healthy4u: logical fallacies

A Real Example of Public Relations Talking Points to Justify Outsize Executive Compensation - and Why We Should No Longer be Fooled

We frequently discuss outsize <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/executive%20compensation">executive compensation</a> in health care organizations as both a symptom and a cause of these organizations' poor leadership and governance, and hence of widespread health care dysfunction. The Latest Stories of Huge CEO Pay Stories of gargantuan compensation appear almost daily.  For example, some headlines about pay at hospitals and hospital systems in the last few months included, <blockquote class="tr_bq"><a href="http://www.gjsentinel.com/news/articles/millionaire-health-care">Millionaire health care?</a> With high costs and insurance premiums in Garfield County, focus falls on pay of a hospital’s chief executive <a href="http://www.masslive.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/05/audit_faults_umass_medical_sch.html">Audit faults UMass Medical School for improper documentation of $2 million in bonus compensation</a> <a href="http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/health/2014/05/25/saint-thomas-ceos-salary-benefits-soar/9556721/">St Thomas CEO's salary, benefits soar</a> <a href="http://bangordailynews.com/2014/06/07/news/state/mainehealth-defends-executive-pay-despite-major-cuts/">MaineHealth defends top executives' pay despite major cuts</a></blockquote> Then there were stories about the amazing pay given to CEOs of top for-profit health insurance companies, e.g., <a href="http://ifawebnews.com/2014/05/30/single-payer-advocate-reports-pay-increases-for-many-health-carrier-ceos-in-2013/">via IFAwebnews,</a> <blockquote class="tr_bq">According to research published by a single-payer advocacy group, average compensation for nine CEOs at large health insurance companies rose by more than 19% in 2013, with some chief executives seeing steep increases in pay, while others received less remuneration. Healthcare-NOW!, a non-profit that says its goal of single-payer health coverage is also known as 'improved Medicare for all,' analyzed recent financial reports of the Fortune 500 health insurance carriers. According to Healthcare-NOW!, the highest compensation increase went to Aetna CEO Mark Bertolini, who received a $30.7 million compensation package in 2013. The Bertolini pay package, which included a large “special one-time performance-based retention award,” represented a 131% increase over his $13.3 million compensation in 2012. Molina Healthcare and Centene, insurers that specialize in privately managed Medicaid plans, roughly doubled CEO compensation in 2013. J. Mario Molina received $11.9 million, up from $5 million in 2012, while Centene’s CEO Michael Neidorff made $14.5 million, up from $8.5 million. Overall, average CEO pay across Fortune 500 health insurers rose from $11.6 million in 2012 to $13.9 million in 2013.</blockquote> Here we go again.  In May, 2014, I <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2014/05/more-stories-of-million-dollar-plus.html">summarized</a> how discussion of executive compensation, particularly in non-profit hospitals and hospital systems, seemed to follow a clear pattern. <blockquote class="tr_bq">The Pattern Nearly all non-profit hospitals must release minimal data on the total compensation of a few of the highest paid executives.  When these reports come out, sometimes the local media take a look, either at an individual hospital or hospital system, or at a number of local hospitals.  They almost inevitably find that some, usually most executives make what appears to be lots of money.  This could be hundreds of thousands of dollars at small community hospitals, or millions of dollars at larger hospitals and hospital systems.  Sometimes the reports end there.  Sometimes the reporters ask hospital representatives or local experts to explain the apparently exalted compensation figures.  The Talking Points  The explanations are usually very similar, and so we have called this part of The Pattern The Talking Points. It seems nearly every attempt made to defend the outsize compensation given hospital and health system executives involves the same arguments, thus suggesting they are talking points, possibly crafted as a public relations ploy.   We first listed the talking points <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/09/talking-points-sans-original-thought-to.html">here</a>, and then provided additional examples of their use <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/09/more-repeats-of-talking-points.html">here</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/03/example-of-how-complex-takes-control.html">here</a> <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/12/health-care-hired-managers-not-playing.html">here,</a> <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/05/executive-compensation-as-legal.html">here</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/06/no-blues-but-lots-of-green-for-st-louis.html">here,</a> and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/08/should-we-cry-for-non-profit-hospital.html">here</a>, and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/08/the-long-con-charitable-hospitals-make.html">here</a>.  They are: - We have to pay competitive rates - We have to pay enough to retain at least competent executives, given how hard it is to be an executive - Our executives are not merely competitive, but brilliant (and have to be to do such a difficult job). The talking points are usually supplied by hospital public relations personnel, sometimes by hospital trustees or executives, sometime by various health care consultants.  The talking points are rarely questioned.</blockquote> There Really Were Talking Points, at Least at Cigna I hypothesized that perhaps public relations managers at various hospitals might actually have organized these talking points, since so many news stories of executive compensation in health care seemed to faithfully follow the pattern.  That was, however, speculation.  However, now there is anecdotal evidence that public relations executives really did use these talking points to defend their bosses' compensation. Wendell Potter is the former head of public relations for for-profit health insurance company Cigna who defected, and now advocates for honest, fair health care.  On June 9, 2014, he <a href="http://wendellpotter.com/2014/06/skyrocketing-salaries-for-health-insurance-ceos/">wrote</a> in <a href="http://wendellpotter.com/blog/">his blog</a> about the latest revelations about outrageous executive compensation given to health insurance CEOs (as summarized above).  <blockquote class="tr_bq">When I handled financial communications for Cigna, the day I dreaded most every year was the day we filed the company’s proxy. That’s because I knew I would get calls from reporters wanting to know how we could justify paying the CEO so much when most other employees were lucky to get 3 percent raises. I always had talking points drafted with plenty of help from the company’s lawyers and HR executives. They didn’t vary much from year to year. Basically, all I said was, hey, this is a very big company, the CEO has a very big job and his pay is in line with what other firms of similar size pay their top guys.</blockquote> So there you are.  First, at least at this company, it appears that an important responsibility of the company public relations department was to defend the CEOs pay.  In my humble opinion, this confirms my suspicion that corporate public relations and marketing often put the personal interests of the top company executives ahead of everything else, including the interests of shareholders of for-profit companies in fair executive compensation, and the interests of patients in reasonable health care costs. Second, there really were talking points used at least in this company's public relations that were pretty similar to those I hypothesized:  - We have to pay competitive rates = "his pay is in line with what other firms of similar size pay their top guys." - We have to pay enough to retain at least competent executives, given how hard it is to be an executive = " this is a very big company, the CEO has a very big job" - Our executives are not merely competitive, but brilliant (and have to be to do such a difficult job) = by implication. You heard it here first. So maybe we should all be a lot more skeptical about executive compensation.  Unfortunately, Mr Potter suggests we may be getting less so. <blockquote class="tr_bq">I made frequent use of those talking points the first couple years. But toward the end of my 15 years at the company, I would rarely get more than one or two calls. By 2008, the year I left, the phone didn’t ring at all, at least not from the media. Fewer and fewer reporters even bothered to look at the proxy statements.</blockquote> Of course, that may have something to do with the general decline of journalism, perhaps partially due to the transformation of journalism into a pursuit of a few big corporations, lead by overly compensated executives. Furthermore, instead of the talking points, consider some recent ideas about causes and effects of excess executive compensation.  We have discussed some of these frequently, but here are some recent versions. Causes of Excess Executive Compensation Cronies on the Board - from an Associated Press story <a href="http://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2014/05/27/the-ceo-got-a-huge-raise-you-didnt-heres-why">via US News and World Report</a>, <blockquote class="tr_bq">Some board members defer to a CEO's judgment on what his or her own compensation should be. There's a good reason: Many boards are composed of current and former CEOs at other companies. And in some cases, board members are essentially hand-picked or at least vetted by the CEO. Not surprisingly, the boards' compensation committees offer generous bonuses.</blockquote> In more detail, from <a href="http://www.startribune.com/opinion/commentaries/258379541.html">an op-ed in the Minneapolis-St Paul Star Tribune</a>, <blockquote class="tr_bq"> Under current practice, a nominating committee made up of current board members selects nominees to be presented to the shareholders for approval. Since there are rarely any more nominees than open positions, being nominated virtually assures election. These elections are the same as what you would expect in a communist country where voters vote yes or no on a single candidate.  