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More Air Into the Health Care Bubble: the $30,000 a Month Cancer Drug

Over four years ago, we <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2005/07/oh-prices-we-pay-thalidomide-for.html">posted</a> about the stratospheric prices of new drugs that seemed disproportionate to manufacturing and development costs on one hand, and the value of the drugs for patients on the other.  For example, back then we noted that thalidomide, a very old drug that notoriously was found to cause birth defects when it was given to preganant women, but that then showed promise as an anti-cancer drug, was being marketed in the US for $29 per capsule (approximately $25,000 a year), while a generic form sold in Brazil for $0.07 per capsule. That was then, and this is now.  This week, the New York Times <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/05/health/05drug.html">reported</a> on a $30,000+  per month cancer drug.  <blockquote>A newly approved chemotherapy drug will cost about $30,000 a month, a sign that the prices of cancer medicines are continuing to rise despite growing concern about health care costs. The price of the new drug, called Folotyn, is at least triple that of other drugs that critics have said are too expensive for the benefits they offer to patients. The colon cancer drug Erbitux, for instance, costs $10,000 a month and the drug Avastin about $8,800 when used to treat lung cancer. </blockquote> So what could be the rationale for this breathtaking price? Drug Effectiveness Could it be that the drug is extremely effective? Not according to the NY Times: <blockquote>Folotyn has not yet shown an effect on longevity. In the clinical trial that led to approval of the drug, 27 percent of the 109 patients experienced a reduction in tumor size. The reductions lasted a median of 9.4 months. But considering all the patients in the trial, only 12 percent had a reduction in tumor size that lasted for more than 14 weeks. The trial did not compare Folotyn to another drug or a placebo </blockquote> A PubMed search revealed no sign that this trial had been publsiehd, and no publications reporting any controlled trials of this drug. So at best, this drug at best may temporarily shrink tumors, although that assertion is based on evidence that has not yet been published or subject to peer-review. It does not seem that the tremendous price of the drug could be justified by tremendous benefits to patients. Research, Development and Manufacturing So, perhaps the drug was very difficult and expensive to create, manufacture and develop?  That does not seem to be the case, either. Folotyn's generic name is pralatrexate. As the name suggests, it is a chemical compound very similar to the much older anti-cancer drug methotrexate. [See O'Connor OA. Pralatrexate: an emerging new agent with activity in T-cell lymphoma. Curr Opin Oncol 2006; 18: 591-597.]  It was first developed not by Allos Therapeutics, but by Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, Southern Research Institute, and Stanford Research Institute.  The Allos Therapeutics <a href="http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9MzQwNzcxfENoaWxkSUQ9MzI2NDg5fFR5cGU9MQ==&t=1">2008 annual report</a> noted that the company's total research and development expenses for the drug from 1992 through 2008 were $26.8 million (so much for the urban myth that the average drug costs $1 billion to develop.)  Based on the estimate that the drug would cost roughly $30,000/ month from the NY Times, the company could recover all the development costs of this drug after 893 patient-months of use. Allos Therapeutics does not actually make pralotrexate, but outsources its production, according to the company's .  The firm's total yearly manufacturing costs (for several experimental drugs as well as pralotrexate) in 2008 were $6.7 million. So it does not seem that the tremendous price of the drug could be attributed to the costs of discovering, developing, or manufacturing it. So where would the money go? General and Administrative Costs, Executive and Board Compensation Allos Therapeutics seems to spend a disproportionate amount of money on marketing, general and administrative costs.  According to the 2008 report, "marketing, general and administrative expenses include costs for pre-marketing activities, corporate development, executive administration, corporate offices and related infrastructure."  In 2008, these expenses were $23 million, in one year, almost as much as the company spent over 16 years to research and develop Folotyn. Allos Therapeutics has enriched its corporate insiders.  According to the company's <a href="http://ccbn.10kwizard.com/xml/download.php?repo=tenk&ipage=6359493&format=PDF">2009 proxy statement,</a> in 2008, CEO Paul L Berns received $2,091,600 in total compensation; Chief Commercial Officer James V Caruso received $1,259,700; and Chief Medical Officer Pablo J Cagnoni received $1,408,700.  The total compensation of the five highest paid executives of the company in 2008, $5,945,500, was over 10% of the entire company's budget, $53,639,000.  Mr Berns, who has only been with the company since 2006, owned 994,606 shares or equivalent (at a price of $6.62 per share on 4 December, 2009, worth $6,584,292).  Mr Caruso owned 272,072 shares or equivalent,and Dr Cagnoni owned 386,245.   Although two board members, Stewart Hen and Jonathan S Leff seemed to be serving by virtue of their positions with Warburg Pincus & Co, whose Private Equity VIII LP owns over 29% of Allos Therapeutics stock, Mr Hen and Mr Leff received $120,700 and $119,400 to sit on the board. These amounts should be considered in light of the fact that the company is comparatively tiny.  Its 2008 report disclosed that it only has 81 full-time employees, of whom fully 31 "are involved in marketing, corporate development, finance, administration, and operations."  The company has never made money.  Its 2008 report noted losses of over $20 million a year in the past five years, and a total loss of over $289 million. So one wonders if the real reason pralatrexate was priced so high was to justify the millions that top company leaders have reaped from a company that lost money over the 16 years? Summary The NY Times reported that people outside of Allos were not pleased with the price of Folotyn: <blockquote>Dr. Lee N. Newcomer, senior vice president for oncology at the big insurer UnitedHealthcare, called the price of Folotyn 'unconscionable.' He said that Folotyn alone would cost as much as UnitedHealthcare now typically spends in total to treat a lymphoma patient from diagnosis until death. That median expenditure now, he said, is $87,000 for a little over a year of treatments. But Dr. Newcomer said insurers would be obligated to pay for Folotyn because there were no alternatives. </blockquote> Furthermore, <blockquote>'This drug is not a home run,' Dr. Brad S. Kahl, a lymphoma specialist at the University of Wisconsin, said during a meeting of an advisory committee to the F.D.A. on Sept. 2. 'It’s not even a double. It’s a single.' Saying that even a single was helpful, Dr. Kahl was part of a majority on the panel that recommended approval of the drug, 10 to 4. But after recently learning what Allos planned to charge for Folotyn, Dr. Kahl said he was 'disappointed' by the 'excessive' price. 'It dampens my enthusiasm for using that drug,' he said. 'It creates these huge ethical quandaries about trying a drug that has a modest benefit for the average patient at enormous expense.' </blockquote>So the <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/12/health-care-bubble-parallels-with.html">health care bubble</a> continues to inflate.  I suggest that the case of the ridiculous pricing of Folotyn shows how this bubble is in part generated by "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/12/compensation-madness-insiders-hijacking.html">compensation madness</a>," not only "insiders hijacking established institutions for their personal benefit," but also insiders able to become rich at the expense of even tiny, money-losing corporations.   But the bubble is also generated by the amazing acquiescence of those who pay bills at all levels, form the individuals who ultimately fund health care through salary dollars not earned, health insurance premiums, co-pays and the like, and tax payments, through the health care insurers and government agencies who did not balk at paying $25,000 a year for thalidomide in 2005, and seemingly will not balk at paying $30,000+ a year for pralatrexate in 2009. If we really want to provide accessible health care of good quality and a reasonable cost, we will need to develop mechanisms to pay more reasonable amounts for health care goods and services.  This will require some courage facing down the corporate and organizational insiders who have made themselves very rich from the current craziness.  NOTE (21 December, 2009) - See also comments <a href="http://postscript.communitycatalyst.org/?p=1038">on the Postscript blog</a>.

