healthy4u: faith-based informatics beliefs

At Risk in the Computerized Hospital: The HITECH Act as Social Policy Malpractice, and Passivity of Medical Professionals

I am revisiting the issue of HITECH in light of recent reports on health IT drawbacks and/or failure to achieve long-claimed advantages. The <a href="http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/111/hitech.pdf" target="_blank">HITECH Act</a>, a multi-billion dollar EHR incentive/penalty measure inserted into the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act legislation (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Recovery_and_Reinvestment_Act_of_2009" target="_blank">ARRA</a> or 'economic recovery' act), is proving to be an example of what should be called "Social Policy Malpractice." The HITECH Act was largely a consequence of intense industry lobbying on behalf of the IT industry (as in the Washington Post at "<a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/15/AR2009051503667.html?hpid=topnews">The Machinery Behind Health-Care Reform: How an Industry Lobby Scored a Swift, Unexpected Victory by Channeling Billions to Electronic Records</a>", May 16, 2009). It is in fact not based on science or reliable evidence, and has led to increased patient endangerment and a worsening national debt picture. The recent revelations of reports from diverse sources including but not by any means limited to the following indicate that HITECH and its expenditures of billions of dollars on experimental, unregulated, unproven technology represents social policy malpractice:   <div></div><div><ul><li>ABC News (<a href="http://abcnews.go.com/Health/medical-records-private-abc-news-investigation/story?id=17228986" target="_blank">Your Medical Records May Not Be Private: ABC News Investigation</a>" - privacy of electronic health data is very poor, in ways that paper would and could never have permitted); </li></ul></div><div><ul><li>The Center for Public Integrity "<a href="http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/09/19/10812/growth-electronic-medical-records-eases-path-inflated-bills" target="_blank">Growth of electronic medical records eases path to inflated bills</a>", on how EHRs lead to increased, not decreased healthcare costs; </li></ul></div><div><ul><li>Experts at Penn and Harvard -"<a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443847404577627041964831020.html?mod=googlenews_wsj" target="_blank">A Major Glitch for Digitized Health-Care Records</a>" - savings from EHRs are illusory;</li></ul><ul><li>Budget reports - in view of the deficit spending reported by OMB and others that is causing national debt to spiral out of control, jeopardizing the economic well being of the United States, and with upcoding as a side-effect and no cost savings, HITECH is an unaffordable extravagance.  </li></ul><ul><li>Recent revelations of outright EHR-induced mass chaos largely due to outspoken clinicians who've had enough - "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/09/in-addition-to-nurses-doctors-now-air.html" target="_blank">Contra Costa County health doctors air complaints about county's new $45 million computer system</a>", "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/09/the-extremes-to-which-faith-based.html" target="_blank">Lake County (IL) Health Department - Depression era soup lines at the clinic</a>";</li></ul><ul><li>Abuses of NPRM Public Comment periods on followup health IT incentive regulations via industry ghostwriting (stealth lobbying), reducing EHR effectiveness while further enriching the industry - "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/08/health-it-vendor-epic-uses-clients-as.html">Health IT Vendor EPIC Caught Red-Handed: Ghostwriting And Using Customers as Stealth Lobbyists - Did ONC Ignore This?"</a>;</li></ul> Of course, I'd already cited these reports in past posts but they bear repeating: <ul></ul><ul></ul></div><div><ul><li>The IOM report on HIT safety ("There's risk, but we don't even know the magnitude because there are major systemic impediments to diffusion of that information"), <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/11/iom-report-on-health-it-safety-nix-fda.html" target="_blank">http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/11/iom-report-on-health-it-safety-nix-fda.html</a>;</li></ul></div><div><ul><li>FDA (known injuries and deaths are likely the "tip of the iceberg" because of the impediments, and EHRs are medical devices that should fall under the FD&C Act, but FDA has largely refrained from enforcing our regulatory requirements with respect to HIT devices because they're a political hot potato - Jeff Shuren MD JD, CDRH), <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/04/fda-decides-regulating-implantable.html" target="_blank">http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/04/fda-decides-regulating-implantable.html</a>;</li></ul></div><div><ul><li>NIST (health IT usability is poor, major remediation is needed) - <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/10/nist-on-ehr-mission-hostile-user.html" target="_blank">http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/10/nist-on-ehr-mission-hostile-user.html</a></li></ul></div><div></div><div> I'd called for a moratorium on ambitious EHR plans for similar reasons as far back as 2008, at posts <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/11/should-us-call-moratorium-on-ambitious.html" target="_blank">here</a> and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/01/i-ask-again-should-us-call-moratorium.html" target="_blank">here</a>.</div><div>  </div><div></div><div>The path that ethical medical centers and clinicians should take is to delay computerization in 2012 and push for slowdown or retraction of HITECH and its penalties for non-adopters.  Yet instead, what is usually seen is excuses and cheerleading by healthcare organization leaders, and passive physician and nurse acceptance of deficient information technology.  </div><div></div><div> This stunning passivity and acceptance by physicians and nurses of a deeply flawed technology of unknown risk seems largely due to physician learned helplessness and the Stockholm Syndrome.  See the posts on "physician learned helplessness" at <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/10/physicians-learned-helplessness.html" target="_blank">http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/10/physicians-learned-helplessness.html</a> (commenting on observations in MedScape written by a lawyer), as well as on the "Stckholm Syndrome"  at <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stockholm_syndrome" target="_blank">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stockholm_syndrome</a>.  Per a psychiatrist/informatics specialist Dr. Scott Monteith who has <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/Dr.%20Scott%20Monteith" target="_blank">commented on this blog</a>, the compliance of clinicians may also be a manifestation of the inherent human psychopathology reflected in the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milgram_experiment" target="_blank">Milgram Experiment</a> (and elsewhere):</div><div></div> <blockquote class="tr_bq"><div>The Milgram experiment on obedience to authority figures was a series of notable social psychology experiments conducted by Yale University psychologist Stanley Milgram, which measured the willingness of study participants to obey an authority figure who instructed them to perform acts that conflicted with their personal conscience. Milgram first described his research in 1963 in an article published in the Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, and later discussed his findings in greater depth in his 1974 book, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View. </div></blockquote><div> As to the consequences of physician "acceptance" of this technology in 2012 in its present condition, physicians are: <div><ul><li>Acting, in effect, 'in loco parentis' for their patients, not in the latter's best interests, who are not even afforded opportunity for informed consent.  This is in violation of long-accepted norms of human subjects experimentation and research such as the <a href="http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/index2.html" target="_blank">Belmont Report, Nuremberg Code</a> and <a href="http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/index.html" target="_blank">HHS human subject protection</a> regulations at <a href="http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/45cfr46.html">45 CFR part 46</a> themselves;</li></ul></div><div><ul><li>Giving free provision of their expertise and labor at improvisation and workarounds, in effect providing free alpha and beta testing to an entirely unregulated IT sector;</li></ul></div><div><ul><li>Engaging in passive acceptance of the entire liability and their hospital executives' breach of fiduciary responsibility to protect them from same due to Hold Harmless clauses, and breach of Joint Commission safety standards through signing "gag" clauses on defects and harms (see <a href="http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/?loc=cases&sloc=koppel_kreda" target="_blank">http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/?loc=cases&sloc=koppel_kreda</a>). </li></ul></div> </div><div>National health IT leaders have proven to be hyperenthusiasts about health IT benefits as well:</div><div></div><div> <blockquote class="tr_bq">... This from Robert Kolodner, former head of the Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT (ONC) at HHS: <blockquote class="tr_bq">Dr. Robert Kolodner, a physician who headed the federal push for electronic medical records in 2007, acknowledged that billing abuse took a backseat to steps likely to entice the medical community to embrace the new technology. Kolodner said officials were certain the savings achieved by computerizing medicine would be so great that billing abuse, “while needing to be monitored, was not something that should be put as the primary issue at that time.”</blockquote> In other words, sideline (ignore) health IT-based billing abuse (and safety risks to the live patients subjected to this experimental technology without informed consent) because "we believe" the savings will be greater based on "our faith in the technology."</blockquote>  </div><div>Such individuals contributed materially to the social policy malpractice represented by the HITECH ACT.</div><div> </div><div>Considering all of the above, I call once again for a moratorium on further economic incentives for EHR adoption, and investment in the very measures recommended by the National Research Council in its Jan. 2009 report "<a href="http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=12572" target="_blank">Computational Technology for Effective Health Care: Immediate Steps and Strategic Directions</a>" that:</div><div> <blockquote class="tr_bq">In the long term, success will depend upon accelerating interdisciplinary research in biomedical informatics, computer science, social science, and health care engineering. </blockquote></div><div></div><div></div><div> This research must be conducted, of course, with full human subjects protections in place.</div><div> </div><div>-- SS</div>

At Risk in the Computerized Hospital: The HITECH Act as Social Policy Malpractice, and Passivity of Medical Professionals

I am revisiting the issue of HITECH in light of recent reports on health IT drawbacks and/or failure to achieve long-claimed advantages.The HITECH Act, a multi-billion dollar EHR incentive/penalty mea…

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20 Sep 2012

Lake County Health Department: The extremes to which faith-based informatics beliefs can drive healthcare facilities - Depression era soup lines at the clinic?