The nominating committee is usually selected by the board chairman and the CEO (in too many cases, the same person). The CEO and the chairman are almost always on the nominating committee. It is in the CEO’s interest to select board members whose loyalty can be trusted. In many cases, a nominee’s primary qualification is loyalty to the CEO and the board chairman, with little knowledge of or experience in the business. Often there is a prior business or personal relationship to the nominee and very often the CEO and/or the chairman serves on the board of a nominee, a cozy mutual back-scratching arrangement. Serving on the board is prestigious and lucrative and abounds in perks. Besides cash and/or stock options or grants, perks such as company-paid travel to foreign trade shows, board meetings in posh resorts (with spouses, of course) and other company benefits make continuing on the board the first priority of most board members, with shareholder interests a distant second priority. This is akin to a politician whose first priority is to get re-elected and whose constituents’ interests come next.  To maintain continuation of this bonanza of benefits, the board member must be assured of being renominated by the nominating committee. Since the CEO and the chairman are on the nominating committee, which they selected, they have great influence over the ultimate choices for nominees. Now, if you are a board member and want to be assured of being renominated, it pays (literally) to be looked upon favorably by the CEO and the chairman. </blockquote> Note that both of these accounts referred to for-profit corporations, but could easily apply to boards of non-profit organizations as well.   Note further that crony boards violate the expectations of their charges, which are to defend the organizations' mission and the interests of all their stakeholders, not just a few top executive cronies. The Ratchet, or "Lake Wobegon" Effect -  from an Associated Press story <a href="http://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2014/05/27/the-ceo-got-a-huge-raise-you-didnt-heres-why">via US News and World Report</a>, <blockquote class="tr_bq">Robert Solow, a Nobel Prize-winning economist, recently observed that CEOs live in 'Lake Wobegon,' that fabled town created by radio show host Garrison Keillor where, it is said, 'all the children are above average.' Solow didn't mean it as a compliment. Corporate boards often set CEO pay based on what the leaders of other companies make. No board wants an 'average' CEO. So boards tend to want to pay their own CEO more than rival CEOs who are chosen for benchmarking compensation packages. This will 'naturally create an upward bias' in pay, Charles Elson and Craig Ferrere of the University of Delaware concluded in a 2012 paper. '(T)he compounded effect has been to create a significant disparity between the pay of executives and what is appropriate to the companies they run.'</blockquote> Note that the Lake Wobegon effect is based on a logical fallacy.  All CEOs cannot be above average.  CEOs as "Great Men" - from an <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/great-men-great-pay-why-ceo-compensation-is-sky-high/2014/06/12/6e49d796-d227-11e3-9e25-188ebe1fa93b_story.html">op-ed in the Washington Post</a>, <blockquote class="tr_bq">It is a system that rests on the Great Man theory of history: a school of thought that attributes virtually all important developments through time to heroic individuals. Think back to Jack Welch’s 20-year reign as chief executive of General Electric. He was lauded as a corporate leader and management guru who, seemingly single-handedly, grew the company’s revenue and market capitalization many times over. Before long, GE had become a synonym for Jack Welch (or was it the other way around?).</blockquote> The theory is from the 19th century, <blockquote class="tr_bq"> As a historian trying to parse America’s enthrallment with superstars, I keep coming back to the Great Man theory of history. Popularized in the mid-19th century by the Scottish essayist Thomas Carlyle, this concept holds that history is largely attributable to the actions of great individuals, who because of their personal (and often mysterious) qualities — such as intelligence, wisdom, deftness, goodness and energy — use their agency to make a big impact. 'In all epochs of the world’s history,' <a href="http://grammar.about.com/od/classicessays/a/On-Heroes-And-Hero-Worship-By-Thomas-Carlyle.htm" title="grammar.about.com">Caryle wrote</a> in his 1841 book, <a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1461064619?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creativeASIN=1461064619&linkCode=xm2&tag=thewaspos09-20" title="www.amazon.com">'On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History,''</a> 'we shall find the Great Man to have been the indispensable saviour of his epoch.'</blockquote> But it makes no real sense, <blockquote class="tr_bq"> Such lionization is misplaced. Operating a sustainable enterprise, as any executive, manager or employee knows well, is inherently a team sport. Across companies and industries, this activity depends on many people working in concert in all kinds of groups, at all levels of the organization. Such interdependence means that it is hard to precisely delineate, much less quantify, any one individual’s contribution, even that of the most senior manager, to a firm’s performance.</blockquote> This is particularly true in health care, and particularly in organizations that provide direct patient care.  In my humble opinion, it is ridiculous to lionize managers when health care professionals actually take care of patients, using tests and treatments developed by other professionals and scientists.  Effects of Excess Executive Compensation Declining Morale of all Other Employees -  from an Associated Press story <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/may/27/us-ceo-median-package-rise-10m">via the UK Guardian</a>, <blockquote class="tr_bq"> 'There's this unbalanced approach, where there's all this energy put into how to reward executives, but little energy being put into ensuring the rest of the workforce is engaged, productive and paid appropriately,' says Richard Clayton, research director at Change to Win Investment Group, which works with labor union-affiliated pension funds.</blockquote> The CEO Disease - per Dan Quiggle, who invented the term, <a href="http://www.exchangemagazine.com/morningpost/2014/week24/Thursday/14061910.htm">in Exchange Magazine</a>, which leads to: <blockquote class="tr_bq">You either hear really good things from your people…or nothing at all. You don’t trust the feedback you receive. You take criticism too personally. In general, your employees don’t seem engaged. Your best employees are unhappy or leaving. You don’t connect with people in a way that leads to loyalty.</blockquote> That is, bad management, and hence... Poor Organizational Performance - from a <a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/2014/06/16/the-highest-paid-ceos-are-the-worst-performers-new-study-says/">Forbes column by Susan Adams</a>,  Across the board, the more CEOs get paid, the worse their companies do over the next three years, according to extensive <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1572085">new research</a>. This is true whether they’re CEOs at the highest end of the pay spectrum or the lowest. 'The more CEOs are paid, the worse the firm does over the next three years, as far as stock performance and even accounting performance,' says one of the authors of the study, Michael Cooper of the University of Utah’s David Eccles School of Business. Since most health care CEOs seem to know more about finance and health care, I wonder if this effect is even more pronounced on health care quality and patient outcomes? Income Inequality and a Declining Economy - from <a href="http://www.fiercehealthcare.com/story/ceo-compensation-time-reign-skyrocketing-salaries-incentives/2014-06-19">an editorial in FierceHealthcare</a>, <blockquote class="tr_bq">Indeed, the continual <a href="http://www.fiercehealthfinance.com/story/healthcare-ceo-pay-skewing-economy/2014-06-12" target="_blank">rise of executive paychecks may contribute to inequities in the U.S. economy</a>, according to a new Roosevelt Institute paper, 'Taking Stock: Why Executive Pay Results in an Unstable and Inequitable Economy.' 'The toxic combination of stock-based executive pay and open-market stock repurchases has contributed to not only the growing concentration of income at the top but also the failure of the U.S. economy to sustain existing middle-class jobs and create new ones,' wrote author William Lazonick, professor and director of the Lowell Center for Industrial Competitiveness at the University of Massachusetts.</blockquote> Civil Unrest - from a <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/robert-j-samuelson-the-ceo-aristocracy-may-not-be-worth-all-that-money-they-get/2014/06/22/d0bbd596-f888-11e3-8aa9-dad2ec039789_story.html">Washington Post op-ed by Robert J Samuelson</a>, <blockquote class="tr_bq">Americans dislike aristocracies. Unless companies can find a more restrained pay system, they risk an anti-capitalist public backlash. This is the ultimate danger.</blockquote> Summary So far, the rise of executive compensation in health care has been inexorable.  Much of the public and many health care professionals have been lulled into complacency, or paralyzed by learned helplessness.  Yet the talking points used to justify outrageous executive pay are nonsense.  Rising compensation seems to be really due to crony capitalism, logical fallacies, and false historical analogies.  Rising pay may lead to poor management, poor organizational performance, worsening social inequality, a failing economy, and ultimately civil unrest.  Although the transition of executives into a new aristocracy is a society wide, if not a global problem, we in health care cannot be complacent that someone else will solve it.  True health care reform would enable accountable leadership that puts the health care mission and patients' and the public's health ahead of personal gain.