More Air Into the Health Care Bubble: the $30,000 a Month Cancer Drug

Over four years ago, we posted about the stratospheric prices of new drugs that seemed disproportionate to manufacturing and development co...

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Troubled £12bn NHS IT System to be Scaled Back: UK MP's Come to Their Senses on Health IT. Will the U.S. Follow?

The UK National Programme for Health IT in the NHS, by the findings of the <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmpubacc/153/15304.htm">House of Commons Public Account audit committee</a>, has been a £12bn debacle. Started as a starry-eyed utopian fantasy about experimental computerized clinical tools by former Prime Minister Tony Blair, nearly every possible mistake outlined at my <a href="http://www.tinyurl.com/hit-misadventure">ten year old website on HIT failure</a> has been made, and made in abundance, the coup de grâce being dependence on an American health IT company. It seems people's ability to detect rigor and seriousness in industrialists has become seriously impaired, the recent spectacular Ponzi schemes fallen for by quite prominent people and foundations being one example. Now the UK is at the point where hospitals are "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/12/we-are-unable-to-share-documents.html">unable to share documents</a>" relating to problematic EHR's as their contract with that vendor includes a confidentiality clause. (Not that such clauses are limited to one company. The health IT industry has generally profited from a sweetheart relationship of stunning proportions with healthcare regulatory agencies (it is entirely unregulated); with government (in the U.S., hundreds of billions of dollars are being thrown their way on similar starry-eyed dreams about reduced costs and improved quality per the economic "stimulus" bill); and with healthcare organizations (who accept HIT marketing puffery hook, line and sinker, do not perform due diligence properly for such critical clinical tools, who manage IT and informatics talent poorly, and who willingly sign defects nondisclosure and hold harmless clauses that violate the fiduciary responsibilities of their governance bodies as in my JAMA letter <a href="http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/extract/302/4/382">here</a> and longer essay <a href="http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/failurecases/?loc=cases&sloc=koppel_kreda">here</a>). At least for the £12bn down the drain, the U.K. is coming to their senses: <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8397854.stm"> </a><blockquote><a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8397854.stm" style="font-weight: bold;">Troubled £12bn NHS IT system to be scaled back</a> BBC News 6 December 2009 The government is to scale back its £12bn NHS IT system in what the Tories are calling a "massive U-turn". Chancellor Alistair Darling said he would be delaying parts of the scheme in Wednesday's pre-Budget Report as it was "not essential to the front line". The move may save hundreds of millions but Mr Darling admitted it was only a fraction of total spending cuts needed. The Tories and Lib Dems have been calling for the IT system, which has been hit by costly delays, to be axed. ... “It has held back the development of IT at a local level, cost billions and is running years behind schedule” - Norman Lamb, MP Liberal Democrats. ... [Chancellor Darling] said the full picture of cuts would not emerge until "the first half of next year at some point" - a reference to the comprehensive spending review, which the government has delayed until after an election.</blockquote> The comprehensive spending review should be interesting, to say the least. I humbly suggest the NHS look at the contracting practices of the vendors, especially the gag clauses, the multiply-layered subcontracting deals with dyscompetent consulting companies common in IT, and conflicts of interest of local and national program leaders with IT and consulting suppliers. I also suggest the reviewers borrow from the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance letter <a href="http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/failurecases/grassley_erecords102409.pdf">here</a> from Senator Grassley to HIT vendors and consultants. <blockquote>'Procurement disaster' Treasury officials have stressed that only part of the NHS IT programme is facing the axe, and the whole project will not be scrapped. But the Conservatives said Mr Darling's words represented a "massive U-turn". Shadow Health Secretary Andrew Lansley said it was "another government IT procurement disaster". "After seven years Labour have finally acknowledged what we've said for years, that the procurement for NHS IT was costing billions and not delivering," he said. </blockquote> Why did it take years to acknowledge the obvious? The driving force behind blindness to IT failure goes way beyond wishful thinking. Lack of knowledge by the leadership of the complexities of "doing health IT right" and the ease of getting it wrong are a factor, especially when employing management talent in top positions inappropriate to the job such as these: <blockquote> <a href="http://www.bjhcim.co.uk/news/2008/n808002.htm" style="font-family: arial;">Two senior management appointments for NHS National Programme for IT announced</a> 12 August 2008 The Department of Health has announced the two long-awaited senior management appointments for the National Programme for IT ... The Department announced in February that it was recruiting the two positions as part of a revised governance structure for handling informatics in the Department of Health. Christine Connelly will be the first Chief Information Officer for Health and will focus on developing and delivering the Department's overall information strategy and integrating leadership across the NHS and associated bodies including NHS Connecting for Health and the NHS Information Centre for Health and Social Care.Christine Connelly was previously Chief Information Officer at Cadbury Schweppes with direct control of all IT operations and projects. She also spent over 20 years at BP where her roles included Chief of Staff for Gas, Power and Renewables, and Head of IT for both the upstream and downstream business. Martin Bellamy will be the Director of Programme and System Delivery. He will lead NHS Connecting for Health and focus on enhancing partnerships with and within the NHS. Martin Bellamy has worked for the Department for Work and Pensions since 2003. His main role has been as CIO of the Pension Service.</blockquote> "Informatics leadership" in healthcare with these backgrounds? Where's Winston Churchill when you need him? Large sums of money in one's pocket also creates the most rabid enthusiasm in face of the obvious. <blockquote>The electronic patient record system, which is thought to have cost about £12bn so far, was commissioned in 2002 by then prime minister Tony Blair, and was meant to be completed by 2010.</blockquote> This sounds eerily familiar to the U.S., which set an equally unrealistic ten year timeline for a major social re-engineering project -- entirely dependent on experimental IT -- of immense proportions. <blockquote>Mr Lansley told BBC One's Politics Show the Tories would scrap the "enormous centralised IT system" and instead give hospitals "the opportunity to buy IT systems" that could transfer images, patient records and prescriptions electronically. </blockquote>A focus on easy wins - providing local hospitals leeway to buy or build systems to transfer images, basic records useful to clinicians in the real world (as opposed to every data point in the known universe possible about a patient) and prescriptions, with incremental refinement and slow spread as IT and human capabilities warrant, should have been the focus at the start, not an idealistic project to create a centralized national Medi-net. <blockquote>It comes as the Conservatives called for a moratorium on all government computer projects, ahead of the publication of the government's five-year IT strategy later this week. They say Labour has spent £100bn on IT since 1997 and contracts worth another £70bn are due to be renewed or commissioned in the next two years.</blockquote> That's a lot of money. What's the ROI, exactly? <blockquote>The Liberal Democrats said the NHS programme had been "flawed from the start". The party's health spokesman, Norman Lamb, said: "It has held back the development of IT at a local level, cost billions and is running years behind schedule."</blockquote> That is subtantiated by the above linked House of Commons report. <blockquote>But Dr Grant Ingrams, from the British Medical Association, said the system currently scheduled to come into effect would result in the NHS saving money. "It's an essential tool for clinicians, for doctors and other staff to be able to treat patients," he said. "The NHS pays out a third of a billion pounds a year on mistakes; a lot of that could be put right if the IT was in place."</blockquote> That type of statement about medical mistakes is at the crux of the idealists' and zealots' dream. Unfortunately, they do not ask these simple minded questions: <ul><li>Are those mistakes due to informational issues, e.g., lack of immediate availability of patient information, or due to other personal, local and/or systemic factors?</li></ul><ul><li>What percentage of the mistakes meet the criterion of being amenable to "prevention by IT"?</li></ul><ul><li>Could computerized systems create new mistakes of their own?</li></ul><ul><li>Where is the robust evidence that supports such a statement about error prevention?</li></ul><ul><li>Has such evidence been rigorously reconciled with an accumulating evidence base to the contrary? </li></ul> The answers to these simple questions are not hard to obtain to anyone who cares to look, and who will take off their global warming "<a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nEiLgbBGKVk">Hide the Decline</a>" blinders (warning: YouTube link to a most apropos satire and mockery). Lacking the miracle of our own government officials sprouting new brain cells in cortical centers responsible for critical thinking and ethics, I regrettably predict the U.S. will be at this same point in approximately three to five years. -- SS

