prescribing error rates for three of the four indicators measured: drug allergy detection, excessive dose, and incomplete or unclear order. The fourth indicator measured, therapeutic duplication, did not show a significant effect on prescribing error rates. For the rules engine software CDSS, the colchicine indicator did not show a statistically significant effect on prescribing error rate, but a significant decrease in prescribing errors related to metformin use in renal insufficiency was observed after implementation of the rules engine software and integration with CPOE. </blockquote> Again, these are commendable results, but on its face the technologies involved went far beyond just CPOE, and the results were not uniform.  The actual reduction figures for seven categories were mostly in 50% range, one at 86% (allergy), but the duplicates issue at 8%, not felt statistically significant. Of more concern, there was this in the news in 2011.  A software bug at this organization led to thousands and perhaps tens of thousands of prescription errors that could have (and without definite proof, despite organization denials I would be concerned did) led to injury and death.  I wrote about the malfunction at <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/11/lifespan-rhode-island-yet-another.html">http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/11/lifespan-rhode-island-yet-another.html</a>.  The bug was not discovered for about a year. Other organizations, especially those new to CPOE and/or health IT, face similar risks. Again, this is not a caveat-free endorsement of national CPOE rollout in 2013. Included study #9 (footnote 18): Effect of computer order entry on prevention of serious medication errors in hospitalized children. Pediatrics 2008;121:e421–7. 627 pediatric admissions, with 12 672 medication orders written over 3234 patient-days.  The rate of non-intercepted serious medication errors in this pediatric population was reduced by 7% after the introduction of a commercial computerized physician order entry system, much less than previously reported for adults, and there was no change in the rate of injuries as a result of error. Several human-machine interface problems, particularly surrounding selection and dosing of pediatric medications, were identified. The issues of concern here are bolded and underlined above and need not be restated. Lastly: Included study #10 (footnote 19): Evaluation of reported medication errors before and after implementation of computerized practitioner order entry. J Health Inf Manag 2006;20:46–53. <blockquote class="tr_bq">While a major objective of CPOE is to reduce medication errors, its introduction is a major system change that may result in unintended outcomes. Monitoring voluntarily-reported medication errors in a university setting was used to identify the impact of initial CPOE implementation on medical-surgical and intensive care units. A retrospective trend analysis was used to compare errors one year before and six months after implementation. Total error reports increased post-CPOE but the level of patient harm related to those errors decreased. Numerous modifications were made to the system and the implementation process. The study supports the notion that CPOE configuration and implementation influences the risk of medication errors. Implementation teams should incorporate monitoring medication errors into project plans and expect to make ongoing changes to continually support the design of a safer care delivery environment.</blockquote> This study appeared more a study reporting unintended outcomes than benefits. The total medication error reports increased post-CPOE but the level of patient harm related to those errors decreased.   (That decrease might have been due to human factors, or to serendipity, both of which cannot be expected to protect forever.) The reasons for the changes were described this way: <blockquote class="tr_bq">... Contributing causes. To assist in the development of safety interventions, contributing causes were identified for reported errors. The most common contributing cause was noncompliance to policy and procedure, identified in 40 percent of errors. For example, a previous order may not have been discontinued when a new dose change was entered, resulting in two active orders for the same medication with different dosages  The next most common contributing cause was computer entry errors, seen in 25 percent of mistakes. One example was if a medication order was placed on the wrong patient.  ["Use error" due to confusing user interfaces as recently defined by NIST - as opposed to "user error" - was likely to have contributed to at least some of these errors - ed.]  The next most common error was initial load errors (19 percent). During entry of all current medications on the day of activation, multiple category B errors were made. An example was a written order for sliding scale calcium gluconate “PRN,” which was entered into the CPOE system as “scheduled.” There were also computer design issues that contributed to 10 percent of errors. An example was when the pharmacist received two printouts for methylprednisolone 500 mg IV. He assumed it was a duplicate order, but when he reviewed the CPOE system, he saw that one order was for today and the other was for tomorrow. The dates for these orders were not visible on the order printout from the CPOE system. [This again seems to be 'use error' - ed.]</blockquote><div><div> <div><div> These issues can and will occur anywhere.  Once again, this is not entirely an article, either by itself or in a meta-analysis, that I find ideal in attempted proof of CPOE effectiveness and beneficence. In fact, after I reviewed this source, I noted that this study was eliminated from the inclusion set: <blockquote class="tr_bq">... Based on later expert reviewer feedback, we eliminated one additional study that solely used a voluntary reporting method for error detection, leaving nine studies for our final pooled analysis. </blockquote></div></div><div><div> It would probably not be hard to convince critical thinkers of the possibility this study was removed for reasons other than stated. In summary, while one should not and cannot expect perfection in the studies available in a meta-analysis, due to the difficulties in this domain the literature resources utilized were not ideal, and the surrogate endpoint also raises concern.  (I have not reviewed the entire corpus of potential literature myself.)  The authors conducted a difficult and rigorous study, but one cannot turn data "lead" (as in Pb) to gold (as in Au), no matter how hard one works or however good one's intentions are. The authors did note the limitations of the study, although their conclusion will likely be taken by the industry as a "full steam ahead" signal.   (I do note with some irony the proximity of this article's release to the soon-to-start massive <a href="http://www.himssconference.org/" target="_blank">HIMSS 2013 Annual Conference & Exhibition trade show</a>, March 3-7, 2013 in New Orleans, LA.)  While likely a coincidence, my concern is that CPOE vendors will be talking nonstop about these results. Thus, I agree with the author's conclusion (especially in view of the recent voluntary reporting-based ECRI PSO study) that "future research in this area will be critically important to inform policy and funding decisions regarding the development and implementation of CPOE in care delivery." From a clinical perspective, "primum non nocere" and the avoidance of gambling billions of dollars applies, at least until a better understanding of the technology's risk/benefit ratio and how to improve it occurs. A fraction of those billions would pay for more robust, current studies on the scale needed to get closer to the truth, such as formal post-market, mandatory surveillance that measures not surrogate but primary variables - such as outcomes both positive and negative.  As noted by the authors, voluntary reporting has the least sensitivity towards uncovering error:  <blockquote class="tr_bq">... Reviewed studies used various medication error detection methods. Research suggests that the highest error rates are found through direct observation, followed by chart review, then automated surveillance, and voluntary reporting.  [Citations were made to papers by Flynn and Jha regarding these points - ed.] </blockquote> Formal studies are essential from the basis of medical (e.g., safety and public health), business (e.g., ROI and liability), and social policy perspectives (e.g., are we spending the billions of dollars this technology costs wisely). -- SS Addendum:    I have often been the <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/02/modern-healthcare-health-it-iconoclasts.html" target="_blank">fire-breathing and </a><a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/02/modern-healthcare-health-it-iconoclasts.html" target="_blank">über-skeptic iconoclast</a> on matters such as this.  However, I will allow a true international expert to take on that role this time, Dr. Richard Cook, who had a guest post here yesterday (<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/03/dr-richard-cook-on-health-it-sectors.html" target="_blank">link</a>).  Dr. Cook's opinion on this JAMIA study (again, reproduced here with permission) was this: <blockquote class="tr_bq"><div>A meta-analysis of the literature on the nature of the universe in the mid 1500's would have concluded that the sun revolves around the earth. The data isn't fake, just worthless.  </div></blockquote> -- SS </div></div></div></div>