A Real Example of Public Relations Talking Points to Justify Outsize Executive Compensation - and Why We Should No Longer be Fooled

We frequently discuss outsize executive compensation in health care organizations as both a symptom and a cause of these organizations' poor leadership and governance, and hence of widespread health c…

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25 Jun 2014

Confused Thinking about New Cholesterol Guidelines - Were Conflicts of Interest to Blame?

For years, clinical practice guidelines promulgated by prominent health care organizations have been hailed with accolades as received wisdom.  However, there is increasing reason to be skeptical of such guidelines.  Many guidelines are not based on rigorous application of the principles of <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/evidence-based%20medicine">evidence-based medicine,</a> and often seem to arise from the personal opinions of their authors.  This is particularly troublesome when those authors  have conflicts of interest, and when the organizations that sponsor guideline development have institutional conflicts of interest.  Back in 2011, an Institute of Medicine panel advocated standards for guideline development, including strict limits on conflicted panel members, to make their results more trustworthy.  However, as we noted <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/11/what-if-institute-of-medicine-wrote.html">here</a>, those standards have been largely ignored.    Therefore, it is good news that the just released, long awaited guidelines on the treatment of blood cholesterol from the American College of Cardiology (ACC) and American Heart Association (AHA)(1)  they provoked controversy rather than adulation.  However, connecting some dots reveals that the guideline development process and the defenses of the guidelines by its developers were even more confused than they first seemed.  That confusion may be explained by conflicts of interest affecting guideline development of the sort that the IOM report wanted eliminated.  . The New Cholesterol Guidelines - Background A striking feature of the guidelines was a new approach to drug treatment for primary prevention, that is, for patients who do not already have heart disease or other atherosclerosis.   Such drug based primary prevention has been controversial, although drug treatment for people with high cholesterol who also have documented coronary heart disease, secondary prevention, is well-established. The new cholesterol treatment guideline suggested drug treatment, essentially limited to statin medications, for patients believed to be at elevated risk of developing coronary artery disease or other forms of atherosclerotic disease, even in the absence of elevated cholesterol levels.   <blockquote class="tr_bq">Adults 40 to 75 years of age with LDL–C [so called "bad cholesterol"] ]70 to 189 mg/dL, without clinical ASCVD* [atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease] or diabetes and an estimated 10-year ASCVD risk ≥7.5% should be treated with moderate- to high-intensity statin therapy.</blockquote> Also, <blockquote class="tr_bq">It is reasonable to offer treatment with a moderate intensity statin to adults 40 to 75 years of age, with LDL–C 70 to 189 mg/dL, without clinical ASCVD* or diabetes and an estimated 10-year ASCVD risk of 5% to [less than] ... 7.5% </blockquote> Previously, guidelines and other recommendations for the treatment of cholesterol for primary prevention, that is, for patients without known atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease, suggested treatments according to the level of cholesterol or its components.   Less controversially, the guidelines recommended treatment for patients with existing ASCVD, very high LDL-C, and diabetes. The new guidelines raise some  questions: - Given the past controversy, how good is the evidence supporting cholesterol lowering drug treatment in primary prevention? - What is the evidence supporting deciding on drug treatment for primary prevention on predicted risk of atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease? - Can physicians make good enough risk predictions to use this approach? Evidence Supporting Drug Treatment of Cholesterol in Primary Prevention - Do Benefits Outweigh Harms? The reason that cholesterol lowering drug use for primary prevention has been controversial is the lack of clear evidence that such drug use leads to benefits to patients that outweigh its harms.  A central principle of evidence based medicine is that only treatments whose benefits clearly outweigh their harms should be prescribed.  . A recent commentary by Abramson et al in the British Medical Journal in October, 2013 outlines the issues.(2)  There is no good evidence that statins used in primary prevention increase overall survival, or decrease overall incidence of adverse events, defined as death, hospital admission, prolongation of admission, cancer or permanent disability. Individual trials and meta-analyses do show that statins lead to a small reduction in the rate of cardiovascular events.  For example, the authors' re-analysis of data from a patient level meta-analysis showed that of 140 low-risk primary prevention patients treated for five years, one patient would avoid a major coronary event or stroke. However, it is not clear that this small likelihood of benefit offsets the likelihood of adverse events due to treatment.  The data about the harms of statins in primary prevention is not very clear, partially because the relevant randomized controlled trials featured "reporting of adverse events ... [that was] generally poor, 'with failure to provide details of severity and type of adverse events or to report on health-related quality of life." In summary, Abramson et al wrote, <blockquote class="tr_bq">statin therapy prevents one serious cardiovascular event per 140 low risk people (five year risk ... [less than] 10%) treated for five years.  Statin therapy in low risk people does not reduce all cause mortality or serious illness and has about an 18% risk of causing side effects that range from minor and reversible to serious and irreversible.  Broadening the recommendations in cholesterol lowering guidelines to include statin therapy for low risk individuals will unnecessarily increase the incidence of adverse effects without providing overall health benefit.</blockquote> However, the new guideline focused on the ability of statins to prevent ASCVD,  <blockquote class="tr_bq">The RCTs identified in the systematic evidence review indicated a consistent reduction in ASCVD events from 3-hydroxy-3-methylglutaryl-coenzyme A reductase inhibitors (statins) therapy in secondary and primary prevention populations....</blockquote>However, the new guideline ignored the absence of evidence that statin treatment prolonged life, prevented serious illness overall, or improved health status, function or quality of life. Furthermore, the guideline seemed unreasonably optimistic about the harms of statins.  In particular, it ignored evidence about harms other than diabetes, myopathy (serious muscle disease), and stroke.  Yet there is evidence suggesting that statins at least might cause "liver dysfunction, acute renal failure, and cataracts; cognitive symptoms, neuropathy, and sexual dsyfunction; decreased energy and exertional fatigue; and psychiatric symptoms, including depression, memory loss, confusion, and aggressive reactions" as summarized by Abramson and colleagues. Thus the new guidelines did not make a new and improved case that statin treatment for primary prevention has benefits that outweigh its harms.  One could argue that this is their fatal flaw and thus all the rest of the guidelines' discussion about which patients should get primary prevention was pointless. Dr Abramson and his co-author, Dr Rita Redberg, did get to repeat their arguments about why statin use for primary prevention is not justified in a NY Times <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/14/opinion/dont-give-more-patients-statins.html">op-ed,</a> but otherwise the fundamental problem with the guideline's argument for aggressive use of statins went unnoticed. Evidence Supporting Making Decisions about Statin Treatment as Primary Prevention According to Patients' Risks of Developing Atherosclerotic Cardiovascular Disease The guidelines suggested statin therapy for patients judged to have at least a 7.5% risk of ASCVD.  As noted above, there is no evidence that statin therapy in primary prevention in general increases survival, reduces serious events overall, improves health status, quality of life, or function, or has benefits that clearly outweigh its harms.  I could not find any reference in the guidelines to clear evidence about the effects of statin treatment in primary prevention for this sub-group of patients.  In the supplemental guideline on risk assessment,(3) there was this  <blockquote class="tr_bq">After deliberation, the Work Group endorsed the existing and widely employed paradigm of matching the intensity of preventive efforts with the individual’s absolute risk.. The Work Group acknowledges that none of the risk assessment tools or novel risk markers examined in the present document have been formally evaluated in randomized controlled trials of screening strategies with clinical events as outcomes.</blockquote> The wording is confusing, but might be stating that a strategy of using statins only for patients predicted to have a risk greater than 7.5% has not been assessed in a clinical trial.  (It might also, however, be stating that the specific method recommended by the guideline to assess this risk has never been tested in a clinical trial, see below.) The apparent lack of evidence in support of the specific strategy advocated by the guideline to use statins for primary prevention in patients whose risk of ASCVD exceeded the designated threshold did not otherwise attract any notice. Evidence Supporting the Ability of Physicians to Assess Risk of ASCVD Accurately Enough to Implement the Recommended Strategy The supplemental guideline stated that previously published methods of risk prediction would not be suitable for the new proposed approach, <blockquote class="tr_bq">As part of its deliberations, the Work Group considered previously published risk scores with validation in NHLBI cohort data as 1 possible approach. However, a number of persistent concerns with existing risk equations were identified including nonrepresentative or historically dated populations, limited ethnic diversity, narrowly defined endpoints, endpoints influenced by provider preferences (e.g., revascularizations), and endpoints with poor reliability (e.g., angina and heart failure [HF]). </blockquote> Since the recommended strategy requires an estimation of risk, the lack of availability of acceptable risk assessment methods would appear to be another fatal flaw.  However,  <blockquote class="tr_bq">Given the inherent limitations of existing scores, the Work Group judged that a new risk score was needed to address some of the deficiencies of existing scores, such as utilizing a population sample that approaches, to the degree possible, the ideal sample for algorithm development and closely represents the U.S. population.</blockquote> So the question now becomes: did the guideline provide sufficient evidence that the new risk prediction tool developed as part of guideline development predicts sufficiently well to be used to make decisions as recommended by the guidelines? Note that developing, validating, and publishing a new risk score normally would be considered to be tasks that are part of research, not guideline development.  Nonetheless, the guideline developers decided to take on these tasks as part of guideline development, which precluded independent publication of the the results of this research after peer review.  This makes it more difficult for others to critically evaluate the results of the research concerning the new risk score.  But let me attempt to do so. The work group went ahead to develop a new multivariate prediction model for ASCVD.  This means they used statistical methods to find variables, that is, patients' clinical or demographic characteristics, that independently could predict the outcome of interest, and then combined these variables in an equation (or algorithm) to make risk predictions for individual patients.  