Troubled £12bn NHS IT System to be Scaled Back: UK MP's Come to Their Senses on Health IT. Will the U.S. Follow?

The UK National Programme for Health IT in the NHS, by the findings of the House of Commons Public Account audit committee , has been a £12b...

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"Compensation Madness" - "Insiders Hijacking Established Institutions for their Personal Benefit"

As we learn more about the causes of the global financial melt-down, aka great recession, the lessons appear more applicable to health care.  My latest example comes from last week's Wall Street Journal.  There appeared an article by a Professor from the Faculty of Management of McGill University (Montreal, Canada) on executive compensation that has important lessons for health care (Mintzberg H. No more executive bonuses. Wall Street Journal, Nov 30, 2009.  Link <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703294004574511223494536570.html">here</a>.) Prof Mintzberg's first major premise was that current executive compensation at major corporations resembles a rigged casino: <blockquote>Although these executives like to think of themselves as leaders, when it comes to their pay practices, many of them haven't been demonstrating leadership at all. Instead they've been acting like gamblers—except that the games they play are hopelessly rigged in their favor. First, they play with other people's money—the stockholders', not to mention the livelihoods of their employees and the sustainability of their institutions. Second, they collect not when they win so much as when it appears that they are winning—because their company's stock price has gone up and their bonuses have kicked in. Third, they also collect when they lose—it's called a 'golden parachute.' Fourth, some even collect just for drawing cards—for example, receiving a special bonus when they have signed a merger, before anyone can know if it will work out. Most mergers don't. And fifth, on top of all this, there are chief executives who collect merely for not leaving the table. This little trick is called a 'retention bonus' —being paid for staying in the game! </blockquote> Prof Mintzberg points out that while there is no some recognition that the compensation system needs to be fixed, most proposals would simply tinker with the notion of pay for performance. However, Prof Mintzberg believes that such tinkering is hopeless, because the whole system is based on false assumptions. These are "• A company's health is represented by its financial measures alone—even better, by just the price of its stock." However, <blockquote>Companies are a lot more complicated than that. Their health is significantly represented by what accountants call goodwill, which in its basic sense means a company's intrinsic value beyond its tangible assets: the quality of its brands, its overall reputation in the marketplace, the depth of its culture, the commitment of its people, and so on. </blockquote> So the elements of true performance are multiple, and extremely hard to measure. The consequences of making simple financial measures the only metric of performance are severe: <blockquote>This flawed assumption, though, does far more damage than simply distorting CEO compensation. All too often, financial measures are a convenient substitute used by disconnected executives who don't know what else to do—including how to manage more deeply. Or worse, such measures encourage abuse from impatient CEOs, who can have a field day cashing in that goodwill by cutting back on maintenance and customer service, 'downsizing' experienced employees while others are left to 'burn out,' trashing valued brands, and so on. Quickly the measured costs are reduced while slowly the institution deteriorates. </blockquote> "• Performance measures, whether short or long term, represent the true strength of the company." Prof Mintzer suggested that this has lead to an attempt to subsitute long-term rather than short-term financial measures. However, no one knows how long "long-term" should be. " • The CEO, with a few other senior executives, is primarily responsible for the company's performance." This one is especially pernicious <blockquote>What if the CEO was lucky enough to have been in the right place at the right time? When it comes to a company's current performance, history matters, culture matters, markets matter, even weather can matter. How many chief executives have succeeded simply by maneuvering themselves into favorable situations and then hanging on while taking credit for all the success? In something as complex as the contemporary large corporation, how can success over three or even 10 years possibly be attributed to a single individual? Where is teamwork and all that talk about people being 'our most important asset?' More important, should any company even try to attribute success to one person? A robust enterprise is not a collection of 'human resources'; it's a community of human beings. All kinds of people are responsible for its performance. Focusing on a few—indeed, only one, who may have parachuted into the most senior post from the outside—just discourages everyone else in the company. Sometimes, there is the impression that a forceful chief executive has turned around a troubled company. But how sure can we be that such a turnaround will be long-lasting? After all, so many of these supposed corporate resurrections eventually go sour. </blockquote>So Prof Mintzberg observed, "if you do pay bonuses, you get the wrong person in ... [the CEO] chair." Thus, <blockquote>Executive bonuses provide the perfect tool to screen candidates for the CEO job. Anyone who insists on them should be dismissed out of hand, because he or she has demonstrated an absence of the leadership attitude required for a sustainable enterprise. </blockquote> In summation, "All this compensation madness is not about markets or talents or incentives, but rather about insiders hijacking established institutions for their personal benefit." I submit that Prof Mintzberg's essay is as applicable to health care organizations, not only public for-profit health care corporations, but also many of the not-for-profit organizations that have sought to become more businesslike, as it is to any large corporations. We have discussed numerous examples of ill-informed, self-interested, conflicted and corrupt leaders of health care organizations, most of whom became rich despite, or perhaps because of these attributes. We have seen examples of many of what Prof Mintzberg lists as examples of outcomes of the bonus culture: - Short-term results twisted and hyped to enhance the reputation of a "visionary" CEO.  (For example, see the cautionary tale of the Allegheny Health Education and Research Foundation.  See posts <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/04/that-recent-unpleasantness-fall-of.html">here</a> and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2005/04/another-historic-case-of-health-care.html">here</a>.) - Leaders who focus only on short-term financial results, rather than the multi-faceted health care mission (For example, see how one academic health care leader revealed that institutions are <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/04/medical-schools-to-faculty-show-me.html">only in it for the money</a>.) - Cutting back on quality to cut costs and maximize short-term financial results.  (For example, see the consequences of the <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/08/who-investigated-case-of-deadly.html">out-sourced heparin</a>, or <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/11/genzymes-remarkable-businessstrategy.html">failure to do adequate maintenance</a> on over-worked production facilities.) I would underline one particular point. The perverse incentives generated by the current bonus culture in business have lead to practices antithetical to the long-term prosperity of corporations, including cutting the quality and quantity of the product to cut costs, and firing or over-working employees, including the most experienced and sophisticated ones (outside of the leaders' inner circles). This would be bad for any kind of organization, but in health care can lead to distress, disease, disability, and death. I again submit that to truly reform health care, we need to reform the current business culture of health care.  One primary element of that reformation is refocusing leadership on the health care mission.  For not-for-profit health care organizations, the mission must take precedence over making more money.  On the other hand, for-profit health care corporations that put short-term revenues (and bonuses paid to top leaders) before the quality of their products and hence their long-term reputations may find themselves, like some US automobile companies, without markets, without profits, and bankrupt.

