healthy4u: professionalism

The Parts of Professionalism We Are Not Supposed to Discuss

A recent article in a a relatively obscure medical ethics journal dared to approach some important aspects of medical ethics that medical ethicists fear to discuss, but did not address the reasons for this fear or what to do about it. (Glenn JE. The eroding principle of justice in teaching medical ethics.  HEC Forum 2012; 24: 293-305.  Link <a href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10730-012-9199-4">here</a>.) The Basic Ethics Case - A Prescription for the Patient's Spouse? Glenn began with a case typically discussed in medical school ethics courses: <blockquote class="tr_bq">a scenario where a standardized patient asks the student at the end of the examination if his prescription can be written in his spouse’s name as the spouse has health insurance which includes prescription drug coverage while the patient does not.</blockquote> This <blockquote class="tr_bq">poses the question as to whether it is ethical for physicians to deceive third party payers to secure coverage for their patients.</blockquote> The Politically Correct Way to Teach the Case Glenn stated that there is a politically correct way for faculty to teach this case: <blockquote class="tr_bq"> Though we are never expressly instructed to tow [sic] a party line, there is a 'correct' answer to this ethical quandary as far as the institution we work for is concerned. Students who express a willingness to practice deception of third party payers for the good of their patients are to be commended for having their heart in the right place. However, we discuss many reasons why this action would not be a good solution to the problem. One of the issues is that to do so would be committing fraud.</blockquote> Now, of course, writing a prescription for a patient who does not actually need the drug in question, understanding that the patient will give the drug to someone else who does not have insurance coverage to pay for it, is dishonest.  However, the larger point that Glenn made is that it is not politically correct to allow discussion about why the patient made such a request in the first place, and that this ought to be troubling. Note that Glenn did not explain how he inferred what the "correct" answer was, nor its actual source within the institution. <blockquote class="tr_bq">Over the first few years of having this conversation with young medical students, I have always come away feeling empty and flat. Framed as a session on the ethics of 'truth telling,' the conversation and the readings we provide to prepare for it works to obfuscate the much larger ethical issue impossible to tackle in an hour’s time. In essence, 'truth telling' is only a secondary ethical issue at play. The more important ethical issue is a question of social justice: what commitment do doctors have to poor patients and making sure that they get the health care services that they need?</blockquote> Social Justice as Part of Professionalism, and its Avoidance The article by Glenn then emphasized that some of the original conceptions of physicians' professionalism included social justice.  A definition promulgated by Herbert Swick in 2000 expressly included these relevant competencies.  Physicians ought to: -  subordinate their own interests to the interests of others -  respond to social needs and work toward the benefit of the communities in which they live and serve -  adhere to the core humanistic values of honesty and integrity, compassion, altruism, empathy, respect for others, and trustworthiness. Glenn noted that these three competencies, however, have been turned into a more narrow imperative, that <blockquote class="tr_bq">doctors should treat patients with an equally high quality irrespective of their race, ethnicity, gender, religion or cultural background according to what is best for them. In most codes of professionalism, however, class is not expressly implicated.</blockquote> Note that Glenn did not question why the issues of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, or cultural background became important in this context.  He did further question why the issue of class did not.  While <blockquote class="tr_bq"> The professionalism code adopted by the American Board of Internal Medicine in 1999 was bolder and specifically states that doctors are to advocate for 'the best possible care [for their patients] regardless of the ability to pay'</blockquote> Glenn asked <blockquote class="tr_bq"> But where in the medical school curriculum do we teach medical students to be strong patient advocates and take on third party payers and hospital administrators? We now discuss the importance of prescribing generic drugs and we warn against the influence of big pharma, but when do we teach students to rebel against the high cost of medical education that drives students toward boutique medicine and fields of specialty care that offer the most money and most comfortable lifestyles?</blockquote> Furthermore, he noted, <blockquote class="tr_bq"> When it comes to justice in medical ethics instruction, the parameters of the discussion are usually constricted to focus on the conservation of health care resources and rationing care rather than providing more care to more patients.</blockquote> So, now seemingly getting to the key question, <blockquote class="tr_bq">We have created an entire system where all the middlemen that stand between a patient and her health care are expecting to get rich. No oath or professionalism curriculum is structured to teach medical students how to ethically and morally navigate through that. How did the terms of the debate get so co-opted by the health care economists?</blockquote> The Key Question also Avoided However, after this build up, Glenn then had trouble grappling with that question.  He noted that the prices of various parts of US health care are rarely questioned, and wrote about some of the particular issues in pricing new technologies, including the costs of development of new drugs, the tax treatment of drug development, and whether the licenses drug companies obtain from universities to develop drugs are fairly priced.  He also touched on the rising cost of medical school tuition and students' consequent assumption of large levels of debt.  This was interesting, and provided some useful references, but never really directly addressed the key questions above: why was the discussion framed in terms only of current health economics, and more importantly,  why did he and other ethicists feel they could not openly discuss any larger issues? Only at the very end of the article did this appear <blockquote class="tr_bq">the structure of our current medical system has created a network of health care providers, researchers, purveyors and administrators who have strong financial incentives to work against the best interests of patients. This situation makes it difficult to talk with students about the ethical principle of justice in any meaningful way that is not hypocritical, leaving it seldom emphasized relative to the other three core principles of medical ethics.</blockquote> Glenn did not further explain these "financial incentives," detail further who had them, explain how they "work against the best interests of patients," and most importantly, explain how these incentives make "it difficult to talk with students about the ethical principal of justice in any meaningful way that is not hypocritical."  He concluded only <blockquote class="tr_bq"> How can we cultivate within our students an understanding of the threats to medical professionalism posed by the conflicts of interest inherent in the various financial and organizational arrangements in the practice of medicine?  We start by not shying away from the conversation.</blockquote> Summary So Professor Glenn argued that social justice has been considered part of health care ethics, and that ethicists should teach about it by questioning the current economic arrangements within the health care system.  He then suggested that ethicists have been somehow pressured not do raise such questions, and that this pressure has something to do with <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/perverse%20incentives">perverse incentives</a> and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/conflicts%20of%20interest">conflicts of interest</a> prevalent within health care.  However, he never actually addressed who pressured the ethicists, how the pressure was applied, and how that pressure was related to conflicts of interest. Thus, it seems that authors in scholarly health care journals may now hint that there are certain things one must not discuss, that are taboo to discuss in health care, but cannot actually say what exactly is taboo, and why it became that way.  Thus, the article by Glenn seems related to what we sometimes coyly call the "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/anechoic%20effect">anechoic effect</a>,"  that the issues we discuss on <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/">Health Care Renewal</a> often do not seem to be considered topics of polite conversation.  But in a strange recursive way, the article never could quite manage to discuss what it is it said others cannot discuss, which in a way just further validates the importance of the anechoic effect. The Glenn article is reminiscent of another article we <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/01/elephants-we-can-notice-but-cannot-name.html">posted</a> about.  That article, by Souba and colleagues,  found that there are many "elephants," that is,  unmentionable subjects, in academic medicine,  However, that article also never clearly defined what these unmentionable subjects actually are, other than subjects that displease those in power.  Thus this too reinforced just how taboo these topics are.  Even those willing to admit that taboo topics exist are still unable to name them. At least the Glenn article did suggest, however vaguely, a relationship between conflicts of interest and the anechoic effect.  We have documented that <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/conflicts%20of%20interest">individual </a>and<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/institutional%20conflicts%20of%20interest"> institutional</a> conflicts of interest are rampant in health care, including, and probably particularly academic medicine.  For example, pharmaceutical companies (and also all sorts of other health care corporations) may pay medical school faculty members and administrators (as consultants, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/key%20opinion%20leaders">"key opinion leaders,"</a> speakers, advisers, even board members).  The leaders of academic medicine seem particularly prone to such conflicts. For example, a majority of US medical school department chairs have significant financial relationships with health care corporations (see post <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/10/medical-school-leaders-conflicts-of.html">here</a>).  We have shown how top medical school leaders may simultaneously serve on the boards of directors of health care corporations (see post <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2006/03/new-species-of-conflict-of-interest-in.html">here</a>). Such health care corporations may now also support various aspects of medical academia (through research grants, "unrestricted" and other educational grants, other gifts to hospitals and universities, etc).  Financial conflicts of interest may help to directly enrich many faculty and academic leaders, and indirectly enrich them by enriching their organizations. People who are personally profiting from relationships with health care corporations are unlikely to question such relationships.  The leaders of organizations which depend on funding from such corporations are unlikely to question whether conflicts of interest might lead to corruption.  People whose colleagues, friends, family members, or supervisors are personally benefiting from conflicts of interest may hesitate to challenge such relationships.   Since these relationships permeate the economics of health care, is it any wonder that the entire topic has become taboo?   So the first step in challenging this taboo is to acknowledge it exists, and to not "shy away" from discussing it, as Glenn suggested.  People are beginning to acknowledge there is an elephant in the room.  Now we have to describe the elephant, discuss the elephant, and eventually figure out how to get the elephant out of the room.      Hat tip - to the <a href="http://blog.abimfoundation.org/recommended-reading-november-3-9/">Medical Professionalism Blog</a>.