Such multivariate models to make diagnoses or, as in this case, prognostic predictions have been the subject of considerable research since at least the 1970s.  However, they have not been as useful as their initial advocates hoped. The issues turn out to be a bit complex.  I must digress into an area in which I previously did research. It is quite easy to develop multivariate diagnostic or prediction models.  The statistical analytic tools can almost always find multiple patient characteristics that independently correlate with the outcome of interest.  The problem is that such correlations can be based on random associations, or biases produced by idiosyncrasies in the particular data set used for model development.  That a new model can diagnose or predict accurately for patients who were not in the original data set thus is not assured, and should be considered to be merely a hypothesis. Models developed on one group of patients often do not work when tried prospectively on new patients, probably because the initial development group was somehow not completely representative of all the patients of interest.  For example, a model may have been developed using patients from a particular hospital which attracts different sorts of patients than found in other hospitals in which the model might be used.  .Therefore, before one has confidence in such a multivariate model, one must verify that the model predicted or diagnosed well not only in the group of patients from which it was derived, but prospectively on other patients like those on whom it would be used in clinical practice. The supplemental guidelines did assert that the new model was prospectively tested, <blockquote class="tr_bq"> The equations were also assessed in external validation studies using data from other available cohorts</blockquote> However, it did not specify what these cohorts were. There is some data buried in Appendix 4 of the supplemental guideline on the performance of the model.  They did not distinguish results from derived from prospective validation from those from model derivation. <blockquote class="tr_bq"> In summary, discrimination and calibration of the models were very good. C statistics ranged from a low of 0.713  (African-American men) to a high of 0.818 (African-American women). Calibration chi-square statistics ranged from a low of 4.86 (nonHispanic White men) to a high of 7.25 (African-American women).</blockquote> These two sentences do not provide strong evidence that the model would predict well when used prospectively. The C-statistic is an overall measure of the ability of the model to discriminate between patients who will go on to develop the diseases of interest and those who will not.  The statistic is formally equal to the probability that were two patients, one who developed disease, and another who did not, selected randomly, the model would predict disease more strongly for the patient who actually got it.  Thus, at best, for 20% of random pairs of African-American women, one who got disease, one who did not, the model would give a more pessimistic prediction for the women who would not get disease.  This is good, but not great discrimination ability.  (If this result referred to data from model derivation, not prospective validation, it is likely to be over-optimistic.) Furthermore, since the guideline would be used to make decisions based on the absolute risk, its calibration is also important.  Calibration is the measure of whether the model predictions of risk are close to reality.  To assess calibration, one ought to assess the whole range of predictions made by the model.  Given that the guidelines suggest a 7.5% risk threshold, it would be particularly important to determine whether patients given predictions above and below that value really have risks above and below that value. Unfortunately, the two sentences above are not helpful in this regard.  The chi-square statistic presented is a measure of overall calibration, but does not show calibration for groups of patients given predictions with particularly interesting values, like above or below 7.5% Note that the supplemental guideline on risk assessment includes a statement that details about the model validation done "internally and externally" are in a <a href="http://circ.ahajournals.org/content/early/2013/11/11/01.cir.0000437738.63853.7a/suppl/DC1">Full Panel Report Data Supplement</a>.  The download of that supplement so far does not seem to work Setting that aside for a moment, the published guidelines do not provide good evidence that the risk prediction tool the guidelines recommend should be used to assess ASCVD risk in order to make decisions on statin use for individual patients in primary prevention. The lack of a sufficiently accurate method to predict risk seems to a fatal flaw for a strategy that requires risk prediction. Controversy in the Media It turns out that I was not the first person to identify this problem. In fact, it appears that during the internal review process for the guidelines, major questions had already been raised about the risk prediction model's calibration. However, these questions did not seem to have been conveyed to the guideline authors, and hence were never addressed. As <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/18/health/risk-calculator-for-cholesterol-appears-flawed.html">reported</a> by the New York Times on November 17, 2013, <blockquote class="tr_bq">The problems were identified by two Harvard Medical School professors whose findings will be published Tuesday in a commentary in The Lancet, a major medical journal. The professors, Dr. Paul M. Ridker and Dr. Nancy Cook, had pointed out the problems a year earlier when the National Institutes of Health’s National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, which originally was developing the guidelines, sent a draft to each professor independently to review. Both reported back that the calculator was not working among the populations it was tested on by the guideline makers. That was unfortunate because the committee thought the researchers had been given the professors’ responses, said Dr. Donald Lloyd-Jones, co-chairman of the guidelines task force and chairman of the department of preventive medicine  at Northwestern University.</blockquote> The article by Ridker and Cook was indeed published. on November 19, 2013(4).  It suggested major problems with the calibration of the risk assessment model, <blockquote class="tr_bq">Another concern for clinicians is whether the new prediction algorithm created by the ACC/AHA correctly assesses the level of vascular risk. To be useful, prediction models must not only discriminate between individuals with and without disease, but must also calibrate well so that predicted risk estimates match as closely as possible the observed risk in external populations. We calculated predicted 10-year risks of the same atherosclerotic events using the new ACC/AHA risk prediction algorithm and compared these estimates with observed event rates in three large-scale primary prevention cohorts, the Women's Health Study, the Physicians' Health Study, and the Women's Health Initiative Observational Study. As shown in figure 1, in all three of these primary prevention cohorts, the new ACC/AHA risk prediction algorithm systematically overestimated observed risks by 75–150%, roughly doubling the actual observed risk. As shown in figure 2, similar overestimation of risk was observed in two external validation cohorts used by the guideline developers themselves, an issue readily acknowledged in the report. Thus, on the basis of data from these five external validation cohorts, it is possible that as many as 40–50% of the 33 million middle-aged Americans targeted by the new ACC/AHA guidelines for statin therapy do not actually have risk thresholds that exceed the 7·5% threshold suggested for treatment. Miscalibration to this extent should be reconciled and addressed in additional external validation cohorts before these new prediction models are widely implemented. It is possible, for example, that the five external validation cohorts are more contemporary than the cohorts used in the risk prediction algorithm and thus reflect secular improvements in overall health and lifestyle patterns in the USA over the past 25 years. </blockquote> Note that Figure 1 of the Ridker and Cook article showed the calibration of the model in the patient cohorts newly tested by these authors, focusing in particular on whether patients predicted to have risks of cardiovascular disease just over the 7.5% threshold actually had rates of such disease greater than 7.5%.  They clearly did not   Note also that Figure 2 showed calibration of the model when the guideline authors attempted to test it on new patient cohorts, apparently the data found in the so far inaccessible Full Panel Report Data Supplement.  Again, the model overestimated risk for patients just over the crucial threshold. So the guideline developers knew that their model overestimated risk, buried this information in supplemental data, did not admit or perhaps appreciate how it threatened the credibility of their guidelines, and somehow were not given the internal review that suggested this was a fatal flaw of the proposed guidelines .  The Guideline Developers' Responses The media controversy over the accuracy of the prediction model incorporated into the new guidelines provoked responses from the guideline developers, but these responses were at best confused.  .   First, as reported by the NY times, <blockquote class="tr_bq">In a response on Sunday, Dr. [Sidney C] Smith of the guidelines committee said the concerns raised by Dr. Cook and Dr. Ridker 'merit attention.' <div itemprop="articleBody"> But, he continued, 'a lot of people put a lot of thought into how can we identify people who can benefit from therapy.' Further, said Dr. Smith, who is also a professor of medicine at the University of North Carolina and a past president of the American Heart Association, 'What we have come forward with represents the best efforts of people who have been working for five years.'</div></blockquote><div itemprop="articleBody"> </div><div itemprop="articleBody">Note that this response includes two logical fallacies.  First, it contained a <a href="http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/straw-man.html">straw man argument</a>.  It appeared to respond to accusations no one made.  Nobody accused the guideline developers of being lazy, not putting in much effort, or not devoting much thought to the effort.  The response also included an implied <a href="http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/appeal-to-authority.html">appeal to authority</a>: big experts came up with these guidelines so their opinions should be credited, even in the presence of data to the contrary.   </div><div itemprop="articleBody"> </div><div itemprop="articleBody">Also, as <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/18/health/cholesterol-calculator/">reported</a> by CNN,</div><blockquote class="tr_bq"><div class="cnn_storypgraphtxt cnn_storypgraph9">However, 'I can't speak to whether the calculator is valid or not,' Dr. Robert Eckel, co-chair of the American Heart Association committee that wrote the new guidelines and the association's past president, told CNN. 'That needs to be determined.'</div><div class="cnn_storypgraphtxt cnn_storypgraph9"> </div><div class="cnn_storypgraphtxt cnn_storypgraph10">'We trusted that the calculator worked,' he said. 'We trusted that the calculator is valid.'</div></blockquote><div class="cnn_storypgraphtxt cnn_storypgraph10"> </div><div class="cnn_storypgraphtxt cnn_storypgraph10">This was confusing.  Maybe Dr Eckel meant it to be another appeal to authority, the authority in question being that of the work group that developed the risk prediction model.  </div><div class="cnn_storypgraphtxt cnn_storypgraph10"> </div><div class="cnn_storypgraphtxt cnn_storypgraph10">Furthermore, again according to CNN,</div><div class="cnn_storypgraphtxt cnn_storypgraph10"> </div><blockquote class="tr_bq"><div class="cnn_storypgraphtxt cnn_storypgraph10">Researchers apparently did not receive the professors' responses, Dr. Donald Lloyd-Jones, chairman of the committee that developed the equation, told the Times.