healthy4u: health care bubble

The Bloat Continues: More Tales of Non-Profit Hospital Executive Compensation

While unemployment remains high, and mortgage foreclosures continue in the US, nothing seems to stop the rise of health care costs, lead by compensation for top health care leaders. So, it is time once again for a round-up of inflated executive compensation at non-profit and government hospital systems.  We will describe the bloat in order of the appearance of the information in public. Cincinnati The December, 2011, the Cincinnati Business Courier <a href="http://www.bizjournals.com/cincinnati/feature/datacenter-hospital-executive.html">tabulated </a>the pay of the best compensated hospital employees, and discussed the results in an <a href="http://www.bizjournals.com/cincinnati/blog/2011/12/in-hospitals-its-not-just-ceos.html">accompanying article</a>.  By my count, 19 local hospital employees made more than $1 million in 2010.  These included 6 system CEO, 4 division CEOs, 5 chief level executives or vice presidents, 1 clinical department chair, and 3 doctors.  The top compensation went to Kenneth Hanover, CEO of Health Alliance/ UC Health, $2,799,338. Three others made more than $2 million. Western New York In January, 2012, Buffalo Business First <a href="http://www.bizjournals.com/buffalo/news/2012/01/23/four-hospital-execs-earn-more-than-1.html">reported</a>: <blockquote>The top hospital administrators in Western New York took home more than $53 million in compensation during 2010, with four executives earning $1 million-plus paydays. Hospital presidents and chief executives at the region’s two largest health systems were among the top earners, with James Kaskie, president and CEO of Kaleida Health , earning $2.36 million; and Joseph McDonald, president and CEO at Catholic Health , earning nearly $1.1 million. Kaskie’s compensation, as well as Kaleida executives Connie Vari, Robert Nolan and Margaret Paroski, included a deferred retirement plan payout. All four were among the top five earners for 2010, the most recent year for which complete data is available.</blockquote> The life of a top hospital executive near Buffalo was not quite as plush as in Cincinnati. Only 4 made more than $1 million, including the CEO, Chief Medical Officer/ Executive Vice President, and Chief Operating Officer of Kaleida Health, and the CEO of Catholic Health System. Eleven more executives got more than $500,000. North Carolina It was a very good year for executives from some of the state's biggest health care systems, per a February, 2012 <a href="http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2012/02/01/2974848/chs-paid-its-ceo-42m.html">article in the Charlotte Observer</a>. <blockquote>Carolinas HealthCare System paid its CEO $4.2 million in 2011, $523,000 more than the year before, as the system celebrated a profitable year and met all of its systemwide goals, according to hospital officials. Chief Executive Officer Michael Tarwater, 58, who has led the $6 billion public hospital system for 10 years, received a base salary of about $1 million, two bonuses totaling $2.5 million, and other compensation, including retirement and health benefits, of about $700,000. That represents a 9 percent increase in base salary and a 14 percent overall increase compared to 2010, when Tarwater's salary was $986,172 and total compensation was $3.7 million.</blockquote> Meanwhile, at Novant Health, <blockquote>The most recent compensation figures for Novant executives are from 2010. In that year, Novant's CEO Paul Wiles, 64, received total compensation of $3.2 million, including his salary of $1 million, a bonus of about $837,000, and $1.37 million in other income, including retirement and health benefits. Wiles retired at the end of 2011 and was succeeded by Carl Armato, who was previously chief operating officer for Novant.</blockquote> A data table within the article showed that there were 10 employees, all executives, at Carolinas Healthcare System in 2011, and 6, again all executives, at Novant Health in 2010, who got more than $1 million in compensation. Why did the Carolinas CEO warrant a multi-million dollar pay package? One of his employees endeavored to explain, <blockquote>'We've had extremely good performance,' said Debra Plousha Moore, the system's chief of human resources. 'All performance goals this year were either met or exceeded.'</blockquote>Why the credit for that performance should not be spread amongst more hospital employees, especially those who actually took care of patients, she did not explain. Northern New York City Suburbs In February, 2012, LoHud.com <a href="http://www.lohud.com/article/20120212/NEWS02/302120060/Business-Medicine-Part-2-Eight-local-hospital-officials-got-1M-2010">reported</a>: <blockquote>Eight executives from 15 Lower Hudson Valley hospitals received more than $1 million in salary, bonuses, benefits and other pay in 2010 at a time when the state struggled to control health-care costs.</blockquote> The details included: <blockquote>Three executives received more in total compensation than Westchester Medical Center CEO Michael Israel, who earned $1.3 million and oversees a hospital that’s more than twice the size of other facilities in the region.</blockquote> Also, <blockquote>The highest-paid hospital employees include White Plains Hospital CEO Jon Schandler with $1.6 million in total compensation, Dr. Edward Lundy at Good Samaritan Hospital in Suffern with $1.48 million and Edward Dinan, CEO of Lawrence Hospital in Bronxville, with $1.41 million. Others in the million-dollar range include John Federspiel, president of Hudson Valley Hospital Center in Cortlandt; Joel Seligman, CEO of Northern Westchester Hospital in Mount Kisco; and Keith Safian, CEO of Phelps Memorial Hospital Center in Sleepy Hollow. A year earlier, Federspiel received a compensation package of nearly $2 million due partly to an $800,000 deferred compensation payout. The average CEO compensation rose 13 percent from 2009, to $939,751. Ten hospitals paid $7.7 million in bonuses to top executives, an increase of 15 percent over 2009. White Plains Hospital alone distributed $2.1 million in bonuses, including $650,000 to Dr. Jesus Jaile-Marti, chief of neonatology, and $575,000 to Schandler.</blockquote> This article highlighted the contrast between compensation for executives and for employees who provide front line care: <blockquote>The high salaries also come as hospitals pressure many employees for wage freezes, rising insurance costs and watered-down pensions, said Deborah Elliott, a nurse and deputy executive officer of the New York State Nurses Association, a statewide union representing nurses at Sound Shore, Mount Vernon, St. John’s Riverside, St. Joseph’s and Nyack hospitals as well as Westchester Medical Center. 'It never ceases to amaze me that we sit at the bargaining table with these executives who are making $1 million and they give us such a hard time about a half-percent increase for a nurse who is making $63,000,' Elliott said. 'It’s galling.'</blockquote>Again, contrast that one half percent with the average chief executive increase of 13%. While it is a rare hospital that would disparage the performance of its dedicated nurses and physicians, somehow executive talent seems to matter more. For example, here is how Hudson Valley Hospital Center president John Federspiel's compensation was justified by his board chair: <blockquote>Edward B. MacDonald Jr., chairman of Hudson Valley Hospital Center’s board of directors, said Federspiel deserves his paycheck. The hospital has earned a profit for 22 of the 25 years that Federspiel has been at the helm and has expanded both its services and payroll in that time, he said. 'He’s the best administrator, planner and motivator I have ever had the privilege to work with,' MacDonald said. 'I wish I could pay him more.'</blockquote>Again, why the CEO, but not the nurses and doctors deserves the credit for the hospital's performance was not stated. Summary It all gets so tedious, doesn't it? CEOs of all but the smallest non-profit hospitals now seem entitled to at least $1 million a year. At larger systems, multiple executives per system seem entitled to that level of compensation, and CEOs may get multiple millions a year. Yet these are ostensibly non-profit organizations dedicated or providing care to their communities, and often to serving the poor. Thus the health care bubble continues to inflate, and executives are ever more distracted by money, and seem less focused on mission. Note that reporting of this ever rising compensation seems to be becoming more perfunctory as the results seem more routine (and tedious). Two of the four articles noted above did not provide any justifications for the high pay, while two only trotted out brief versions of the "our CEO is so brilliant" meme. As I <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/12/more-tales-of-hospital-ceo-compensation.html">said in December</a>, in a health care system with ever rising costs, declining access, and stagnant quality, we no longer can tolerate the perverse incentives generated by unaccountably high compensation to top executives. As long as top executives continue their sense of "self-entitlement," and can continue their current management practices reinforced by ever rising pay checks, expect poor leadership to undermine any attempts to improve health care. Tired repetitions of the usual rationales, that the CEOs are brilliant and hard-working, and that their compensation is mandated by the market do not make these rationales true. We need health care leadership that has compassion for the increasing hardships that their patients have to endure, and that puts doing the right thing for patients' and the public's health ahead of self-interest.