JAMIA: Reduction in medication errors in hospitals due to adoption of computerized provider order entry systems

A new article appeared online 20 February 2013 in the Journal of the American Medical Informatics Associati...

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AMIA: Enhancing patient safety and quality of care by improving the usability of EHR systems, but ... no sympathy for victims of bad health IT?

A panel of experts from the American Medical Informatics Association have written a paper "Enhancing patient safety and quality of care by improving the usability of electronic health record systems: recommendations from AMIA." The paper is publicly available <a href="http://jamia.bmj.com/content/early/2013/01/24/amiajnl-2012-001458.full.pdf+html" target="_blank">at this link</a> in PDF. The authors are  Blackford Middleton (Harvard Medical School),  Meryl Bloomrosen (AMIA),  Mark A Dente (GE Healthare IT),  Bill Hashmat (CureMD Corp.), Ross Koppel (Dept. of Socology, Univ, of Pennsylvania), J Marc Overhage (Siemens Health Services), Thomas H Payne (U. Washington IT Services),  S Trent Rosenbloom (Vanderbilt Informatics), Charlotte Weaver (Gentiva Health Services) and Jiajie Zhang (University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston). The paper states what has been obvious to this author - and many others - for many years: <blockquote class="tr_bq">ABSTRACT:  In response to mounting evidence that use of electronic medical record systems may cause unintended consequences, and even patient harm, the AMIA Board of Directors convened a Task Force on Usability to examine evidence from the literature and make recommendations. This task force was composed of representatives from both academic settings and vendors of electronic health record (EHR) systems. After a careful review of the literature and of vendor experiences with EHR design and implementation, the task force developed 10 recommendations in four areas: (1) human factors health information technology (IT) research, (2) health IT policy, (3) industry recommendations, and (4) recommendations for the clinician end-user of EHR software. These AMIA recommendations are intended to stimulate informed debate, provide a plan to increase understanding of the impact of usability on the effective use of health IT, and lead to safer and higher quality care with the adoption of useful and usable EHR systems.</blockquote> The paper is a respectable start at acknowledgement of the issues ... albeit years late. That said: I noted some typical language in the article characteristic of the reluctance of the health IT industry and its friends to directly confront these issues.  I wrote a letter to the authors that, as I indicate below, not unexpectedly went unanswered except for one individual -- not even a physician -- who's gone out on a limb professionally in the interest of patient's rights, and as a health IT "iconoclast" (i.e., patient advocate) suffered for doing so (<a href="http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20130126/MAGAZINE/301269955" target="_blank">link</a>).  The lack of a response to the letter is itself representative, in my opinion, of a pathology that renders more rights to the healthcare computer and its makers than patients.   More on this below. First, I note I am rarely if ever cited by the academics.  They are not prohibited from doing so.  I've probably been writing on these issues -- poorly done health IT, improper leadership, the turmoil created, etc., publicly for longer than anyone else in the domain. I also note that the paper is somewhat in the form of an analytical debate.  Analytical debates are relatively ineffective in this domain.  They are like popcorn thrust against a battleship.  The paper, also, appearing as it does in a relatively obscure specialty journal (Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association), will probably get more exposure from this blog post than the entire readership of that journal.  The authors need to be relating these issues in forums that are widely read by citizens and government, not in dusty academic journals - that is, assuming they want the messages to widely diffuse. In my review of the article, I note the following: <blockquote class="tr_bq"><div>... In an Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) workshop on usability in health IT in July 2010, all eight participating vendors agreed that usability was important and many suggested it was a competitive differentiator, although some considered that usability was in the eye of the beholder and that the discipline of usability evaluation was an imperfect science, with results that were not useful.</div></blockquote><div></div><div> A paper like this should have clearly repudiated antiquated viewpoints like that, not merely made note of them.   Not taking a stand is a sign of weakness...or sympathy.