</div><div class="cnn_storypgraphtxt cnn_storypgraph10">  </div><div class="cnn_storypgraphtxt cnn_storypgraph18">But Lloyd-Jones told reporters Monday, 'There's nothing wrong with these equations.'</div><div class="cnn_storypgraphtxt cnn_storypgraph18"> </div><div class="cnn_storypgraphtxt cnn_storypgraph19">Committee members were aware there could be 'overestimation of risk in some populations,' he said.</div></blockquote><div class="cnn_storypgraphtxt cnn_storypgraph19"> </div><div class="cnn_storypgraphtxt cnn_storypgraph19">In addition,</div><div class="cnn_storypgraphtxt cnn_storypgraph19"> </div><blockquote class="tr_bq"><div class="cnn_storypgraphtxt cnn_storypgraph19"> 'Our risk assessment guideline doesn't tell you what to do. ... It just evaluates risk,' he said.</div></blockquote><div class="cnn_storypgraphtxt cnn_storypgraph19"> </div><div class="cnn_storypgraphtxt cnn_storypgraph19">I am not sure this even rises to the level of a logical fallacy.  It appears to be pure denial.  The whole point of the risk assessment tool was to determine whether a patient's risk is above or below the thresholds suggested by the treatment guideline, and thus to tell you what to do.  There clearly is something wrong with "these equations."  Using them appears to vastly overestimate risk, and thus implementation of the guideline would probably lead to vast over treatment of real people  . </div><div class="cnn_storypgraphtxt cnn_storypgraph19"> </div>Thus, after promulgating guidelines that seemed hardly based on evidence, when challenged, the guideline developers' response was confused and illogical.    What About the Issue of Benefits versus Harms? The other problems that I identified above, lack of evidence that primary prevention provides benefits that clearly outweigh harms, and lack of evidence that a strategy based on risk assessment would provide benefits that outweighs harms, did not get media coverage, and so did not provoke a response from the developers.  However, I  did find that one of the members of the guideline panel implied her approach to the benefits versus harms issue in a Medscape news <a href="http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/814526">article</a>.   Dr Noel Bairey Merz gave a talk at the 2013 American Heart Association meeting about primary prevention for women, first saying <blockquote class="tr_bq">Although the randomized clinical trial evidence supporting primary prevention with statin therapy in women is not perfect, 'the absence of data means negative data.' That is the argument formulated by Dr Noel Bairey Merz (Cedars Sinai Medical Center, Los Angeles, CA), who spoke today here at the American Heart Association 2013 Scientific Sessions.   'How confident are we that statins do not save lives in the week before a heart attack, but they do save lives the week after a heart attack, for women and men?'</blockquote> Also, <blockquote class="tr_bq">in the overall JUPITER study of 18 000 patients, there was no treatment benefit when women were studied as a subgroup. Merz argues that JUPITER is powered for the total sample size only, not for women alone. In addition, the statistical test for heterogeneity revealed the interaction by sex was not statistically significant. 'Pretty much all the subgroups fall beyond the statistically significant range,' said Merz. 'So should we withhold treatment for women, who now are the majority of victims of cardiovascular disease, because of low precision and a trial that was not designed to address or answer this question?'</blockquote> So Dr Merz seemed to assume that statins work for particular patients in the absence of evidence that they do not work, maybe implying a general assumption that all treatments are beneficial until proven otherwise.  This stands a central precept of evidence-based medicine, and perhaps the ancient dictum to physicians to do no harm, on their heads. <div class="cnn_storypgraphtxt cnn_storypgraph19">Unwarranted Enthusiasm for (Over) Treatment and Conflicts of Interest The new cholesterol guidelines, and those who developed them, seem enthused about the treatment of cholesterol with statin drugs for primary prevention in the absence of evidence that such treatment produces benefits that outweigh its harms.  They also seem enthused about basing treatment decisions on a statistical prognostic model that has not been shown to be accurate, and in fact which appears to be biased towards promoting excess treatment in the context in which it would be used.   The excess enthusiasm occurred in spite of evidence, and at times in spite of logic.  One possible reason that the guideline developers got so enthused that they seemed unable to think straight appears to be their own conflicts of interest, as first publicly noted in a <a href="http://www.pharmalive.com/cholesterol-guidelines-panelists-and-their-conflicts-of-interest">post</a> on Pharmalot. Reviewing the disclosure forms provided with the guidelines revealed more detail. Of the 13 people on the main treatment guideline panel who were not NHLBI staffers serving ex-officio, 7 had financial relationships with pharmaceutical companies that manufacture statins: - Jennifer Robinson, co-chair, research funded by AstraZeneca and Merck; - C Noel Bairey Merz, consulting for Abbott, Bristol-Myers Squib Novartis, and Pfizer; - Robert H Eckel, consulting for Merck, Pfizer and Abbott; - Anne Carol Goldberg, consulting for Abbott and Merck, research funded by Abbott, Merck, and Novartis; - J Sanford Schwartz, consulting for Abbott, Merck and Pfizer, research funded by Pfizer; - Karol Watson, consulting for Abbott, AstraZeneca, Merck and Pfizer, research funded by Merck; - Peter W F Wilson, consulting for and research funded by Merck. Of the 10 expert reviewers for this panel, 3 had financial relationships with pharmaceutical companies that manufacture statins -  William Virgin Brown, consultant for Abbott, Bristol-Myers Squibb, and Pfizer; -  Matthew Ito, consultant for Kowa; - Robert S Rosenson, consultant for Novartis and Pfizer. Of the 11 people on the risk prediction panel who were not NHLBI staffers serving ex-officio, 5 had financial relationships with pharmaceutical companies that manufacture statins -David C Goff Jr, co-chair, research funded by Merck; - Raymond Gibbons, consultant for AstraZeneca; - Jennifer Robinson, research funded by AstraZeneca, and Merck; - J Sanford Schwartz, consulting for Abbott, Merck and Pfizer, research funded by Pfizer [although these relationships were not listed as relevant to this panel, but found in the listing for the panel above]; - Peter W.F Wilson, consultant for and research funded by Merck. Also, in the Abramson and Redberg NY Times op-ed, the authors noted <blockquote class="tr_bq">both the American Heart Association and the American College of Cardiology, while nonprofit entities, are heavily supported by drug companies </blockquote> As noted on Pharmalot, the prevalence of conflicted panel members did not appear to conform to the <a href="http://www.iom.edu/Activities/Quality/ClinicPracGuide.aspx">standards for the development of trustworthy guidelines</a> recently published by the Institute of Medicine: <blockquote class="tr_bq">whenever possible, guideline development group members should not have conflicts of interest… and the chair or co-chairs should not be a person(s) with conflicts of interest.</blockquote> Also, <a href="http://www.latimes.com/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-statins-risk-calculator-wrong-20131118,0,3734255.story">noted</a> by the Los Angeles Times was this comment from Dr John Abramson, lead author of the commentary on statins in primary prevention(4), <blockquote class="tr_bq">'There is overtreatment that’s been built into the risk calculator, and this is a warning sign about the overtreatment that’s built into the guidelines themselves and the conflicts of interest in the organizations that are overseeing the production of these guidelines,' said Dr. John Abramson, a Harvard University cardiologist who has argued that statins offer little value for people with a 10-year risk level of heart attack or stroke of less than 20%. 'There aren’t brakes being put on the enthusiasm and overreaching of the experts.' 'There are statin believers, and when you hear these experts talk, they’re talking emotionally, not scientifically,' Abramson added. 'The experts are using emotion, not science.'</blockquote> As Joe Collier  observed, "people who have conflicts of interest often find giving clear advice (or opinions) particularly difficult."(5) This difficulty giving clear advice, when amplified by a guideline for a common problem supported by prestigious non-profit organizations, and promoted by vigorous public relations, could lead to "more than 45 million middle-aged Americans who do not have cardiovascular disease being recommended for consideration of statin therapy" (per Ridker and Cook[4]) unnecessarily, likely resulting in millions suffering unneeded side effects, and billions in costs.   Summary Guidelines for management of a very common problem promulgated by a major medical society and a major disease oriented non-profit organization suggested a strategy that would vastly increase drug treatment of currently healthy patients.  The strategy appears not to have been based on good evidence.  When some of the problems with this evidence were pointed out, the guideline developers responded with illogic.  Apparently many of the guideline developers have financial relationships with the drug companies that would most profit from increases in drug treatment as recommended by the guidelines  Implementation of the new guidelines might results in millions of people in the US receiving unneeded drugs, with resultant side effects and costs. . Do we need more examples of how conflicts of interest are causing the poor outcomes and excess costs that are wrecking our health care system?  Do we need more excuses not to eliminate conflicts of interest from guideline development?  Do we need more delay implementing the standards provided by the Institute of Medicine report on trustworthy guidelines?  Do we need more excuses not to drastically reduce conflicts of interest affecting academic medicine, medical societies, and disease specific non-profits, specifically starting with the earlier (and so far generally disregarded) Institute of Medicine <a href="http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2009/Conflict-of-Interest-in-Medical-Research-Education-and-Practice.aspx">report on conflicts of interest in medicine</a>? While we in the US argue incessantly in the details of minor reforms of our supposed free health care market, we ignore the rot at its foundations.  True health care reform would attack the conflicts of interest that have put money, not patients at the center of health care. </div> References 1.  Stone NJ, Robinson J, Lichtenstein AH,  et al.  2013 ACC/AHA guideline on the treatment of blood cholesterol to reduce atherosclerotic cardiovascular risk in adults: a report of the American College of Cardiology/American Heart Association Task Force on Practice Guidelines.  Circulation 2013.  Link <a href="http://circ.ahajournals.org/content/early/2013/11/11/01.cir.0000437738.63853.7a">here</a>. 2.  Abramson JD, Rosenberg HG, Jewell N et al.  Should statins be prescribed to people at low risk of cardiovascular disease. Brit Med J 2013; 347: 15-17.  Link <a href="http://www.bmj.com/content/347/bmj.f6123">here</a>. 3.  Goff Jr DC, Lloyd-Jones DM, Bennett G, et al.  2013 ACC/AHA Guideline on the Assessment of Cardiovascular Risk.  Journal of the American College of Cardiology (2013), doi: 10.1016/j.jacc.2013.11.005.  Link <a href="http://content.onlinejacc.org/data/Journals/JAC/0/11005.pdf">here</a>. 4.  Rikder PM, Cook NR. Statins: new American guidelines for prevention of cardiovascular disease.  Lancet 2013;   Link <a href="http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736%2813%2962388-0/fulltext">here</a>. 5.   Collier J. The price of independence. Br Med J 2006; 332: 1447-9.  Link <a href="http://bmj.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/full/332/7555/1447">here</a>