The Bloat Continues: More Tales of Non-Profit Hospital Executive Compensation

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17 Feb 2012

More Tales of the Hospital CEO Compensation Bubble

The hospital <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/executive%20compensation">CEO compensation</a> bubble continues to grow. As the year draws to a close, I have found another set of stories about outsized payments to health care executives.  While their repetitive features suggest the magnitude of the issue, they featured some twists on the usual justifications given for large compensation packages. Presented in order of the size of the compensation package..... Maxis Health System, Pennsylvania The Scanton Times-Tribune <a href="http://thetimes-tribune.com/news/marian-community-hospital-to-leave-behind-more-than-19-million-in-liabilities-1.1240913">reported</a>: <blockquote>Mary Theresa Vautrinot, president and CEO of parent company Maxis Health System, earned a little more than $464,000 in salary and other compensation, according to 2010 tax forms filed by the hospital.</blockquote> These days, compensation under a half a million dollars may not seem like all that much, but it should be viewed in context. Maxis Health Systems actually actually owns only one hospital, Marian Community Hospital. In 2010, that hospital, already small, shrunk further, <blockquote>In January 2010, the 70-bed hospital scaled back operations to just 35 beds. For the past six months, Marian Community Hospital has had about 20 inpatients each day.</blockquote> Now it will close: <blockquote>Last Monday, parent company Maxis Health System announced the Carbondale hospital's impending closure, citing ongoing financial pressures and a dwindling patient population</blockquote> $464,000 seems like a lot of money to run a tiny hospital under "ongoing financial pressure" into bankruptcy. This seems like another example of pay for poor performance. Summa Health System, Akron Children's Hospital, Akron General Health System, Ohio In a survey of local hospital CEO compensation, the Akron Beacon-Journal <a href="http://www.ohio.com/news/top-stories/hospitals-disclose-executive-pay-charity-care-1.248669">noted</a>, <blockquote>Children’s President and Chief Executive William Considine received compensation and other benefits totaling $1,560,659 in 2010. Thomas J. Strauss, president and chief executive of Summa Health System, received a total compensation and bonus package worth $1,408,062 last year. For Akron General, 2010 was a year of leadership transition, with a former, interim and current leader all receiving executive pay. Alan J. Bleyer, who retired as the hospital’s leader in 2009, received $677,267 in compensation. Michael Rindler, a national health-care consultant who was interim chief executive and continued in a consulting role through the year, made $983,744. Vincent J. McCorkle, who took over as president and chief executive on July 1, 2010, received $568,605 in total compensation last year.</blockquote>Lest anyone think that these hospitals were paying their CEOs a lot of money, <blockquote>Nonprofit hospital executives could make substantially more if they worked in for-profit industries, [Ohio Hospitals Association spokesperson Mary] Yost said. 'A million dollars certainly is a decent package, but it’s not the highest thing that these people could command,' she said. 'We’re blessed that there are people who want to work for a nonprofit that has the mission of serving its community and they’re not just in it for the money.'</blockquote> Only within the protected world of top executives would $1 million a year seem only a "decent package."  The stock defense of lavish executive pay is <a href="http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/appeal-to-common-practice.html">an appeal to common practice</a>, i.e., the pay is justified because so many organizations pay their executives similar amounts.  This version of the defense lacked even the common accompanying assertions that the particular executives are so brilliant and hard-working that they would be assured of a high market price. Furthermore, let us consider another comparison.  Consider the following data, <blockquote>Summa’s revenue exceeded expenses by $31.7 million, for an operating margin of about 3 percent. Akron General Medical Center’s revenue exceeded expenses by about $8 million, resulting in an operating margin of 1.7 percent. Parent company Akron General Health System posted a loss of about $1 million on revenue of $854,207, according to IRS filings. The health system's filings reflect investment income and the costs of providing health screenings to the public, not hospital operations, Akron General spokesman Jim Gosky said. Revenue at Children’s exceeded expenses by about $35.3 million for a 7.4 percent operating margin.</blockquote>These data implied that the CEOs of Summa and Childrens' each received compensation equal to about 5% of their organization's total operating margins. The two people who acted as CEO at Akron General received together an amount that was larger than their system's operating loss, so had they been paid $1 million less, their system would have broken even. In this case, the newspaper found no one to quote who would assert that the former CEOs' performance was so good as to command that much of the hospital's excees, or the latter CEO's performance was so good as to be worth putting the hospital system into a deficit.   Mercy Health Systems, Wisconsin The Janesville, Wisconsin Gazette published a story about one CEOs response to previous reporting of his compensation, <blockquote>Javon Bea saw the August article in a Madison newspaper that questioned the salaries of area health care leaders. Bea, the president and chief executive officer of Janesville-based Mercy Health System, was singled out for receiving considerably more than hospital executives in Madison. The article was based on 2009 tax filings, which show that Mercy paid Bea $3.6 million in total compensation. That included compensation of nearly $2 million and deferred pension payments of just more than $1.6 million. The newspaper reported that the national average was $630,000 and included base salaries, bonuses, pensions and other benefits.</blockquote> Many stories of executive pay have shown leaders who make many times other employees' compensation.  In this case, however, a CEO tried to assert that he did many times other employees' work.  Bea defended his salary by arguing he did the work of at least three, perhaps six people: <blockquote>Bea said the Madison newspaper story compared executives at individual operations to him, an executive of a system that has three hospitals and 61 other facilities in 24 communities in southern Wisconsin and northern Illinois. 'To equal the job description of the CEO of Mercy Health System, you'd have to (add together) the salary of the CEO of DeanCare insurance, the salary of the CEO of Dean Clinic and the salary of the CEO of St. Mary's Hospital,' Bea said. 'And then you'd better throw in the chief operating officers at all three.' Bea said Mercy doesn't have COOs and that he does that work.</blockquote>Mr Bea did not explain how he found enough time in a 24 hour day to do the work of three to six people.  This seems to be a particularly hyperbolic version of argument that the executive is so brilliant and hard-working as to command such a high market price. Perhaps Mercy does not have CEOs or COOs of individual hospitals, but its 2010 Form 990 (from Guidestar <a href="http://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments/2010/390/816/2010-390816848-0734ca49-9.pdf">here</a>) documents that it has ten vice-presidents who each make approximately $200,000 to over $375,000 a year. Why Mr Bea would need to do the work of three or six people when he has so many other well-executives around to help was not clear. Furthermore, Mr Bea came up with an apparently unique justification for his high pay, that its source was some sort of magic money that did not add to health care costs, <blockquote>Bea said his salary has no effect on health care costs or the premiums MercyCare subscribers pay each year. He likened his salary to capital costs, which he also said don't affect what patients are charged. John Cook, Mercy's chief financial officer, said Medicare, Medicaid and private insurance companies don't pay providers based on the costs of capital improvements or salaries, which in Bea's case is determined by a board of directors that works with national consultants and attorneys. 'My salary isn't going to affect your health care cost,' Bea said.