Here is a story exemplifying the extremes to which faith-based informatics beliefs can drive healthcare facilities, to the benefit of IT companies and at the expense of patients.  This is occurring a bit north of the Chicago area: <blockquote class="tr_bq"><a href="http://newssun.suntimes.com/news/15001817-418/county-health-department-clinics-moving-to-electronic-records.html" target="_blank">County Health Department clinics moving to electronic records</a> By Judy Masterson Last Modified: Sep 11, 2012 02:43AM People who rely on Lake County Health Department clinics for their health care have found cuts in service during walk-in hours as the department began implementing a new electronic medical record.</blockquote>  That, as is explained further in the story, is an understatement. <blockquote class="tr_bq">The massive shift to electronic storage of medical data by the department has been underway for about two years, at a cost through April 2012 of $3.8 million, according to department spokeswoman Leslie Piotrowski. During the first phase, appointment-taking, laboratory, financial and demographic information and billing were transferred from paper records to electronic storage. Under the newest phase of the project, physicians and staff are being trained to use new computer software to electronically gather health histories and record information on tests, treatments and prescriptions.</blockquote> Are they using the software to record health histories, or to gather them?  There is a difference, and I believe this passage exemplifies that these "EHRs" are no longer innocuous filing systems, but are interfering in and regulating the information gathering process from patients itself (i.e., the physician-patient relationship) itself.  More on that issue below. <blockquote class="tr_bq">Denise Koppit, Health Department associate director of primary care services, acknowledged the training has temporarily cut by half the number of walk-in patients seen at the department’s clinics in Waukegan, Zion, North Chicago, Highland Park and Round Lake Beach.</blockquote> Cut by 50%?  That is remarkable.  That an electronic record system could be so hard to learn and use that patient count has to be halved is stunning - and outrageous. It suggests a fiasco in the making in terms of care quality when the clinicians are asked (and probably forced) to get back to more traditional volumes. Similar situations are noted here:   "Avatar fails - No, not the Cameron movie, but yet another lousy EMR system implemented by amateurs." <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/11/avatar-fails-no-not-cameron-movie-but.html">http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/11/avatar-fails-no-not-cameron-movie-but.html</a> and here: "Contra Costa's $45 million computer health care system endangering lives, nurses say." <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/08/contra-costas-45-million-computer.html">http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/08/contra-costas-45-million-computer.html</a> <blockquote class="tr_bq">“We’re learning new systems which totally change the way we gather information about patients,” Koppit said, noting “it was a little bumpy” the first day, Sept. 5, but Sept. 6 “it was a little better.”</blockquote> "Totally change the way we gather information about patients?"  (As opposed to "the way we record information?") This is concerning to me, as it suggests interference (ill-conceived and deleterious interference is probably more accurate) in medical processes by technology.  To my knowledge, there's been no revolution in clinician history taking and performance of physical exams.  The state government needs to examine exactly what is being referred to. Also - add "a little bumpy" to the list of banal excuses for toxic software such as - it's a rare event, it's just a 'glitch',  it's teething problems, it's a learning experience, we have to work the 'kinks' out, it's growing pains, etc. I'm actually surprised not to see the usual refrain in this article, that "patient care was not compromised." <blockquote class="tr_bq">... “We want to improve quality of care and increase efficiency so patients don’t go through multiple tests and so everyone can see medications,” Koppit said. “This will allow ready access to patient information. Patients will receive a printout of their diagnoses, medications and lab work.”</blockquote> As described in other posts (query link <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/faith-based%20informatics%20beliefs" target="_blank">here</a>), these are "faith-based informatics beliefs" (i.e., enthusiasm and technology-deterministic statements of fait accompli not driven by robust evidence, especially considering the state of health IT in 2012). <blockquote class="tr_bq">Patients who transfer to different providers, will receive their medical history and information in a paper file or on a flash drive.</blockquote> Paper file? <blockquote class="tr_bq">The reductions in number of walk-in patients accepted hit the Zion clinic especially hard. One user, who contacted the Lake County News-Sun, said patients waiting outside the clinic “on any given day” look like “a Depression-era soup line” that snakes around the corner of 27th Street. Koppit said that the Zion clinic, which also serves patients from Winthrop Harbor, Beach Park and Wadsworth, relies on just two physicians who typically treat between 12 and 15 walk-ins per day.</blockquote> Health IT project managers whose plans caused “a Depression-era soup line” of sick patients should be sanctioned, in my opinion.  <table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh7BMxnqggy8uE_HoqysLU-USfqGKgEWNs2naCXaUx-aPxh9WRQvxS19R805UvDwmf20L2UOCnh1KhJ58tJniA8pk5GD5fC4xBNLXPYD6QOQb1OxFnzi6zjyEmpp2jgZJisGzjTTESz8jEJ/s1600/soupline-depression-550.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="196" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh7BMxnqggy8uE_HoqysLU-USfqGKgEWNs2naCXaUx-aPxh9WRQvxS19R805UvDwmf20L2UOCnh1KhJ58tJniA8pk5GD5fC4xBNLXPYD6QOQb1OxFnzi6zjyEmpp2jgZJisGzjTTESz8jEJ/s400/soupline-depression-550.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">When an EMR implementation causes "Depression-era soup lines" at the clinic, one can reasonably conclude project mismanagement is occurring.</td></tr></tbody></table> This is entirely unnecessary, and endangers patients dependent on the care provided in these clinics.  This project as structured, in fact, violates patient's rights in my opinion. <blockquote class="tr_bq">She admitted that regular appointments can take two months to schedule. “If somebody comes in very sick, we’re trying to get them squeezed in,” she said.</blockquote> We're "trying to get them squeezed in"?  And, if they are harmed or die because they can't be "squeezed in", or because the clinicians are up to their necks in cybernetic frenzy, who's liable? I suggest the implementation leadership team should, in that case, find themselves as defendants. -- SS

Lake County Health Department: The extremes to which faith-based informatics beliefs can drive healthcare facilities - Depression era soup lines at the clinic?

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13 Sep 2012

The Scientific Justification for Meaningul Use, Stage 2: The NWB Methodology

The Final Rule for Meaningful Use Stage 2 has been released.  It is at <a href="http://www.ofr.gov/OFRUpload/OFRData/2012-21050_PI.pdf" target="_blank">this link</a> (PDF).  It is a mere 672 pages in length, a quick read during one's evenings of leisure. Here is, from page 18 verbatim, the scientific justification for the program.  The finest scientific methods were used to achieve these criteria in justification of spending of $15 billion of taxpayer money in "incentives" (probably a low estimate), not counting the additional hundreds of billions the buyers themselves will spend that is diverted from your healthcare to the IT sector: <blockquote class="tr_bq">3. Summary of Costs and Benefits This final rule is anticipated to have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more, making it an economically significant rule under the Executive Order and a major rule under the Congressional Review Act. Accordingly, we have prepared a Regulatory Impact Analysis that to the best of our ability presents the costs and benefits of the final rule. The total Federal cost of the Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive Programs between 2014 and 2019 is estimated to be $15.4 billion (these estimates include net payment adjustments for Medicare providers who do not achieve meaningful use in 2015 and subsequent years in the amount of $2.1 billion). In this final rule we have not quantified the overall benefits to the industry, nor to EPs, eligible hospitals, or CAHs participating in the Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive Programs. Information on the costs and benefits of adopting systems specifically meeting the requirements for the EHR Incentive Programs has not yet been collected and information on costs and benefits overall is limited.  Nonetheless, we believe there are substantial benefits that can be obtained by eligible hospitals and EPs, including reductions in medical recordkeeping costs, reductions in repeat tests, decreases in length of stay, increased patient safety, and reduced medical errors. There is evidence to support the cost-saving benefits anticipated from wider adoption of EHRs.</blockquote> There's no truly robust evidence of generalizable benefit, no randomized trials, there's <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/02/updated-reading-list-on-health-it.html" target="_blank">significant evidence to the contrary</a> (that, incidentally, is deliberately being ignored), there's risk to safety that this disruptive technology causes in its present state (but the magnitude is unknown, see quotes from 2012 IOM study <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/03/doctors-and-ehrs-reframing-modernists-v.html" target="_blank">here</a>) that MU and "certification" <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/02/hospitals-and-doctors-use-health-it-at.html" target="_blank">do not address</a>, there's a plethora of <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/01/maude-and-hit-risk-mother-mary-what-in.html" target="_blank">hair-raising defect reports</a> from the only seller that reports such things, but CMS justifies the program with the line: <blockquote class="tr_bq">"Evidence [on benefits] is limited ... Nonetheless, we believe there are substantial benefits that can be obtained by eligible hospitals and EPs ... There is evidence to support the cost-saving benefits anticipated from wider adoption of EHRs."</blockquote> I am deeply impressed by the level of rigorous science here.  We are truly in a golden age of science. I recommend NIH, NSF, FDA and all other research and regulatory agencies immediately adopt this rigorous HHS methodology (called the "NWB" methodology for "nonetheless we believe") in their professional pursuits and research grant approval processes. -- SS

The Scientific Justification for Meaningul Use, Stage 2: The NWB Methodology

The Final Rule for Meaningful Use Stage 2 has been released. It is at this link (PDF). It is a mere 672 pages in length, a quick read during one's evenings of leisure.Here is, from page 18 verbatim,…

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29 Aug 2012

Health IT difficulties and controversial excuses from health IT hyperenthusiasts and extremists