</div><div> As a matter of fact, if leaders such as this had paid attention to the 'iconoclasts' and their 'anecdotes', my own mother might not have gone through horrible suffering and death, with me as sad witness as I related to them in my letter below. <blockquote class="tr_bq">... End-users of EHR systems are ultimately accountable for their safe and effective use, like any tool in clinical care. </blockquote> I see a linguistic <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sleight_of_hand" target="_blank">sleight of hand</a> via use the word "tool" to describe HIT and trying to blend or homogenize this apparatus with other "tools" in clinical care.  The HIT "tool" is unlike any other since no transaction of care can occur without it going through this device, and as such, all care is totally dependent on it.  Further, unlike pharma and medical devices, this "tool" is unvetted and unregulated but its use forced upon many users. <blockquote class="tr_bq">... [AMIA] subcommittees reviewed the literature on usability in health IT, current related activities underway at various US Federal agencies, lessons learned regarding usability and human factors in other industries, and current federally funded research activities.</blockquote></div><div> <div></div> <div>Did they speak with the source of the most candid information?  The plaintiff's and defendant's Bars? Need I even ask that question?</div><div></div><div> <blockquote class="tr_bq"><div>... Recent reports describe the safe and effective use of EHR as a property resulting from the careful integration of multiple factors in a broad sociotechnical framework</div></blockquote> This is not merely 'recent' news.  The field of Social Informatics (<a href="http://www.dlib.org/dlib/january99/kling/01kling.html" target="_blank">link</a>), that has studied IT in its social contexts for decades now, has offered observations on the importance of considering multiple factors in a broad sociotechnical framework.   The authors all know this - or should know this, or should have made it their business to know this.  The statement sounds somewhat protective of the HIT and hospital industries for their longstanding negligence towards those issues. <div dir="ltr"></div> <blockquote class="tr_bq"><div dir="ltr">... User error may result in untoward outcomes and unintended negative consequences. These may also occur as a result of poor usability, and may also be an emergent property only demonstrated after system implementation or widespread use.</div></blockquote></div><div> I note the use of the term "user error" and lack of the term "use error" with significant disdain.  As I wrote <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/11/two-opposing-views-of-ehr-1.html" target="_blank">here</a> regarding the views of a HIT industry exexcutive holding the mystical "American Medical Informatics Certification for Health Information Technology",  NIST itself now defines "use error" (as opposed to "user error") as follows: <blockquote class="tr_bq">“Use error” is a term used very specifically by NIST to refer to user interface designs that will engender users to make errors of commission or omission. It is true that users do make errors, but many errors are due not to user error per se but due to designs that are flawed, e.g., poorly written messaging, misuse of color-coding conventions, omission of information, etc. From "NISTIR 7804: Technical Evaluation, Testing and Validation of the Usability of Electronic Health Records." It is available at <a href="http://www.nist.gov/healthcare/usability/upload/Draft_EUP_09_28_11.pdf" rel="nofollow">http://www.nist.gov/healthcare/usability/upload/Draft_EUP_09_28_11.pdf</a> (PDF).</blockquote><div dir="ltr"></div><div dir="ltr"> In the article, indefinites were exchanged with what should have been stronger, declarative statements, and vice versa: <blockquote class="tr_bq">User error ... may also represent a potential health IT-related error yet to happen.</blockquote></div><div dir="ltr"></div><div dir="ltr"> I most decidedly wish they'd stop this "may" verbiage in policy papers like this.</div><div dir="ltr"></div> <blockquote class="tr_bq"><div dir="ltr">... Anecdotal reports suggest that these application differences [where clinicians use more than one commercial EHR system] result in an increased training burden for EHR users.</div></blockquote><div dir="ltr"></div><div dir="ltr"> "Anecdotal"?  How about "obvious to a third grader?"  "Anecdotal" in academic papers often is a term of derision for inconvenient truths such as reports of health IT problems.  Its use often reflects a need for authors using the term (per a senior clinician from Victoria, Australia on the 'anecdotes' issue, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/08/from-senior-clinician-down-under.html" target="_blank">link</a>) "to attend revision courses in research methodology and risk management."</div><div dir="ltr"></div> <blockquote class="tr_bq"><div dir="ltr">... Some suggest that the expected gains sought with the adoption of EHR are not yet realized.</div></blockquote><div dir="ltr"></div><div dir="ltr"> "Some"?  How about "credible experts?"  "Suggest?"  They merely hint at it?  How about "opine?"   </div><div dir="ltr"></div><blockquote class="tr_bq"><div dir="ltr">... The design of software applications requires both technical expertise and the ability to completely understand the user’s goal, the user’s workflow, and the socio-technical context of the intent</div></blockquote><div dir="ltr"></div><div dir="ltr"> In the meantime, AMIA has been promoting national rollout of a technology where, most often, the latter does not apply.</div><div dir="ltr"></div> <blockquote class="tr_bq"><div dir="ltr">To ... transform our healthcare delivery system ... clinicians need to use usable, efficient health IT that enhances patient safety and the quality of care.</div></blockquote><div dir="ltr"></div><div dir="ltr"> This is the typical hyperenthusiast mantra.  Where's the proof?  And, transform into what, exactly?  Vague rhetoric like this in allegedly scientific papers is most unwelcome.</div><div dir="ltr"></div> <blockquote class="tr_bq"><div dir="ltr">Some experts suggest that improving the usability of EHR may be critical to the continued successful diffusion of the technology.</div></blockquote><div dir="ltr"></div><div dir="ltr"> More weak talk.  Why not come right out and say "Credible experts opine that ...."?</div><div dir="ltr"></div> <blockquote class="tr_bq"><div dir="ltr">... While some EHR vendors have adopted user-centered design when developing health information technologies, the practice is not universal and may be difficult to apply to legacy systems.</div></blockquote><div dir="ltr"></div><div dir="ltr"> From the patient advocacy perspective, that's their problem...it's a risk of being in this business.  Patients should not be expected to be used as experimental subjects while IT sellers figure out what other industry sectors have long mastered.   Further, they should be held accountable for failures that result in harm.  Another risk of doing business in this sector that clinicians have long learned to live with...</div><div dir="ltr"></div> <blockquote class="tr_bq"><div dir="ltr">... Some believe it is difficult or impossible to reliably compare one product with another on the basis of usability given the challenges in assessment of products as implemented.</div></blockquote><div dir="ltr"></div><div dir="ltr"> Nothing is "impossible" and again, if it's "difficult", that's the industry's problem.  There is risk of being in the business of medicine or medical facilitation; nobody promised a rose garden, and a rose garden should not be expected. </div> <blockquote class="tr_bq"><div dir="ltr">... Many effects of health IT can be considered to be ‘emergent’ or only discovered after monitoring a system in use</div></blockquote><div dir="ltr"> One might ask,  where's the industry and AMIA been regading postmarket surveillance (common in other health sectors) for the past several decades?</div><div dir="ltr"></div> <blockquote class="tr_bq"><div dir="ltr">... AMIA believes it is now critical to coordinate and accelerate the numerous efforts underway focusing on the issue of EHR usability.</div></blockquote><div dir="ltr"></div><div dir="ltr"> Only "now?"</div><div dir="ltr"></div> <blockquote class="tr_bq"><div dir="ltr">... Establish an adverse event reporting system for health IT and voluntary health IT event reporting</div></blockquote><div dir="ltr"></div><div dir="ltr"> No, no, no ...voluntary reporting doesn't work.  Even mandatory reporting is flawed, but it's better than voluntary. I am invariably disappointed by recommendations like this.  I've observed repeatedly, for example, that "volunatary reporting" of EHR problems already exists - in the form of the FDA MAUDE database - and most HIT sellers' reports are absent.  See my posts on MAUDE <a href="http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/?loc=cases&sloc=MAUDE">here</a>, <a href="http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/?loc=cases&sloc=maude_death">here</a> and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/01/maude-and-hit-risk-mother-mary-what-in.html" target="_blank">here</a>.  (Also, the only one that seems to report may have <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/04/healthcare-it-corporate-ethics-101.html" target="_blank">ulterior motives</a>, i.e., restraint of trade.)</div><div dir="ltr"></div> <blockquote class="tr_bq"><div dir="ltr">... A voluntary reporting process could leverage the AHRQ patient safety organizations (PSO) ... This work should be sponsored by the AHRQ.</div></blockquote><div dir="ltr"></div><div dir="ltr"> These folks clearly don't want any teeth in this.  AHRQ is a research-oriented government branch, not a regulator, nor does it have regulatory expertise.</div><div dir="ltr"> <div>AMIA recommends: </div><blockquote class="tr_bq"><div dir="ltr"><h4>Research and promote best practices for safe implementation of EHR</h4></div></blockquote>In 2013 this is valuable information in the same sense that advice to use sterile technique during neurosurgery is valuable. <div dir="ltr"></div> <div dir="ltr">"Promoting best practices" has been done for decades.  Not mentioned is avoiding worst practices.   I've long written these are not the same thing, as toleration of the inappropriate leadership by health IT amateurs (a term I use in the same sense that I am a Radio Amateur, not a telecommunications professional), politics, empire-building and other dysfunction that goes on in health IT endeavors negates laundry lists of "best practices." </div> What is required is to research and abolish worst practices, including the culture and dynamics of the 'health IT-industrial complex.'  