</blockquote> Maybe Mr Bea needs a second opinion from another CFO. His compensation appears to come from the hospital system's budget, per its 990 form, so it affects hospital costs as much as any other expense of the same amount. Furthermore, it is well known that hospital systems negotiate payment rates with private insurers, and that larger systems with more market power may negotiate higher rates.  Finally, it is also well known that different hospitals collect different amounts from government insurance programs for patients with apparently similar problems.  Thus, the notion that executive pay has no effect on health care costs, and the implication that it somehow comes from a magical place outside of the budget, seems to be an entirely new rationale for huge executive compensation.  From a psychological standpoint, it appears to be based on wishful or magical thinking.  Another way to look at it is as a logical fallacy, a <a href="http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/special-pleading.html">special pleading</a>, an assertion without a clear basis that the usual rules or principles do not apply. Montefiore Medical Center, New York-Presbyterian Medical Center, and Others, New York, New York A brief <a href="http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/rich_ceos_performing_cashectomy_neFNAu2KnwUlm3Wi3rWVSK">article</a> in the New York Post focused on the bonuses given to some local CEOs, <blockquote>Dr. Kenneth Davis, the head of Mount Sinai hospital and medical school, raked in a $1.2 million bonus in 2010, and Michael Dowling, the CEO of the North Shore-LIJ Health System, got $1 million. Louis Shapiro, president of the Hospital for Special Surgery, got a $1.5 million bonus and $992,215 salary. Some CEOs also got a housing allowance, car and driver, and first- or business-class air travel. Montefiore Medical Center in The Bronx paid CEO Steven Safyer $1.4 million plus a $359,845 bonus. The hospital also put $2.2 million into Safyer’s retirement fund, which he can take only when he leaves.</blockquote> In addition, <blockquote>The highest total compensation — $4.3 million — went to Dr. Herbert Pardes, the retiring head of New York-Presbyterian Hospital, who got $1.7 million in salary, a $1.9 million bonus and $648,686 as “other” compensation.</blockquote> The Post found someone to provide the usual rationale, <blockquote>Brian Conway, a spokesman for the Greater New York Hospital Association, defended the packages. 'Hospital CEO compensation reflects their myriad responsibilities, the complexity of running a medical center, and the national market for their talents,' he said.</blockquote> That was a quick one-sentence summation of the "market" and "brilliant, hard-working" arguments.  Note that, as usual, no justification of why the particular people involved should be considered particularly brilliant or hard-working, and no comparison of their dedication or brilliance to that of lesser paid hospital employees was supplied.  Note also that CEO compensation is usually determined not by the market, but by a biased <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/10/peer-benchmarking-lake-wobegone-effect.html">benchmarking process,</a> see post here. Note further that this process almost never includes comparisons with employees who are not CEOs, nor includes explicit comparison of particular CEOs dedication, brilliance, etc with either that of other CEOs or other employees. Premier Health Partners, and Others, Cincinnati, Ohio The Middletown (Ohio) Journal <a href="http://www.middletownjournal.com/news/middletown-news/some-health-ceos-earned-millions-1297729.html">reported</a>, <blockquote>Jim Pancoast, president and CEO of Premier Health Partners, the parent organization of Atrium Medical Center in Middletown, had the highest pay in 2010 of information available to date from that year. Pancoast collected about $4.6 million in 2010, most of which is a lump sum paid out through a supplemental executive retirement program.</blockquote> The year before saw someone get even richer compensation, <blockquote>Kettering Health Network’s former Chief Executive Officer Frank Perez and UC Health’s former CEO Kenneth Hanover topped the list in 2009, with each receiving more than $2.6 million. Frank Perez’ total reportable pay in 2009 of more than $5.5 million included a more than $4.5 million lump-sum, taxable retirement payment. </blockquote> Ron Seifert, executive compensation practice leader for the health care practice at Hay Group, supplied the usual rationale, <blockquote>'No one, including the boards of these organizations, denies this is a lot of money. But what they’ll tell you is this takes a special leader,' he said. 'They come with a price tag.'</blockquote> As is also usual, why the particular leader should be considered so special, particularly in comparison to other lesser paid hospital employees,  was not specified.. Northwestern Memorial Healthcare System, Chicago, Illinois Last but not least, we address the compensation given Dean M Harrison, the CEO of Northwestern Memorial Healthcare System, as discussed in an editorial in FierceHealthFinance, entitled, "<a href="http://www.fiercehealthfinance.com/story/evaluating-eight-figure-paychecks-and-near-poor-patients/2011-11-28">The problem of 8-figure hospital paychecks and near-poor patients</a>." In summary, <blockquote>Harrison was paid an astonishing $10.2 million in 2010, the result of a $7.5 supplemental retirement fund payout.</blockquote> The ire this generated, so unlike the tone in the typical news article about executive compensation,  is worth quoting: <blockquote>There are hundreds of nonprofit hospital CEOs like Harrison, compensated with millions of dollars while their institutions throw a few bread crumbs to the poor living in their service areas. Many these institutions spend more on CEO pay than charity care. Alan Sager, a professor of health policy and management at Boston University, recently told Crain's Chicago Business what a lot of healthcare pay and governance experts dare not say: 'There's an enormous sense of self-entitlement among CEOs. It started in the for-profit corporate sector, but it has sloshed over into the non-profit hospital world.' I worked up some talking points for Northwestern Chief Financial Officer Peter J. McCanna that he can bring to the next board meeting, although I'm guessing he won't do so. For those CFOs actually willing to rock the boat, these bullet points work for practically any large urban hospital in the country: • Dean Harrison's 2010 compensation was approximately 170 times that of a charge nurse on their feet 12 hours a day. Does Dean Harrison work 170 times harder? • Dean Harrison's compensation was approximately 20 times that of a cardiac surgeon performing 300 to 400 high-revenue procedures a year. Does Dean Harrison provide 20 times the benefit? • Dean Harrison's compensation could be used to cover the first 10,000 uninsured patients who come through the emergency room each year. Which would provide a greater benefit to the hospital and community? • The purpose of a supplemental retirement plan is to ensure its recipient maintains a reasonable standard of living past their working years. Given the tens of millions of dollars Dean Harrison has already received during his career and the six-figure pension and high five-figure Social Security income he is guaranteed upon retirement, will the $7.5 million payout actually accomplish its goal? Or will it merely be gravy for his heirs?</blockquote> He concluded, <blockquote>Meanwhile, if your hospital has a single patient who works hard, will be bankrupted by the bill they receive, and no one on your staff has walked them through every step of a charity care claim, that is where some imagination and original thought is sorely needed. Too much money in some places, and not enough in others. Someone needs to announce that the buck stops here. And start moving around all the other bucks.</blockquote> Summary In a health care system with ever rising costs, declining access, and stagnant quality, we no longer can tolerate the perverse incentives generated by unaccoutanably high compensation to top executives. As long as top executives continue their sense of "self-entitlement," and can continue their current management practices reinforced by ever rising pay checks, expect poor leadership to undermine any attempts to improve health care.  Tired repititions of the usual rationales, that the CEOs are brilliant and hard-working, and that their compensation is mandated by the market do not make these rationales true. We need health care leadership that has compassion for the increasing hardships that their patients have to endure, and that puts doing the right thing for patients' and the public's health ahead of self-interest.