The Parts of Professionalism We Are Not Supposed to Discuss

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06 Dec 2012

Should Health Care be a "'Commodity, Subordinate to the Laws of the Market?" - a Powerful Rebuttal

In the US, it has become the accepted wisdom that health care is now an industry, not a calling or a profession, and the health care it produces is a commodity, not a human service.  The Conventional Wisdom For example, earlier in 2012 we <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/08/private-equity-obfuscatory-advertising.html">quoted</a> Dr Ralph de la Torre, the CEO of Steward Healthcare (formerly the Caritas Christi health system, a Catholic health care system whose take-over by Cerberus Capital Management, a private equity firm, was arranged in part by Dr de la Torre [see posts <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/Caritas%20Christi">here</a>]): <blockquote class="tr_bq">In deference to those who love the individual hospital, you have to look back at America and the trends in industries that have gone from being art to science, to being commodities. Health care is becoming a commodity. The car industry started off as an art, people hand-shaping the bodies, hand-building the engines. As it became a commodity and was all about making cars accessible to everybody, it became more about standardization. It's not different from the banking industry and other industries as they've matured. Health care is finally maturing as an industry, and part of that maturation process is consolidation. It's getting economies of scale and in many ways making it a commodity</blockquote> More recently, Human Events, which <a href="http://www.humanevents.com/about-human-events/">describes itself</a> as "the nation’s first conservative weekly," featured a <a href="http://www.humanevents.com/2012/11/20/politics-of-healthcare-reform-could-jeopardize-real-healthcare-business-opportunities/">description</a> of a new book by one Edmund L Valentine, "CEO of the Stamford, Conn.-based <a href="http://www.mmcint.com/home.html">MMC International,</a> a health care consulting firm, which emphasizes its expertise in the pharmaceutical and device manufacturing fields.  In it, Mr Valentine stated that one should: <blockquote class="tr_bq">treat health insurance as a commodity, where companies only compete based on their reputation and price.</blockquote>but presumably companies should not compete based on the effects of their products on the health of those who buy them. Furthermore, he supported <blockquote class="tr_bq">the further industrialization of healthcare, ... 'Industrialization created our great economy,' he said. 'Allow the market and competition can fix the inefficiencies in the system.'</blockquote>This ignored the arguments going back to the work of Kenneth Arrow that health care cannot be an ideal market (see <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/08/how-fallacy-of-perfect-health-care.html">this post</a>), and all the data suggesting that in the last 20-30 years, when the market fundamentalists became so influential in US health care, costs have risen continuously and quickly without commensurate gains in access or quality.    These are just the latest of many examples of the business people who now run health care justifying approaching it as just another business. A Strong Rebuttal of the Argument that Health Care is an Industry that Produces a Commodity   For quite a while, Dr Arnold Relman has lead a relatively lonely quest to restore medicine as a profession and health care as a calling  (see posts <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/12/relman-in-jama-on-threats-to-physicians.html">here</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/06/why-did-us-physicians-give-up-their.html">here</a> and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/08/how-fallacy-of-perfect-health-care.html">here</a>).  He <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/12/relman-in-jama-on-threats-to-physicians.html">noted</a> that at one time, the notion that "the practice of medicine should not be commercialized, nor treated as a commodity in trade.'" was considered very mainstream.  (The quote came from the mid- twentieth century AMA code of ethics.)  We have done what little we can to support him.  However, the opposition to the new normal of health care as an industry that produces a commodity has paled compared to the conventional wisdom favored by rich executives and supported by billions of dollars of marketing, public relations, and lobbying budgets.     However, this week strong support for health care as professions, as a calling, and hospitals as serving a mission just <a href="http://www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/cns/1204884.htm">appeared</a> in a big way in a major address to a health care meeting in Europe.  First, in the context   <blockquote class="tr_bq">during the current economic crisis "that is cutting resources for safeguarding health,"...   Hospitals and other facilities 'must rethink their particular role in order to avoid having health become a simple 'commodity,' subordinate to the laws of the market, and, therefore, a good reserved to a few, rather than a universal good to be guaranteed and defended,'  </blockquote>   Furthermore, <blockquote class="tr_bq">'Only when the wellbeing of the person, in its most fragile and defenseless condition and in search of meaning in the unfathomable mystery of pain, is very clearly at the center of medical and assisted care' can the hospital be seen as a place where healing isn't a job, but a mission, </blockquote>   The speaker thus directly challenged the current notion that health care is a commodity, and those who work in health care have jobs, not callings or missions.  While the speaker was in fact a retired distinguished professor from a European university, but before any market fundamentalists start thinking he could be pilloried as some radical European academic, note the following. The conference was the <a href="http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/hlthwork/documents/XXVIIConferenzaPCPS.pdf">XXVI International Conference</a> of the <a href="http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/hlthwork/index.htm">Pontifical Council for Health Care Workers</a>, and the speaker quoted above was <a href="http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/index.htm">Pope Benedict XVI</a>.  Thus there is some very distinguished, albeit not numerous support for the ideas that held sway before market fundamentalism took over much of health care, the ideas that medicine is a profession and a calling, and hospitals should be mission oriented organizations, and that health care professionals and institutions should put patients' health and welfare first, very far ahead of short-term revenue and the accumulation of wealth by health care organizational leaders.

