healthy4u: reimbursement

Another Attempt to Show the RUC Behind the Curtain

In 2007, readers of the Annals of Internal Medicine could read part of the solution to a great medical mystery.(1)  For years, health care costs in the US had been levitating faster than inflation, without producing any noticeable positive effect on patients.  Many possible reasons were proposed, but as the problem continued to worsen, none were proven. Prices are High Because They are Fixed That Way The article in the Annals, however, proposed one conceptually simple answer. The prices of most physicians' services, at least most of those that involved procedures or operations for Medicare patients, were high because the US government set them that way. Although the notion that prices were high because they were fixed to be so high was simple, how the fixing was done, and how the fixing affected the rest of the health system was complex, mind numbingly complex. Perhaps because of the complexity of its implementation, the simplicity of the concept has not seemingly reached the consciousness of most American health care professionals or policy makers, despite the publication of several scholarly articles on the subject,.<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/RUC">efforts by humble bloggers such as yours truly,</a> a major journalistic expose, and recent congressional hearings.  The lack of discussion of this issue seemed to be a prime example of what we have called the <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/anechoic%20effect">anechoic effect</a>, that important causes of health care dysfunction whose discussion would discomfit those who are currently personally profiting from the current system rarely produce many public echoes.  (For a review of what is known to date about how the offputtingly named Resource Based Relative Value Scale Update Committee (RUC) works, and previous attempts to makes it central role in fixing what US physicians are paid public, see the Appendix.) The Washington Monthly Pulls Back the Curtain Now another attempt to pull back the curtain that hides the RUC was just made by the Washington Monthly.  A long, detailed, well-written <a href="http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/july_august_2013/features/special_deal045641.php">article</a> by Haley Sweetland Edwards went through the major points, and included some new discoveries.  She asserted: The RUC is Well Hidden <blockquote class="tr_bq">[The RUC is] probably one of the most powerful committees in America that you’ve never heard of.</blockquote> The RUC Fixes Prices <blockquote class="tr_bq">when a roomful of professionals from the same trade meet behind closed doors to agree on how much their services should be worth. It’s called price-fixing. </blockquote> The Government Enables the RUC to Fix Prices <blockquote class="tr_bq"> this kind of 'price-fixing' is not only perfectly legal, it’s sanctioned by the U.S. government. At the end of each of these meetings, RUC members vote anonymously on a list of 'recommended values,' which are then sent to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the federal agency that runs those programs. For the last twenty-two years, the CMS has accepted about 90 percent of the RUC’s recommended values—essentially transferring the committee’s decisions directly into law.</blockquote> The Government Fixed Prices are Endorsed by the Private Sector <blockquote class="tr_bq"> private insurance companies also use Medicare’s fee schedule as a baseline for negotiating prices with hospitals and other providers. </blockquote> The Price Fixing Drives Up Costs and the Use of Services <blockquote class="tr_bq"> So if the RUC inflates the base price Medicare pays for a specific procedure, that inflationary effect ripples up through the health care industry as a whole.</blockquote> These Incentives Cripple Primary Care <blockquote class="tr_bq"> These manipulated prices are also a major reason why specialists are in oversupply in many parts of the country, while a worsening shortage of primary care providers threatens the whole health care delivery system. </blockquote> These Incentives Benefit Big Corporations, not just Medical Specialists <blockquote class="tr_bq"> the incentives are perfectly aligned: ordering that extra test means more money for a doctor’s practice or hospital, more money for the labs, and often more money for the device makers and drug companies, too. (Oh, and, by the way, the device makers and drug companies are, not incidentally, major funders of the medical specialty societies whose members vote on the RUC.)</blockquote><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhHWzSplnD2du3x_SfpKZJ5CaSFXrAoZkdhDxue_1J1f0wQIAV2rbRMgDA-oHz01r7lgv341htPKIV2_EfPKtU_eEAzu6xAn9ZPSUdVYtqfaappwD18k5EziA-KfAvazcaaooKFrlj7doQ9/s1600/SpecialDeal(WashingtonMonthly0713).jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="195" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhHWzSplnD2du3x_SfpKZJ5CaSFXrAoZkdhDxue_1J1f0wQIAV2rbRMgDA-oHz01r7lgv341htPKIV2_EfPKtU_eEAzu6xAn9ZPSUdVYtqfaappwD18k5EziA-KfAvazcaaooKFrlj7doQ9/s320/SpecialDeal(WashingtonMonthly0713).jpg" width="320" /></a></div> [Art by Monte Wolverton for the Washington Monthly article] What to Do and What Will Happen? We previously wrote,  Economists have beaten us over the head with idea that incentives matter.  The RUC seems to embody a corporatist approach to fixing prices for medical services to create <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/perverse%20incentives">perverse incentives</a> for physicians to do more procedures, and do less conversing with and examining patients, examining the best clinical research evidence about their problems, and rigorously thinking about how best to help them.  More procedures at higher prices helps physicians who do procedures.  It may help even more the corporations that provide the devices and drugs whose use is necessitated by such procedures, and the hospitals who can charge a lot of money as sites for performance of procedures.  It may even help insurance companies by driving ever more money through the health care system, and thus allow rationalization for higher administrative expenses as a function of overall money flow. Yet incentives favoring procedures over all else may lead to worse outcomes for patients, and more costs to patients and society.  If we do not figure out how to make incentives given to physicians more rational and fair, expect health care costs to continue to rise, while access and quality continue to suffer. Ms Edwards ended her article with two specific suggestions: <blockquote class="tr_bq">take the process away from the control of the AMA and put it in the hands of a well-resourced group of experts under the auspices of the federal government. This might take the form of a panel of doctors employed by the government, or of an advisory committee of representatives of different medical societies but with greater representation of primary care doctors.</blockquote> Or <blockquote class="tr_bq"> get Medicare out of the business of funding fee-for-service medicine. </blockquote> I can only hope that the latest Washington Monthly article, which was accompanied by an <a href="http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/july_august_2013/editors_note/the_doctor_cartel_will_see_you045632.php">editorial</a> and a short first-hand <a href="http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/july_august_2013/features/a_day_in_the_life_of_a_primary045640.php">account</a> of how difficult is the lot of the modern primary care physician, will succeed in increasing awareness of the RUC and its essential role in making the US health care system increasingly unworkable.  