Confused Thinking about New Cholesterol Guidelines - Were Conflicts of Interest to Blame?

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22 Nov 2013

Vested Interests and Their Influence on Physicians- New Understanding from Cognitive and Social Psychology

<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/evidence-based%20medicine">Evidence-based medicine</a> proposes patient care decisions based on the best evidence from critically reviewed clinical research, knowledge of biology and the biopsychosocial context, and patients' values and preferences.  Yet physicians often fail to make evidence-based decisions, despite many efforts to educate, or incentivize them to do so.  We used to think that the main reason was physicians' lack of knowledge and understanding of EBM, and human cognitive limitations that make such evidence-based thinking difficult.  However, now we realize that physicians are deluged by  attempts to influence their decisions so as to favor vested interests, whether or not that is good for patients. We have discussed various kinds of <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/deception">deception</a> used in <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/marketing">marketing</a> meant to increase physicians' prescriptions for drugs, and recommendations for devices and health care services.  Physicians have not proved to be very resistant to these methods. Now a new article provides a different perspective on how marketers use cognitive and social psychology to manipulate physicians.(1)  Sunita Sah's and Adriane Fugh-Berman's introduction stated, <blockquote class="tr_bq">Physicians often believe that a conscious commitment to ethical behavior and professionalism will protect them from industry influence.  Despite increasing concern over the extent of physician-industry relationships, physicians usually fail to recognize the nature and impact of subconscious and unintentional biases on therapeutic decision-making. Pharmaceutical and medical device companies, however, routinely demonstrate their knowledge of social psychology processes on behavior and apply these principles to their marketing. </blockquote> The article then listed a number of findings from social (and cognitive) psychology that marketers may use to their advantage on naive physicians. Psychological Mechanisms Promoting Acceptance of Conflicts of Interest and Dubious Marketing Ploys First, marketers may take advantage of cognitive biases and psychological mechanisms that allow physicians to accept marketing maneuvers while denying the effect of marketing on their decision making. Confidence and Over-Confidence <blockquote class="tr_bq">People are strongly influenced by messages delivered with confidence and do not take the trouble to ascertain the accuracy of these messages if doing so requires effort or money.</blockquote> I would add that many humans, including physicians, are also over-confident in the accuracy of their own judgments.  (In 1989 we showed  that physicians often were excessively confident in their judgments of patients' outcomes, in particular, about survival of critically ill patients.)(2) Of course, marketers often state their messages with great confidence regardless of their accuracy. So physicians need to try to restrain their own over-confidence, and be more skeptical of the confidence of others. Maybe this would just be an exercise in simple humility. Self-Serving (or Ego) Biases People tend to believe that the results of their decisions, or of their groups' decisions, are better than average.  This can be called the Lake Wobegon effect (from Garrison Keilor's fictional town in which all the children are above average.) We and others have shown that physicians may be overly optimistic about the outcomes of their own (versus others') patients, or their clinical units' (versus others') outcomes, again in the context of predicting survival of critically ill patients.(3)  We have also <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/07/where-no-hospital-ceos-are-below.html">posted</a> about how corporate boards of directors seem to almost always think that their hired executives are better than average, at least when determining their executive compensation. Similarly, Sah and Fugh-Berman wrote, <blockquote class="tr_bq">Physicians believe that their own prescribing behavior is unaffected by industry influence, although they concede that other physicians are susceptible to such influence.</blockquote> Furthermore, <blockquote class="tr_bq">Social psychology research confirms that people have a 'bias blind spot,' namely, they are more likely to identify the existence of cognitive and motivational biases in other than in themselves.</blockquote>But, as Dana and Lowenstein wrote, <blockquote class="tr_bq">It cannot both be true that most physicians are unbiased and that most other physicians are biased.</blockquote> So, to put it bluntly, physicians ought to be more humble about their own ability to resist outside influences and the resulting biases. Again, some simple humility might help. Cognitive Dissonance Sah and Fugh-Berman pointed out that <blockquote class="tr_bq">While articulating and believing in the importance of scientific objectivity, physicians' biases to accept industry gifts create cognitive dissonance; that is, discomfort that arises from discrepancy between conflicting beliefs, or between beliefs and behaviors.</blockquote> So, <blockquote class="tr_bq">Cognitive dissonance theory specifies three methods - not mutually exclusive - by which people manage or reduce dissonance.  Changing one of the dissonant beliefs, opinions or behaviors (possibly a difficult or painful process that requires sacrificing a pleasurable behavior or treasured belief); Lowering the importance of one of the discordant factors which can be accomplished by denial - forgetting or rejecting the significance of one or more of the conflicting cognitions; and adding consonant elements that resolve or lessen the dissonance (this may involve rationalizations to buffer the dissonance between conflicting cognitions.)</blockquote> Physicians may use denial and rationalization to reduce cognitive dissonance caused by their concurrent desire for relationships with marketers and others with vested interests on one hand, and their professionalism and its obligation to put patients' needs first on the other hand.  Sah and Fugh-Berman cited Chimonas and colleagues, <blockquote class="tr_bq">Denial included (a) avoiding thinking about the conflict of interest; (b) rejecting the notion that industry relationships affect physician behavior, and (c) disavowing or universalizing responsibility for problems that arose from conflicts of interest ('there's always a conflict of interest...').  Rationalizations included (a) asserting techniques that would help maintain impartiality and (b) reasoning that meetings with drug reps were educational and benefited patients.</blockquote> We have discussed various public justifications for accepting conflicts of interest by physicians and other health care decision makers that employed a variety of <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/logical%20fallacies">logical fallacies</a> along these lines. So physicians need to re-examine their treasured beliefs and the gratification they get from relationships with industry (as opposed to those with patients, colleagues, friends and families).  They could remember the advice that no one can serve two masters. Sense of Entitlement Physicians' sense of entitlement, especially given the increasing stress upon them, may be used to rationalize relationships with drug, device and biotechnology companies since these corporations seem to be among their few friends (versus insurance companies, government agencies, and sometimes hospital administrations whom physicians feel may be more burdensome.).  So, in one study, <blockquote class="tr_bq">Implicitly reminding physicians of the burdens of medical training and their working conditions more than doubled reported willingness to accept gifts....</blockquote>So physicians need to reconsider that to which they feel entitled.  This is the third instance in which some humility might help.  Principles of Influence Used by Marketers Markets seem to also be well acquainted with the six principles of influence and persuasion identified by Cialdini and colleagues. Reciprocity <blockquote class="tr_bq">The norm of reciprocity - the obligation to help those who have helped you - is one of the guiding principles of human interaction</blockquote> This is the foundation of the effect of relatively small conflicts of interest, such as giving of small gifts. <blockquote class="tr_bq">Physicians pay off industry gifts through changes in their practice</blockquote> Furthermore, <blockquote class="tr_bq">Gifts associated with a subtle implicit request may be more likely to achieve compliance than gifts that call for explicit reciprocation. </blockquote>So physicians need to be wary of Greeks, or anyone else bearing gifts, even those less conspicuous than wheeled horses. Commitment and Consistence <blockquote class="tr_bq">Consistency is highly valued in our society and associated with rationality and stability.  After committing to a decision or opinion, people justify that choice or opinion by remaining consistent with it.</blockquote> So marketers try to get physicians to make small commitments to leverage larger ones.  This is <blockquote class="tr_bq">why drug reps, ask, for example, 'will you try my drug on your next five patients?'</blockquote>So physicians should remember there is no virtue in commitment to erroneous beliefs.  "A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds." - Ralph Waldo Emerson Social Proof This is basically the deliberate deployment of the logical fallacy of the <a href="http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/appeal-to-common-practice.html">appeal to common practice</a>. <blockquote class="tr_bq">Social proof, also referred to as social validation or conformity, is the practice of deciding what to do by looking at what others are doing. </blockquote> So, <blockquote class="tr_bq">If accepting industry gifts is a cultural norm in medicine, physicians will continue to do so.  The opinions of colleagues are often used by industry representatives to sway physicians to adopt a particular therapy.  </blockquote> This may be why industry works so hard to sign up health care academics. <blockquote class="tr_bq">Trainees in an institution, for example, are affected by the institution's stated policies but also - and sometimes more so - by what they see their mentors do.</blockquote>So physicians, who often pride themselves on independence, need to be skeptical about the need to follow the crowd. Liking or Rapport The more you like someone, the more you are apt to follow their advice, even if your feelings towards them have been manipulated. This is obviously why drug representatives, for example, are so nice to physicians. <blockquote class="tr_bq">Physicians often feel overworked, underpaid, and unappreciated [ed note -  and their is plenty of evidence, some of which we have discussed on this blog, that this is not unreasonable.]  Drug reps dispense sympathy, flattery, food, gifts, services and income-enhancing opportunities and seek to ask nothing in return but scholarly consideration of the benefits of drugs. </blockquote>So physicians need to reconsider who really are their friends, and be skeptical of "friends" with something to sell.  Authority and Security This is basically the deliberate deployment of the logical fallacy of the <a href="http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/appeal-to-authority.html">appeal to authority</a>.  The best example is industry's efforts to recruit <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/key%20opinion%20leaders">key opinion leaders</a>, that is health professionals who are perceived as authority figures, but have really been hired to market. <blockquote class="tr_bq">From an industry perspective, the best KOLs radiate status and authority while successfully convincing their peers (and perhaps themselves) of their illusory independence and lack of bias. </blockquote> Note that <blockquote class="tr_bq">KOL speakers not only influence audience members' prescribing behavior, but also - as predicted by cognitive dissonance theory - become more convinced themselves of the benefits of the products they endorse.</blockquote>So physicians need to be skeptical of those claiming to be authorities, especially when they are connected with people who have something to sell. Summary We used to strongly believe (and Dr Wally Smith and I used to teach a course to the effect that) the major barrier to true evidence-based practice was the cognitive limitations that physicians share with all humans.  We thought in terms of cognitive biases and the inappropriate use of cognitive heuristics leading physicians to inaccurately judge the probabilities of diagnoses and medical outcomes, and thus make less than optimal decisions. Now it seems apparent that the deliberate influencing of health professionals' judgments and decisions by external actors, mainly those interested in selling more products and services, but sometimes by those with ideological or political motives, is currently a much more important challenge to evidence based practice.  It looks like the influencers may be very knowledgeable about human cognitive limitations and how social psychology influences judgment and decisions, and may use this knowledge to pursue their vested interests, at the financial and physical expense of patients, and ultimately the public.  True health care reform would encourage professional education designed to increase resistance to external influences that put self-interest ahead of patients' and the public's health, and careful regulation that would decrease some of the more dangerous practices used.  Of course, much more resistance might be achieved if physicians used a little more common sense when dealing with people who are obviously trying to sell them on goods, services, or ideas.  A good proportion of the deceptive methods discussed above could be countered by remembering the usefulness of humility, skepticism, and a few simple aphorisms.    Again, as we have written repeatedly, not only should all conflicts of interest be disclosed for the sake of honesty, but physicians and other health professionals ought to consider repudiating most of all of them, maybe at some personal expense, but in the interest of re-establishing their commitment to putting the patient, not their own self-interest, or the vested interests of others, first.     References 1.  Sah S, Fugh-Berman A. Physicians under the influence: social psychology and industry marketing strategies.  J Law Med Ethics 2013; 14:  . Link <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2286433">here</a>: 2. Poses RM, Bekes C, Copare F, Scott WE.  The answer to "what are my chances, doctor?"  depends on whom is asked: prognostic disagreement and inaccuracy for critically ill patients.  Crit Care Med 1989; 17: 827-833.  Link <a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/2752779">here</a>. 3. Poses RM,  McClish DK, Bekes C, Scott WE, Morley JN. Ego bias, reverse ego bias, and physicians' prognostic judgments for critically ill patients. Crit Care Med 1991; 19: 1533-1539.  Link here.