Should Health Care be a "'Commodity, Subordinate to the Laws of the Market?" - a Powerful Rebuttal

In the US, it has become the accepted wisdom that health care is now an industry, not a calling or a profession, and the health care it produces is a commodity, not a human service. The Conventional …

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23 Nov 2012

Using a "Professionalism" Initiative as a Speech Code to Punish Students' Criticisms of Administrative Authority?

The original impetus to set up <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/">Health Care Renewal</a> was increasing evidence of external threats to physicians' professional values.  So it seemed to me that renewed interest in addressing professionalism in academic medicine might lead to more attention to these threats, and perhaps even real challenges to them.  Instead, most academic professionalism initiatives seem to have steered away from this contentious area.  Worse, at times the academic medical concept of professionalism has been turned on its head.  A Dispute Among Students at University of California - Davis A recent <a href="http://thefire.org/article/14251.html">post</a> in the Torch blog from our friends at FIRE (the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education) provided a graphic example.  The case involved an apparently trivial dispute among two medical students: <blockquote>[University of California - Davis medical student Curtis] Allumbaugh's ordeal began after he emailed the 'med2014' mailing list (or 'listserv') on July 19, 2010, regarding a party he was organizing. The listserv was widely used for a variety of non-academic purposes. Allumbaugh's email provided the address of the party, detailed the available space, and listed the variety of alcohol that would be available at the party. The email noted that others had signed up to bring snacks and mentioned that some things were still lacking for the party, such as music, fruit juice, and beer. Prior to Allumbaugh's message, others had sent similar emails using the same listserv about their own parties, such as a 'kegger' one student called 'CAMP MED.' On July 20, 2010, a second-year student emailed Allumbaugh, notifying him that she had 'been placed on the class of 2014's listserve' and had monitored the class email. She criticized Allumbaugh's email for placing 'a heavy emphasis on alcohol.' In response, Allumbaugh emailed her directly on July 21, calling her a 'busy body' and telling her, 'You should really just mind your own business and let our class be.'</blockquote> Note that the second-year student's email (available <a href="http://thefire.org/article/14238.html">here</a>) carried a suggestion that she had some sort of authority to monitor the extra-curricular actions of first year students as manifested on the list server, and perhaps even punish them for perceived misconduct: <blockquote>I can tell you that as MS2s, we work and play hard, but we do it responsibly and always in the forefront of our minds we remember what image we are portraying in public and through the messages we send. I'd hate to see any one of you 2014ers get into any trouble right before you start an amazing period of your life.</blockquote> Note that the exchange between the two students did not occur in an academic or clinical setting, and it was never clear why the second year student was "placed on" the list server, or why she should have any authority over the Allumbaugh. . The School Administration Invokes "Professionalism" The medical school saw fit to cast Allumbaugh's actions as violations of the school's standards of professionalism: <blockquote>As a result of this email exchange, Associate Dean of Student Affairs and Graduate Medical Education James Nuovo sent Allumbaugh a letter on September 14, 2010, citing him for 'failing to demonstrate the highest standards of civility and decency to all' and 'failing to demonstrate courtesy, sensitivity and respect.' On November 3, 2010, Allumbaugh received a letter from the SOM Committee on Student Progress, punishing him with academic probation for the rest of his time in medical school and requiring him to undergo a psychological assessment to determine whether he was 'fit' to continue in medical school. Finally, on November 19, 2010, SOM changed its rules to force all medical students to abide by the Principles of Community or else face academic probation. </blockquote> The result was a series of interventions by FIRE: <blockquote>In response, FIRE wrote UC Davis Chancellor Linda P.B. Katehi on August 3, 2011, noting that enforcing professional standards in truly professional settings differs greatly from enforcing workplace standards in other settings such as private conversations. FIRE also noted that it is blatantly unconstitutional to police student speech under the UC Davis Principles of Community because such a 'civility' policy violates the First Amendment right to freedom of speech when it is given disciplinary force. </blockquote> When that letter had no effect, it took threats of litigation for the medical school to suspend Allumbaugh's punishment more than one year after it began: <blockquote>SOM Associate Dean of Curriculum and Competency Development Mark Servis replied to FIRE on August 10, 2011, defending the policy. FIRE responded on November 23, 2011, reminding Katehi that 'violating well-established law regarding the First Amendment rights of students at public universities leaves you at risk of losing qualified immunity, thereby opening you and other administrators to personal liability' for the deprivation of students' First Amendment rights. Servis again defended the policy in a reply on December 5, 2011. Finally, on February 16, 2012, the Committee on Student Progress notified Allumbaugh that his probation had been dropped, but persisted in requiring him to adhere to the Principles of Community. </blockquote>Note that Associate Dean <a href="http://thefire.org/public/pdfs/6d24a77115edf335c1cb2b1d1a737622.pdf?direct">Servis' letter</a> stated that the email sent to Allumbaugh by the second year student was "a genuine suggestion of concern and an offer of albeit unsolicited friendly advice."  Thus, Servis seemed unaware that it could have been interpreted as an assertion of authority and a threat of punishment ("I'd hate to see any one of you 2014ers get into any trouble.") Dean Servis also defended the use of probation to punish a student for failing to "work effectively with classmates." Yet the dispute that had nothing to do with (academic or clinical) work, and only involved a single student from another class.  Why that student was not equally to blame was not clear, unless it was because she had been granted special authority by the administration to monitor the actions of less senior students.  The implication appears to be that the punishment was in defense of a student who had been granted special authority by the administration, and hence was ultimately in defense of the administration's power.  Summary In this case, the medical school's professionalism policy seemed to be used by the administration primarily to control students' speech outside of the academic and clinical setting. Furthermore, the student's main offense seemed to be failure to kowtow sufficiently to another student who by implication had been given some sort of authority by the administration.  What the two students' dispute had to with professionalism is not  apparent. On one hand, this seems like a case in which a speech code was mainly used to defend administrators from criticism and challenge. On the other hand, this speech code was cloaked in the mantle of professionalism.  So this case seems to be an example of a professionalism initiative used as an excuse for the leadership to maintain its power. It is beyond ironic that while this was going on, the University of California - Davis, and its Chancellor Linda Katehi were becoming briefly infamous for another effort, a more violent one, by the administration to prevent criticism and challenge. Chancellor Katehi had authorized university police to "clear" student demonstrators from an "occupation" of the campus which was protesting, among other things, rising tuition and economic inequality, and in doing so, the police used pepper spray on unarmed students (see <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/11/uc-davis-pepper-spray-case-as.html">this post</a>.) There are a lot bigger threats to physicians' and other health care professionals' professionalism than medical students' sarcasm or even rudeness in disputes about alcohol served at off-hours parties. Since many of these threats also generate personal benefits to academic leadership, it may not be much of a surprise that they have received little attention.  (See the list of threats appended below.  Note that we have discussed two of these threats in the specific context of the University of California - Davis.  <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/08/university-leaders-goal-taking-new.html">Here</a> we noted that Chancellor Katehi seemed to be re-imagining her medical school as a biotechnology company.  <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/11/john-wiley-and-sons-director-apologizes.html">Here</a> we noted that Chancellor Katehi was also on the board of a company with a medical education and communication company subsidiary.) However, while they remain unaddressed, I submit that using "professionalism" to cloak increased social control of students to prevent them from looking too closely at what academic administrators are doing will eventually backfire.  === ADDENDUM: List of Threats to Professionalism Instead, to really uphold professionalism, we need to defend it from its real threats, as listed in my <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/12/lancet-emphasizes-threats-to-academic.html">2010 post</a>: <ul><li>Abandonment of traditional prohibitions of the commercial practice of medicine - In the US, a Supreme Court decision was interpreted to mean that medical societies could no longer regulate the ethics of their members.  Until 1980, the US American Medical Association had  ruled that the practice of medicine should not be "commercialized, nor treated as a commodity in trade."  After then, it ceased trying to maintain this prohibition.  The result was increasing, now rampant commercialization.  See posts  <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/12/relman-in-jama-on-threats-to-physicians.html">here</a> and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/06/why-did-us-physicians-give-up-their.html">here</a>.</li><li>Making money takes precedence over education -  A recent survey showing that more than half the faculty at multiple US medical schools felt they were valued more for how much money they brought in than their teaching or patient care abilities (<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/12/american-medical-schools-are-only-in-it.html">here</a>), confirming previous anecdotal reports (see <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/04/medical-schools-to-faculty-show-me.html">here</a>).  </li><li>The medical school re-imagined as a biotechnology company -  In 2000, a Vice President of the American Association of Medical Colleges(1) wrote that research universities must respond to "societal demands that they become engines of economic development…."  Many universities now defend lax conflict of interest policies with similar arguments.  For more details, go <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/11/who-you-gonna-call-how-should-young.html">here</a>.</li><li>Faculty become employees of industry - For numerous examples of this and other kinds of conflicts of interest, go <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/conflicts%20of%20interest">here</a>.  A survey by Campbell et al suggested that approximately two-thirds of medical academics get significant payments from industry.(2)</li><li>Academics become "key opinion leaders" paid to market drugs and devices - Marketers regard "key opinion leaders" as salespeople who appear more credible because of their professional guise.  See anecdotal evidence <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/key%20opinion%20leaders">here</a>.  </li><li>Control of clinical research given to commercial sponsors - A study by Mello et al showed how universities' grant administrators are willing to sign contracts giving commercial sponsors control over key aspects of human research studies.(3)  See post <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2005/05/troubling-study-of-contracts-between.html">here</a>. </li><li>Conflicts of interest allow manipulation and suppression of clinical research - Commercially sponsored research design, implementation, and dissemination are often <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/manipulating%20clinical%20research">manipulated</a> to favor the sponsor's interests.  When such manipulation fails to produce favorable results, the results may simply be <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/suppression%20of%20medical%20research">suppressed</a>.</li><li>Academics take credit for articles written by commercially paid ghost-writers - Such <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/ghost%20writing">ghost-writing</a> is often part of organized <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/stealth%20marketing">stealth marketing</a> campaigns.  </li><li>Whistle blowers are discouraged, or worse, and academic freedom is damaged.  Discussion of some examples of what may happen to whistle blowers is <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/whistle-blowers">here</a>.  The survey mentioned earlier (<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/12/american-medical-schools-are-only-in-it.html">here</a>) showed that about one-third of faculty fear they may be punished for speaking  out.  </li><li>Leadership of academic medical centers by businesspeople - <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/ill-informed%20management">Ill-informed management</a> may result from leaders who have no background or training in actual health care.  </li><li>Leaders of teaching hospitals and universities become millionaires -  A recent example is <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/08/more-hospital-ceos-join-millionaires.html">here</a>, and more may be found <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/executive%20compensation">here</a>.  Leaders of academic medical centers and the parent universities of medical schools often make more than $1 million a year in the US.  When such amounts are in play, executives may focus more on short-term measures that lead to even more pay than on upholding the mission.  </li><li>Medical school leaders become stewards (as members of boards of directors) of for-profit health care corporations - A recent example is <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/12/duke-divinity-students-protest-pay-of.html">here</a>, and a summary of how we discovered this phenomenon in 2006 is <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2006/03/new-species-of-conflict-of-interest-in.html">here</a>.   The conflict of interest is severe because directors of for-profit corporations are supposed to have unyielding loyalty to the interests of the corporation and its stockholders, although they are frequently accused of acting mainly as cronies of the top hired executives (see <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/07/new-york-times-reports-university.html">here</a> and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/01/one-small-step-towards-reducing.html">here</a>).</li><li>Leaders of failed finance firms become stewards of academic medicine - We have found numerous examples, recently <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/04/failed-leaders-of-citigroup-as-leaders.html">here</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/04/wamu-worry-more-overlaps-between.html">here</a>, and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/03/members-of-board-of-now-bankrupt-lehman.html">here</a>, of top executives and/or board members of the finance firms who helped bring on the global financial collapse also being trustees of medical schools, academic medical centers, or their parent universities.  Such "stewards" may bring to the academic environment the "greed is good" culture now pervasive in finance.  </li></ul>References 1. Korn D. Conflicts of interest in biomedical research. JAMA 2000; 284: 2234-2237. Link <a href="http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/284/17/2234">here</a>. 2. Campbell EG, Gruen RL, Mountford J et al. A national survey of physician–industry relationships. N Engl J Med 2007; 356:1742-1750. Llink <a href="http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsa064508">here</a>. 3. Mello MM, Clarridge BR, Studdert DM. Academic medical centers' standards for clinical-trial agreements with industry. N Engl J Med 2005; 352: 21.  Link <a href="http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/short/352/21/2202">here</a>.