Of course, such awareness may disturb the many people who are making so much money within the current system.  But if we do nothing about the RUC, and about the ever expanding bubble of health care costs, that bubble will surely burst, and the results for patients' and the public's health will be devastating. APPENDIX - Background on the RUC  We have <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/RUC">frequently posted</a>, first <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/03/on-disparities-between-reimbursement-of.html">here in 2007</a>, and more recently <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/07/primary-care-and-hc-renewal-ruc-kus.html">here,</a>  <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/06/ruc-off-new-england-journal-once-again.html">here</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/02/replace-ruc.html">here</a>, and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/03/getting-out-of-our-ruc-open-letter-to.html">here</a>, about the little-known group that controls how the US Medicare system pays physicians, the RBRVS Update Committee, or <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/RUC">RUC</a>. Since 1991, Medicare has set physicians' payments using the Resource Based Relative Value System (RBRVS), ostensibly based on a rational formula to tie physicians' pay to the time and effort they expend, and the resources they consume on particular patient care activities. Although the RBRVS was meant to level the payment playing field for cognitive services, including primary care vs procedures, over time it has had the opposite effect, as explained by Bodenheimer et al in a 1997 article in the Annals of Internal Medicine.(1) A system that pays a lot for procedures, but much less for diagnosing illnesses, forecasting prognoses, deciding on treatment, and understanding patients' values and preferences when procedures and devices are not involved, is likely to be very expensive, but not necessarily very good for patients.   As we <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/02/what-ruc-again-one-of-worlds-most.html">wrote before</a>, to update the system, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) relies almost exclusively on the advice of the <a href="http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/solutions-managing-your-practice/coding-billing-insurance/medicare/the-resource-based-relative-value-scale/the-rvs-update-committee.shtml">RBRVS Update Committee</a>. The RUC is a private committee of the AMA, <a href="http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/380/toptenthings.pdf">touted</a> as an "expert panel" that takes advantage of the organization's First Amendment rights to petition the government. Membership on the RUC is allotted to represent specialty societies, so that the vast majority of the members represent specialties that do procedures and focus on expensive, high-technology tests and treatments.   However, the identities of RUC members were opaque for a long time, and the proceedings of the group are secret.  As Goodson(2) noted, RUC "meetings are closed to outside observers except by invitation of the chair." Furthermore, he stated, "proceedings are proprietary and therefore not publicly available for review."   In fact, the fog surrounding the operations of the RUC seems to have affected many who write about it. We have posted (<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/12/is-sustainable-growth-rate-main-problem.html">here</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/07/can-we-fix-medicare-while-pretending.html">here</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/12/no-such-ruc-new-england-journal-takes.html">here</a>, and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/06/ruc-off-new-england-journal-once-again.html">here</a>) about how previous publications about problems with incentives provided to physicians seemed to have avoided even mentioning the RUC. Up until 2010, after the US recent attempt at health care reform, the RUC seemed to remain the great unmentionable. Even the leading US medical journal seemed reluctant to even print its name.   That <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/10/ruc-it-up-how-us-government-fixes.html">changed</a> in October, 2010.  A combined effort by the Wall Street Journal, the Center for Public Integrity, and Kaiser Health News yielded two major articles about the RUC, <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704657304575540440173772102.html">here</a> in the WSJ (also with two more spin-off articles), and <a href="http://www.publicintegrity.org/articles/entry/2571/">here </a>from the Center for Public Integrity (also <a href="http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2010/October/27/AMA-center-public-integrity.aspx">reprinted</a> by Kaiser Health News.) The articles covered the main points about the RUC: its de facto control over how physicians are paid, its "secretive" nature (quoting the WSJ article), how it appears to favor procedures over cognitive physician services, etc.   In 2011, after the "<a href="http://www.replacetheruc.org/">Replace the RUC</a>" movement generated some more interest about this secretive group, and its complicated but obscure role in the health care system, the current RUC membership was finally revealed.  It was relatively <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/04/rucing-about-conflicts-of-interest.html">easy for me to determine </a>that many of the members had conflicts of interest (beyond their specialty or sub-specialty identity and their role in medical societies that might have institutional conflicts of interest, and leaders with conflicts of interest).     Then that year a lawsuit was filed by a number of primary care physicians that contended that the RUC was functioning illegally as a de facto US government advisory panel.  It appeared that things might change.  However, it was not to be.  A judge <a href="http://careandcost.com/2012/05/19/medicare-physician-payment-the-rucs-hollow-victory/">dismissed the lawsuit</a> in 2012, based on his contention that the law that set up the RBRVS system prevented any challenges through the legal system to the mechanism used to set payment rates.  The ruling did not address the legality of the relationship between the RUC and the federal government.  The eery quiet then resumed, only punctuated briefly in early 2013, when a <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/01/us-senate-subcommittee-asks-what-ruc-is.html">Senate committee held hearings</a> with no obvious effect.       ADDENDUM (15 July, 2013) - see also <a href="http://brodyhooked.blogspot.com/2013/07/the-ruc-revisited-more-corruption-in.html">comments</a> by Dr Howard Brody on the Hooked: Ethics, Medicine and Pharma blog.   ADDENDUM (18 July, 2013) - see also <a href="http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2013/07/how-the-ama-engages-in-government-sanctioned-price-fixing.html">comments</a> by Yves Smith on the Naked Capitalism blog. References 1. Bodenheimer T, Berenson RA, Rudolf P. The primary care-specialty income gap: why it matters. Ann Intern Med 2007; 146: 301-306. (Link <a href="http://www.annals.org/content/146/4/301.full">here</a>.) 2. Goodson JD. Unintended consequences of Resource-Based Relative Value Scale reimbursement. JAMA 2007; 298(19):2308-2310. (Link <a href="http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/short/298/19/2308">here</a>.)