I made this point in my very first website in 1998.  It appears the authors don't get it and/or won't admit to the dysfunction that goes on in health IT projects.   </div><div dir="ltr"></div><blockquote class="tr_bq"><div id="divRpF57737" style="direction: ltr;">... The adoption of useful and usable EHR will lead to safer and higher quality care, and a better return on investment for institutions that adopt them.</div></blockquote><div style="direction: ltr;"></div><div style="direction: ltr;"> "Will?"  With respect to my observation above about the paper's prominent misuse of indefinites vs. stronger declarative terms, the word "may" would have been the appropriate term here.  As I wrote about similar statements from ONC in the NEJM in my 2010 post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/07/new-england-journal-on-meaningful-use.html" target="_blank">Science or Politics? The New England Journal and The 'Meaningful Use' Regulation for Electronic Health Records</a>", I'm quite disappointed seeing speculation and PR presented as fact from alleged scientists and scientific organizations. Finally, I wrote the following email letter to the authors, to which (except for Ross Koppel) I received no reply.  While Dr. Koppel (a PhD) graciously expressed sympathy for my me and mother, the others (many MD's) were silent.</div><div style="direction: ltr;"> Perhaps the silence is the best indicator of their concern for the rights of computers and HIT merchants relative to the rights of people: </div><blockquote><div style="direction: ltr;">Mon, Jan 28, 2013 at 1:12 PM </div></blockquote><blockquote><div style="direction: ltr;">Dear authors, I've reviewed the new paper "Enhancing patient safety and quality of care by improving the usability of electronic health record systems: recommendations from AMIA" and wanted to express thanks for it. It's a good start.  Late, but a good start at returning the health IT domain to credibility and evidence-based practice. It's too bad it didn't come out years earlier.  Perhaps my mother would not have gone through a year of horrible suffering and death, with me as sad witness, due to the toxic effects of bad health IT.  Perhaps you should hear how horrible it was to hear my mother in an extended agitated delirium; to hear her cry hysterically later on when the rehab people told her that her weight was 95 pounds; to have to make her a "no code" and put her on hospice-care protocols, and then to have watched her aspirate a sleeping pill when she was agitated, and die several days later of aspiration pneumonia and sepsis ... in the living room of my home ... and then watch the Hearse take her away from my driveway...as a result of bad health IT. I will be writing more thoughts on your article at the Healthcare Renewal blog, of course, but wanted to raise three issues: 1.  The use of "may" and "will" is reversed, and conflating the term "anecdote" with risk management-relevant case reports.  <ul><li>They may also represent a potential health IT-related error yet to happen.  --->  They likely represent a potential health IT-related error yet to happen</li></ul><ul><li>Anecdotal reports suggest that these application differences result in an increased training burden for EHR users.  ---> Credible reports indicate...</li></ul><ul><li>Some suggest that the expected gains sought with the adoption of EHR are not yet realized. ---> Credible experts opine ....</li></ul><div dir="ltr"><ul><li>Some experts suggest that improving the usability of EHR may be critical to the continued successful diffusion of the technology. --->  "Credible experts opine that ..."</li></ul></div><div dir="ltr"><ul><li>The adoption of useful and usable EHR will lead to safer and higher quality care, and a better return on investment for institutions that adopt them. ---> The adoption of useful and usable EHR may lead to safer and higher quality care</li></ul></div> You really need to show more clarity ... and guts ... in papers like this, and drop the faux academic weasel words. 2.  You neglected to speak to the best source for information on EHR-related harms, evidence spoliation, etc... med mal attorneys. 3.  You also neglected to speak to, or cite, the writings of a Medical Informaticist on bad health IT now going back 15 years - and whose mother was injured and died as a result of the issues you write about - me.  In fact I am rarely cited or mentioned by anyone with industry interests. An apparent contempt for 'whistleblowers' such as myself makes me wonder ... what kind of people are the leaders of health IT, exactly?  Do they value computer's rights over patients'? It is not at all clear to me which has been the primary motivator of many of the health IT leaders. I think the rights which I value are quite clear. Sincerely, Scot Silverstein</div></blockquote></div></div> I neglected to mention the horror of seeing my mother put in a Body Bag before being taken to the Hearse in my driveway. -- SS