Vested Interests and Their Influence on Physicians- New Understanding from Cognitive and Social Psychology

Evidence-based medicine proposes patient care decisions based on the best evidence from critically reviewed clinical research, knowledge of biology and the biopsychosocial context, and patients' value…

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26 Sep 2013

More Signs of Organized Resistance? - Proposed Legislation for More Hospital Leadership Accountability

This year we note the beginning of action against the power of large health care organizations lead by hired executives and cronies who seem to put their self-interest and self-enrichment ahead of patients' and the people's health.  In 2013 we noted no confidence votes by medical school faculty (<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/01/at-university-of-miami-faculty-without.html">here</a>), and university faculty (<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/03/nyu-faculty-vote-no-confidence-in-their.html">here</a>) against academic leaders perceived as putting their power and wealth ahead of core values, actions by a state governor (<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/02/another-reason-for-hope-concern-about.html">here</a>) and a big city mayor (<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-push-back-continues-mayor-of.html">here</a>) against local health care systems perceived as putting their executives' enrichment ahead of their services to patients, and a union labor action (<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-market-made-us-do-it-increasing-low.html">here</a>) against a health care system perceived as putting executive enrichment ahead of adequate health insurance for low level employees.  We have posted about numerous examples of hospital (and other health care organization) executives receiving <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/executive%20compensation">compensation</a> far out of proportion to any realistic measure of their organizations' performance or positive effects on patients' or the public's health, and seemingly skimmed off the top of these organizations' budgets. Now Modern Healthcare has <a href="http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20130330/NEWS/303309961/calif-bill-challenges-tax-exemption-for-profitable-not-for-profit">reported</a> about a bill in the California legislature aimed at supposedly not for profit hospitals that put money ahead of patients: <blockquote class="tr_bq">Officials with the California Nurses Association say the proposed law—AB 975—is an attempt to bring more accountability to money-making hospitals that use tax exemptions to turn tidy profits and give hefty salaries to executives.</blockquote> Furthermore, <blockquote class="tr_bq"> Charles Idelson, spokesman for the California Nurses Association, said many profitable tax-exempt hospitals have lost the public's trust in recent years by making profits their top mission and paying salaries that allow executives to buy yachts while 'chipping away' at less-profitable services for women, children, the poor and mentally ill. 'What this bill does is, it really is an effort to increase transparency and make hospitals more accountable to the communities that they purport to serve,' Idelson said. 'Hospitals that are meeting their charity care obligation should welcome this process and understand that it is an opportunity to rebuild some of the public trust that they have lost through their other policies and practices.'</blockquote> Hospital Leaders Deploy Talking Points, Including Logical Fallacies  Perhaps predictably, hospital executives are not so happy: <blockquote class="tr_bq"><div id="storyGraf2">'This is less about good public policy than it is about politics,' said Michael Hunn, chief executive for southern California hospitals at Providence Health & Services, which has five hospitals in the state. 'I would hate to see a political agenda further harm those that are marginalized in society,' Hunn said. 'No matter what the legislative and political process is, we need to keep in mind the human beings that it is our responsibility to care for.'</div></blockquote><div id="storyGraf2"> </div><div id="storyGraf2">Note that Providence Health & Services is the ostensibly non-profit Catholic hospital system accused of putting paying executives multi-million dollar compensation ahead of giving low level employees minimally adequate health insurance as we posted <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-market-made-us-do-it-increasing-low.html">here</a>.  According to the <a href="http://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments/2011/510/216/2011-510216586-08d12748-9.pdf">organization's latest 990 form</a>, Mr Hunn got $1,576,978 total compensation in 2011.  So one wonders which human beings he is feeling most responsible for?  Note also that the unsubstantiated allusion to a "political agenda," appears to be an <a href="http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/appeal-to-ridicule.html">appeal to ridicule</a>, "a fallacy in which ridicule or mockery is substituted for evidence in an 'argument.'"  We have noted before how public relations flacks working for top executives of health care organizations seem to be very good at using such <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/logical%20fallacies">logical fallacies</a>.  The argument Mr Hunn made seems essentially identical to an argument used against a lawsuit to end the tax exemption of a huge Pennsylvania hospital system that has apparently angered the communities which it is supposed to serve while paying its executives millions (look <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-push-back-continues-mayor-of.html">here</a>).</div><div id="storyGraf2"> </div><div id="storyGraf2">In addition, </div><div id="storyGraf2"> </div><div id="storyGraf2"> <blockquote class="tr_bq">Jan Emerson-Shea, spokesman for the California Hospital Association, said the bill's union backers were hiding their real agenda with 'red herring' issues like highly compensated executives and the superficial dissonance of not-for-profit organizations with healthy margins. ''Not-for-profit hospital' doesn't mean that you don't make a profit--all hospitals need to make a profit to keep the doors open,' Emerson-Shea said</blockquote></div><div id="storyGraf2"><div style="background-color: white; border: medium none; color: black; overflow: hidden; text-align: left; text-decoration: none;"> </div><div style="background-color: white; border: medium none; color: black; overflow: hidden; text-align: left; text-decoration: none;">Of course, that last assertion is not true.  Non-profit organizations need to avoid sustaining repeated losses to keep their doors open, but do not need to make any surplus to do so.  And the issue was not whether hospitals make small surpluses, but whether they behave like for-profit corporations, especially in regard to how well they pay hired executives.  So while protesting "red herrings," one spokesperson for hospitals, presumably for hospitals' hired executives, seemed to be arguing that the only alternative to a very large surplus and a very large reserve is a deficit.  By ignoring another obvious alternative, having a small surplus and a small reserve, this argument thus is derived from the logical fallacy known as the <a href="http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/false-dilemma.html">false dilemma</a>.  The spokesperson also seemed to be arguing that a deficit inevitably leads to bankruptcy.  Of course prolonged deficits might lead to bankruptcy, but a single deficit would not necessarily do so.  Thus we see the logical fallacy known as the <a href="http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/slippery-slope.html">slippery slope</a>. Note further that the argument used by the California executive here was again essentially identical to an argument used against a lawsuit to end the tax exemption of a huge Pennsylvania hospital system that has apparently angered the communities which it is supposed to serve while paying its executives millions.  So it looks like once again the hired executives and their public relations operatives have their talking points in line.   (See this <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-push-back-continues-mayor-of.html">pos</a>t, from which our argument about the logical fallacies employed first in Pennsylvania came.)</div></div> Summary It really is beginning to look like there is some sort of trend, albeit still small, towards organized resistance against the hired executives and cronies who have made themselves rich from large health care organizations, putting their self-interest and enrichment apparently before taking care of patients and serving the public's health.  As we have said ad infinitum.... Health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research. On the other hand, those who authorize, direct and implement bad behavior ought to suffer negative consequences sufficient to deter future bad behavior. If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.

More Signs of Organized Resistance? - Proposed Legislation for More Hospital Leadership Accountability

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01 Apr 2013

The Push Back Continues: the Mayor of Pittsburgh Sues UPMC Claiming it is No "Public Charity"