Using a "Professionalism" Initiative as a Speech Code to Punish Students' Criticisms of Administrative Authority?

The original impetus to set up Health Care Renewal was increasing evidence of external threats to physicians' professional values. So it seemed to me that renewed interest in addressing professionali…

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07 Mar 2012

"Health Professionals for a New Century": Calling for "Ethical Conduct," a "New Professionalism," and Improved "Stewardship" and "Social Accountability"

A major article just published in the Lancet urged global reform of health care education  [Frenk J, Chen L, Bhutta ZA, Cohen J, Crisp N, Evans T et al. Health professionals for a new century: transforming education to strengthen health systems in an interdependent world.  Lancet 2010; 376: 1923-1958.  Link <a href="http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/uploads/files/cc71deb1-1dd6-4a97-a4e3-678f520a0bc6-lancet.pdf">here</a>.] The problems it recognized included <ul><li>"Pitifully modest" spending for health professional education, compared to overall health spending</li><li>Health care systems that are "dysfunctional and inequitable," due in part to "commercialism in the professions," leading to "breakdown ... especially noteworthy within primary care, in both poor and rich countries."</li><li>For profit medical education leading to "a so-called de-Flexnerisation process ... in which low-quality professional schools might be proliferating...."</li><li>Health care corruption, e.g., "the Indian press has reported illegal payments by new private schools seeking accreditation...."</li></ul>The solutions it advocated included - Fostering "ethical conduct" by professionals, developing a "new professionalism," earning trust "steered by ethical commitment and social accountability." - Improving "stewardship mechanisms, including socially accountable accreditation" It is nice to be in such good company.  While the report was written in the subtle, diplomatic language of international public health, it was the only such authoritative report to appear in a widely circulated, highly respected medical journal that I can recall that was this direct about the seriousness of such problems. In fact, not only is little spent on actual medical education within academic medical institutions, but faculty members are <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/12/american-medical-schools-are-only-in-it.html">valued more for the money</a> they bring in than for their teaching.  Commercialism in health care has been institutionalized in the last 30 years (for discussion of its history in the US, look <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/12/relman-in-jama-on-threats-to-physicians.html">here</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/06/why-did-us-physicians-give-up-their.html">here</a>, and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/08/how-fallacy-of-perfect-health-care.html">here</a>.)  The <a href="http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/gcr_2006">Transparency International Global Corruption Report of 2006</a> asserted "the scale of corruption is vast in both rich and poor countries," yet has gotten almost no notice in medical, health care research, and health care policy circles.  In 2009, the US Institute of Medicine published a detailed report including fairly strong recommendations on <a href="http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2009/Conflict-of-Interest-in-Medical-Research-Education-and-Practice.aspx">Conflict of Interest in Research, Education and Practice</a>.  The <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/anechoic%20effect">anechoic effect</a>, however, has dictated that discussion of striking examples of <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/mission-hostile%20management">mission-hostile management</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/conflicts%20of%20interest">conflicts of interest</a>, and outright <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/crime">crime</a> and corruption is simply not done, especially in medical, health care, or health policy venues and journals.  The 2006 TI and 2009 IOM reports have infrequently been cited, and their recommendations have widely been ignored. I do hope that the appearance of a publication as authoritative as the article by Frenk et al leads to some soul-searching by the leaders of health care around the world.  They need to realize that despite the article's measured tones, the problems really are severe, and even more broad than the article implied.  We have discussed in detail how health care education (and all of health care) are hurt by concentration and abuse of power, by governance that lacks accountability, integrity, and transparency; by leadership that ignores the <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/ill-informed%20management">context</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/mission-hostile%20management">core values and mission</a>, promotes self-interest and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/conflicts%20of%20interest">conflicts of interest</a>, and sneers at ethics; and by results such as <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/suppression%20of%20medical%20research">suppressed</a> and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/manipulating%20clinical%20research">manipulated</a> research, deceptive and dishonest education (look <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/key%20opinion%20leaders">here</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/medical%20education%20and%20communication%20companies">here</a>, and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/stealth%20marketing">here </a>for examples), stifling of <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/academic%20freedom">academic freedom</a> and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/whistle-blowers">whistle-blowers</a>, then dissatisfied, burned out faculty (<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/12/american-medical-schools-are-only-in-it.html">here</a>), and finally the final common pathway of rising costs, declining access, and poor quality.   It is heartening that the importance of our concerns has been corroborated in such a notable venue.  I hope this report gathers less dust than the 2006 Transparency International Global Corruption Report and the 2009 Institute of Medicine conflict of interest report. I suggest that to truly reform health care education (and health care itself), we will have to attend to the sorts of problems we write about on Health Care Renewal.  On one hand, we will need to improve the stewardship, governance, and leadership of health care education itself, and reduce the pervasive conflicts of interest that ensnare the faculty.  On the other, we will need to make sure education prepares students to deal with these problems in health care at large. It would be nice if the appearance of the Lancet article signifies that help will soon be at hand to tackle the huge amount of work that needs to be done, in the face of likely withering opposition from those who have enriched themselves from the dysfunctionality of the current system.  We at Health Care Renewal will continue to try to draw attention to these issues, accompanied I am sure by our fellow bloggers (as are listed in the right hand column).  However, a small group of voluntary "citizen journalists," and health care professional curmudgeons cannot solve this problem on our own. I hope we will soon have some more support. ADDENDUM (14 December, 2010) - See also comments by Paul Levy <a href="http://runningahospital.blogspot.com/2010/12/will-this-cause-change.html">on the Running a Hospital blog</a>.