More Tales of the Hospital CEO Compensation Bubble

The hospital CEO compensation bubble continues to grow. As the year draws to a close, I have found another set of stories about outsized payments to health care executives. While their repetitive fea…

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26 Dec 2011

"A Kind of Blackmail": A Not-for-Profit Health Insurance Company CEO's Salary So Large It "Had Broken the Law"

Here is another case in the annals of over-paid executives of not-for-profit health care organizations, this time <a href="http://www.burlingtonfreepress.com/article/20100603/NEWS02/100602054/Blue-Cross-and-Blue-Shield-of-Vermont-ordered-to-pay-3M">from the Burlington (VT) Free-Press</a>, <blockquote>Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Vermont overpaid its former chief executive officer by $3 million over an eight-year period and has been ordered to pay the money back to its subscribers by 2012 in the form of reduced premiums, a top state regulator said Wednesday. The action by the state Banking, Insurance, Securities and Health Care Administration Department follows last year’s disclosure that William Milnes, the nonprofit firm’s former CEO, received a $7.2 million payout when he stepped down in 2008.</blockquote> Furthermore, note that <blockquote>[Commissioner of the Banking, Insurance, Securities and Health Care Administration Department Paulette] Thabault said her department had concluded Blue Cross had broken the law by paying Milnes more money than necessary to perform his functions as head of the nonprofit health-benefits provider.</blockquote> The Department's review found obvious flaws in how Blue Cross Blue Shield set its former CEO's pay: <blockquote>The department’s review found that Milnes’ salary package while at Blue Cross was excessive, and in some years, he was paid more in bonuses than he received in base pay. In 2005, for example, Milnes was paid $425,000 in salary and $489,800 in bonuses. 'Other health insurance or managed care organizations of a similar size to the Vermont company compensate their chief executive officers at a level of about 45 percent to 50 percent less than the compensation levels set by the company for Mr. Milnes,' the department order said in part. The department said Blue Cross used a 'peer group' study to justify the pay it gave Milnes, but regulators concluded the study was flawed because it put Milnes’ position on the same level of chief executive officers of much larger Blue Cross sister companies. 'The peer group ... used in 2007 included 14 companies, all but one of which were substantially larger in terms of annual gross premiums,' the department’s order said. 'Nine of the 14 companies had gross premiums in excess of $1 billion.' Blue Cross gross premiums for 2007 were $590 million.</blockquote> This story is striking because it seems that the overpayment of a not-for-profit health care organization's executive this time seemed to rise to the level of crime. However, current Blue Cross leaders seemed unconcerned. <blockquote>'The company accepts the findings of the department, and it just wants to move on at this point,' [Blue Cross and Blue Shield spokesman Kevin] Goddard said.</blockquote>Somehow, whenever a health care organization's conduct is publicly revealed to be shameful, the response is not sorrow or apology, but let's just "move on." Moving on, of course, minimizes the accountability of those initially responsible for the bad behavior. Furthermore, do not expect corporate leadership to acknowledge anything wrong with how the pay for the top hired corporate executive was determined. <blockquote>Goddard said the company thought the peer group numbers it was using were sound. 'Our board used a comprehensive analysis to come up with a compensation package for Bill,' he said. 'We relied on what we thought was professional information.'</blockquote> One begins to feel a little sorry for the poor spokesman who is obligated to mouth these sorts of sentiments. Whether the analysis was rational, or the "professional information" was relevant or correct seems not to have bee anyone's concern. In addition, although Blue Cross and Blue Shield is now obligated to reimburse its policy-holders for former CEO Milnes' excessive pay, do not expect the money to come out of his pocket: <blockquote>None of the $3 million the company has to pay back will come from Milnes. Blue Cross asked Milnes, through his attorney, if he would give back some of the money but was rejected, according to documents in the case made public Wednesday. 'He has made it quite clear that Mr. Milnes is not willing to make a voluntary repayment of any portion of the Supplemental Executive Retirement Program distribution,' Christopher Gannon, a Blue Cross vice president, wrote in a letter to Thabault’s department Jan. 21.</blockquote> One would think that the current company management would be so upset about its new $3 million obligation, that it would aggressively try to recover the money from the person who benefited from it. However, it seems that all the current Blue Cross and Blue Shield management was willing to do was politely requesting that Mr Milnes return it. Suing a former CEO, of course, is just something that is not done. Perhaps it would be too disturbing to  the cozy atmosphere now prevailing among top executives and the boards of trustees who are supposed to be supervising them. This seems to make clear that no one at Blue Cross and Blue Shield ever really was responsible for what Mr Milnes was paid. As an <a href="http://www.rutlandherald.com/article/20100604/OPINION01/6040310/1038/OPINION01">editorial</a> in the Rutland Herald put it: <blockquote>On its face, it was an outrage. Blue Cross is a nonprofit corporation that insures about 150,000 Vermonters. That a nonprofit with a mission of providing health care coverage should be a source of extravagant personal profit was an affront to all Vermonters, including those struggling to pay escalating premiums, those struggling to find adequate care, or those with no coverage at all. The usual excuse from companies is that big money is necessary to attract big talent. It's a marketplace. But this excuse is really a kind of blackmail that allows corporate executives to collude in the inflation of their own worth.</blockquote> So the notion of the "imperial CEO" who can virtually set his or her own pay, unencumbered by any real accountability to a board of trustees who would dare not ruffle the imperial feathers has now been imported even into relatively small health care organizations in New England states once famed for their common-sense and frugality. So here we go again.... We have <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/executive%20compensation">discussed</a> numerous examples of compensation of health care organizations' leadership that seems orders of magnitude above that which would be rationally justified. These latest examples of the wealth being accumulated by leaders of supposedly mission-centered not-for-profit organizations are a product of the current management culture that has been infused into nearly every health care organization in the US. That culture holds that managers are different from you and me. They are entitled to a special share of other people's money. Because of their innate and self-evident brilliance, they are entitled to become rich. This entitlement exists even when the economy, or the financial performance of the specific organization prevents other people from making any economic progress. This entitlement exists even if those other people actually do the work, and ultimately provide the money that sustains the organization. Although the executives of not-for-profit health care organizations generally make far less than executives of for-profit health care corporations, collectively, hired managers of even not-for-profit health care organizations have become richer and richer at a time when most Americans, including many health professionals, and most primary care physicians, have seen their incomes stagnate or fall. They are less and less restrained by passive, if not crony boards, and more and more unaccountable. In a kind of multi-centric coup d'etat of the hired managers, they have become our new de facto aristocracy. Or as we wrote in our previous post, executive compensation in health care seems best described <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/executive%20compensation">as Prof Mintzberg described</a> compensation for finance CEOs, "All this compensation madness is not about markets or talents or incentives, but rather about insiders hijacking established institutions for their personal benefit." As it did in finance, compensation madness is likely to keep the health care bubble inflating until it bursts, with the expected adverse consequences. Meanwhile, I say again, if health care reformers really care about improving access and controlling costs, they will have to have the courage to confront the powerful and self-interested leaders who benefit so well from their previously mission-driven organizations. It is time to reverse the coup d'etat of the hired managers.

"A Kind of Blackmail": A Not-for-Profit Health Insurance Company CEO's Salary So Large It "Had Broken the Law"

Here is another case in the annals of over-paid executives of not-for-profit health care organizations, this time from the Burlington (VT) Free-Press,Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Vermont overpaid its…

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08 Jun 2010

Oh, the Prices We Pay, Reloaded - Celgene Balks at Explaining High Price of Thalidomide

A brief <a href="http://preview.bloomberg.com/news/2010-04-22/celgene-to-get-hearing-before-canada-s-supreme-court-over-thalomid-pricing.html">article</a> on Bloomberg.com implied that Celgene has been fighting efforts by the Canadian Patented Medicine Prices Review Board to get pricing data about the drug Thalidomid (thalidomide): <blockquote>Celgene Corp., the biotechnology company specializing in blood-cancer medicines, will get a hearing before Canada’s highest court over the country’s demands to provide pricing information for the drug Thalomid. The Supreme Court of Canada today agreed to hear Celgene’s appeal of a Federal Court of Appeal ruling that said Canada’s Patented Medicine Prices Review Board was entitled to information about the pricing of the drug. The high court gave no reason for its decision. Celgene’s two top-selling drugs are Revlimid and Thalomid, for a form of blood-cancer called multiple myeloma. They brought in more than 80 percent of the company’s total $2.25 billion in 2008 revenue.</blockquote> It should be no surprise that Celgene may be sensitive about the price of Thalidomid. We <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2005/07/oh-prices-we-pay-thalidomide-for.html">posted</a> back in 2005 about the stratospheric prices of new drugs that seemed disproportionate to manufacturing and development costs on one hand, and the value of the drugs for patients on the other. We noted that thalidomide, a very old drug that notoriously was found to cause birth defects when it was given to pregnant women, but that then showed promise as an anti-cancer drug, was being marketed in the US for $29 per capsule (approximately $25,000 a year), while a generic form sold in Brazil for $0.07 per capsule.   The amount Celgene manages to make from this very old (and demonstrably cheap to produce) molecule is vivid, albeit anecdotal evidence about what has gone wrong with health care prices in the US.  Despite health care insurance companies' protestations that their goal is to provide reasonably priced health care, they seem utterly incapable of negotiating down the prices of even the most obviously over-priced drugs.  And the US government Medicare program so far is prohibited by law from negotiating prices.  How our supposed free market health care system has tilted so far in favor of pharmaceuticals is a reason to wonder, but ought to be reason to investigate.    Meanwhile, <a href="http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9MzcyNzkwfENoaWxkSUQ9MzcwMzAxfFR5cGU9MQ==&t=1">Celgene's 2010 annual report</a> shows that the company has sold more than $400 million worth of Thalidomid yearly since 2007. The company's total sales in 2009 were $2.567 billion, while it spent $795 million on research and development, and $754 million on general, sales, and administrative expenses. According to the company's <a href="http://ccbn.10kwizard.com/xml/download.php?repo=tenk&ipage=6278317&format=PDF">2009 proxy statement</a>, in 2008 its CEO received over $8.5 million, its COO over $5.1 million, its CFO over $2.1 million in compensation, and a senior vice president over $3.0 million. The total compensation of its five highest-paid hired managers (compare to a total of 2813 full-time employees in 2009), approximately $20.5 million 2008, was was approximately 2.6% of the company's net income in 2009, and just under 1% of its total sales.   As we have <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/12/more-air-into-health-care-bubble-30000.html">said previously</a>, so the <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/12/health-care-bubble-parallels-with.html">health care bubble</a> continues to inflate.  One cause is"<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/12/compensation-madness-insiders-hijacking.html">compensation madness</a>," including "insiders hijacking established institutions for their personal benefit."  Another is the amazing acquiescence of those who pay bills at all levels, from the individuals who ultimately fund health care through salary dollars not earned, health insurance premiums, co-pays and the like, and tax payments, through the health care insurers and government agencies who did not balk at paying $25,000 a year for thalidomide in 2005.  If we really want to provide accessible health care of good quality and a reasonable cost, we will need to develop mechanisms to pay more reasonable amounts for health care goods and services. This will require some courage facing down the corporate and organizational insiders who have made themselves very rich from the current craziness.