There is another indication that push back against the power of large health care organizations is getting more significant. In February, 2013, we <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/02/another-reason-for-hope-concern-about.html">noted</a> that the Governor of the state of Connecticut publicly criticized lavish executive compensation at a small regional hospital system, compensation partially fueled by government funded health insurance payments, and in contrast to hospitals' claims that insufficient reimbursement was driving them to poverty.    The Suit Challenging the Charitable Status of UPMC Now the outgoing Mayor of Pittsburgh has launched a lawsuit challenging the status of huge, nominally non-profit health system UPMC as a public charity.  A summary of the arguments comes from an <a href="http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/local/neighborhoods-city/upmc-pittsburgh-stake-positions-for-court-fight-on-nonprofit-status-680393/">article</a> in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette.  First, in the state of Pennsylvania, a Supreme Court description set out a test to determine if a particular organization is a public charity, the status the UPMC currently claims: <blockquote class="tr_bq">The Supreme Court's 1985 ruling involving the Hospital Utilization Project (or HUP) set out a test that requires that a purely public charity must fulfill all five of the test's points that it: advances a charitable purpose; donates or renders gratuitously a substantial portion of its services; benefits a substantial and indefinite class of persons who are legitimate subjects of charity; relieves the government of some of its burden; and operates entirely free from private profit motive. That ruling was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in April in a case involving an Orthodox Jewish summer camp in Pike County that was found to not deserve its property tax exemption.</blockquote><div style="background-color: white; border: medium none; color: black; overflow: hidden; text-align: left; text-decoration: none;"> The city's lawyer, E.J. Strassburger of Strassburge Mckenna Gutnick & Gefsky, argued that UPMC does not pass that test:</div><div style="background-color: white; border: medium none; color: black; overflow: hidden; text-align: left; text-decoration: none;"><a href="http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/local/neighborhoods-city/upmc-pittsburgh-stake-positions-for-court-fight-on-nonprofit-status-680393/#ixzz2OezY8Lbc" style="color: #003399;"></a> </div><div style="background-color: white; border: medium none; color: black; overflow: hidden; text-align: left; text-decoration: none;"> <blockquote class="tr_bq">Mr. Strassburger wrote, first and most strongly, that 'it seems virtually certain that UPMC would fail to carry its burden of proving that it satisfies the fifth prong of the HUP test by 'operating entirely free from profit motive.'' He cited UPMC's nearly $1 billion surplus over the last two years and $3 billion in reserves as evidence of this, and that UPMC 'is carefully structuring its operations to prioritize profits-generation over charity.'</blockquote> Also,  <blockquote class="tr_bq">In addition, Mr. Strassburger wrote that UPMC does not 'advance a charitable purpose' in part because UPMC 'maintains an 'open admissions policy' in name only' and it does not make all of its health care available to everyone, regardless of ability to pay.</blockquote> Furthermore, <blockquote class="tr_bq">the review says UPMC fails to provide sufficient charity care, operates far-flung international operations that are losing money, and has closed operations in poor communities only to open or expand into richer ones. But it also cites what it terms 'excessive' benefits of UPMC executives, including CEO Jeffrey Romoff's $5.9 million salary; the fact that more than 20 employees are paid more than $1 million; UPMC's corporate jet; Mr. Romoff's 'lavish'  Downtown headquarters (which it claims includes a private chef, chauffeur and private dining room).</blockquote><div style="background-color: white; border: medium none; color: black; overflow: hidden; text-align: left; text-decoration: none;"></div></div> The Post-Gazette also sought the advice of experts, <blockquote class="tr_bq">Nicholas Cafardi, dean emeritus and professor at Duquesne University's Law School, said he believes the argument that UPMC is not free from a private profit motive is the strongest one in Mr. Strassburger's review, in part because of how far-flung UPMC has become. 'The more they do that gets them away from their core purpose, the more they open themselves up to the argument that they aren't doing charity,' he said. In addition, Mr. Cafardi said, UPMC's extensive advertising campaign --sometimes directly against rival Highmark -- makes it look like the organization is operating for profit. 'A lot of things like that make them look like they're operating for a private profit,' he said. 'You advertise because you're in competition. That's the private profit motive.' Gary M. Grobman, former head of the nonprofit Pennsylvania Jewish Coalition and author of 'The Pennsylvania Nonprofit Handbook,' said UPMC would have a fight on its hands. 'Based on what [Mr. Strassburger] has written, which may or may not be true, it seems some staff at the hospital are paid quite well and some decisions are made based on achieving as much revenue as possible instead of providing as much charity as possible,' he said. 'And if all of that is true, they don't deserve their not-for-profit status.'</blockquote> So the main issues brought up by the city are similar to issues we have raised about numerous nominally non-profit health care organizations.  We have shown that many particular organizations appear not to act like charities when they appear to put short-term revenue ahead of the organization's mission, a process sometimes called <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/financialization">financialization</a>, and put <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/executive%20compensation">lavish compensation of top hired managers </a>ahead of the organization's general financial well-being; and when their leadership appears to <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/mission-hostile%20management">subvert the organization's mission</a>. The UPMC Response versus Anger in the Community Of course, UPMC public relations disagreed with the premises of the lawsuit: <blockquote class="tr_bq">'We think the 13-page memo that a local law firm wrote for the City is very weak and reaches its conclusions entirely based on opinion, not fact,' UPMC spokesman Paul Wood wrote. 'Rather than responding to partisan politics and blatant union pandering by the Mayor, UPMC looks forward to demonstrating in a court of law that we meet all five prongs of the HUP test and that our hospitals easily qualify for the tax-exempt status they unquestionably deserve. Interestingly, by hiring an outside law firm the City is prepared to waste millions of dollars of taxpayer funds on an unsuccessful attempt to pursue this case.'</blockquote> Note that the unsubstantiated allusions to "partisan politics" and "pandering" appear to be an <a href="http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/appeal-to-ridicule.html">appeal to ridicule</a>, "a fallacy in which ridicule or mockery is substituted for evidence in an 'argument.'"  We have noted before how public relations flacks working for top executives of health care organizations seem to be very good at using such <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/logical%20fallacies">logical fallacies</a>. Mr Wood also scoffed at the naive notion that having a $1 billion surplus and $3 billion in reserves means the organization operates like a business:   <blockquote class="tr_bq">Mr. Wood wrote that 'numerous people have tried to distort the meaning of that component to attain a political result.' 'It does not mean a nonprofit shouldn't strive to have a positive operating margin -- organizations that don't do that go out of business,' he added.</blockquote> Note that Mr Wood seems to be arguing that the only alternative to a very large surplus and a very large reserve is a deficit.  By ignoring another obvious alternative, having a small surplus and a small reserve, his argument thus is derived from the logical fallacy known as the <a href="http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/false-dilemma.html">false dilemma</a>.  He also seemed to be arguing that a deficit inevitably leads to bankruptcy.  Of course prolonged deficits might lead to bankruptcy, but a single deficit would not necessarily do so.  Thus he also employed the logical fallacy known as the <a href="http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/slippery-slope.html">slippery slope</a>.  On the other hand, a Post-Gazette columnist <a href="http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/opinion/sally-kalson/mayor-v-moneybags-upmc-could-be-beloved-if-it-put-patients-over-profits-and-perks-680646/">showed</a> the depth of community concern over the role of UPMC: <blockquote class="tr_bq">Someone in power is taking official action against the biggest corporate bully in town. Can I get an Amen? In fact, I can get many Amens, and that says a lot about the behavior of the region's dominant hospital system. Has there ever been a 'charity' so disliked and mistrusted by the people it's supposed to serve and the people it employs? You rarely hear anyone say 'I cannot stand CARE,' or 'I despise Doctors Without Borders.' But you hear it all the time about UPMC, notwithstanding the jobs it creates, the medical innovations it advances, the life-saving care its doctors deliver and its commitment of $100 million for the Pittsburgh Promise scholarship fund. With all that to its credit it should be beloved, but the opposite is true. Not helping matters is its corporate public relations, which is increasingly tone deaf. In an emailed response to the mayor's announcement, UPMC spokesman Paul Wood said the lawsuit 'appears to be based on the mistaken impression that a non-profit organization must conduct its affairs in a way that pleases certain labor unions, certain favored businesses, or particular political constituencies.' No, Mr. Wood. It's based on the correct impression that a nonprofit hospital's top priority should be the patients, not building a monopoly. And that a $10 billion system with a billion-dollar surplus and $2 billion to $3 billion in reserves should be taking care of many more indigent sick people than UPMC has been treating -- especially when it owns land that a Post-Gazette investigation valued at $1.6 billion, even as it enjoys a $20-million tax break every year, underwritten by the good citizens of Pittsburgh and Allegheny County. You can try blaming the SEIU organizing campaign or your arch-enemy, Highmark the insurer, or politics, but this is so much bigger than any of those things. And the public knows it.</blockquote> Keep in mind that the current discussion of UPMC in the media focuses on very recent events.  On Health Care Renewal, we have <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/UPMC">posted frequently</a> over the last eight years about problems with the leadership of UPMC.  We <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2005/05/guilty-pleas-in-another-hospital.html">started </a>in 2005 with their inability to prevent a fraud  perpetrated by some UPMC middle managers. In 2008, we <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/11/questions-of-benefits-vs-risks-for-upmc.html">discussed </a>the apparent mismanagement of the highly touted UPMC liver transplant program.    <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/02/healthcare-it-blamed-in-patient-death.html">Starting in 2009</a>, and continuing <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/03/when-human-error-causes-ehr-downtime.html">through 2013</a>, InformaticsMD chronicled how the leadership has presided over health care information technology so problematic that it has been <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/02/healthcare-it-blamed-in-patient-death.html">blamed for patient deaths</a>.  In 2009, we<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/09/upmc-fouls-another-one-off.html"> noted</a> sanctions against UPMC's public relations.   In 2010, we <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/05/at-upmc-dealings-with-board-members.html">noted</a> conflicts of interest and apparent self-dealing and nepotism affecting the UPMC board of trustees and UPMC executives.  Summary For at least a generation, health care leaders and health policy makers have been pushing for consolidation of health care organizations in the name of efficiency.  We now have a health care system dominated by fewer, larger organizations, and whatever efficiencies have been produced mainly seem to have benefited organizational insiders.  Maybe now, though, some are beginning to remember that monopolists - starting at least with John D Rockefeller, I believe - have historically touted their ability to improve efficiency and rationality.  The results, however, have been higher prices and poorer results for everyone else.  Hospitals and hospital systems have been particularly good at getting away with the efficiency argument despite the fact that health care prices in the US have been soaring ever since the "vertical integration" craze in the early 1990s.  I believe such organizations have been getting away with this nonsense because of their revered status within their communities.  Now, however, as huge hospital systems drive up prices and make their top executives rich, maybe we will remember Theodore Roosevelt's warnings about trusts and malefactors of great wealth. There is no good evidence that large hospitals and even larger hospital systems take better care of patients, or provide better teaching and research.  Not only should we question whether huge hospital systems like UPMC are public charities, we should wonder how we ever let them get so big, and proceed to break up these new sorts of "trusts."

The Push Back Continues: the Mayor of Pittsburgh Sues UPMC Claiming it is No "Public Charity"

There is another indication that push back against the power of large health care organizations is getting more significant.In February, 2013, we noted that the Governor of the state of Connecticut pu…

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26 Mar 2013

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