"Health Professionals for a New Century": Calling for "Ethical Conduct," a "New Professionalism," and Improved "Stewardship" and "Social Accountability"

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13 Dec 2010

How the Fallacy of the "Perfect" Health Care Market Undermined Professionalism and Caused Health Care Dysfunction - in the New York Times

We began this blog way back in 2005 to discuss threats to physicians' values, especially from concentration and abuse of power.  Personal experience, and cases and anecdotes described by colleagues suggested that a dysfunctional health care system was making patients and physicians miserable.  Interviews with more physicians suggested pervasive threats to their values, many stemming from how leaders of health care organizations wielded their power.   Threats to Professional Values In a 2007 <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/12/relman-in-jama-on-threats-to-physicians.html">post</a>, based on an article in JAMA by Dr Arnold Relman, I asserted that the notion that threats to physicians' professional values are a major cause of health care dysfunction was becoming mainstream.  Furthermore, Dr Relman's review of the history of the problem suggested that the rising power of for-profit health care corporations, for whom making money came before the health and safety of patients, was a primary culprit.  Dr Relman has discussed the issue frequently (e.g., see <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/06/why-did-us-physicians-give-up-their.html">this post</a>).  However, despite occasional publication in some prestigious medical journals, his views seem to have gotten little traction.  Arrow's Analysis: Is Health Care a Perfectly Competitive Market? Amazingly, however, the issue has made it into the New York Times, in the form of two posts in the Economix blog by health economist Prof Uwe Reinhardt.  Prof Reinhardt <a href="http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/06/is-health-care-special/">started</a> by resurrecting the classic article by "Nobel laureate economist Kenneth Arrow," which argued that health care's special context means that the health care market cannot be truly competitive. First Prof Arrow reviewed the characteristics of a perfectly competitive market: <blockquote>To lay down a standard to which to compare the health care sector, Professor Arrow explained first on what basis economists consider a perfectly competitive market for some good or service as 'maximizing human welfare,' an outcome economists describe as 'efficient.' The crucial characteristics of a perfectly competitive market are (1) that all of the quality dimensions of the good or service traded in that market are accurately understood by buyer and seller; (2) that potential buyers have full transparency on the price they will have to pay per unit of that good or service; (3) that it is easy and relatively costless for potential sellers to enter and exit this market; (4) and that there are so many potential buyers and sellers that none individually can affect the market price of the thing being traded. If those and some other conditions are met, Professor Arrow explained, then for any given initial distribution of income and wealth that market will settle down at a unique equilibrium, that is, a state from which no potential buyer or seller would want to move. This equilibrium has important attributes. First, in what Professor Arrow calls the First Optimality Theorem of welfare economics, it can be shown that in this equilibrium the traded good or service is allocated among buyers in such a way that it would be impossible through any reallocation to make someone happier without making someone else less happy. It is an allocation that economists call Pareto efficient, in honor of the Italian industrialist, economist and philosopher Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923), who first proposed this criterion. For any given initial distribution of income and wealth, economists declare the associated Pareto-efficient allocation of the thing being produced and traded to be 'welfare-maximizing' — hence the term 'welfare economics' for this type of analysis. Second, and very importantly, in what Arrow calls the Second Optimality Theorem, he explains that if on ethical grounds society wished to distribute a good or service (for example, education or health care or food or beach houses) among people in a particular way — like egalitarian principles — it need not have government directly involved in producing or distributing that good or service. </blockquote> In his <a href="http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/13/health-care-uncertainty-and-morality/">second blog post</a>, Prof Reinhardt summarized why health care cannot be such a competitive market. The problems are uncertainty and asymmetry of information: <blockquote>This uncertainty has several aspects. First, physicians may not agree on the medical condition causing the symptoms the patient presents. Second, even if physicians agree in their diagnoses, they often do not agree on the efficacy of alternative responses — for example, surgery or medical management for lower-back pain. Third, information on both the diagnosis of and the likely consequences of treatment are asymmetrically allocated between the sell-side (providers) and the buy-side (patients) of the health care market. The very reason that patients seek advice and treatment from physicians in the first place is that they expect physicians to have vastly superior knowledge about the proper diagnosis and efficacy of treatment. That makes the market for medical care deviate significantly from the benchmark of perfect competition, in which buyers and sellers would be equally well informed. Uncertainty and asymmetry of information about the quality of goods or services being traded is not, of course, unique to the medical care market. It is ubiquitous in modern economies that trade in highly complex goods and services. We find these characteristics, for example, in financial transactions, including all types of insurance; in automobile repairs, in plumbing and even in the purchase of some consumer electronics. Wherever asymmetry of information is present, there exists the potential for the better-informed market participants to exploit the ignorance of the less well informed. How society responds to this flaw in markets depends on the severity of its consequences. In the market for electronic products, for example, the consequences appear to be regarded as trivial. A customer may be seduced into purchasing an excessively complex and expensive product, but society takes no action on this front. In finance, on the other hand, the consequences of asymmetric information can be severe, as we have been reminded once again in the recent financial crisis. </blockquote>Professional Standards and Mission-Oriented Non-Profit Organizations to Remedy Market Imperfections Prof Arrow suggested that how health care worked when he wrote his article, in 1963, could be partially explained as attempting to remedy the problems created by uncertainty and asymmetry of information. <blockquote>Professor Arrow explained many of the nonmarket social institutions and regulations characteristic of medical care [at that time] that he had identified as 'attempts to overcome the lack of optimality resulting from asymmetry of information and the inability of competitive markets to allocate efficiently all of the risks inherent in health care.' Pointedly, he said, 'It is the general social consensus, clearly, that the laissez-faire solution for medicine is intolerable.'</blockquote> That was then and this is now. The Rise of "Greed is Good" The problem is, of course, that health care has changed a lot since 1963. In an <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2009/07/an-interview-with-kenneth-arrow-part-two/22279/">interview with the Atlantic from 2009</a>, Prof Arrow defended his basic analysis: <blockquote>I think the fundamental questions are the same. I also think there are more problems in the market today than when I wrote the paper. But I think the basic analysis hasn't changed.</blockquote> He also discussed how failure to heed it have lead to our current dysfunctional health care system: <blockquote>The market won't work -- it doesn't work well in the health context. But something else supplements the market, and the thing I put stress on in the paper are the elements that put a non-economic influence on the market: professional commitments to provide a service, to engage in services that aren't self-serving. Standards of caring decided by non-economic actors. And one problem we have now is an erosion of professional standards. In a way there is more emphasis on markets and self-aggrandizement in the context of healthcare, and that has led to some of the problems we have today. </blockquote> Furthermore, he commented on those who sold the idea, which today ought to be totally discredited, in my humble opinion, that health care could be a perfect market, and this market would make everything right: <blockquote>Sometimes I think it's because of the Chicago School. I think there has been a general drift around the country towards the idea that greed is good. Look at Wall Street. All of these industries involve a professional element in which information is flowing. You're supposed to be constrained to be honest about it. I don't really know why. But there is now more of an emphasis on popularization, which does improve efficiency but can also lead to an erosion of professional standards. There was this idea that professional standards were a mask for monopoly power--a Chicago theory, which I believe came from George Stigler. I don't know if they were that influential, but they seemed to be saying a lot of things that people were taking up in practice. I'm not totally sure why these professional standards changed, but it's more than medical reasons.</blockquote> So you do not need to take it from me, take it from a Nobel laureate economist.  It now seems clear in retrospect that a major characteristic of modern health care is how the "better-informed market participants ... exploit the ignorance of the less well informed." Summary: What is to be Done? We have been sold a real bill of goods that health care could function as an ideal market. That bill of goods has lead to the deprofessionalization and commercialization of physicians, the destruction of the basic values of health care professionals, and the rise of health care organizations that put making money ahead of patients' health, safety, and welfare. And in health care, the dominant slogan has become "greed is good." This is true of course, but only for the greedy. True health care reform would help physicians and other health care professionals uphold their traditional values, including, as the AMA once stated, "the practice of medicine should not be commercialized, nor treated as a commodity in trade." True health care reform would put health care "delivery" back in the hands of mission-focused, not-for-profit organizations, which put patients' health, safety and welfare first. These reforms, however, would certainly threaten the continuing wealth of a lot of people who have profited mightily from the current dysfunctional system. So do not expect them to be happy about even the discussion of them.