AMIA: Enhancing patient safety and quality of care by improving the usability of EHR systems, but ... no sympathy for victims of bad health IT?

A panel of experts from the American Medical Informatics Association have written a paper " Enhancing patient safety and quality of car...

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ONC's Christmas Confessional on Health IT Safety: "HIT Patient Safety Action & Surveillance Plan for Public Comment"

This time of year is certainly appropriate for a confessional on the health IT industry and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/03/doctors-and-ehrs-reframing-modernists-v.html" target="_blank">hyperenthusiasts</a>' sins. In the first report I've seen that seems genuinely imbued with a  basic level of recognition of social responsibility incurred by conducting the grand human subjects experiment known as national health IT, ONC has issued a Dec. 21, 2012 report "Health Information Technology Patient Safety Action & Surveillance Plan for Public Comment." It is available <a href="http://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/safetyplanhhspubliccomment.pdf" target="_blank">at this link</a> in PDF. Statements are made that have appeared repeatedly since 2004 at this blog, and my health IT difficulties site that went online years before this blog (1998 to be exact); it is possible through my early writing and that of like-minded colleagues that we were the origin of most of these memes.  We wrote them with the result of bringing much scorn upon ourselves. After all, "how could health IT possibly not be a panacea?" was the "you are an apostate" attitude I certainly experienced (e.g., as in my Sept. 2012 post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/09/dangers-of-critical-thinking-in.html" target="_blank">The Dangers of Critical Thinking in A Politicized, Irrational Culture</a>"). Observations echoed in the new ONC report: <ul><li>"Just as health IT can create new opportunities to improve patient care and safety, it can also create new potentials for harm."</li><li>Health IT will only fulfill its enormous potential to improve patient safety if the risks associated with its use are identified, if there is a coordinated effort to mitigate those risks, and if it is used to make care safer.</li><li>Because health IT is so tightly integrated into care delivery today, it is difficult to interpret this initial research [such as the PA Patient Safety Authority study  - ed.], which would seem to suggest that health IT is a modest cause of medical errors. However, it is difficult to say whether a medical error is health IT-related. [Not emphasized, as I wrote <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/12/a-very-signifcant-additonal-observation.html" target="_blank">here</a>, is the issue of risk when, say, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/11/lifespan-rhode-island-yet-another.html" target="_blank">tens of </a><a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/11/lifespan-rhode-island-yet-another.html" target="_blank">thousands of prescriptions are erroneous</a> due to one software bug, a feat impossible with paper - ed.]</li><li>The proper steps to improve the safety of health IT can only be taken if there is better information regarding health IT’s risks, harms, and impact on patient safety.</li></ul> Suggested steps to be taken include: <ul><li>Make it easier for clinicians to report patient safety events and risks using EHR technology.</li><li>Engage health IT developers to embrace their shared responsibility for patient safety and promote reporting of patient safety events and risks. [I am frankly amazed to see this admission.  In the past, that sector excused itself entirely on the basis of the "learned intermediary" doctrine and "hold harmless" clauses; where the clinician is an all-knowing Deity between computer and patient.  I've been writing for years, however, that the computer is now the intermediary between clinician and patient since all care 'transactions' have to traverse what is now an enterprise clinical resource and clinician control system - ed.]</li><li>Provide support to Patient Safety Organizations (PSOs) to identify, aggregate, and analyze health IT safety event and hazard reports.</li><li>Incorporate health IT safety in post-market surveillance of certified EHR technology</li><li>Align CMS health and safety standards with the safety of health IT, and train surveyors.</li><li>Collect data on health IT safety events through the Quality & Safety Review System (QSRS).</li><li>Monitor health IT adverse event reports to the Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience (MAUDE) database. [I've been promoting the use of MAUDE for just that purpose, and much more regarding documenting and reporting on mission-hostile health IT; see <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/08/clinicians-how-to-document-ehr-screens.html" target="_blank">this </a><a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/08/clinicians-how-to-document-ehr-screens.html" target="_blank">post </a>- ed.]</li></ul> These steps are to be taken in order to "Inspire Confidence and Trust in Health IT and Health Information Exchange." The title of my keynote address to the Health Informatics Society of Australia this summer was, in fact, "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/08/my-presentation-to-health-informatics.html" target="_blank">Critical Thinking on Building Trusted, Transformative Medical Information:  Improving Health IT as the First Step</a>". My thoughts on this report: <ul><li>It is at least two decades overdue.</li><li>It was produced largely if not solely due to the pressure of the "HIT apostates", finally overcoming industry memes and control of information flows through great perseverance.</li><li>It is indeed a confessional of the sins committed by the health IT industry over those decades.  Creating, implementing and maintaining mission critical software in a safety-cognizant way is not, and was not, a mystery.  It's been done in numerous industries for decades.</li><li>It is still a bit weak in acknowledging the likely magnitude of under-reporting of medical errors, including HIT-related, in the available data, and the issue of risk vs. 'confirmed body counts' as I wrote at my recent post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/12/a-very-signifcant-additonal-observation.html" target="_blank">A Significant Additional Observation on the PA Patient Safety Authority Report -- Risk</a>". </li><li>It is unfortunate that this report did not come from the informatics academic community in the United States, i.e., the <a href="http://www.amia.org/" target="_blank">American Medical Informatics Association (AMIA)</a>.  AMIA's academics have done well in advancing the theoretical aspects of the technologies, and how to create "good health IT" and not "bad health IT."  However, they have largely abrogated their social responsibilities and obligations, including but not limited to those of physicians, in ensuring the theories were followed in practice by an industry all too eager to ignore academic research (which, in order to follow, utilizes money and resources and reduces margins).</li></ul>(On the latter point, just last week did the American College of Medical Informatics [ACMI] refuse to permit me to be a speaker at their early 2013 annual retreat despite support from some of its members.) And this: <ul><li>If the industry and the academics had been doing their job responsibly, I might be spending this Christmas and New Years's holiday with my mother, rather than visiting her in the cemetery. </li></ul> All that said, the report is welcome. Finally, it is hoped - and expected - that public comments will indeed be "public", and that any irregularities in such comments (such as appeared in the public comments period for MU2 due to industry ghostwriting as in my Aug. 2012 post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/08/health-it-vendor-epic-uses-clients-as.html" target="_blank">Health IT Vendor EPIC Caught Red-Handed: Ghostwriting And Using Customers as Stealth Lobbyists - Did ONC Ignore This?</a>" and Sept. 2012 post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/09/from-what-i-can-tell-epic-was.html" target="_blank">Was EPIC successful in watering down the Meaningful Use Stage 2 Final Rule?</a>") will be reported and acted upon in an aggressive manner. And finally, from the Healthcare Renewal blog, Merry Christmas. -- SS