As I observed at my Aug. 15, 2012 post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/08/contra-costas-45-million-computer.html">Contra Costa's $45 million computer health care system endangering lives, nurses say</a>" and other posts, common in case reports of health IT difficulties is the refrain (usually from a seller, healthcare executive or health IT pundit) that: <ul><li>It's a rare event, it's just a 'glitch',  it's teething problems, it's a learning experience, we have to work the 'kinks' out, it's growing pains, etc.</li></ul> Or perhaps worse: <ul><li>Patient safety was not compromised (stated long before the speaker or writer could possibly know that).</li></ul> What these statements translate to:  any patient harm that may have resulted is for the "greater good" in perfecting the technology. Here is the problem with that: These statements, while seemingly banal, are actually highly controversial and amoral. and reflect what can be called "faith-based informatics beliefs" (i.e., enthusiasm not driven by evidence). They are amoral because they significantly deviate from accepted medical ethics and patient rights, especially regarding experimentation or research such as the plain language of the <a href="http://history.nih.gov/research/downloads/nuremberg.pdf" target="_blank">Nuremberg code</a>, the <a href="http://videocast.nih.gov/pdf/ohrp_belmont_report.pdf" target="_blank">Belmont Report</a>, World Medical Association <a href="http://history.nih.gov/research/downloads/helsinki.pdf" target="_blank">Declaration of Helsinki</a>, <a href="http://www.nccamwatch.org/research/human_guidelines.pdf" target="_blank">Guidelines for Conduct of Research Involving Human Subjects at NIH</a>, and <a href="http://bioethics.od.nih.gov/IRB.html" target="_blank">other documents</a> that originated out of medical abuses of the past. Semantic or legal arguments on the term "research", "experimentation" etc. are, at best, misdirection away the substantive issues.  Indeed, for all practical purposes the use of unfinished software (or software with newly-minted modifications) that has not been extensively tested and validated and that is suspected to or known to cause harm, without explicit informed consent, is contrary to the spirit of the aforementioned patients' rights documents. They are excuses from health IT hyper-enthusiasts ("<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/03/doctors-and-ehrs-reframing-modernists-v.html" target="_blank">Ddulites</a>"), who in fact have become so hyper-enthusiastic as to ignore the ethical issues and downsides.  The attitude gives more rights to the cybernetic device and its creators than to the patients who are subject to the device's effects. These excuses are, in effect, from people who it would not be unreasonable to refer to as technophile extremists. -- SS Addendum: The <a href="http://videocast.nih.gov/pdf/ohrp_belmont_report.pdf" target="_blank">Belmont Report</a> of the mid to late 1970's, long before health IT became at all common, actually starts out with a section discussing "BOUNDARIES BETWEEN PRACTICE AND RESEARCH."  I have updated one of the observations in that section to modern times: <blockquote class="tr_bq"> ... It is important to distinguish between biomedical and behavioral research, on the one hand, and the practice of accepted therapy on the other, in order to know what activities ought to undergo review for the protection of human subjects of research. ... When a clinician [or entire healthcare delivery system - ed.] departs in a significant way from standard or accepted practice, the innovation does not, in and of itself, constitute research. The fact that a procedure is "experimental," in the sense of new, untested or different, does not automatically place it in the category of research. Radically new procedures of this description [such as use of cybernetic intermediaries to regulate and govern care - ed.] should, however, be made the object of formal research at an early stage in order to determine whether they are safe and effective. Thus, it is the responsibility of medical practice committees, for example, to insist that a major innovation [such as health IT - ed.] be incorporated into a formal research project. </blockquote> Health IT appears to have been "graduated" from experimental to tried-and-true without the formal safety research called for in the Belmont report. The Belmont report continues: <blockquote class="tr_bq">Research and practice may be carried on together when research is designed to evaluate the safety and efficacy of a therapy. This need not cause any confusion regarding whether or not the activity requires review; the general rule is that if there is any element of research in an activity, that activity should undergo review for the protection of human subjects. </blockquote> Instead, what we have for the most part are excuses and special accommodations for health IT, on which the <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/02/updated-reading-list-on-health-it.html" target="_blank">literature is conflicting</a> regarding safety and efficacy, all the way up to the <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/11/iom-report-on-health-it-safety-nix-fda.html" target="_blank">Institute of Medicine</a>. -- SS

Health IT difficulties and controversial excuses from health IT hyperenthusiasts and extremists

As I observed at my Aug. 15, 2012 post "Contra Costa's $45 million computer health care system endangering lives, nurses say" and other posts, common in case reports of health IT difficulties is the r…

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18 Aug 2012

Cart Before the Horse, Part 3: AHRQ's "Health IT Hazard Manager"

<div style="text-align: center;">(Addendum: the AHRQ hazards manager taxonomy report can see seen at <a href="http://healthit.ahrq.gov/sites/default/files/docs/citation/HealthITHazardManagerFinalReport.pdf.">http://healthit.ahrq.gov/sites/default/files/docs/citation/HealthITHazardManagerFinalReport.pdf.</a>)</div> In a July 2010 post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/07/meaningful-use-final-rule-have.html" target="_blank">Meaningful Use Final Rule: Have the Administration and ONC Put the Cart Before the Horse on Health IT?</a>" and an Oct . 2010 post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/10/cart-before-horse-again-institute-of.html" target="_blank">Cart before the horse, again: IOM to study HIT patient safety for ONC; should HITECH be repealed?</a>" I wrote about the postmodern "ready, fire, aim" approach to health IT: In the first post, I wrote: <blockquote class="tr_bq">... These "usability" problems require long term solutions. There are no quick fix, plug and play solutions. Years of research are needed, and years of system migrations as well for existing installations. Yet we now have an HHS Final Rule on "meaningful use" regarding experimental, unregulated medical devices the industry itself admits have major usability problems, along with a growing body of literature on the <a href="http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/?loc=cases&sloc=2009">risks entailed</a>. <div dir="ltr"></div><div dir="ltr">For crying out loud, talk about putting the cart before the horse... </div> <div dir="ltr" style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhbxjl-AlGATfarPayjaUYkCOG4sUrulp4D88Nk7_z-eEbaWRl-xi1g0neGKWDhEL1w6-_-FCu4iBoJx9AUlU-bccaAmEcMfmGI1uoa4gTohjch5gzcx5tA9Ru-uMB0Mip6NE0PuUsfDXJ5/s1600/horse-cart.jpg"><img alt="" border="0" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5493460657310735298" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhbxjl-AlGATfarPayjaUYkCOG4sUrulp4D88Nk7_z-eEbaWRl-xi1g0neGKWDhEL1w6-_-FCu4iBoJx9AUlU-bccaAmEcMfmGI1uoa4gTohjch5gzcx5tA9Ru-uMB0Mip6NE0PuUsfDXJ5/s320/horse-cart.jpg" style="cursor: pointer; display: block; height: 168px; margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; width: 253px;" /></a>Something's very wrong here...</div> However, this situation is anything but humorous. How more "cart before the horse" can government get?</blockquote> In the second post, I wrote: <blockquote class="tr_bq">... So, in the midst of a National Program for Health IT in the United States (NPfIT in the U.S.), with tens of billions of dollars earmarked for health IT already (money we don't really have, but it can be printed quickly, or borrowed from China) the IOM is going to study health IT safety, prevention of health IT-related errors, etc. ... only now?</blockquote> Here we go yet again. The problem with the AHRQ (<a href="http://www.ahrq.gov/" target="_blank">Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality</a>, a division of HHS) announcement below of a webinar about a new tool for identifying, categorizing, and resolving health IT hazards, as I have written before, is putting the "cart before the horse" and throwing medical ethics to the wind. If we've just developed a tool "for identifying, categorizing, and resolving health IT hazards", the magnitude of which others such as IOM admit are unknown to our detriment (e.g., <a href="http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/Patient%20Safety%20and%20Health%20IT%20prepub.pdf">Health IT and Patient Safety: Building Safer Systems for Better Care</a>, pg. S-2), then health IT is, it follows, an experimental technology. If it is an experimental technology, AHRQ and others in HHS should probably be raising the issue of a slow down or moratorium on widespread rollout under HITECH until risk management and remediation is better understood.  At the very least they should be calling for patient informed consent that a device that will largely regulate their care is experimental, that a competency "gap" exists among healthcare practitioners within the "health IT environment" (meaning patients are at risk), and that patients should be offered the opportunity for informed consent with opt-out provisions.  The principals should not just be announcing a webinar: <blockquote class="tr_bq">Sent: Tuesday, June 05, 2012 12:23 PM To: OHITQUSERS@LIST.NIH.GOV Subject: Register Now! AHRQ Health IT Webinar "Purpose and Demonstration of the Health IT Hazard Manager and Next Steps" June 11, 2:30 PM ET Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality Purpose and Demonstration of the Health IT Hazard Manager and Next Steps June 11, 2012 — 2:30-4 p.m., EST The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) has identified a gap in a health care/public health practitioner’s competency within the health IT environment. This webinar is designed to increase practitioners’ competencies in several areas: improving health care decision making; supporting patient-centered care; and enhancing the quality and safety of medication management by improving the ability to identify, categorize, and resolve health IT hazards. The Webinar will explore the Health IT Hazard Manager—a tool for identifying, categorizing, and resolving health IT hazards. When implemented, the tool allows health care organizations and software vendors alike to learn about potential hazards and work to resolve them, including the use of data to communicate potential and actual adverse effects. The session will discuss how the Health IT Hazard Manager was tested and refined as well as strategies and implications for deploying it. The target audience includes AHRQ grantees/researchers; health care providers, including physicians and nurses; consumers/patients; and health care policymakers. ... Webinar learning objectives include: 1. Describe the rationale for developing the Health IT Hazard Manager and how it evolved through alpha and beta testing. 2. Explain the process for identifying and categorizing health IT-related hazards. 3. Demonstrate how the Health IT Hazard Manager would be used [i.e., it's not yet in use, despite mandates for HIT rollout with penalties for non-adopters - ed.] within and across care delivery organizations and health IT software vendors. 4. Discuss policy and process implications for deploying the Health IT Hazard Manager via different organizations (i.e., AHRQ; Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT; Patient Safety Organization(s); Accrediting bodies; IT entities). </blockquote> In effect, HHS seems to be saying "we're working on the HIT risk problem, but roll it out anyway; if you get harmed or killed, tough luck."  This seems a form of negligence. Have we thrown out all we know about <a href="http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/hs/ethical_guidelines.htm" target="_blank">medical research and human subjects protections</a> in face of the magical powers and profits of computers in medicine? -- SS