How the Fallacy of the "Perfect" Health Care Market Undermined Professionalism and Caused Health Care Dysfunction - in the New York Times

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18 Aug 2010

Turning Patients into "Dialysis Dollars"

As we have discussed in previous posts (<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/12/relman-in-jama-on-threats-to-physicians.html">here</a> and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/06/why-did-us-physicians-give-up-their.html">here</a>), prior to a US Supreme Court decision in 1975, physicians (and other professionals) were left free to set up and enforce their own codes of ethics. Until about 1980, the US American Medical Association (AMA) stated, <ul><li>"in the practice of medicine a physician should limit the source of his professional income to medical services actually rendered by him, or under his supervision, to his patients"</li><li>"the practice of medicine should not be commercialized, nor treated as a commodity in trade"</li></ul> The Supreme Court decision was widely construed as meaning that any promulgation by US professional organizations of ethical regulations that constrained any economic practices of their members was a violation of anti-trust laws. Thus, in 1980, the AMA dropped their prohibitions against the commercialization of medicine, and nobody, it appeared, tried to change the anti-trust law whose provisions the court interpreted. A vivid example of how physicians and patients may be caught in the cross-fires among health care corporations in this brave new era of commercialized health care was provided by a <a href="http://www.denverpost.com/commented/ci_12830453">recent report </a>in the Denver Post: <blockquote>News that Fortune 500 company DaVita Dialysis is moving its headquarters to Denver socked its competitors like a punch in the gut. To its rivals, the kidney-care giant is a bully armed with high-powered attorneys who use lawsuits as tools to intimidate. DaVita executives counter that they are simply strong competitors — they act as aggressors only when doctors or nurses or other dialysis companies break promises and double-cross them. Either way, a string of DaVita-filed lawsuits around the country — with two major battles boiling in Denver and Colorado Springs — shed light on the ruthless competition over dialysis patients in an industry that costs Medicare alone more than $8 billion per year. For years, DaVita's competition in Colorado's two largest cities was almost nonexistent. The mud began to fly last year when the second-largest group of Denver kidney doctors, called nephrologists, ended their exclusive affiliation with DaVita and partnered with a Massachusetts dialysis company entering the Denver market. Near the same time, the largest nephrology group in Colorado Springs dumped DaVita in favor of Liberty Dialysis, which recently opened two dialysis centers in the city. DaVita quickly sued doctors in both cities, plus a nurse battling breast cancer who quit her job at a DaVita dialysis center and took one with Liberty. The hostility between the companies is so intense, it's seeping down to the patients. 'With everything that is going on, you feel like you are becoming sort of a dialysis dollar,' said Julie Estes, a 53-year- old Colorado Springs woman who spends three days a week, four hours at a time, hooked to a dialysis machine in order to stay alive. DaVita says it 'paid millions' in 1998 to the doctors of Western Nephrology in Denver to retain them as medical directors of six dialysis centers in the metro area for 10 years. The doctors signed non-compete agreements, promising not to join forces with DaVita rivals or steal any of the California-based company's nurses. Patients are free by law to choose any dialysis center they want. But dialysis companies bank on the fact that snagging the most popular kidney doctors in town to serve as medical directors of their centers will bring in the most patients — and the most dollars. Every dialysis center is required by federal law to have a medical director to oversee the care of patients and the water purification system used to flush toxins from the blood of people with failing kidneys. It's a side job, separate from a nephrologist's practice, that some estimate takes only a couple of hours each week. Companies and doctors declined to say what salary comes with the job, but estimates range from $20,000 to $200,000 per year depending on the competitiveness of the market. After 10 years with DaVita, when they believed the non-compete agreement was about to expire, Western Nephrology doctors began making plans to become medical directors of shiny-new American Renal Associates dialysis centers opening in Denver with a flat-panel TV and heated, massage chair at every dialysis station. Four of the new centers are within 3 1/2 miles of existing Da Vita centers. The non-compete agreement that Western Nephrology doctors had signed for DaVita prohibited them from having relationships with competitors within a 35-mile radius. DaVita contends in its lawsuit that it found out about Western Nephrology's 'secret campaign' because the dialysis company they were working with applied for Medicare billing numbers for five new centers in the Denver area. In its counterclaim, American Renal Associates accused DaVita of violating federal antitrust law — the company had controlled at least 80 percent of the Denver market. DaVita lagged in updating its dialysis centers until competition was imminent, according to court records. And the claim accused DaVita of 'filing legal actions that are objectively baseless' merely as an 'anticompetitive weapon.' </blockquote> "Ruthless competition," "lawsuits as a tool to intimidate," "double crosses," flying mud, patients who feel like "dialyis dollars," non-compete agreements, medical directors paid according to "the competitiveness of the market," "secret campaigns?" - is this any way to run a health care system? As Dr Arnold Relman pointed out (see our previous posts linked above), through the 1960s there was some consensus that health care does not function like a pure market, partially because patients cannot function like steely-eyed consumers. They do not have enough information about the benefits, harms and costs of their possible choices. They have trouble understanding the ambiguity and uncertainty of the medical context. And most important, they may not be capable of the cold cognition the free market model requires, since they may be dealing with choices whose potential outcomes prompt extreme emotions, and in many cases, they may be too frightened, sick, or cognitively impaired to make fully rational choices. In particular, patients with end-stage kidney disease, requiring dialysis to maintain life, seem very different from some ideal, coldly cognitive consumers. So what in the world are they doing caught up in these sorts of disputes? I submit that real health care reform ought to help physicians and other health care professionals renew their professionalism, and put the provision of health care (and health education and clinical research) back in the hands of people who view these activities as callings, not purely as ways to get rich. Meanwhile, when you are a patient, be prepared to be treated merely like a source of revenue. PS - Please note that, as we have <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/03/meet-new-boss-same-as-old-boss-health.html">posted</a> before, the new US "czar" for health care reform is a former member of the board of directors of DaVita.