"Compensation Madness" - "Insiders Hijacking Established Institutions for their Personal Benefit"

As we learn more about the causes of the global financial melt-down, aka great recession, the lessons appear more applicable to health care....

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Pfizer CEO Now Acknowledges "We Need to be Straight with People"

Even the CEO of the world's largest pharmaceutical company is now conceding that unethical behavior by large health care corporations has lead to trouble.  As <a href="http://www.theday.com/article/20091202/BIZ02/312029931/-1/BIZ">reported by The Day</a> (New London, CT, US):  <blockquote>Three months after his company paid the largest criminal fine in U.S. history, Pfizer Inc. chief executive Jeffrey B. Kindler called on government and business leaders Tuesday to face up to the 'real and legitimate anger' of citizens fed up with ethics breaches. 'If we fail to change, the future will not be pretty - for business or for society as a whole,' Kindler said in a keynote address to the Boston College Chief Executives' Club at the Boston Harbor Hotel. 'People have had enough, and the backlash is real.' Kindler told the luncheon meeting of about 250 chief executives in the Boston area that a recent survey found two-thirds of the American people now have less trust in corporations than they did a year ago - and the decline in their faith in government and public officials has been even more drastic. 'When the majority don't trust you, they will find a way to force you to change,' he said. These changes, he added, could include limits on businesses' licenses to operate and might affect private-sector innovation. Pfizer, he acknowledged, has had ethical lapses as well, capped by the $2.3 billion in fines imposed in September for the company's illegal marketing of various drugs. The company's $1.2 billion criminal fine was the largest corporate penalty in U.S. history. 'It was a real blow to our employees,' Kindler said. 'It did not reflect the company we all knew.' The government of Switzerland also fined Pfizer and two other firms a total of $5.7 million Tuesday for alleged price-fixing of erectile dysfunction drugs. </blockquote> Mr Kindler also pledged there would be some changes: <blockquote>Kindler said he understood those in the audience who might wonder, in the wake of Pfizer's own ethical problems, 'Who are you to talk about trust?' But he said Pfizer has changed. Golf trips, fancy dinners and tchotchkes left for doctors are now out, and there are fewer company sales representatives in the waiting rooms. Results of clinical trials are now posted for all to see. </blockquote> Also, according to a <a href="http://news.bostonherald.com/jobfind/news/healthcare/view/20091202pfizer_looks_to_rebuild_trust_in_wake_of_23b_drug_scandal_ceo_has_industry_rx/srvc=home&position=also">Boston Herald article</a>: <blockquote>'We need to be straight with people,' said Kindler at a Boston College Chief Executives’ Club lunch. 'It’s up to us to earn back the trust we’ve lost,' Kindler said. Already, the company is much more transparent with its operations, he said. It has begun disclosing a number of its business relationships on its Web site and has ceased the high-priced wooing of the doctors who might prescribe its products. </blockquote> Let me applaud Mr Kindler's declaration that we "need to be straight with people," and in the spirit of constructive criticism, give him some unsolicited advice about ways the company could be more "straight." First, he might start by admitting the scope of past problems.  As we <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/09/pfour-legal-settlements-for-pfizer-why.html">posted previously</a>,  the $2.3 billion settlement alluded to above was  the company's fourth major settlement of charges of unethical marketing behavior since 2002, and also as alluded to above, it is not the company's most recent ethical problem.  For a catalog of Pfizer's ethical pfailures, see <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/Pfizer">this link</a>.  Second, he might acknowledge some responsibility for past problems, or indicate that someone will be held accountable for them.  Note that according to the biographical statement in the <a href="http://ccbn.tenkwizard.com/xml/download.php?format=PDF&ipage=6201895">2009 Pfizer proxy</a>, Mr Kindler has held leadership positions at the company since 2002.  Third, he might consider a more vigorous transparency effort, starting with the company's relationships with physicians, and other health care professionals and academics.  The company has <a href="http://www.pfizer.com/responsibility/working_with_hcp/how_we_insure_integrity_with_hcp.jsp">pledged</a> to put some sort of information about payments to such people online, but not until 2010.  Maybe that schedule could be sped up.  Furthermore, it is not clear how much information will be disclosed, but the company ought to consider making it clear what payments are for, what division of the company (e.g., research and development, or marketing or public relations) made the payments, and how the payments were linked to particular Pfizer products. Fourth, he might make a more vigorous effort to disclose the results of all clinical research sponsored by Pfizer.  In the past, Pfizer has allegedly been a party to suppression of results of clinical research that turned out not to favor its products (e.g., see <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/10/did-pfizer-marketers-suppress-and.html">this post</a>).  It is true that Pfizer <a href="http://www.pfizer.com/research/research_clinical_trials/trial_results_research_progress.jsp">pledged</a> to post the results of at least some unpublished studies on <a href="http://clinicalstudyresults.org/">ClinicalStudyResults.org</a>, but the completeness of its reporting is questionable.  But a <a href="http://www.iqwig.de/index.981.en.html">report </a>by the German Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care suggested that through this year Pfizer has been dragging its feet about disclosing results that may not make its products look good.  Consequently, the Institute is now <a href="http://www.iqwig.de/index.982.en.html">calling for</a> compulsory disclosure of the results of all clinical trials.  I do hope that Mr Kindler and Pfizer management are serious about their commitment to "earn back the trust we've lost."  If so, more power to them.