Cart Before the Horse, Part 3: AHRQ's "Health IT Hazard Manager"

(Addendum: the AHRQ hazards manager taxonomy report can see seen at http://healthit.ahrq.gov/sites/default/files/docs/citation/HealthITHazardManagerFinalReport.pdf.)In a July 2010 post "Meaningful Use…

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05 Jun 2012

ONC's "Health Data Palooza" - A Title of Exceptionally Bad Taste, For a "See No Evil" Meeting

The Office of the National Coordinator of Health IT has sent out this announcement: <div style="color: #16588b; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 20px;">Subject: HEALTH DATA PALOOZA III: Unleashing the Power of Data to Improve Health From:    ONC Health IT <onchealthit .="." service.govdelivery.com="service.govdelivery.com"> Date:    Thu, May 10, 2012 10:36 am </onchealthit></div><div style="color: #16588b; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 20px;"> </div><div style="color: #16588b; font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 20px;">HEALTH DATA PALOOZA III: Unleashing the Power of Data to Improve Health</div><div style="text-align: center;"> June 5-6th, Washington DC Health Data and Innovation Week <a href="http://links.govdelivery.com/track?type=click&enid=ZWFzPTEmbWFpbGluZ2lkPTIwMTIwNTEwLjc0NDU0MDEmbWVzc2FnZWlkPU1EQi1QUkQtQlVMLTIwMTIwNTEwLjc0NDU0MDEmZGF0YWJhc2VpZD0xMDAxJnNlcmlhbD0xNjk4NDczMyZlbWFpbGlkPXNjb3RzaWx2QGFvbC5jb20mdXNlcmlkPXNjb3RzaWx2QGFvbC5jb20mZmw9JmV4dHJhPU11bHRpdmFyaWF0ZUlkPSYmJg==&&&101&&&http://www.hdiforum.org" target="_blank">www.hdiforum.org</a> | #healthdata CONFIRMED SPEAKERS Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human Services Marc Bertolini, CEO Aetna Thomas Goetz, Execuitve Editor of WIRED Atul Gawande, surgeon and author Bill Frist, former Republican Majority Leader Dominique Dawes, two time gold medal winner Todd Park, US Chief Technology Officer Hear from Farzad Mostashari, National Coordinator for Health IT on data liberation ONC will host breakout sessions on Consumer e-Health, HealthData.gov, and Uses of Data by ACOs ONC will release nine challenges during this year’s event! </div><div style="text-align: center;"> </div><div style="text-align: left;"> </div><div style="text-align: left;">This title for a government-sponsored meeting is bizarre and tasteless in my opinion.  What is deemed by ONC to be the major source of this data?  Health IT.</div><div style="text-align: left;"> </div><div style="text-align: left;">"Palooza?"</div><div style="text-align: left;"> </div><div style="text-align: left;">From Urban Dictionary:</div><div style="text-align: left;"> </div><blockquote dir="ltr" style="margin-right: 0px;"><div>Palooza - <a href="http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=palooza">http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=palooza</a></div><div class="definition"></div></blockquote><blockquote dir="ltr" style="margin-right: 0px;"><div class="definition">An all-out crazy party; partying at one place with a ton of people like there's no tomorrow; The art of throwing a very drunken extravagant party with a plethora of friends</div></blockquote><div></div><div></div><div> "Data Liberation?"    </div><div></div><div> What about "patient liberation" -- from risk? </div><div></div><div> Considering it unlikely that issues in the bulleted points below, commented on in detail in past posts on this blog, will be discussed at this meeting, the title of the meeting is especially tasteless:</div><div></div><div style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;"><ul><li>There is a markedly unscientific "irrational exuberance" pushing clinical IT into wide use at a dangerously rapid pace. This exuberance is contradicted by a growing body of literature that shows the benefits are likely far less than stated, e.g., by way of example, the ad-hoc set at <a href="http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/?loc=cases&sloc=readinglist">http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/?loc=cases&sloc=readinglist</a>  </li><li>The technology remains experimental, its rollout is a human subjects experiment on a massive scale lacking nearly all the protections of other human subjects experimentation and for IT in mission critical settings (e.g., informed consent, formal quality control/validation/regulation, formal postmarket surveillance and reporting) due to extraordinary legal and regulatory special accommodations afforded the technology and its purveyors; </li><li>Defects of in-use systems are rampant, inappropriately turning patients and clinicians into software alpha and beta testers (e.g., as in the voluntary FDA MAUDE database, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/01/maude-and-hit-risk-mother-mary-what-in.html">http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/01/maude-and-hit-risk-mother-mary-what-in.html</a> which contains information for just one HIT vendor, Cerner, who voluntarily reports such issues); </li><li>The technology is unsupportive of clinician cognitive needs (2009 National Research Council study, which also stated that accelerating interdisciplinary research in biomedical informatics, computer science, social science, and health care engineering will be essential to perfect this technology); </li><li>The roles of <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/08/from-senior-clinician-down-under.html" target="_blank">scientific discovery and anecdote</a> have been turned on their heads. RCT's of clinical IT are nearly non-existent and lower-level evidence (e.g., weak observational, pre-post, qualitative, and other study types) are cited as "scientific proof" of efficacy and safety justifying hundreds of billions of dollars of taxpayer (or is it Chinese loan?) expenditures.  Yet, risk management-relevant case reports of harmful events and near misses, crucial to help organizations and regulatory agencies understand risks are dismissed as "anecdotal" (e.g., Blumenthal: "The [ONC] committee [investigating FDA reports of HIT endangement] said that nothing it had found would give them any pause that a policy of introducing EMR's could impede patient safety," he said, while ONC issued an article based on questionable research methods entitled "<a href="http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/30/3/464.full.html">The Benefits Of Health Information Technology: A Review Of The Recent Literature Shows Predominantly Positive Results</a>" extolling the virtues of HIT, written about at <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/03/benefits-of-health-information.html">http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/03/benefits-of-health-information.html</a>). </li><li>Risks are definite, with known patient injury and death, but the magnitude is admittedly unknown by JC (2008 Sentinel Event Alert), FDA (2010 Internal memo on HIT risks and statements of Jeffrey Shuren MD JD about known harms likely being "the tip of the iceberg"), IOM (2011 report on HIT risk), ECRI Institute (Top ten healthcare technology hazards for 2011 and 2012), NORCAL Mutual Insurance Company 2009 report on EHR risks, others; </li><li>Existence of severe impediments to information diffusion about risks explicitly admitted by FDA (2010 memo), IOM (2011 report), others; </li><li>Usability of commercial products in real world settings is often poor (e.g., NIST 2011 study on usability), promoting "use error" (user interface designs that engender users to make errors of commission or omission, where many errors are due not to user error per se but due to designs that are flawed, e.g., poorly written messaging, misuse of color-coding conventions, omission of information, etc.) </li><li>These systems promote capture and display of clinically irrelevant information in the interest of charge capture, and result in <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/02/electronic-medical-records-two-weeks.html" target="_blank">reams of "legible gibberish"</a> with many negative characteristics that make it difficult for other clinicians and reviewers to establish a cohesive, definitive narrative of clinical events and timelines.</li></ul></div><div></div><div> Health IT and health data issues are not 'partying' affairs. An un-seriousness about anything related to health IT seems in vogue of late. Finally, I ask:  does this "Health Data Palooza" bring my <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/02/health-it-ddulites-and-disregard-for.html" target="_blank">Ddulite</a> term to life?</div><div></div><div> <blockquote>Ddulite: Hyper-enthusiastic technophiles who either deliberately ignore or are blinded to technology's downsides, ethical issues, and repeated local and mass failures. </blockquote> A Ddulite Palooza.  How charming. Like the recent extravagances of other government agencies such as <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/16/politics/gsa-hearing/index.html" target="_blank">GSA in Las Vegas</a> and the <a href="http://worldnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/05/07/11575731-prostitute-at-center-of-secret-service-scandal-agents-were-stupid-brutes?lite" target="_blank">Secret Service in Colombia</a>, let's hope this Data Palooza is a Palooza in name only. In light of those recent scandals, calling a government sponsored meeting a "Palooza" seems inappropriate on that basis as well. -- SS 5/13/12  Addendum: A commenter pointed this flyer out: <div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiTPbMy_j7ie4KaNq3KWvaVvz0U-dCbEJ6UFSqTSyAmbRjMgptx5t_RbH8VRoBEsC_HQnKX-0E0NlppsCpdARzpzgLCAXPfRFN5WhNbiifkKQBMqONs_ORtXBGiny-6_XxVVycRVkTM8CG1/s1600/Health_Datapalooza_Poster_4.25_large.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiTPbMy_j7ie4KaNq3KWvaVvz0U-dCbEJ6UFSqTSyAmbRjMgptx5t_RbH8VRoBEsC_HQnKX-0E0NlppsCpdARzpzgLCAXPfRFN5WhNbiifkKQBMqONs_ORtXBGiny-6_XxVVycRVkTM8CG1/s320/Health_Datapalooza_Poster_4.25_large.jpg" width="247" /></a></div><div style="text-align: center;">(click to enlarge)</div><div style="text-align: center;"> </div><div style="text-align: left;">I post it here with no additional comments.</div><div style="text-align: left;"> </div><div style="text-align: left;">-- SS</div></div>