Another Attempt to Show the RUC Behind the Curtain

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08 Jul 2013

Three Facets of One Hospital: Coddling the Rich, Hounding the Poor, and Crooked Executives

Juxtaposing three news stories from the past few months raises disturbing questions about the priorities of the leaders of one of the US' more prestigious hospitals. "Chefs, Butlers, Marble Baths: Hospitals Vie for the Affluent"  This 21 January, 2012 <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/nyregion/chefs-butlers-and-marble-baths-not-your-average-hospital-room.html">article </a>from the New York Times focused on the ritzy comforts now provided for wealthy (but perhaps not very sick) patients at the renowned New York Presbyterian/ Weill Cornell Hospital.  It opened, <blockquote>The feverish patient had spent hours in a crowded emergency room. When she opened her eyes in her Manhattan hospital room last winter, she recalled later, she wondered if she could be hallucinating: 'This is like the Four Seasons — where am I?' The bed linens were by Frette, Italian purveyors of high-thread-count sheets to popes and princes. The bathroom gleamed with polished marble. Huge windows displayed panoramic East River views. And in the hush of her $2,400 suite, a man in a black vest and tie proffered an elaborate menu and told her, 'I’ll be your butler.' It was Greenberg 14 South, the elite wing on the new penthouse floor of NewYork-Presbyterian/Weill Cornell hospital. Pampering and décor to rival a grand hotel, if not a Downton Abbey, have long been the hallmark of such 'amenities units,' often hidden behind closed doors at New York’s premier hospitals. But the phenomenon is escalating here and around the country, health care design specialists say, part of an international competition for wealthy patients willing to pay extra, even as the federal government cuts back hospital reimbursement in pursuit of a more universal and affordable American medical system. </blockquote> Additional amenities include: <blockquote>A waterfall, a grand piano and the image of a giant orchid grace the soaring ninth floor atrium....</blockquote> Also, <blockquote>the visitors’ lounge seems to hang over the East River in a glass prow and Ciao Bella gelato is available on demand....</blockquote> An architect who specializes in designing such luxury facilities for hospitals noted: <blockquote>'These kinds of patients, they’re paying cash — they’re the best kind of patient to have,' she added. 'Theoretically, it trickles down.' </blockquote> Note that the article also mentioned other hospitals which offered similar luxuries, including Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, Cedars-Sinai Medical Center in Los Angeles, and Mount Sinai Medical Center in New York. On the other hand,.... Hounding the Poor for Payment While Getting Government Money for Indigent Care On 12 February, the New York Times published an <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/13/nyregion/study-finds-new-york-hospitals-flout-charity-rules.html">article</a> about how New York Presbyterian/ Weill Cornell deals with patients with fewer resources than those discussed above: <blockquote>For most of her life, Hope Rubel was a healthy woman with good medical insurance, an unblemished credit history and a solid career in graphic design. But on the day an ambulance rushed her to a Manhattan hospital emergency room shortly after her 48th birthday, she was jobless, uninsured and having a stroke. Ms. Rubel’s medical problem was rare, a result of a benign tumor on her adrenal gland, but the financial consequences were not unusual. She depleted her savings to pay $17,000 for surgery to remove the tumor, and then watched, 'emotionally paralyzed,' she said, as $88,000 in additional hospital bills poured in. Eventually the hospital sued her for the money. Yet that year the hospital, NewYork-Presbyterian/Weill Cornell, had already collected $50.2 million from the state’s so-called Indigent Care Pool to help care for people like Ms. Rubel who have no insurance and cannot pay their bills. </blockquote> Note that the article also included other New York hospitals that allegedly used aggressive collection tactics on poor patients even though they too collected government money for indigent care. These included NYU Langone Medical Center and State University of New York Downstate Medical Center. And one more... Kickbacks for Hospital Executives For some reason, the only media coverage of this story was not in New York, but <a href="http://articles.philly.com/2012-02-13/news/31054958_1_kickbacks-philadelphia-developer-hospital-employees">by the Philadelphia Inquirer </a>on 13 February, 2012. <blockquote>The FBI said that ... [Michael Yaron] he received asbestos-removal and construction contracts at New York Presbyterian Hospital for two of his companies, Cambridge Environmental & Construction Corp. and Oxford Construction & Development Corp., because he paid about $2.3 million in kickbacks starting in 2000. Neither Yaron, a resident of Meadowbrook, Montgomery County, nor his attorneys could be reached for comment yesterday. No one answered at Yaron Properties, his offices on Arch Street in Old City. Bucks County native Moshe Buchnik, a president of two asbestos-abatement companies, was also convicted after the four-week trial. Santo Saglimbeni, a former vice president of facilities operations at the hospital, and Emilio 'Tony' Figueroa, a former director of facilities operations at the hospital, were also convicted. The FBI said the two former hospital employees steered contracts to Yaron and Buchnik in exchange for the kickbacks.