Pfizer CEO Now Acknowledges "We Need to be Straight with People"

Even the CEO of the world's largest pharmaceutical company is now conceding that unethical behavior by large health care corporations ha...

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The Health Care Bubble: Parallels with the Global Financial Meltdown

The global financial melt-down, or great recession, or whatever it will be called was a big surprise in September, 2008, to those of us not immersed in finance. A year later there is an opportunity to at least better understand the events leading up to it.  I have managed to read two focused books on aspects of the melt-down, (<a href="http://www.amazon.com/House-Cards-Hubris-Wretched-Excess/dp/0385528264/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1259867440&sr=1-1">House of Cards, by William D Cohan</a>, and <a href="http://www.amazon.com/dp/141659857X/?tag=googhydr-20&hvadid=3300552655&ref=pd_sl_65nk6xhefw_b">Fool's Gold by Gillian Tett</a>) and am in the midst of what may be the best general narrative of it published to date, <a href="http://www.harpercollins.com/books/9780061892486/The_Sellout/index.aspx">The Sellout, by Charles Gasparino.</a> Reading the recent history of the meltdown makes me uncomfortably aware of parallels between these events and the current dysfunction of the health care system.  In his discussion of the run-up to the crash, Mr Gasparino emphasized a number of issues which I will catalog along with their health care parallels. Prices Always Go Up The prices in question were those of real-estate, and the notion that they would always go up helped to fuel would an explosion of mortgage loans made to people who had little chance of fully repaying them.  When housing prices reached an unsustainable level and started to fall, the melt-down began. -  It is a cliche that overall health care costs in the US have been going up much faster than inflation for as long as most of us can remember (at least since the 1970s), creating the expectation that they always will go up.    Products were Over-Rated by the Apparent Experts Mortgages made to people who were unlikely to be able to pay them back were sold by irresponsible originators, and then packaged into financial derivatives by finance firms.  Many of these derivatives were rated "AAA" by trusted rating firms, even though they contained multiple individually risky mortages.  The rating firms boasted of expertise, and used complex mathematical models supposedly based on evidence to make their ratings.  -  In health care, we have come to trust expert professionals' assessments of products (like drugs and devices) and services based on their expertise and clinical research evidence.  Evidence Used to Rate Products was Suspect The mathematical models used to predict risk were based on limited data and assumptions.  In particular, they did not account for the possibility that real-estate prices might go down, or that particular circumstances might cause multiple home-owners to default on their mortgages at the same time.  The increasing level of defaults, signaling that the derivatives based on the mortgages might be riskier and less valuable than previously thought, caused the melt-down to accelerate. -  We have discussed how the clinical evidence may be <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/manipulating%20clinical%20research">manipulated</a> by those with vested interests in selling products or services.  When manipulation  does not yield the result desired by the marketers, the results of the research may be entirely <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/suppression%20of%20medical%20research">suppressed</a>.  One particularly telling example was the <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/08/high-costs-and-poor-outcomes-lesson.html">suppression of research  unfavorable to new anti-depressant medications</a> as documented in part by Erick Turner et al.  When all suppressed research was taken into account, the drugs appeared much less effective than was previously believed. The Experts were Conflicted The rating agencies were paid by the finance firms which sold the derivatives.  Ratings agencies that did not deliver sufficiently good ratings were likely to lose business.  "By 2005 triple-A ratings were being handed out like candy: underwriters could nearly demand they wanted on a deal and did." -  We have discussed how physicians and medical academics frequently have <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/conflicts%20of%20interest">conflicts of interest</a> due to their financial ties to pharmaceutical/ biotechnology/ device and other health care companies.  August academic medical institutions have come to <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/institutional%20conflicts%20of%20interest">depend on money</a> from industry to support research and education.  Distinguished academics are often paid <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/key%20opinion%20leaders">key opinion leaders</a> for drug and device marketers. Deceptive Marketing Per The Sellout, "On Wall Street, complexity isn't something to be avoided - it allows smooth-talking salesmen to obscure simple concepts like risk and losses." - We have written again and again about <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/deception">deceptive</a> marketing practices, how marketing is disguised as <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/continuing%20medical%20education">medical education</a>, the use of <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/stealth%20marketing">stealth marketing</a>, etc to promote often overpriced tests and treatments that are often less effective and/or more hazardous than they are advertised to be.  Politicians Pushed Access without Regard to Consequences US politicians from both parties pushed ever more accessible mortgages for the laudable goal of making better housing available to the less advantaged, but seemed unconcerned about how they would eventually pay back the loans. -  The driving motivation for most current health care reforms efforts in the US seems to be to provide "access," now redefined as some sort of health insurance, without much attention to the reasons health care has become so inaccessible in the first place. Major Organizations Lead by the Clueless The Sellout provided some notable vignettes, including those about Jimmy Cayne, the CEO of Bear Stearns, who did not understand the complex derivatives his firm bought and sold, or the level of risk the firm was assuming; Stan O'Neal, the CEO of Merrill Lynch, whose tenure was "one of the strangest, most volatile, and ultimately most disastrous that Wall Street had ever seen;" and Charles Prince, the CEO of Citigroup, who apparently was a good lawyer, but had "little experience running a business," much less one as complex as Citigroup. -  We have repeatedly discussed how large health care organizations are now often <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/Mismanagement">mismanaged</a>, at times by people with <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/ill-informed%20management">little knowledge</a> of or experience in the health care context. Overpaid, Isolated, Arrogant, Imperial CEOs The Sellout provided more notable vignettes.  