ONC's "Health Data Palooza" - A Title of Exceptionally Bad Taste, For a "See No Evil" Meeting

The Office of the National Coordinator of Health IT has sent out this announcement:Subject: HEALTH DATA PALOOZA III: Unleashing the Power of Data to Improve HealthFrom: ONC Health IT Date: Thu, …

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10 May 2012

EHRs and test ordering: Health Affairs authors reply to ONC

At my March 9, 2012 post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/03/increased-lab-ordering-with-ehrs.html">Increased Lab Ordering with EHR's?</a>" I refuted ONC's response to a Harvard-based research study "Giving Office-Based Physicians Electronic Access To Patients’ Prior Imaging And Lab Results Did Not Deter Ordering Of Tests" that may contradict the notion that HIT reduces medical costs. Now the authors themselves have responded to ONC. There are many similar themes in their response. I've bolded them below: <blockquote> <a href="http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/03/12/the-effect-of-physicians-electronic-access-to-tests-a-response-to-farzad-mostashari/" rel="bookmark" title="Permanent Link: The Effect Of Physicians’ Electronic Access To Tests: A Response To Farzad Mostashari">The Effect Of Physicians’ Electronic Access To Tests: A Response To Farzad Mostashari</a> March 12th, 2012 by Danny McCormick, David Bor, Stephanie Woolhandler, and David Himmelstein <a href="http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/31/3/488.abstract" target="_blank">Our recent Health Affairs article</a> linking increased test ordering to electronic access to results has elicited heated responses, including <a href="http://www.healthit.gov/buzz-blog/meaningful-use/study-facts/" target="_blank">a blog post by Farzad Mostashari</a>, National Coordinator for Health IT. Some of the assertions in his blog post are mistaken. Some take us to task for claims we never made, or for studying only some of the myriad issues relevant to medical computing. And many reflect wishful thinking regarding health IT; an acceptance of deeply flawed evidence of its benefit, and skepticism about solid data that leads to unwelcome conclusions. <div class="entrytext">Dr. Mostashari’s critique of our paper, will, we hope, open a fruitful dialogue. We trust that in the interest of fairness he will direct readers to our response on his agency’s site. [If not, HC Renewal posts get highly ranked by Google - ed.] Our study analyzed government survey data on a nationally representative sample of 28,741 patient visits to 1187 office-based physicians. We found that electronic access to computerized imaging results (either the report or the actual image) was associated with a 40% -70% increase in imaging tests, including sharp increases in expensive tests like MRIs and CT scans; the findings for blood tests were similar. Although the survey did not collect data on payments for the tests, it’s hard to imagine how a 40% to 70% increase in testing could fail to increase imaging costs. Dr. Mostashari’s statement that “reducing test orders is not the way that health IT is meant to reduce costs” is surprising, and contradicts <a href="http://commonhealth.wbur.org/2011/05/health-technology-blumenthal" style="font-weight: bold;" target="_blank">statements by his predecessor as National Coordinator</a> that electronic access to a previous CT scan helped him to avoid ordering a duplicate and “saved a whole bunch of money.” <a href="http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/24/5/1103.abstract" target="_blank">A Rand study</a>, widely cited by health IT advocates including President Obama, estimated that health IT would save $6.6 billion annually on outpatient imaging and lab testing. <a href="http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.10v1" target="_blank">Another frequently quoted estimate of HIT-based savings</a> projected annual cost reductions of $8.3 billion on imaging and $8.1 billion on lab testing. We focused on electronic access to results because the common understanding of how health IT might decrease test ordering is that it would facilitate retrieval of previous results, avoiding duplicate tests. Indeed, it’s clear from the extensive press coverage that our study was seen as contravening this “conventional wisdom”. Nonetheless, Dr. Mostashari criticizes us for analyzing the impact of physicians’ electronic access to imaging and test results, but not other aspects of electronic health record (EHR) use. We did, however, analyze the relationship of EHRs to test ordering in a subsidiary analysis. While physicians use of a full EHR was associated with a 19% increase in image ordering, as we noted in the paper this finding was not statistically significant. While we cautiously (and properly) interpreted this as a “null” finding, these data are inconsistent with Mostashari’s optimistic view that use of a full EHR reduces costs. He asserts that our 2008 data are passe, and that health IT meeting today’s “meaningful use” criteria definitely saves money. The data we analyzed were the latest available data when we initiated the study. While the proportion of outpatient physicians utilizing health IT has grown since 2008, we are unaware of any “game changing” health IT developments in the past four years that are would produce substantially different results if the study were repeated today. The EHR vendors that dominated the market in 2008 remain, by and large, today’s market leaders, and their products have undergone mostly modest tweaks. Mostashari’s contention that 2012 EHRs – incorporating decision support and electronic information exchange – save money in ways not possible in 2008 should be tested through additional research but remains merely a hypothesis. We hope that some day his predicted savings can be achieved. Dr. Mostashari offers his own explanation for our findings, suggesting that doctors who are inclined to order more tests are also inclined to purchase health IT for viewing test results electronically rather than on paper. He offers no evidence for this assertion and ignores the fact that we explored (and rejected) this explanation by analyzing subgroups of doctors who are unlikely to be the decision maker for IT purchases – e.g. employed physicians, those working in an HMO setting etc. In other words, electronic access to results predicted more test ordering whether or not the ordering physician was responsible for health IT purchases. He incorrectly states that our analysis did not take into account patients’ severity of illness, physicians’ level of training, and the nature of physicians’ financial arrangements. In fact, we reported subsidiary multivariate analyses that included several serious diagnoses; all of our models included physician specialty (which we specified in several different ways); and all models included adjustment for an extensive list of indicators of financial arrangements (e.g. whether the physician owned the practice or was an employee; the type of office; whether the practice was owned by a hospital; whether the physician was a solo practitioner; whether the physician’s compensation was based, in part or whole on “profiling”; and whether the practice was predominantly prepaid). We also performed a series of subsidiary analyses that explored whether physicians with a proclivity to “self refer” patients for imaging tests accounted for our finding; they didn’t. Dr. Mostashari criticizes us for failing to assess whether health IT improved the quality or appropriateness of care. Of course, these were not the topic of our research. Those are different studies for a different time. However, we would note that <a href="http://www.pnhp.org/sites/default/files/docs/AJM-Himmelstein-Hospital-Computing.pdf" target="_blank">other</a> <a href="http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/29/4/639.abstract" target="_blank">large-scale</a> <a href="http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/29/4/647.abstract" target="_blank">studies</a> have found no, or trivial quality improvements associated with HIT outside of a few flagship institutions4-6. Dr. Mostashari’s strongest claim is that observational studies like ours (and most other health policy studies, including some by Dr. Mostashari himself) cannot prove causation. This is surely true. As long time teachers of evidence based medicine we took care to couch our conclusions in cautious terms, stating only that “Computerization, whatever its other benefits, remains unproven as a cost control strategy.” But Dr. Motashari is less cautious, asserting that the case for HIT is closed. The paper he cites to buttress this claim (authored by members of his own agency) culled studies reporting any impact of HIT on virtually any aspect of care, and accepted authors’ claims of benefit without regard to study quality or statistical niceties. Thus, a focus group’s impressions of benefit are accorded the same weight as nationwide studies of Medicare data showing virtually no impact of computerization on quality measures. Reports of a reduction from 70% to 38 % in “missed billing opportunities” or a $7,000 reduction in office supply costs are among the 92% of studies judged “positive”. While the literature review he cites is interesting, nothing in it contradicts our findings. Dr. Mostashari is also correct in reiterating that randomized trials are the best way to assess health IT. In fact, no randomized trial has ever been published that examines patients’ outcomes or costs associated with off-the-shelf health IT systems that dominate the U.S. market. No drug or new medical device could pass FDA review based on such thin evidence as we have on health IT. Yet his agency is disbursing $19 billion in federal funds to stimulate the adoption of this inadequately evaluated technology. Dr. Mostashari is perhaps the only person in our nation who commands the resources needed to mount a well done randomized controlled trial to fairly assess the impact of health IT, and the comparative efficacy of the various EHR options. Finally, Dr. Mostashari’s unbridled faith in technology is mirrored by his belief that ACOs are the next panacea for health costs and quality. That health policy flavor-of-the-month also remains wholly unproven.</div></blockquote><div class="entrytext"></div> I think readers comparing my response to the authors', and who are familiar with the many posts at HC Renewal going back to 2004, will recognize the themes I have bolded in the author's response to HHS. -- SS

EHRs and test ordering: Health Affairs authors reply to ONC

At my March 9, 2012 post "Increased Lab Ordering with EHR's?" I refuted ONC's response to a Harvard-based research study "Giving Office-Based Physicians Electronic Access To Patients’ Prior Imaging An…

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15 Mar 2012

Doctors and EHRs: Reframing the "Modernists v. Luddites" Canard to The Accurate "Ardent Technophiles vs. Pragmatists" Reality