</blockquote> The Inquirer apparently covered the story because Yaron lives in Philadelphia. Thus it treated the convictions of a former vice president and former director of facilities operations at New York Presbyterian/ Weill Cornell Hospital as afterthoughts. Summary Thus, in the last six weeks, we have been treated to stories that showed how New York Presbyterian/ Weill Cornell Hospital has devoted substantial resources to create luxury suites for rich patients, presumably because they may pay cash; while simultaneously hounding poor patients who could not pay their large medical bills, even though the hospital was receiving government funds for indigent care; and until recently was employing some executives now shown to have abused their authority. The themes of the three individual stories should be familiar. The first story was a reminder that the very rich are different from you and me in how they interact with the health care system. In many ways, the rich and powerful - some might call them the one percent - are personally protected from various aspects of health care dysfunction. For example, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/executive%20health%20plans">here</a> we have discussed how wealthy executives seem to be able to obtain health insurance with benefits unheard of by the more common folk, and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/10/how-rich-and-influential-get-health.html">here</a> we discussed how the wealthy and influential may get preferential hospital treatment. Thus, even one percenters who are not otherwise involved in health care may not be inclined to lend their support to any efforts to really reform the system. Aggressive bill collection practices by hospitals which are supposed to serve the poor are also old news. We first <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2004/12/money-trumps-mission.html">discussed</a> such practices occurring in New York City in 2004 - yes, this blog is that old. We also <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/12/suing-poor-patients-in-maryland.html">discussed</a> such practices in Baltimore in 2008. Such practices are an example of <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/mission-hostile%20management">mission-hostile management</a>. Finally, we have commented many times about misbehavior by health care executives, and discussed examples of <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/fraud">fraud</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/kickbacks">kickbacks</a>, and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/health%20care%20corruption">health care corruption</a>. It has been unusual, however, for individual executives to actually suffer negative consequences when they induce systemic misbehavior in their organizations. Instead, the results are often <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/legal%20settlements">legal settlements</a> that only lead to financial penalties on the organizations that are no more than costs of doing business. However, the juxtaposition of stories that a hospital has been coddling the rich, and simultaneously hounding the poor while it was lead by at least a few criminal executives is unusual. One would think that they should lead to an in-depth look at the leadership and governance of the institution in question, perhaps even to some reform of same. (By the way, one area of interest to such an investigation should be the presence of several former and current leaders of some of the failed financial firms that lead us into the global financial crisis or great recession on the board of that hospital, as we discussed <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/01/new-york-presbyterian-hospital-trustee.html">here</a> and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/12/with-leaders-like-these.html">here</a>.) However, so far I seem to be only one to note the inter-relationships of these stories, and their implications, while obvious, therefore remain anechoic. So I get to repeat.... Health care organizations need leadership that understands, and knowledgeably upholds the organizations' missions and patients and the public's health. The leaders should be subject to incentives that align with these responsibilities, and should not be given opportunities to personally profit from activities hostile to the mission.