Oh, the Prices We Pay, Reloaded - Celgene Balks at Explaining High Price of Thalidomide

A brief article on Bloomberg.com implied that Celgene has been fighting efforts by the Canadian Patented Medicine Prices Review Board to get pricing data about the drug Thalidomid (thalidomide):Celgen…

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28 Apr 2010

With Leaders Like These...

My current favorite book about the global financial meltdown, aka great recession, <a href="http://www.harpercollins.com/books/9780061892486/The_Sellout/index.aspx">The Sellout, by Charles Gasparino</a>, featured vivid portraits of the bad leadership that lead to the collapse.  For example: Richard S Fuld, Jr, former CEO of Lehman Brothers (now bankrupt) - <blockquote>Fuld had become more isolated and arrogant. (p.208) As the firm's leverage increased, Fuld's grip on his management and board grew. He was revered by so many people in his circle of senior advisers that almost no one dared to speak out about the firm's risk and leverate, and almost never to Fuld himself. Everyone else was so scared to be cursed at in public or even fired that they simply kept their mouths shut. Fuld's leadership was more like that of a cult leader than even that of an imperial CEO. (p. 209) </blockquote>Maurice R ("Hank") Greenberg, former CEO of AIG (now bailed out by the US government) - <blockquote>Greenberg had begun the financial products group that sold all those [now discredited] credit default swaps in the late 1980s.... Greenberg had a love-hate relationship with the group and its various leaders. He hated the risks they took and the independence the top people in the group sought. But he loved the profits the financial products group ... produced. Yet Eliot Spitzer, the New York State attorney general and by now Wall Street's most famous enforcer, believed Greenberg ran a company that regularly committed accounting fraud and created fictional profits through a series of sham transactions that had nothing to do with credit default swaps. Greenberg considered these possible transgressions so trivial that he called them 'foot faults,' as in a minor foul in tennis. Greenberg eventually did resign.... (p. 204) [and the financial products unit nearly drove AIG bankrupt] </blockquote> John A Thain, former CEO of Merrill Lynch (bailed out by being forcibly merged into Bank of America under pressure from the US government) <blockquote>Over time, it became difficult to keep track of every statement coming out of Thain's mouth that turned out to be wrong since nearly the moment he had taken over as CEO. (p. 417) Thain was becoming unhinged; during a briefing in one of his finely decordated conference rooms that had been part of the $1.2 million office spending spree, people close to the firm said, he completely lost his compusure when an aide informed him about the size of the [company's] losses. What Thain did isn't clear, but Merrill Lynch had to replace a shattered glass panel that appeared to have been the target of the CEO's rage. (p. 419) </blockquote> - Sanford I Weill, former CEO of Citigroup (bailed out by the US government) <blockquote>But in reality, Will never really ran anything. He was a visionary, to be sure, but one whose vision was so myopically focused on building the empire had lusted for for so long and on its share price that he ignored just about everything else. (p. 144) </blockquote> So here we again have reminders of how bad leadership of major US financial firms lead to the collapse. We had <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/12/health-care-bubble-parallels-with.html">discussed </a>a series of such factors and how they obtain in health care, suggesting that health care is undergoing a bubble likely to burst just as badly as did the financial/ housing bubble. However, I supplied these quotes not just to underline this point.  It turns out that Mr Fuld, Mr Greenberg, Mr Thain, and Mr Weill have something in common other than having helped to lead their financial firms toward the brink, something in common with relevance to health care. We recently <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/12/98-million-dollar-man.html">discussed</a> the outsize compensation given to the current CEO and other top leaders of one of the country's revered medical centers, New York - Presbyterian Hospital.   I suggested that such "compensation madness" will continue to inflate the health care bubble.  What that post did not discuss was how these leaders got to be so well paid.  Presumably, their compensation was set, or at least acquiesced to by the Board of Trustees of the hospital.  So I thought it might be entertaining to see who is currently on this Board. According to the <a href="http://nyp.org/about/board-trustees.html">medical center web-site</a>, the Board of Trustees as of October, 2009, was quite large (including 88 people by my count).  The web-site lists only names, not biographies, so that who most of the members are was not obvious.  This lack of transparency, which is not uncommon in health care organizations, would make figuring out who all the people ostensibly responsible for the $9.8 million dollary man are quite laborious.  However, I did recognize a few names immediately.  These were Richard S Fuld, Jr, Maurice R Greenberg, John A Thain, and Sanford I Weill.  Thus, the Board of Trustees of New York - Presbyterian Hospital includes four of the most well-known architects of the global financial meltdown.  Thus, is it any wonder why the Board of Trustees was happy paying the CEO of a not-for-profit health care institution at a level comparable to a for-profit corporate CEO?  (And is it any wonder that the Dean of the Faculties of Health Sciences and Medicine, and Executive Vice-President for Health and Biomedical Sciences at Columbia University, one of the two medical schools that provide students, trainees and faculty at New York - Presbyterian Hospital, once admitted that the school's main criterion for faculty success was ability to generate external funds, which he called being a <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/04/medical-schools-to-faculty-show-me.html">"taxpayer,"</a> rather than ability to teach, research, or take care of patients?) As we have discussed before, boards of trustees of not-for-profit health care institutions have a primary duty to uphold the institutions' missions.  Thus, one would think such boards would be selected according to their dedication to their missions.  But perhaps, in the grubby real world, there may be more important criteria, possibly such as the size of their donations to the institution.  Furthermore, those likely to donate the most  may be more likely to be richest (and perhaps most in need to making themselves appear philanthropic and public-spirited) than the most fervent upholders of patient care, teaching and research. Maybe giving stewardship of our once proud health care institutuions to people most likely to defend their missions, rather than most likely to donate a lot of money, would result in somewhat poorer institutions which do a better job of patient care, teaching and research.

With Leaders Like These...

My current favorite book about the global financial meltdown, aka great recession, The Sellout, by Charles Gasparino, featured vivid portraits of the bad leadership that lead to the collapse. For exa…

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17 Dec 2009

Teaching Would-be Health Care Leaders About Health Care: Why Is This News?

The Wall Street Journal just published <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704398304574598132733849334.html">a story</a> on a big innovation in the business school curriculum: <blockquote>David Song was in the middle of a two-year executive M.B.A. program at University of Chicago's Booth School of Business in February when he got the idea to create a course to help business people better understand the inner workings of medicine. Dr. Song, chief of plastic surgery at the University of Chicago Medical Center, believes the course may help close the gap between such industries as pharmaceutical and biotech, and the medical community they serve. 'Why not help reveal how things run and how we make decisions, particularly in this time of immense overhaul to the system?' says Dr. Song, who began collaborating with one of his marketing professors, Sanjay Dhar, to put together the course, titled 'Understanding the New Breed of Healthcare Decision Makers'—a five-day $7,650 program slated for May. The program is designed to give participants a look at the administrative workings of an academic medical center, including how doctors make decisions about the way to treat patients, and which devices and products they choose to purchase. Booth, like other business schools, is struggling to keep up enrollment in executive education at a time when companies are pulling back on training budgets. Dr. Song's health-care program is the only new addition to the curriculum for the academic year, says Stephen LaCivita, associate dean of executive education. The program is geared toward professionals who work in areas like pharmaceuticals, medical devices and financial services, who may have a limited understanding of the physicians, nurses and other clinicians who are their customers. Some of the issues addressed in the seminars, which will be taught by medical and business faculty, include: how doctors and hospitals define value; how reimbursement strategies work; and how supply chain, purchasing decisions, patient flow and operations are managed. </blockquote> And here is the course's big feature: <blockquote>As an added bonus, on the second to last day students will change into scrubs and observe a surgery, make rounds with doctors and see how patients are prioritized in the emergency room. 'This is getting a glimpse of what it's like and how we make decisions,' says Dr. Song. </blockquote> Earlier this year we <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/08/ny-times-proclaims-anyone-can-run.html">noted</a> a NY Times article which breathlessly promoted management jobs in health care, partially by implying that they were available to those who knew little to nothing about what health care actually entails, with, at most "a little studying up." This new article suggests how little "studying up" may actually be needed.  The fact that a five-day course to teach budding MBAs a little bit about health care is considered a newsworthy business education innovation by the Wall Street Journal certainly suggests that the prevailing business culture allows management of heatlh care organizations by people with almost no knowledge of or experience in actual health care. We noted in August that the NY Times article had the whiff of a bubble about to burst.  Indeed, we just <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/12/health-care-bubble-parallels-with.html">noted</a> an article that listed some of the salient characteristics of the recently burst financial/ housing bubble, including "major organizations lead by the clueless."  For that post, we used examples of three leaders of huge financial firms that have now failed (that is, are bankrupt or bailed out) who did not understand the complex derivatives their firms were buying and selling.  In the earlier post, we noted examples of leaders of two big American automobile companies that have now similarly failed who seemed to know little about automobiles.  So here we have would-be leaders in pharmaceutical, medical device and other health care corporations "who may have a limited understanding of the physicians, nurses and other clinicians." This reinforces my thesis that health care is now in a bubble that will soon burst.  It also suggests why health care in the US costs so much, out of proportion to the quality or access provided.  Even setting aside how the business culture in the last 20 years has put short-term revenue and personal enrichment ahead of everything else, why would we expect that health care leadership by people who know little about health care, and care less for its values, would be anything but disastrous?