Turning Patients into "Dialysis Dollars"

As we have discussed in previous posts (here and here), prior to a US Supreme Court decision in 1975, physicians (and other professionals) were left free to set up and enforce their own codes of ethic…

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17 Jul 2009

Why Did US Physicians Give Up Their Ability to Enforce Their Own Professional Standards?

In his recent review of Dr Ezekiel Emanuel's book, (Healthcare, Guaranteed: A Simple, Secure Solution for America,) Dr Arnold Relman, Editor-Emeritus of the New England Journal of Medicine, <a href="http://www.nybooks.com/articles/22798">discussed </a>the history of the deprofessionalization of American physicians. <blockquote> The behavior of US physicians has been changed by the commercialization of medical care, and this too has increased costs. US medical practice has traditionally relied on fee-for-service, which has always given it some of the attributes and incentives of a business. However, the American Medical Association (AMA) maintained for many years that medical practice was a profession, not a business. The AMA's ethical guidelines therefore advised physicians to limit their income to reasonable earnings from the care of patients, and to refrain from advertising and from entering financial arrangements with drug and device manufacturers. Those restrictions were lifted after the US Supreme Court decided in 1975 that lawyers, and by extension members of other professions, including physicians, are engaged in interstate commerce and therefore must be subject to antitrust law (from which they had largely been exempt).(1) This decision had an enormous effect on the medical profession, but its consequences have received relatively little public attention. Although the courts did not initiate the commercialization of medicine, they certainly accelerated it and gave it legal justification. In 1980, after medical organizations lost some costly antitrust trials, in which they were accused of such offenses as limiting doctor fees or denying staff privileges, the AMA changed its ethical guidelines, declaring medicine to be both a business and a profession. This lowered the AMA's barriers to the commercialization of medical practice, allowing physicians to participate in any legal profit-making business arrangement that did not harm patients. Nearly a half-century ago, Stanford economics professor Kenneth Arrow, later a Nobel laureate, convincingly argued that medical care cannot conform to market laws because patients are not ordinary consumers and doctors are not ordinary vendors. He said that sick or injured patients must rely on physicians in ways fundamentally different from the price-driven relation between buyers and sellers in an ordinary market. This argument implied that, contrary to the assumptions of antitrust law, market competition among physicians cannot be expected to lower medical prices. And since physicians influence decisions to use medical services far more than patients do, the volume and types of services provided to patients—and hence total health costs—need to be controlled by forces other than the market, such as professional standards and government regulation. But Arrow's argument was largely ignored in the rush to exploit health care for commercial purposes that ensued after the passage of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965.(2) </blockquote> Writing about the decline of physicians' professionalism in 2007 [ Relman AS. Medical professionalism in a commercialized health care market. JAMA 2007; 298: 2668-2670. [link <a href="http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/298/22/2668">here</a>) ], Dr Relman had briefly alluded to the effect of the 1975 Supreme Court decision, (see our post <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/12/relman-in-jama-on-threats-to-physicians.html">here</a>): <blockquote>The law also has played a major role in the decline of medical professionalism. The 1975 Supreme Court ruling that the professions were not protected from anti-trust law undermined the traditional restraint that medical professional societies had always placed on the commercial behavior of physicians, such as advertising and investing in the products they prescribe or facilities they recommend. Having lost some initial legal battles and fearing the financial costs of losing more, organized medicine now hesitates to require physicians to behave differently from business people. It asks only that physicians' business activities should be legal, disclosed to patients, and not inconsistent with patients' interests. Until forced by anti-trust concerns to change its ethical code in 1980, the American Medical Association had held that 'in the practice of medicine a physician should limit the source of his professional income to medical services actually rendered by him, or under his supervision, to his patients' and that 'the practice of medicine should not be commercialized, nor treated as a commodity in trade.' These sentiments reflecting the spirit of professionalism are now gone. </blockquote> It seems to me that Dr Relman has elucidated one of the "missing links" that help explain the current sorry state of physicians' core values, and the broader continuing health care crisis. I am amazed that this bit of history seems to have been so thoroughly forgotten. Dr Relman did write about it before 2007, but in publications that few physicians and other health care professionals were likely to see. Other than Dr Relman, almost no one writing in the medical and health care literature seems to have interest in this issue. (It has been discussed in the Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, and the Stanford Law Review by M. Gregg Bloche, but these unfortunately also could have easily been missed by nearly all physicians and health care professionals.) So we have another example of the anechoic effect. Yet in my humble opinion, every physician and health care professional ought to know that the profession once foreswore the commercialization of medical practice, but gave up on its ability to police its own conflicts of interest after the US Supreme Court decided that professionals are subject to anti-trust law. But knowing this important bit of history raises more questions than it answers: <ul><li>The Supreme Court decision apparently involved interpretation of law, not the constitution. Therefore, why didn't organized medicine pursue a change in the law that would allow physicians to continue to enforce their traditional professional values? </li><li>The Supreme Court decision was primarily directed at lawyers, not physicians. Since the decision, to my knowledge, the law profession has maintained strict rules about conflicts of interest. (For example, no legal CME is sponsored by corporations whose products they seek to have the attendees favor.) Why did the decision wreck physicians' but not lawyers' abilities to regulate their own conflicts of interest? </li><li>The Supreme Court decision only affects US law. Why have physicians in other countries also abandoned their traditional values about commercial entanglements? </li><li>Why did this application of US antitrust law have such significant effects during an era when antitrust enforcement in health care was generally declining? (Insurance companies and hospitals that dominate local markets have not feared antitrust enforcement.)</li><li>Why did only Dr Relman and Prof Bloche seem to care about this up to now?</li></ul> Inquiring minds want to know.... And answering these questions might bring us back on the path of true medical professionalism. Hat tip to Merrill Goozner <a href="http://www.gooznews.com/node/2971">in the GoozNews blog</a>. References (from Relman) 1. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 2. Kenneth J. Arrow, "Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care," The American Economic Review, Vol. 53, No. 5 (December 1963).

Why Did US Physicians Give Up Their Ability to Enforce Their Own Professional Standards?

In his recent review of Dr Ezekiel Emanuel's book, (Healthcare, Guaranteed: A Simple, Secure Solution for America,) Dr Arnold Relman, Editor-Emeritus of the New England Journal of Medicine, discussed …

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26 Jun 2009

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