ONC's Christmas Confessional on Health IT Safety: "HIT Patient Safety Action & Surveillance Plan for Public Comment"

This time of year is certainly appropriate for a confessional on the health IT industry and hyperenthusiasts ' sins. In the first report...

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Australian ED EHR Study: An End to the Line "Your Evidence Is Anecdotal, Thus Worthless?"

At my Sept. 2010 post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/09/dangers-of-critical-thinking-in.html">The Dangers of Critical Thinking in A Politicized, Irrational Culture</a>" I lamented that while my early mentor in biomedicine Victor P. Satinsky MD taught the wise credo "critical thinking always, or your patient's dead" in the 1970's, our culture had become so perverse that this credo had been largely supplanted with: <blockquote>"Critical thinking anytime, and your career's dead." </blockquote>That post was in reaction to continued heckling on a professional mailing list, the American Medical Informatics Association (AMIA) Clinical Information Systems Working Group (cis-wg). On this list, Oregon Health Sciences University professor <a href="http://www.billhersh.info/">William Hersh</a> expounded on how the evidence of health IT dangers was largely "anecdotal" therefore to be discounted, and how I, specifically, "didn't know the literature on health IT." In that post I put the lie to the latter figment. On the former prevarication Dr. Jon Patrick, author of the recent thorough dissection of problems with the ED EHR system being rolled out in public hospitals in New South Wales, Australia (see my Mar. 5, 2011 post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/03/on-emr-forensic-evaluation-from-down.html">On an EMR Forensic Evaluation by Professor Jon Patrick from Down Under: More Thoughts</a>"), hit the ball out of the park: <blockquote>Prof. Patrick to AMIA cis-wg: I think such defences are particularly unuseful especially with respect to the dismissal of personal stories and experiences as "anecdotes", hence committing them to the realm of folklore. I offer these notions as a counterpoint. Discounting Anecdotes: 1. Is a perfidious and specious act. 2. It denies early warning signs of problems. 3. It denies a voice and disempowers the working clinical community who have to operationalise decisions made by others. 4. It denies a route to process improvement within an institution - which is most important for EBM and incremental review of local processes. 5. It defends software manufacturers from fault rectification - cuts off even a need to deliberate on it. Critics of the value of anecdotes are squarely on the side of the faulty and deficient manufacturer. 6. A rule of project management is that projects consist of 3 components, cost, quality and time and if their needs to be a compromise it has to be on quality. Anecdotes are early warning signs of such a compromise. </blockquote><blockquote> </blockquote>Prof. Patrick had to once again put the lie to this refrain at a comment on the HISTalk blog yesterday, where the anonymous proprietor <a href="http://histalk2.com/2011/03/06/monday-morning-update-3711/">had written in a review of Patrick's EHR study</a>: <blockquote>... On the other hand, I wouldn’t say it’s [Prof. Patrick's Cerner FirstNet study] necessarily unbiased, it focuses on implementation of a single department application that didn’t go well for a variety of reasons (despite many successful FirstNet implementations elsewhere), it uses the unchallenged anecdotal comments of unhappy users who make it clear they liked their previous EDIS better, and it nitpicks (I wasn’t moved to find a pitchfork when I learned that the primary keys in the Millennium database aren’t named consistently). [Considering the complexity and changeability of healthcare and the corresponding software lifecycle, I duly note that that latter attitude about 'failing to find pitchforks' regarding breaches of sound software engineering practices seems to be a symptom of the larger health IT disease that Prof. Patrick writes about - ed.] </blockquote> Dr. Patrick then knocked the ball out of the Southern Hemisphere with a <a href="http://histalk2.com/2011/03/06/monday-morning-update-3711/#comment-14097">comment of his own</a> about anecdotalism and a link to an expansion of the aforementioned ideas he'd shared on "discounting anecdotes": <blockquote>Prof. Patrick