Jimmy Cayne (see above), was at one point worth more than US $1 billion.  He spent more and more time playing bridge, and less managing his company.  Stan O'Neal (see above), would often vanish to play golf.  The leadership of Richard Fuld, the CEO of Lehman Brothers, "was more like that of a cult leader than even that of an imperial CEO." -  We have repeatedly discussed how large health care organizations' leaders may be overpaid (some making nearly as much as the leaders of some financial firms before the collapse), arrogant <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/imperial%20CEO">imperial CEOs</a>, some aspiring to be members of the <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/superclass">superclass</a>.  One striking example was the former CEO of UnitedHealth, Dr William McGuire, who was once worth more than US $1 billion before it became apparent that some of his fortune was based on <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/08/final-settlement-of-unitedhealth.html">back-dated stock options</a>.  Sycophantic Cronies as "Stewards" The Sellout discussed how members of the boards of directors of financial firms were mostly chosen by the CEOs they were supposed to supervise.  For example, Jimmy Cayne, who had "a firm grip over his board of directors," noting "my board is my board." -  We have often discussed poor <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/governance">governance</a> of health care organizations, and specifically how <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/boards%20of%20trustees">boards of directors or trustees</a> of health care organizations are similarly unlikely to challenge the CEOs they are supposed to supervise.  We also have noted how health care organizations' are often lead by the same Masters of the Universe who brought us the global financial collapse.  For example, Cornell's Weill Medical School was named after former <a href="http://www.cornell.edu/trustees/members.cfm#active">trustee </a>Sanford Weill, who constructed the giant conglomerate Citegroup, but did not figure out how to make its pieces fit together, and was forced "to step down as CEO as the research scandal [investigation] initiated by [former New York state Attorney General] Spitzer snared its highest-profile target, Weill himself." (from The Sellout, p. 187.) Suppression of Dissent The Sellout noted how increasingly arrogant leaders of financial firms ignored advice of more conservative or risk-adverse employees.  Dissenters were often afraid to speak out, and some were fired.  For example, at Bear Stearns, Jimmy Cayne increasingly marginalized "Ace" Greenberg, who was wary of excess risk.  At Lehman Brothers, the cult of personality that surrounded Fuld suppressed dissent and debate. -  We have discussed the <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/anechoic%20effect">anechoic effect</a>, the lack of discussion surrounding important health care issues, seemingly enabled by the sense that one simply does not talk about such issues.  <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/whistle-blowers">Whistle-blowers</a> are often ostracized, or worse, and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/academic%20freedom">academic freedom</a> and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/free%20speech">free speech</a> may be frankly threatened. Ineffective, or Captured Regulators From the 1980s onward, deregulation of the financial industry advanced.  The Sellout discussed how the Federal Reserve, lead by Allan Greenspan, enabled if not cheer-lead for the bubble.  The  Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was often ineffectual at best. -  We have discussed how the <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/FDA">FDA</a> got conflicted advice and often seemed to feel that drug and device manufacturers, rather than the public were its clients.  We just noted that one version of health care reform would put control of a <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/comparative%20effectiveness%20research">comparative effectiveness research</a> institute in the hands of industry, and would empower its leaders to suppress research which offends them. Summary We have discussed the impetus to make physicians give up their <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/professionalism">professionalism</a> ostensibly to increase competition (see post <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/06/why-did-us-physicians-give-up-their.html">here</a>), and to then <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2006/03/consequences-of-breaking-physicians.html">hand over control of health care to managers</a> ostensibly to reduce costs.  Since the 1980s, health care has increasingly been dominated by large organizations run as businesses by business managers.  It should therefore be no surprise that the ethos of health care management has come to resemble the ethos of business management in general.  Thus, maybe the parallels between some of the issues related to the global financial meltdown and the issues related to current health care dysfunction should not be surprising. A few other bloggers and business writers have referred to a health care bubble in the last few years.  Notably, <a href="http://drwes.blogspot.com/2008/09/our-healthcare-hindenburg.html">Dr Wes</a> advanced the concept in 2008.  Dr Rich <a href="http://covertrationingblog.com/general-rationing-issues/the-healthcare-bubble">spoke out</a> in early 2009, and Dr George Lundberg <a href="http://www.thehealthcareblog.com/the_health_care_blog/2009/05/beware-the-bursting-of-the-health-care-bubble.html">added</a> to it later in 2009.  So I make a fearless assertion and prediction.  Health care dysfunction has lead to a health care bubble, which is likely to burst soon with considerable adverse consequences.  Perhaps a controlled deflation of the bubble would be possible, but would require more courage and clear thinking than most of our political and health care leaders have exhibited so far.  We have repeatedly noted how current efforts to reform health care have ignored most of the issues discussed above and documented repeatedly on Health Care Renewal.  If one of the currently proposed versions of health care reform becomes law, it may postpone for a while the popping of the bubble.  However, the longer the bubble grows, the nastier the bursting of it. Do not say we did not warn you.

The Health Care Bubble: Parallels with the Global Financial Meltdown

The global financial melt-down, or great recession, or whatever it will be called was a big surprise in September, 2008, to those of us not ...