Teaching Would-be Health Care Leaders About Health Care: Why Is This News?

The Wall Street Journal just published a story on a big innovation in the business school curriculum:David Song was in the middle of a two-year executive M.B.A. program at University of Chicago's Boot…

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17 Dec 2009

The $9.8 Million Dollar Man

We seem to have a new candidate for the award for best-paid CEO of a not-for-profit academic medical center, as <a href="http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/sickening_bonuses_8pL0AI56MMF7wcPa3ibFDM">reported in the New York Post</a>, <blockquote>Wall Streeters aren't the only ones raking in big bonuses during tough economic times. Hospital presidents and CEOs also collect fat bonuses and 'incentive payments,' even as health-care systems cry poverty, claiming they struggle to break even against government cutbacks, tightwad insurers and skyrocketing costs. While warning of layoffs and slashed patient services, many hospitals shower their top execs and department heads with bonuses and perks. They include housing allowances, chauffeurs, first-class air travel, tuition for their kids and country-club memberships. Under new IRS rules, the extras are disclosed for the first time in recently filed 2008 tax records obtained by The Post. The filings for the city's biggest and most prestigious private, tax-exempt hospitals show at least a dozen CEOs get compensation of $1 million and up. Some also cash in early on million-dollar pre-retirement payouts while on the job. Dr. Herbert Pardes, who runs the New York-Presbyterian Hospital and its health-care system -- the city's largest private hospital network -- received a $1 million bonus in 2008 on top of his $1.67 million salary. The hospital has a 'pay for performance' philosophy but says even though Pardes met his goals, his bonus was smaller than 2007's to 'reflect the current external environment.' But Pardes' compensation totaled $9.8 million in 2008 because he vested in a retirement plan that will pay $6.8 million when he leaves in 2011. He also received a $93,500 housing allowance and the use of a car and driver. </blockquote> The Post article also listed two other hospital CEOs who got over $4.5 million in compensation, and several other top executives at other hospitals who got substantial compensation despite the hospitals' financial distress or accusations of unethical behavior.  On the other hand, the CEO of the city's Health and Hospital Corporation, with a budget of $6.3 million, got only $291,000. Note that Dr Pardes' total compensation was more than double the compensation for a Boston medical center CEO that I <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/09/safety-net-medical-center-ceo-gets.html">thought</a> was so outlandish back in September, 2009. So here is much more evidence about the continually inflating health care bubble.  Not only do executives of big, for-profit drug, device, biotechnology and health insurance companies make seven and eight figure salaries, now it appears executives of ostensibly not-for-profit, charitable organizations can also make this much.  Is it possible that at least Dr Pardes' compensation was a fluke, related to a one-time retirement payment? The answer appears to be negative.  The New York - Presbyterian Hospital's 2007 US Internal Revenue Service (IRS)<a href="http://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments/2007/133/957/2007-133957095-04a99802-9.pdf"> form 990</a>, which was organized somewhat differently and may have used somewhat different definitions than the 2008 form from which the Post reporters apprently got their information, showed Dr Pardes total compensation to be $4,736,824 plus a $1,433,761 contribution to employee benefit plans and deferred retirement plans in that year. In addition, in 2007, (apparently former) executive Vice President Michael A Berman, MD received $5,949,092 in compensation plus $31,830, current Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer Steven J Corwin MD received $2,671,747 plus $455,304, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer Phillis RF Lantos received $2,481,044 plus $336,284, Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer Robert Kelly received $1,538,412 plus $271,641, Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer Cynthia N Sparer received $1,370,541 plus $307,259, Senior Vice President and Senior Legal Officer Maxine Fass Esq received $1,337,354 plus $257.06, Senior Vice President, Finance Dov Schwartzben received $1,314,960 plus $173,848, Senior Vice President and Chief Nursing Officer Wilhelmina Manzano received $1,218,966 plus $159,555.  In summary, in 2007, the medical center paid at least 10 current and former executives each substantially more than $1 million a year. By my calculations, the medical center paid these ten executives over $26 million a year, approximately equal to 25% of the center's fund excess (e.g., profit equivalent), of slightly over$106 million.  These ten executives received nearly 1% of the entire 16,850 employee institution's budget.  Furthermore, note that in the medical center's 2007 expense statement, general and administrative expenses, over $675 million, made up about 24% of the center's total expenses.  So it appears that gigantic compensation for New York - Presbyterian Hospital executives, which is outsize both in comparison to the Hospital's fund excess and total budget, is part of a long-term trend The Post quoted Brian Conway of the Greater New York Hospital Association with this excuse: <blockquote>There are thousands of 20-somethings on Wall Street making millions who don't have anywhere near the responsibilities or skills of New York hospital CEOs. </blockquote> This fits in our catalog of logical fallacies.  It is an <a href="http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/appeal-to-common-practice.html">appeal to common practice</a>.  Of course, the particular practice to which Mr Conway appealed is the exaggerated executive compensation in finance that many believe was a cause of the global financial melt-down, aka great recession.  One could also argue that not one Wall Street executive has the life and death responsibilities of the typical practicing primary care physician.  I doubt Mr Conway would try to argue that Dr Pardes' job requires 40 times the skill of full-time practicing primary care or cognitive physician. Instead, executive compensation for hospital CEOs seems best described <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/12/compensation-madness-insiders-hijacking.html">as Prof Mintzberg described</a> compensation for finance CEOs, "All this compensation madness is not about markets or talents or incentives, but rather about insiders hijacking established institutions for their personal benefit."  As it did in finance, compensation madness is likely to keep the health care bubble inflating until it bursts, with the expected adverse consequences.  Meanwhile, I say again, if health care reformers really care about improving access and controlling costs, they will have to have the courage to confront the powerful and self-interested leaders who benefit so well from their previously mission-driven organizations.

The $9.8 Million Dollar Man

We seem to have a new candidate for the award for best-paid CEO of a not-for-profit academic medical center, as reported in the New York Post,Wall Streeters aren't the only ones raking in big bonuses …