to HISTalk owner: Your Comment “it uses the unchallenged anecdotal comments of unhappy users ” is not only unfair but unreasonably inaccurate. The comments made by the users are the Directors of 7 EDs and so they have a right to carry authority by virtue of the experience but also the number of 6 out 7 presenting a view of Firstnet as unfit for purpose has numeric validity, which they justify with about 20+ pages of their comments – see Part 2 Appendix 2. I would also point readers to my editorial about the role of personal experiences being the most useful information to understand the nature of socio-technical failures. <a href="http://aci.schattauer.de/en/contents/archive/issue/1124/manuscript/15463/show.html" rel="nofollow">http://aci.schattauer.de/en/contents/archive/issue/1124/manuscript/15463/show.html</a></blockquote> The essay at that link, "The Validity of Personal Experiences in Evaluating HIT", is an editorial in Johns Hopkins informaticist Chris Lehmann's brilliant new journal "<a href="http://aci.schattauer.de/en/contents/archive.html">Applied Clinical Informatics</a>." The editorial is available free, and is a must-read for anyone in a decision-making or managerial role in mission critical domains, including our elected representatives. In the editorial Dr. Patrick concludes. similarly to his earlier AMIA mailing list opinion: <blockquote> ... the denial of recounted personal experiences in discussion and analysis of HIT is biased and specious and has the effect of: 1. Denying early warning signs of problems. 2. Denying a voice for the working clinical community who have to operationalise decisions made by others and thus disempowers them. 3. Denying process improvement within an institution – which is most important for Evidence Based Medicine and incremental review of local processes. 4. Discourages staff from engaging in any form of process improvement hence worsening the sense of disenchantment. Every legitimate personal experience of a HIT deserves to be considered on its merits lest we wish to retreat from process and product improvement. Mechanisms of censorship both implicit due to contrived processes of disinformation and disempowerment or explicit due to contractual specifications will lead to more waste, lost productivity, contempt for the providers, and distress among frontline staff rather than increased productivity and improved patient health and safety as we all desire. </blockquote> In my view, the drivers or motivators for the "anecdotalist" accusation are these, singly or in combination: <ul><li>Too much "education" to see the nose on one's face, as in, to think zebras and unicorns instead of horses when hearing hoofbeats outside one's midwest U.S. abode (eggheads); </li><li>Too little common sense (fools), as in <a href="http://www.morgantownbrights.com/2009/09/10/you-are-wrong-because/">Scott Adams' example</a>: "IGNORING ALL ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE - Example: I always get hives immediately after eating strawberries. But without a scientifically controlled experiment, it’s not reliable data. So I continue to eat strawberries every day, since I can’t tell if they cause hives"; </li><li>Too much concern for the possible interruption of flow of money or power in one's direction (<a style="font-weight: bold;" href="http://www.thefreedictionary.com/gonif">gonifs</a>). </li></ul> In conclusion, the anecdotalist refrain of "your evidence is anecdotal" [therefore of little or no value] when used repetitively against competent observers is the refrain of eggheads, fools and gonifs. In healthcare, the end result is "your patient's dead." My "anecdotal relative" injured in a mid-2010 HIT mishap is sadly an example. [June 2011 addendum: <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/06/my-mother-passed-away.html">my relative</a>, after much suffering, has now died of complications of the "anecdotal HIT mishap" - ed.] As for myself, I am a Markopolist (see my Sept. 2010 post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/09/health-it-on-anecdotalism-and.html">Health IT: On Anecdotalism and Totalitarianism</a>"). -- SS

Australian ED EHR Study: An End to the Line "Your Evidence Is Anecdotal, Thus Worthless?"

At my Sept. 2010 post " The Dangers of Critical Thinking in A Politicized, Irrational Culture " I lamented that while my early men...

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