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Healthcare IT Failure and The Arrogance of the IT Industry

In the Wall Street Journal healthcare blog post "Safety Guru: ‘Health IT Is Harder Than It Looks’" <a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2009/12/01/safety-guru-health-it-is-harder-than-it-looks/">here</a>, reporter Jacob Goldstein reports on UC San Francisco hospitalist <a href="http://community.the-hospitalist.org/blogs/wachters_world/pages/bob-s-bio.aspx">Bob Wachter's</a> commentary that: <blockquote>... recent experience has confirmed that health IT is harder than it looks … Several major installations of vendor-produced systems have failed, and many safety hazards caused by faulty health IT systems have been reported.</blockquote> I would differ with Dr. Wachter only in that the "experience that health IT is harder than it looks" goes far beyond "recent", e.g., as in the wisdom of the Medical Informatics pioneers from the 1960's-1970's and earlier as in my post "Medical Informatics, Pharma, Health IT, and Golden Advice That Sits Sadly Unused" <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/10/medical-informatics-pharma-health-it.html">here</a>. One comment to the WSJ posting, however, caught my eye. It is a common refrain heard from the IT industry and from health IT amateurs (a term I use in the same sense that I am a <a href="http://www.arrl.org/">radio amateur</a>) unaware of decades of research in the sociotechnical aspects of computerization, i.e., medical informatics, <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Understanding-Communicating-Social-Informatics-Communication/dp/1573872288/ref=sr_1_1/102-9749119-8288920?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1174318804&sr=8-1">social informatics</a> [1], human computer interaction, etc.: <blockquote>Commenter: "I have seen very few health IT products that actually harness the power of the computer. Bob is right about “implementation without changing processes” - we need companies to stop asking docs and hospitals how they can duplicate the paper chart and instead work with docs and hospitals to make things work better than the old way."</blockquote> I take the opposite view. In reality, handwriting issues aside, there is little wrong with "the old medical chart" from an information science perspective. It evolved over a century or longer to serve the needs of its users. It is a simple document in terms of organization, containing sometimes complex information but in an easy to find form (when maintained by humans properly) and in a presentation style that recognizes human cognitive limitations in very busy, complex social environments such as patient care settings. Its quasi-duplication in electronic form would serve medicine well. Instead, like the OS bloat that has now left room for newcomers such as <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Chrome_OS">Google Chrome OS</a> to demonstrate the virtues of simplicity, we have markedly complicated EHR's with a large number of screens, subscreens, widgets, controls, scroll bars, alerts, navigation aids, and other "bloatware" that bog the clinician down. (A paper chart and pen do not require a 500+ page user manual as do some EHR's). The "power of the computer" and its programmers to create complexity is what slows physician down and creates myriad opportunities for unexpected adverse consequences, often through the <a href="http://tinyurl.com/hostileuserexper">mission hostile user experience</a> presented to clinical users [2]. This is not to minimize the issues of <a href="https://www.ahimastore.org/ProductDetailBooks.aspx?ProductID=14181">implementation debacles and upheavals</a> [3,4], bugs, errors, unpredicted dependencies and interactions (e.g., per Koppel's articles on <a href="http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/abstract/293/10/1197">CPOE</a> [5] and <a href="http://www.jamia.org/cgi/content/short/15/4/408">barcoding</a> [6]), and other problems <a href="http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/Goldfinch_pessimism_PAR.pdf">unavoidable in any massively complex computer information system</a> [7]. In fact, politically speaking, health IT can be viewed as a cross-occupational invasion of healthcare by the IT industry. (Other invaders are at work also, but I am only considering the IT industry here.) The latter industry is largely <a href="http://www.ctlab.org/documents/Hiding%20in%20plain%20sight.pdf">healthcare-dyscompetent or incompetent</a> [8] while simultaneously highly arrogant, perhaps as a result of the <a href="http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=563354&coll=portal&dl=ACM">acculturation common in the field</a> [9]. I ask: What right do the domain-dyscompetent occupants have to tell the occupees, the latter rigorously trained in clinical medicine through years of both classroom and grueling practical experience, and in the record keeping paradigms developed over centuries, how to maintain their records and perform their processes? What arrogance is it that drives the the occupants to tell the occupees to stop complaining about the terms of the occupation - seriously deficient experimental health IT applications - and get in line with the methodologies and preferences of the occupants? The pace of articles showing the lack of return on investment of health IT is accelerating (see, for example, "2009: A Pivotal Year in Health IT" <a href="http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/?loc=cases&sloc=2009">here</a>). The reasons for this failure can be explained by a simple triad: <ul><li>Health IT is an experimental technology.</li></ul><ul><li>The vendors promote it as a well tested, validated, tried and true healthcare "cure."</li></ul><ul><li>Reality is a harsh master.</li></ul> Until the arrogance of the IT industry is recognized and countered - even if it comes to, in a quasi-comical suggestion, the doctors arming themselves with scalpels and cutting every network cable in sight - and it is recognized that experiments conducted under false assumptions are doomed to fail - our approaches to health IT, per the National Research Council, will <a href="http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=12572">remain insufficent</a> [10]. The latter organization recommended that health IT success will depend upon accelerating interdisciplinary research in biomedical informatics, computer science, social science, and health care engineering. This research will be a long time in coming if we as a society are still at the level of arguing about whether "health IT is harder than it looks" and about the unproven and arrogant assertion, made with a straight face by process re-engineering analysts and consultants seeing money to be made and with little consideration of unforeseen side effects, that the computer will achieve miracles only when we "change medical processes" [i.e., adjust medicine, the occupee, for the convenience of medicine's occupiers, the IT industry]. -- SS Notes: (numbers hyperlink to source) <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Understanding-Communicating-Social-Informatics-Communication/dp/1573872288/ref=sr_1_1/102-9749119-8288920?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1174318804&sr=8-1">[1]</a> Understanding And Communicating Social Informatics. Kling, Rosenbaum & Sawyer. Information Today Press, 2005. <a href="http://tinyurl.com/hostileuserexper">[2]</a> Are Health IT Designers, Testers and Purchasers Trying to Harm Patients? S. Silverstein MD. Healthcare Renewal Blog, eight-part series, <a href="http://tinyurl.com/hostileuserexper">http://tinyurl.com/hostileuserexper</a> <a href="https://www.ahimastore.org/ProductDetailBooks.aspx?ProductID=14181">[3]</a> H.I.T. or Miss: Lessons Learned from Health Information Technology Implementations. AHIMA Press (2009), ISBN: 9781584262404. (Disclosure - I am an associate editor of this book). <a href="http://www.it.usyd.edu.au/%7Ehitru/essays/The%20Story%20of%20the%20Deployment%20of%20an%20ED%20Clinical%20Information%20System6.0.pdf">[4]</a> A Critical Essay on the Deployment of an ED Clinical Information System - Systemic Failure or Bad Luck, version 6. Prof. Jon Patrick, Health Information Technologies Research Laboratory, University of Sydney, Australia, Dec. 2009. <a href="http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/abstract/293/10/1197">[5]</a> Role of Computerized Physician Order Entry Systems in Facilitating Medication Errors. Koppel et al., Journal of the American Medical Association, 2005;293:1197-1203 <a href="http://www.jamia.org/cgi/content/short/15/4/408">[6]</a> Workarounds to Barcode Medication Administration Systems: Their Occurrences, Causes, and Threats to Patient Safety. J Am Med Inform Assoc. 2008;15:408-423 <a href="http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/Goldfinch_pessimism_PAR.pdf">[7]</a> Pessimism, Computer Failure, and Information Systems Development in the Public Sector. Shaun Goldfinch, University of Otago, New Zealand. Public Administration Review 67;5:917-929, Sept/Oct. 2007. <a href="http://www.ctlab.org/documents/Hiding%20in%20plain%20sight.pdf">[8]</a> Hiding in plain sight: What Koppel et al. tell us about healthcare IT. Christopher Nemeth, Richard Cook, J Biomed Inform. 2005 Aug;38(4):262-3 <a href="http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=563354&coll=portal&dl=ACM">[9]</a> Defensive climate in the computer science classroom. Barker et al. ACM SIGCSE Bulletin, Volume 34 , Issue 1 (March 2002) <a href="http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=12572">[10]</a> Current Approaches to U.S. Health Care Information Technology are Insufficient. The National Academies, Jan. 9, 2009. <a href="http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=12572"></a>