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14 Dec 2009

More Air Into the Health Care Bubble: the $30,000 a Month Cancer Drug

Over four years ago, we <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2005/07/oh-prices-we-pay-thalidomide-for.html">posted</a> about the stratospheric prices of new drugs that seemed disproportionate to manufacturing and development costs on one hand, and the value of the drugs for patients on the other.  For example, back then we noted that thalidomide, a very old drug that notoriously was found to cause birth defects when it was given to preganant women, but that then showed promise as an anti-cancer drug, was being marketed in the US for $29 per capsule (approximately $25,000 a year), while a generic form sold in Brazil for $0.07 per capsule. That was then, and this is now.  This week, the New York Times <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/05/health/05drug.html">reported</a> on a $30,000+  per month cancer drug.  <blockquote>A newly approved chemotherapy drug will cost about $30,000 a month, a sign that the prices of cancer medicines are continuing to rise despite growing concern about health care costs. The price of the new drug, called Folotyn, is at least triple that of other drugs that critics have said are too expensive for the benefits they offer to patients. The colon cancer drug Erbitux, for instance, costs $10,000 a month and the drug Avastin about $8,800 when used to treat lung cancer. </blockquote> So what could be the rationale for this breathtaking price? Drug Effectiveness Could it be that the drug is extremely effective? Not according to the NY Times: <blockquote>Folotyn has not yet shown an effect on longevity. In the clinical trial that led to approval of the drug, 27 percent of the 109 patients experienced a reduction in tumor size. The reductions lasted a median of 9.4 months. But considering all the patients in the trial, only 12 percent had a reduction in tumor size that lasted for more than 14 weeks. The trial did not compare Folotyn to another drug or a placebo </blockquote> A PubMed search revealed no sign that this trial had been publsiehd, and no publications reporting any controlled trials of this drug. So at best, this drug at best may temporarily shrink tumors, although that assertion is based on evidence that has not yet been published or subject to peer-review. It does not seem that the tremendous price of the drug could be justified by tremendous benefits to patients. Research, Development and Manufacturing So, perhaps the drug was very difficult and expensive to create, manufacture and develop?  That does not seem to be the case, either. Folotyn's generic name is pralatrexate. As the name suggests, it is a chemical compound very similar to the much older anti-cancer drug methotrexate. [See O'Connor OA. Pralatrexate: an emerging new agent with activity in T-cell lymphoma. Curr Opin Oncol 2006; 18: 591-597.]  It was first developed not by Allos Therapeutics, but by Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, Southern Research Institute, and Stanford Research Institute.  The Allos Therapeutics <a href="http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9MzQwNzcxfENoaWxkSUQ9MzI2NDg5fFR5cGU9MQ==&t=1">2008 annual report</a> noted that the company's total research and development expenses for the drug from 1992 through 2008 were $26.8 million (so much for the urban myth that the average drug costs $1 billion to develop.)  Based on the estimate that the drug would cost roughly $30,000/ month from the NY Times, the company could recover all the development costs of this drug after 893 patient-months of use. Allos Therapeutics does not actually make pralotrexate, but outsources its production, according to the company's .  The firm's total yearly manufacturing costs (for several experimental drugs as well as pralotrexate) in 2008 were $6.7 million. So it does not seem that the tremendous price of the drug could be attributed to the costs of discovering, developing, or manufacturing it. So where would the money go? General and Administrative Costs, Executive and Board Compensation Allos Therapeutics seems to spend a disproportionate amount of money on marketing, general and administrative costs.  According to the 2008 report, "marketing, general and administrative expenses include costs for pre-marketing activities, corporate development, executive administration, corporate offices and related infrastructure."  In 2008, these expenses were $23 million, in one year, almost as much as the company spent over 16 years to research and develop Folotyn. Allos Therapeutics has enriched its corporate insiders.  According to the company's <a href="http://ccbn.10kwizard.com/xml/download.php?repo=tenk&ipage=6359493&format=PDF">2009 proxy statement,</a> in 2008, CEO Paul L Berns received $2,091,600 in total compensation; Chief Commercial Officer James V Caruso received $1,259,700; and Chief Medical Officer Pablo J Cagnoni received $1,408,700.  The total compensation of the five highest paid executives of the company in 2008, $5,945,500, was over 10% of the entire company's budget, $53,639,000.  Mr Berns, who has only been with the company since 2006, owned 994,606 shares or equivalent (at a price of $6.62 per share on 4 December, 2009, worth $6,584,292).  Mr Caruso owned 272,072 shares or equivalent,and Dr Cagnoni owned 386,245.   Although two board members, Stewart Hen and Jonathan S Leff seemed to be serving by virtue of their positions with Warburg Pincus & Co, whose Private Equity VIII LP owns over 29% of Allos Therapeutics stock, Mr Hen and Mr Leff received $120,700 and $119,400 to sit on the board. These amounts should be considered in light of the fact that the company is comparatively tiny.  Its 2008 report disclosed that it only has 81 full-time employees, of whom fully 31 "are involved in marketing, corporate development, finance, administration, and operations."  The company has never made money.  Its 2008 report noted losses of over $20 million a year in the past five years, and a total loss of over $289 million. So one wonders if the real reason pralatrexate was priced so high was to justify the millions that top company leaders have reaped from a company that lost money over the 16 years? Summary The NY Times reported that people outside of Allos were not pleased with the price of Folotyn: <blockquote>Dr. Lee N. Newcomer, senior vice president for oncology at the big insurer UnitedHealthcare, called the price of Folotyn 'unconscionable.' He said that Folotyn alone would cost as much as UnitedHealthcare now typically spends in total to treat a lymphoma patient from diagnosis until death. That median expenditure now, he said, is $87,000 for a little over a year of treatments. But Dr. Newcomer said insurers would be obligated to pay for Folotyn because there were no alternatives. </blockquote> Furthermore, <blockquote>'This drug is not a home run,' Dr. Brad S. Kahl, a lymphoma specialist at the University of Wisconsin, said during a meeting of an advisory committee to the F.D.A. on Sept. 2. 'It’s not even a double. It’s a single.' Saying that even a single was helpful, Dr. Kahl was part of a majority on the panel that recommended approval of the drug, 10 to 4. But after recently learning what Allos planned to charge for Folotyn, Dr. Kahl said he was 'disappointed' by the 'excessive' price. 'It dampens my enthusiasm for using that drug,' he said. 'It creates these huge ethical quandaries about trying a drug that has a modest benefit for the average patient at enormous expense.' </blockquote>So the <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/12/health-care-bubble-parallels-with.html">health care bubble</a> continues to inflate.  I suggest that the case of the ridiculous pricing of Folotyn shows how this bubble is in part generated by "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/12/compensation-madness-insiders-hijacking.html">compensation madness</a>," not only "insiders hijacking established institutions for their personal benefit," but also insiders able to become rich at the expense of even tiny, money-losing corporations.   But the bubble is also generated by the amazing acquiescence of those who pay bills at all levels, form the individuals who ultimately fund health care through salary dollars not earned, health insurance premiums, co-pays and the like, and tax payments, through the health care insurers and government agencies who did not balk at paying $25,000 a year for thalidomide in 2005, and seemingly will not balk at paying $30,000+ a year for pralatrexate in 2009. If we really want to provide accessible health care of good quality and a reasonable cost, we will need to develop mechanisms to pay more reasonable amounts for health care goods and services.  This will require some courage facing down the corporate and organizational insiders who have made themselves very rich from the current craziness.  NOTE (21 December, 2009) - See also comments <a href="http://postscript.communitycatalyst.org/?p=1038">on the Postscript blog</a>.

More Air Into the Health Care Bubble: the $30,000 a Month Cancer Drug

Over four years ago, we posted about the stratospheric prices of new drugs that seemed disproportionate to manufacturing and development costs on one hand, and the value of the drugs for patients on t…