One manner by which Healthcare's core values are usurped is via distortions and slander about physicians and other clinicians. At "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/02/health-it-ddulites-and-irrational.html">Health IT: Ddulites and Irrational Exuberance</a>" and related posts (<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/Ddulite">query link</a>) I've described the phenomenon of the: <blockquote>'Hyper-enthusiastic technophile who either deliberately ignores or is blinded to technology's downsides, ethical issues, and repeated local and mass failures.'</blockquote> I have called this personality type the "Ddulite", which is "Luddite" with the first four letter reversed. I have also pointed out that the two are not exact opposites, as the Luddites did not endanger anyone in trying to preserve their textile jobs, whereas the Ddulites in healthcare IT do endanger patients. Yet, in the 20 years I've been professionally involved in health IT, I have frequently heard the refrain, usually from IT personnel and their management, that "Doctors resists EHRs because they are [backwards, technophobic, reactionary, dinosaurs, unable/unwilling to change, think they are Gods, ..... insert other slanderous/libelous comment]. I've heard this at Informatics meetings, at medical meetings, at commercial health IT meetings (e.g., Microsoft's Health Users Group, and at <a href="http://www.himss.org/ASP/index.asp">HIMSS</a>), at government meetings (e.g., <a href="http://www.gs1.org/healthcare/about">GS1 healthcare</a>), and others. The summary catchphrase I've heard and seen (even in the comments on this blog) is that doctors are "Luddites" while IT personnel are forward-thinking, know better than doctors, and are "Modernists." This slander and libel of physicians and other clinicians needs to stop, and the entire issue needs to be reframed. Doctors are pragmatists. When a new technology is rigorously shown to be beneficial to patients, and (perhaps more importantly) rigorously shown not to be of little benefit or worse, significantly harmful, doctors will embrace it. There are countless examples of this that I need not go into. They also have responsibilities, obligations, ethical considerations, liabilities, and other factors to consider in their decisions: <blockquote><a href="http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pragmatism">Pragmatism</a> (Merriam-Webster): : a practical approach to problems and affairs <tried a="" and="" balance="" between="" pragmatism="" principles="" strike="" to=""> </tried></blockquote> The reality is not: <blockquote>Luddite doctors <---- are in tension with ----> Modernist IT personnel</blockquote> but is: <blockquote>Pragmatist doctors <---- are in tension with ----> Ardent technophiles (Ddulites) </blockquote> The technophiles' views may be due, on the one hand, to ignorance of medicine's true complexities and "innocent" overconfidence in technology. Unfortunately, it is a gargantuan leap of logic to go from "well, computers work in tracking FedEx packages and allowing me to withdraw money from my U.S. bank when I'm abroad, to "therefore with just a little work they will transform medicine." Anyone familiar with even the most fundamental issues in Medical Informatics is aware of this. (This is the problem with "generic management" of healthcare IT - healthcare amateurs are unfamiliar with these issues.) Due to the complex, messy social, scientific, informational, ethical, cultural, emotional and other issues relatively unique to medicine, that leap from banking/widget tracking/mercantile computing --> medicine is probably more naive than the leap in logic, for instance, that would have a person believe since a hot air balloon can go high in the sky, it can take a person to the moon, as I observed <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/01/wsj-waste-feared-in-digitizing-patient.html">here</a>. On the other hand the technophile's expressed views can also be a territorial ploy with full awareness of, and reckless disregard for, the consequences of technology's downsides. (The CIO where I was a CMIO was well-known to be an aficionado of Sun Tzu's "<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Art_of_War">Art of War</a>" in his corporate politics - the polar opposite of a 'team player.' I might add that the doctors were fully expected to be 'team players'.) Part of the struggle between the health IT industry and medical professionals has also been control of information flow about HIT. This has been brought to the fore by my observation of the almost uniformly negative comments on today's HIT at the physician-only site <a href="http://www.sermo.com/">Sermo.com</a>. Sermo is populated, I might add, not by computerphobes but by physicians in a wide variety of specialties using computers for social networking. These comments will hopefully soon be published. (They are not dissimilar to the many comments I reported in my Jan. 2010 post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/01/honest-physician-survey-on-ehrs.html">An Honest Physician Survey on EHR's</a>", although some might call the sponsor of the latter survey, <a href="http://www.aapsonline.org/">AAPS</a>, biased. I do not think the same can be said of Sermo.com, an open site for all physicians.) I have mentioned on this blog the numerous impediments to flow of information about health IT's downsides, and these impediments are well described, for example, in the Joint Commission Sentinel Events Alert on Health IT (<a href="http://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/18/SEA_42.PDF">link</a>), the FDA Internal Memorandum on H-IT Safety (<a href="http://www.scribd.com/huffpostfund/d/33754943-Internal-FDA-Report-on-Adverse-Events-Involving-Health-Information-Technology">link</a>) and elsewhere (such as at <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/02/updated-reading-list-on-health-it.html">link</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/healthcare%20IT%20safety">link</a>). The Institute of Medicine of the National Academies noted this in their <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/11/iom-report-on-health-it-safety-nix-fda.html">late 2011 study on EHR safety</a>: <blockquote>... While some studies suggest improvements in patient safety can be made, others have found no effect. Instances of health IT–associated harm have been reported. However, little published evidence could be found quantifying the magnitude of the risk. Several reasons health IT–related safety data are lacking include the absence of measures and a central repository (or linkages among decentralized repositories) to collect, analyze, and act on information related to safety of this technology. Another impediment to gathering safety data is contractual barriers (e.g., nondisclosure, confidentiality clauses) that can prevent users from sharing information about health IT–related adverse events. These barriers limit users’ abilities to share knowledge of risk-prone user interfaces, for instance through screenshots and descriptions of potentially unsafe processes. In addition, some vendors include language in their sales contracts and escape responsibility for errors or defects in their software (i.e., “hold harmless clauses”). The committee believes these types of contractual restrictions limit transparency, which significantly contributes to the gaps in knowledge of health IT–related patient safety risks. These barriers to generating evidence pose unacceptable risks to safety.[IOM (Institute of Medicine). 2012. <a href="http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/Patient%20Safety%20and%20Health%20IT%20prepub.pdf">Health IT and Patient Safety: Building Safer Systems for Better Care</a> (PDF). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, pg. S-2.] </blockquote> Also in the IOM report: <blockquote class="tr_bq">… “For example, the number of patients who receive the correct medication in hospitals increases when these hospitals implement well-planned, robust computerized prescribing mechanisms and use barcoding systems. But even in these instances, the ability to generalize the results across the health care system may be limited. For other products— including electronic health records, which are being employed with more and more frequency— some studies find improvements in patient safety, while other studies find no effect. More worrisome, some case reports suggest that poorly designed health IT can create new hazards in the already complex delivery of care. Although the magnitude of the risk associated with health IT is not known, some examples illustrate the concerns. Dosing errors, failure to detect life-threatening illnesses, and delaying treatment due to poor human–computer interactions or loss of data have led to serious injury and death.”</blockquote> I note that the 'impediments to generating evidence' effectively rise to the level of legalized censorship, as observed by Koppel and Kreda regarding gag and hold-harmless clauses in their JAMA article "<a href="http://jama.ama-assn.org/content/301/12/1276.extract">Health Care Information Technology Vendors' Hold Harmless Clause: Implications for Patients and Clinicians</a>", JAMA 2009;301(12):1276-1278. doi: 10.1001/jama.2009.398. Pragmatist physicians are quite rightly very wary of the technology as it now exists. Ultimately, even when information on HIT risks or defects does surface, it is highly inappropriately labeled as "anecdotal" (see <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/08/from-senior-clinician-down-under.html">this post on anecdotes</a> for why this behavior is inappropriate). This "anecdotalist" phenomenon occurs right up to the HHS Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT (ONC), as I described in my post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/04/common-sense-on-side-effects-lacking-in.html">Making a Stat Less Significant: Common Sense on 'Side Effects' Lacking in Healthcare IT Sector</a>" and elsewhere. Therefore, another part of reframing the pragmatism vs. technophilia issue is for clinicians to put an end to censorship of HIT adverse experiences. I have the following practical suggestions, used myself, to start to accomplish the latter goal. These suggestions are in the interest of protecting public health and safety: When a physician or other clinician observes health IT problems, defects, malfunctions, <a href="http://www.tinyurl.com/hostileuserexper">mission hostility</a> (e.g., poor user interfaces), significant downtimes, lost data, erroneous data, misidentified data, and so forth ... and most certainly, patient 'close calls' or actual injuries ... they should (anonymously if necessary if in a hostile management setting): (DISCLAIMER:  I am not responsible for any adverse outcomes if any organizational policies or existing laws are broken in doing any of the following.) <ul><li>Inform their facility's senior management, if deemed safe and not likely to result in retaliation such as being slandered as a "<a href="http://www.jpands.org/vol9no3/huntoon.pdf">disruptive physician</a>" and/or or being subjected to sham peer review (<a href="http://www.aapsonline.org/index.php/article/sham_peer_review_resources_physicians/">link</a>).</li></ul><ul><li>Inform their personal and organizational insurance carriers, in writing. Insurance carriers do not enjoy paying out for preventable IT-related medical mistakes. They have begun to become aware of HIT risks. See, for example, the essay on Norcal Mutual Insurance Company's newsletter on HIT risks<a href="http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/?loc=cases&sloc=norcal"> at this link</a>. (Note - many medical malpractice insurance policies can be interpreted as requiring this reporting, observed occasional guest blogger <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/Dr.%20Scott%20Monteith">Dr. Scott Monteith</a> in a comment to me about this post.)</li></ul><ul><li>Inform the Joint Commission (or similar national accreditor of hospital safety if not in the U.S.) via their complaint site at <a href="http://www.jointcommission.org/report_a_complaint.aspx">http://www.jointcommission.org/report_a_complaint.aspx</a> . Also consider writing the JC senior officers (<a href="http://www.jointcommission.org/about_us/joint_commission_officers.aspx">link to officer's list</a>), whose awareness of HIT issues I can personally attest to via our correspondences.</li></ul><ul><li>Inform the FDA (or similar healthcare regulator if not in the U.S.) via the FDA Medwatch Form 3500 reporting site at <a href="https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/medwatch/medwatch-online.htm">https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/medwatch/medwatch-online.htm</a>. An example of such an adverse event report I filed myself (when the involved hospital refused) is <a href="http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfmaude/Detail.CFM?MDRFOI__ID=1729552">at this link</a> in the FDA MAUDE (Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience) database.</li></ul><ul><li>Inform the State Medical Society and local Medical Society of your locale.</li></ul><ul><li>Inform the appropriate Board of Health for your locale.</li></ul><ul><li>If applicable (and it often is), inform the Medicare Quality Improvement Organization (QIO) of your state or region. Example: in Pennsylvania, the QIO is "<a href="http://www.qipa.org/Home.aspx">Quality Insights of PA</a>."</li></ul><ul><li>Inform a personal attorney.</li></ul><ul><li>Inform local, state and national representatives such as congressional representatives. Sen. Grassley of Iowa is aware of these issues, for example.</li></ul><ul><li>As clinicians are often forced to use health IT, at their own risk even when "certified" (<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/02/hospitals-and-doctors-use-health-it-at.html">link</a>), if a healthcare organization or HIT seller is sluggish or resistant in taking corrective actions, consider taking another risk (perhaps this is for the very daring or those near the end of their clinical career). Present your organization's management with a statement for them to sign to the effect of:</li></ul><blockquote>"We, the undersigned, do hereby acknowledge the concerns of [Dr. Jones] about care quality issues at [Mount St. Elsewhere Hospital] regarding EHR difficulties that were reported, namely [event A, event B, event C ... etc.] We hereby indemnify [Dr. Jones] for malpractice liability regarding patient care errors that occur due to EHR issues beyond his/her control, but within the control of hospital management, including but not limited to: [system downtimes, lost orders, missing or erroneous data, etc.] that are known to pose risk to patients. We assume responsibility for any such malpractice. With regard to health IT and its potential negative effects on care, Dr. Jones has provided us with the Joint Commission Sentinel Events Alert on Health IT at <a href="http://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/18/SEA_42.PDF" style="font-style: italic;">http://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/18/SEA_42.PDF</a>, the IOM report on HIT safety at <a href="http://www.modernhealthcare.com/Assets/pdf/CH76254118.PDF" style="font-style: italic;">http://www.modernhealthcare.com/Assets/pdf/CH76254118.PDF</a>, and the FDA Internal Memorandum on H-IT Safety Issues at <a href="http://www.scribd.com/huffpostfund/d/33754943-Internal-FDA-Report-on-Adverse-Events-Involving-Health-Information-Technology" style="font-style: italic;">http://www.scribd.com/huffpostfund/d/33754943-Internal-FDA-Report-on-Adverse-Events-Involving-Health-Information-Technology</a>. CMO __________ (date, time) CIO ___________ (date, time) CMIO _________ (date, time) General Counsel ___________ (date, time) etc."</blockquote><ul><li>If the hospital or organizational management refuses to sign such a waiver (and they likely will!), note the refusal, with date and time of refusal, and file away with your attorney. It could come in handy if EHR-related med mal does occur.</li></ul><ul><li>As EHRs remain experimental, I note that indemnifications such as the above probably belong in medical staff contracts and bylaws when EHR use is coerced.</li></ul> These measures can help "light a fire" under the decision makers, and "get the lead out" of efforts to improve this technology to the point where it is usable, efficacious and safe. -- SS