Healthcare IT Failure and The Arrogance of the IT Industry

In the Wall Street Journal healthcare blog post " Safety Guru: ‘Health IT Is Harder Than It Looks’ " here , reporter Jacob Goldste...

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Diversity Nightmare And Federal Antidiscrimination Laws: Cleveland Clinic CEO Delos M. Cosgrove Would Proudly Discriminate Against Fat People

The following stunning quote appeared in the Nov. 27, 2009 Newsweek article "<a href="http://www.newsweek.com/id/224585">The Hospital That Could Cure Health Care</a>" about the Cleveland Clinic: <blockquote>[Cleveland Clinic president and CEO Dr. Delos M. Cosgrove, a former cardiac surgeon] has even taken on the most intractable driver of American health-care costs: Americans. Having already banned the hiring of smokers (a dictate enforced by urine tests for nicotine), Cosgrove declared this year that if it weren't illegal under federal law, he would refuse to hire fat people as well. The resulting outcry led him to apologize for "hurtful" comments. But he has not backed down from his belief that obesity is a failure of willpower, which can be attacked by the same weapons used to combat smoking: public education, economic incentives, and sheer exhortation.</blockquote> My thoughts come from the perspective of a former fitness-for-duty evaluator and drug testing officer (Medical Review Officer) for the regional transit authority in a very large city, and a hiring manager in the hospital and pharmaceutical sectors. I find a profoundly discriminatory statement that a hospital CEO would "refuse to hire fat people" if he could get away with it, and that he refuses to hire smokers and forces people (presumably candidates) to take a urine nicotine test, totalitarian and highly abhorrent. Nothing about smoking or obesity [except in very specialized job situations for the latter] makes a person unfit to work in a hospital. This attitude is exactly why we have federal anti-discrimination laws, to protect people from biased autocrats like this. I should add that talent apparently is irrelevant to this autocrat; if a person is overweight, this self-righteous SOB would send an applicant out the door. So much for talent management if he could get his way. One wonders if he would also send current employees who are overweight out the door - if he could get away with it. A May 2008 USA Today article entitled "Weight discrimination could be as common as racial bias" <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/weightloss/2008-05-20-overweight-bias_N.htm">here</a> made the point that: <blockquote> <div class="inside-copy">Weight discrimination, especially against women, is increasing in U.S. society and is almost as common as racial discrimination, two studies suggest. Reported discrimination based on weight has increased 66% in the past decade, up from about 7% to 12% of U.S. adults, says one study, in the journal Obesity. The other study, in the International Journal of Obesity, says such discrimination is common in both institutional and interpersonal situations — and in some cases is even more prevalent than rates of discrimination based on gender and race. (About 17% of men and 9% of women reported race discrimination.) Among severely obese people, about 28% of men and 45% of women said they have experienced discrimination because of their weight. "Weight discrimination is a very serious social problem that we need to pay attention to," says Rebecca Puhl of the Rudd Center for Food Policy and Obesity at Yale University, a co-author of both studies. ... Institutional discrimination involved health care, education or workplace situations, such as cases in which people said they were fired, denied a job or a promotion because of their weight. Interpersonal discrimination focused on insults, abuse and harassment from others.</div> </blockquote> This raises several questions: <ul><li>The CEO of an organization sets the tone. What does such a statement about "fat people" do to staff morale?</li></ul><ul><li>As a result of this CEO's stated preferences, is there subtle or covert discrimination against overweight employees at the Cleveland Clinic, preventing promotions and/or causing or contributing to situations of <a href="http://www.answers.com/topic/constructive-discharge">constructive discharge</a>?</li></ul><ul><li>Is there subtle or covert hiring discrimination against overweight candidates, with the hiring managers knowing the CEO's expressed views? </li></ul><ul><li>One also wonders if this CEO has similar attitudes towards gays, minorities, and people with physical and emotional disorders that also would not affect their ability to perform their jobs.</li></ul><ul><li>How well does the Cleveland Clinic respect other aspects of diversity considerations in its hiring, firing, and job promotion practices?</li></ul><ul><li>What kind of care and quality of staff interactions do overweight people receive/experience at the Cleveland Clinic?</li></ul> This CEO will not be "curing healthcare" any time soon IMO, since a primary consideration is compassion. He seems somewhat deficient in that attribute. He also seems deficient in the characteristic known as business wisdom, especially in an era of competition and trigger-finger litigation. His statement could be used by competitors to steer people away from the Cleveland Clinic and its affiliates. It could very likely also be used in support of discrimination lawsuits against the Cleveland Clinic and its affiliates by current, former, and potential employees (as well as by overweight patients, conceivably) which can be very expensive and damaging to an organization's reputation. In addition to all of the problems exhibited by healthcare leaders as covered on this blog, I add a new one apropos to this CEO's cerebral anatomy: <a href="http://thesaurus.reference.com/browse/fathead">fathead</a>. -- SS

Diversity Nightmare And Federal Antidiscrimination Laws: Cleveland Clinic CEO Delos M. Cosgrove Would Proudly Discriminate Against Fat People

The following stunning quote appeared in the Nov. 27, 2009 Newsweek article " The Hospital That Could Cure Health Care " about the...

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