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09 Dec 2009

The Health Care Bubble: Parallels with the Global Financial Meltdown

The global financial melt-down, or great recession, or whatever it will be called was a big surprise in September, 2008, to those of us not immersed in finance. A year later there is an opportunity to at least better understand the events leading up to it.  I have managed to read two focused books on aspects of the melt-down, (<a href="http://www.amazon.com/House-Cards-Hubris-Wretched-Excess/dp/0385528264/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1259867440&sr=1-1">House of Cards, by William D Cohan</a>, and <a href="http://www.amazon.com/dp/141659857X/?tag=googhydr-20&hvadid=3300552655&ref=pd_sl_65nk6xhefw_b">Fool's Gold by Gillian Tett</a>) and am in the midst of what may be the best general narrative of it published to date, <a href="http://www.harpercollins.com/books/9780061892486/The_Sellout/index.aspx">The Sellout, by Charles Gasparino.</a> Reading the recent history of the meltdown makes me uncomfortably aware of parallels between these events and the current dysfunction of the health care system.  In his discussion of the run-up to the crash, Mr Gasparino emphasized a number of issues which I will catalog along with their health care parallels. Prices Always Go Up The prices in question were those of real-estate, and the notion that they would always go up helped to fuel would an explosion of mortgage loans made to people who had little chance of fully repaying them.  When housing prices reached an unsustainable level and started to fall, the melt-down began. -  It is a cliche that overall health care costs in the US have been going up much faster than inflation for as long as most of us can remember (at least since the 1970s), creating the expectation that they always will go up.    Products were Over-Rated by the Apparent Experts Mortgages made to people who were unlikely to be able to pay them back were sold by irresponsible originators, and then packaged into financial derivatives by finance firms.  Many of these derivatives were rated "AAA" by trusted rating firms, even though they contained multiple individually risky mortages.  The rating firms boasted of expertise, and used complex mathematical models supposedly based on evidence to make their ratings.  -  In health care, we have come to trust expert professionals' assessments of products (like drugs and devices) and services based on their expertise and clinical research evidence.  Evidence Used to Rate Products was Suspect The mathematical models used to predict risk were based on limited data and assumptions.  In particular, they did not account for the possibility that real-estate prices might go down, or that particular circumstances might cause multiple home-owners to default on their mortgages at the same time.  The increasing level of defaults, signaling that the derivatives based on the mortgages might be riskier and less valuable than previously thought, caused the melt-down to accelerate. -  We have discussed how the clinical evidence may be <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/manipulating%20clinical%20research">manipulated</a> by those with vested interests in selling products or services.  When manipulation  does not yield the result desired by the marketers, the results of the research may be entirely <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/suppression%20of%20medical%20research">suppressed</a>.  One particularly telling example was the <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/08/high-costs-and-poor-outcomes-lesson.html">suppression of research  unfavorable to new anti-depressant medications</a> as documented in part by Erick Turner et al.  When all suppressed research was taken into account, the drugs appeared much less effective than was previously believed. The Experts were Conflicted The rating agencies were paid by the finance firms which sold the derivatives.  Ratings agencies that did not deliver sufficiently good ratings were likely to lose business.  "By 2005 triple-A ratings were being handed out like candy: underwriters could nearly demand they wanted on a deal and did." -  We have discussed how physicians and medical academics frequently have <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/conflicts%20of%20interest">conflicts of interest</a> due to their financial ties to pharmaceutical/ biotechnology/ device and other health care companies.  August academic medical institutions have come to <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/institutional%20conflicts%20of%20interest">depend on money</a> from industry to support research and education.  Distinguished academics are often paid <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/key%20opinion%20leaders">key opinion leaders</a> for drug and device marketers. Deceptive Marketing Per The Sellout, "On Wall Street, complexity isn't something to be avoided - it allows smooth-talking salesmen to obscure simple concepts like risk and losses." - We have written again and again about <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/deception">deceptive</a> marketing practices, how marketing is disguised as <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/continuing%20medical%20education">medical education</a>, the use of <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/stealth%20marketing">stealth marketing</a>, etc to promote often overpriced tests and treatments that are often less effective and/or more hazardous than they are advertised to be.  Politicians Pushed Access without Regard to Consequences US politicians from both parties pushed ever more accessible mortgages for the laudable goal of making better housing available to the less advantaged, but seemed unconcerned about how they would eventually pay back the loans. -  The driving motivation for most current health care reforms efforts in the US seems to be to provide "access," now redefined as some sort of health insurance, without much attention to the reasons health care has become so inaccessible in the first place. Major Organizations Lead by the Clueless The Sellout provided some notable vignettes, including those about Jimmy Cayne, the CEO of Bear Stearns, who did not understand the complex derivatives his firm bought and sold, or the level of risk the firm was assuming; Stan O'Neal, the CEO of Merrill Lynch, whose tenure was "one of the strangest, most volatile, and ultimately most disastrous that Wall Street had ever seen;" and Charles Prince, the CEO of Citigroup, who apparently was a good lawyer, but had "little experience running a business," much less one as complex as Citigroup. -  We have repeatedly discussed how large health care organizations are now often <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/Mismanagement">mismanaged</a>, at times by people with <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/ill-informed%20management">little knowledge</a> of or experience in the health care context. Overpaid, Isolated, Arrogant, Imperial CEOs The Sellout provided more notable vignettes.  Jimmy Cayne (see above), was at one point worth more than US $1 billion.  He spent more and more time playing bridge, and less managing his company.  Stan O'Neal (see above), would often vanish to play golf.  The leadership of Richard Fuld, the CEO of Lehman Brothers, "was more like that of a cult leader than even that of an imperial CEO." -  We have repeatedly discussed how large health care organizations' leaders may be overpaid (some making nearly as much as the leaders of some financial firms before the collapse), arrogant <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/imperial%20CEO">imperial CEOs</a>, some aspiring to be members of the <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/superclass">superclass</a>.  One striking example was the former CEO of UnitedHealth, Dr William McGuire, who was once worth more than US $1 billion before it became apparent that some of his fortune was based on <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/08/final-settlement-of-unitedhealth.html">back-dated stock options</a>.  Sycophantic Cronies as "Stewards" The Sellout discussed how members of the boards of directors of financial firms were mostly chosen by the CEOs they were supposed to supervise.  For example, Jimmy Cayne, who had "a firm grip over his board of directors," noting "my board is my board." -  We have often discussed poor <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/governance">governance</a> of health care organizations, and specifically how <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/boards%20of%20trustees">boards of directors or trustees</a> of health care organizations are similarly unlikely to challenge the CEOs they are supposed to supervise.  We also have noted how health care organizations' are often lead by the same Masters of the Universe who brought us the global financial collapse.  For example, Cornell's Weill Medical School was named after former <a href="http://www.cornell.edu/trustees/members.cfm#active">trustee </a>Sanford Weill, who constructed the giant conglomerate Citegroup, but did not figure out how to make its pieces fit together, and was forced "to step down as CEO as the research scandal [investigation] initiated by [former New York state Attorney General] Spitzer snared its highest-profile target, Weill himself." (from The Sellout, p. 187.) Suppression of Dissent The Sellout noted how increasingly arrogant leaders of financial firms ignored advice of more conservative or risk-adverse employees.  Dissenters were often afraid to speak out, and some were fired.  For example, at Bear Stearns, Jimmy Cayne increasingly marginalized "Ace" Greenberg, who was wary of excess risk.  At Lehman Brothers, the cult of personality that surrounded Fuld suppressed dissent and debate. -  We have discussed the <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/anechoic%20effect">anechoic effect</a>, the lack of discussion surrounding important health care issues, seemingly enabled by the sense that one simply does not talk about such issues.  <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/whistle-blowers">Whistle-blowers</a> are often ostracized, or worse, and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/academic%20freedom">academic freedom</a> and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/free%20speech">free speech</a> may be frankly threatened. Ineffective, or Captured Regulators From the 1980s onward, deregulation of the financial industry advanced.  The Sellout discussed how the Federal Reserve, lead by Allan Greenspan, enabled if not cheer-lead for the bubble.  The  Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was often ineffectual at best. -  We have discussed how the <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/FDA">FDA</a> got conflicted advice and often seemed to feel that drug and device manufacturers, rather than the public were its clients.  We just noted that one version of health care reform would put control of a <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/comparative%20effectiveness%20research">comparative effectiveness research</a> institute in the hands of industry, and would empower its leaders to suppress research which offends them. Summary We have discussed the impetus to make physicians give up their <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/professionalism">professionalism</a> ostensibly to increase competition (see post <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/06/why-did-us-physicians-give-up-their.html">here</a>), and to then <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2006/03/consequences-of-breaking-physicians.html">hand over control of health care to managers</a> ostensibly to reduce costs.  Since the 1980s, health care has increasingly been dominated by large organizations run as businesses by business managers.  It should therefore be no surprise that the ethos of health care management has come to resemble the ethos of business management in general.  Thus, maybe the parallels between some of the issues related to the global financial meltdown and the issues related to current health care dysfunction should not be surprising. A few other bloggers and business writers have referred to a health care bubble in the last few years.  Notably, <a href="http://drwes.blogspot.com/2008/09/our-healthcare-hindenburg.html">Dr Wes</a> advanced the concept in 2008.  Dr Rich <a href="http://covertrationingblog.com/general-rationing-issues/the-healthcare-bubble">spoke out</a> in early 2009, and Dr George Lundberg <a href="http://www.thehealthcareblog.com/the_health_care_blog/2009/05/beware-the-bursting-of-the-health-care-bubble.html">added</a> to it later in 2009.  So I make a fearless assertion and prediction.  Health care dysfunction has lead to a health care bubble, which is likely to burst soon with considerable adverse consequences.  Perhaps a controlled deflation of the bubble would be possible, but would require more courage and clear thinking than most of our political and health care leaders have exhibited so far.  We have repeatedly noted how current efforts to reform health care have ignored most of the issues discussed above and documented repeatedly on Health Care Renewal.  If one of the currently proposed versions of health care reform becomes law, it may postpone for a while the popping of the bubble.  However, the longer the bubble grows, the nastier the bursting of it. Do not say we did not warn you.

The Health Care Bubble: Parallels with the Global Financial Meltdown

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03 Dec 2009

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