Doctors and EHRs: Reframing the "Modernists v. Luddites" Canard to The Accurate "Ardent Technophiles vs. Pragmatists" Reality

One manner by which Healthcare's core values are usurped is via distortions and slander about physicians and other clinicians.At "Health IT: Ddulites and Irrational Exuberance" and related posts (quer…

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11 Mar 2012

Increased Lab Ordering with EHR's?

ONC has once more proffered typical politically-motivated spin with regard to the Harvard study "Giving Office-Based Physicians Electronic Access To Patients’ Prior Imaging And Lab Results Did Not Deter Ordering Of Tests" that I wrote about at "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/03/another-health-it-mythbuster-doctors.html">Another Health IT Mythbuster: Doctors order more X-rays, not fewer, with computer access</a>." That study had the rather tame, reasonable conclusion: <blockquote> ... These findings raise the possibility that, as currently implemented, electronic access does not decrease test ordering in the office setting and may even increase it, possibly because of system features that are enticements to ordering. We conclude that use of these health information technologies, whatever their other benefits, remains unproven as an effective cost-control strategy with respect to reducing the ordering of unnecessary tests. </blockquote> The ONC response (posted <a href="http://www.healthit.gov/buzz-blog/meaningful-use/study-facts/">here</a> at present) to such a mild conclusion about an <a href="http://ctlab.org/documents/Hiding%20in%20plain%20sight.pdf">experimental</a> technology seemed very splenetic. As I mentioned at the aforementioned post, ONC has thrown good science under the bus before, for political purposes in my view: <blockquote>... On the other hand, coming from a political office that clearly does not understand how to conduct qualitative research and creates political promotion pieces masquerading as "research", such a statement is not surprising. See "ONC: "The Benefits Of Health Information Technology: A Review Of The Recent Literature Shows Predominantly Positive Results" <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/03/benefits-of-health-information.html">at this link</a>, where essential research methodologies were thrown under the bus for publication in Health Affairs. At least the deviations from rigorous research methodologies were admitted: <blockquote>“... Our findings must be qualified by two important limitations: the question of publication bias [e.g., bias in evidence selection - ed.], and the fact that we implicitly gave equal weight to all studies regardless of study design or sample size.”</blockquote> Unfortunately, the media, politicians, financial decisionmakers and others are likely not to really comprehend, in-depth, the full significance of that sentence.</blockquote> I am in the unfortunate situation of again having to stuff ONC's - um, stuff - back into the bull. First, hat tip to <a href="http://histalk2.com/2012/03/08/news-3912/">Histalk</a> where I found the link below: <blockquote> National Coordinator for HIT Farzad Mostashari, MD <a href="http://www.healthit.gov/buzz-blog/meaningful-use/study-facts/" target="_blank">takes issue</a> with the recently published <a href="http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/31/3/488.abstract" target="_blank">report</a> that found doctors with online access to patients’ charts ordered more tests. Mostashari disputes the study, which raised questions as to whether or not EHRs cut costs. Mostashari’s contends that the study was based on 2008 data and before the start of the Meaningful Use program and thus does not address certified EHRs’ capabilities for data exchange and clinical data support.</blockquote> The fatal passage in the linked ONC piece at <a href="http://www.healthit.gov/buzz-blog/meaningful-use/study-facts/">http://www.healthit.gov/buzz-blog/meaningful-use/study-facts/</a> is this: <blockquote>"Also, the study data were from 2008, before the passage of the HITECH Act and the linking of payment incentives to the meaningful use of EHRs."</blockquote> This seems a variation of the typical excuse-making in IT - "they were using v. 1.0; it's all fixed in the later version." The outcomes of (Orwellian-named) "Meaningful Use" (MU) have not been studied, to my knowledge. Futher, the criteria chosen for "Meaningful Use" were primarily best guesses as to what could be beneficial. ("Meaningful Use" should have been more accurately termed "good faith use.") Claiming that 2008 data on EHR-related test ordering is invalid because "Meaningful Use" was not in effect at the time is, in fact, jumping to an unsupported conclusion that "Meaningful Use" will counter whatever multiple medical/social factors caused the increased ordering in the first place -- because, of course, MU is "Meaningful" and deterministically guaranteed to work out, nationally, as planned, among all outpatient and inpatient settings. This seems a form of "<a href="http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/begging-the-question.html">begging the question</a>": <blockquote>Begging the Question is a fallacy in which the premises include the claim that the conclusion is true or (directly or indirectly) assume that the conclusion is true. This sort of "reasoning" typically has the following form. - Premises in which the truth of the conclusion is claimed or the truth of the conclusion is assumed (either directly or indirectly). - Claim C (the conclusion) is true. This sort of "reasoning" is fallacious because simply assuming that the conclusion is true (directly or indirectly) in the premises does not constitute evidence for that conclusion. Obviously, simply assuming a claim is true does not serve as evidence for that claim. This is especially clear in particularly blatant cases: "X is true. The evidence for this claim is that X is true." </blockquote> I note that the MU criteria are themselves evolving and not finalized. Making predictions about the future is the domain of fortune tellers with crystal balls, not scientists: <div style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgxfGRBku5tQcZH_CDtCrXbUMagZlCYUgLxzVa2C1w8EqImeOHTe22KGNDg2hLPZstTduSJyYJBs4CsxW1Ju8zrsP0cunQpDERfEQgbwPjmtR1jRchJrXu6RyAqGdIvIw4Henn5UqNvGrq_/s1600/crystal+ball.jpg"><img alt="" border="0" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5717930314388106274" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgxfGRBku5tQcZH_CDtCrXbUMagZlCYUgLxzVa2C1w8EqImeOHTe22KGNDg2hLPZstTduSJyYJBs4CsxW1Ju8zrsP0cunQpDERfEQgbwPjmtR1jRchJrXu6RyAqGdIvIw4Henn5UqNvGrq_/s320/crystal+ball.jpg" style="cursor: pointer; display: block; height: 136px; margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; width: 205px;" /></a>Health IT WILL reduce costs and improve caregivers’ decisions and patients’ outcomes. It is written in the stars!</div> ONC seems to think it is capable of such certainty, as I wrote in mid-2010 at "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/07/new-england-journal-on-meaningful-use.html">Science or Politics? The New England Journal and "The 'Meaningful Use' Regulation for Electronic Health Records</a>": <blockquote> ... The widespread use of electronic health records (EHRs) in the United States is inevitable. EHRs will improve caregivers’ decisions and patients’ outcomes. Once patients experience the benefits of this technology, they will demand nothing less from their providers. Hundreds of thousands of physicians have already seen these benefits in their clinical practice.</blockquote> In its current piece, ONC goes on to state: <blockquote>Reducing Test Orders Is Not the Way that Health IT Is Meant to Reduce Costs The ultimate impact of EHRs on reducing cost will be through improvements in the coordination and quality of care, and the prevention of unnecessary and costly complications and hospitalizations. [Note the mysterious disappearance of the word "tests" - ed.] Providers who are embracing new delivery and payment models such as Accountable Care Organizations and Patient-Centered Medical Homes know that meaningful use of EHRs is a critical foundation for being able to improve quality while reducing cost.</blockquote> That is, simply, a lie. Reducing test utilization has long been claimed as a benefit of EHR's. For example, from <a href="http://www.healthit.gov/patients-families/benefits-health-it">http://www.healthit.gov/patients-families/benefits-health-it</a>: <blockquote> EHRs reduce unnecessary tests and procedures. Have you ever had to repeat medical tests ordered by one doctor because the results weren’t readily available to another doctor? Those tests may have been uncomfortable and inconvenient or have posed some risk, and they also cost money. Repeating tests—whether a $20 blood test or a $2,000 MRI--results in higher costs to you in the form of bigger bills and increased insurance premiums. With EHRs, all of your care providers can have access to all your test results and records at once, reducing the potential for unnecessary repeat tests.</blockquote> It is also another example of "moving the goalposts", a defense often used by those without a sound argument; by politicians; and sometimes by - scoundrels. (I observed another "moving of the goalposts" at my aforementioned post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/03/another-health-it-mythbuster-doctors.html">Another Health IT Mythbuster: Doctors order more X-rays, not fewer, with computer access</a>." In that post I observed Michael Furukawa, a health economist in the ONC office, stating that the researchers’ focus was not "deep enough" to support the study’s conclusions. He wrote: “The data are sound, the methods are appropriate, but the focus is limited,” he said. “They only looked at one piece of health IT.”) Well, yes, and the piece they looked at should set off red flags that the assumptions about health IT and savings might be erroneous - not generate excuses that the goalposts were too close, and need to be moved further away. This is not to mention that it appears most healthcare errors have little to do with documentation, as I outlined in my Dec. 2010 post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-healthcare-it-solution-to-wrong.html">Is Healthcare IT a Solution to the Wrong Problem?</a>" I particularly take issue with the ONC statement that: <blockquote> ... this was not a randomized trial, but an observational study (the National Ambulatory Medical Survey) that was not designed to answer the question of cost, or associations between EHRs and quality. As a result, many other variables that could affect physician behavior could not be examined in this study</blockquote> <div class="commentContent UIImageBlock_Content UIImageBlock_SMALL_Content" ft="{"type":33}">Yet in the aforementioned ONC "predominantly positive results" literature survey described <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/03/benefits-of-health-information.html">at this link</a>, ONC "implicitly gave equal weight to all studies regardless of study design or sample size." Their review thus included qualitative studies that were probably not meant to be evaluative, and observational studies subject to severe methodological bias, yet all were weighted equally. Further, studies contradicting the 'narrative' of health IT efficacy and beneficence such as in <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/02/updated-reading-list-on-health-it.html">this list</a> appear to have been excluded. This appears a prime example of, at best, "the pot calling the teakettle black", and raises doubts as to ONC's objectivity and perhaps even intellectual honesty. Of course, they are a political office with a mission, so perhaps this can be understood. (Not excused, but understood.) </div> ONC also views risk management-critical reports of health IT-caused harm as "anecdotal", a scientific and ethical faux pas (or is it willful blindness?) of major proportions. As I wrote at my April 2001 post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/04/common-sense-on-side-effects-lacking-in.html">Making a Stat Less Significant: Common Sense on "Side Effects" Lacking in Healthcare IT Sector</a>": <blockquote>... This view [of negative HIT reports being 'anecdotes'] extends all the way up to the Director of the Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT, who glibly stated per the Aug. 2010 Huffington Post Investigative Fund article <a href="http://www.iwatchnews.org/2010/08/03/7096/fda-obama-digital-medical-records-team-odds-over-safety-oversight">FDA, Obama Digital Medical Records Team at Odds over Safety Oversight</a> that FDA's own reports of health IT related injuries and deaths were “anecdotal": <blockquote>ONC director Blumenthal, the point man for the administration, has called the FDA’s injury findings “anecdotal and fragmentary.” He told the Investigative Fund that he believed nothing in the report indicated a need for regulation.</blockquote> Those "injury findings" appear in an FDA Internal Memo made available by the aforementioned Huffington Post Investigative Fund and archived at the following link: <blockquote><a href="http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/Internal-FDA-Report-on-Adverse-Events-Involving-Health-Information-IT.pdf">Internal FDA memorandum on HIT risks</a> (PDF) to Jeffrey Shuren MD JD (Director, Center for Devices and Radiological Health). Health Information Technology (H-IT) Safety Issues. "This is an Internal Document Not Intended for Public Use." Feb. 23, 2010. (My description/summary of the memorandum is at my Aug. 2010 post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/08/smoking-gun-internal-fda-memorandum-of.html">Internal FDA memorandum of Feb. 23, 2010 to Jeffrey Shuren on HIT risks. Smoking gun?</a>")</blockquote></blockquote> The definitive take-down of the "anecdote" canard is <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/08/from-senior-clinician-down-under.html">at this link</a>. One could wonder if a criteria for work at ONC is a <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/02/health-it-ddulites-and-disregard-for.html">Ddulite</a> disposition ('Luddite' with first four characters reversed): <blockquote>Ddulites: Hyper-enthusiastic technophiles who either deliberately ignore or are blinded to technology's downsides, ethical issues, and repeated local and mass failures.</blockquote> Instead of logical fallacy and "spin", perhaps the ONC would be better served by sponsoring some (independent, objective) researchers to actually conduct research supporting their claims about the effects of the "Meaningful Use" program. Finally, perhaps ONC should ask my mother what she thinks about EHRs. She has specially-acquired firsthand expertise. They can find her <a href="http://www.foresthillsshalom.com/dm20/en_US/locations/03/0355/index.page">here</a>. -- SS Addendum 3/9/12: At my Feb. 2011 post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/02/does-emr-facilitated-upcoding-formely_15.html">Does EHR-Incited Upcoding (Also Known as "Fraud") Need Investigation by CMS, And Could it Explain HIT Irrational Exuberance</a> " is another side effect on costs of EHR's in inpatient settings, specifically, the ED. -- SS Addendum 3/11/12: Another article in 2010 by Himmelstein, Woolhandler & Wright had reached related conclusions: <a href="http://www.amjmed.com/article/S0002-9343%2809%2900816-X/abstract"></a> <blockquote><a href="http://www.amjmed.com/article/S0002-9343%2809%2900816-X/abstract">Hospital Computing and the Costs and Quality of Care: A National Study</a> David U. Himmelstein, MD, Adam Wright, PhD,Steffie Woolhandler, MD, MPH <div class="center noMargin"><a class="button floatLeft" href="http://www.blogger.com/article/S0002-9343%2809%2900878-X/abstract" id="prevArticle"></a>The American Journal of Medicine <a href="http://www.amjmed.com/issues?issue_key=S0002-9343%2809%29X0020-3">Volume 123, Issue 1</a> , Pages 40-46, January 2010</div> Background Many believe that computerization will improve health care quality, reduce costs, and increase administrative efficiency. However, no previous studies have examined computerization's cost and quality impacts at a diverse national sample of hospitals. Methods We linked data from an annual survey of computerization at approximately 4000 hospitals for the period from 2003 to 2007 with administrative cost data from Medicare Cost Reports and cost and quality data from the 2008 Dartmouth Health Atlas. We calculated an overall computerization score and 3 subscores based on 24 individual computer applications, including the use of computerized practitioner order entry and electronic medical records. We analyzed whether more computerized hospitals had lower costs of care or administration, or better quality. We also compared hospitals included on a list of the “100 Most Wired” with others. Results More computerized hospitals had higher total costs in bivariate analyses (r=0.06, P=.001) but not multivariate analyses (P=.69). Neither overall computerization scores nor subscores were consistently related to administrative costs, but hospitals that increased computerization faster had more rapid administrative cost increases (P=.0001). Higher overall computerization scores correlated weakly with better quality scores for acute myocardial infarction (r=0.07, P=.003), but not for heart failure, pneumonia, or the 3 conditions combined. In multivariate analyses, more computerized hospitals had slightly better quality. Hospitals on the “Most Wired” list performed no better than others on quality, costs, or administrative costs. Conclusion As currently implemented, hospital computing might modestly improve process measures of quality but does not reduce administrative or overall costs.</blockquote> -- SS

Increased Lab Ordering with EHR's?

ONC has once more proffered typical politically-motivated spin with regard to the Harvard study "Giving Office-Based Physicians Electronic Access To Patients’ Prior Imaging And Lab Results Did Not Det…

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09 Mar 2012

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