Three Facets of One Hospital: Coddling the Rich, Hounding the Poor, and Crooked Executives

Juxtaposing three news stories from the past few months raises disturbing questions about the priorities of the leaders of one of the US' more prestigious hospitals."Chefs, Butlers, Marble Baths: Hosp…

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26 Feb 2012

Getting Out of Our RUC - "An Open Letter To Primary Care Physicians"

Since 2007, we have been <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/RUC">writing</a> about the secretive RUC (RBRVS Update Committee), the private AMA committee that somehow has managed to get effective control over how Medicare pays physicians.  The RUC has been accused of setting up incentives that strongly favor invasive, high technology procedures while disfavoring primary care and other "cognitive medicine."  Despite the central role of (perverse) incentives in raising health care costs while limiting access and degrading quality, there has been surprisingly little discussion about the pivotal role played by the RUC.  Now there is a movement afoot to <a href="http://replacetheruc.org/">replace the RUC</a>.  In a new post <a href="http://careandcost.com/2011/03/05/an-open-letter-to-primary-care-physicians/">on the Care and Cost blog</a>, and <a href="http://replacetheruc.org/2011/03/05/an-open-letter-to-primary-care-physicians/">the Replace the RUC site</a>, Paul M. Fischer and Brian Klepper urged four approaches: 1. Make the public aware of the RUC’s role and urge the primary care societies to stop “enabling” the RUC through their participation. 2. Recruit experts who can credibly calculate the economic impacts of the RUC’s actions, and who can devise alternative payment methodologies. 3. Demonstrate the unlawfulness of CMS’ (and HCFA’s) two-decades long reliance on the RUC. 4. Develop a collaboration between primary care and non-health care business. They are also urging three specific actions: <blockquote>1. Contact your primary care society to demand that they withdraw from the RUC. 2. Broaden awareness of what we’re doing and why by rebroadcasting to your primary care colleagues. 3. Get in touch to help us with resources, relationships or approaches that can strengthen this project.</blockquote> They have set up an <a href="http://www.ipetitions.com/petition/quittheruc/">electronic petition</a> that people can use to urge the three major medical societies that represent primary care physicians to quit the RUC. On Health Care Renewal, we have been trying to make the systemic problems with with the leadership of health care organizations less <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/anechoic%20effect">anechoic</a> in the hopes that greater realization that these problems exist would lead to actions to solve them. The regulatory capture by the RUC of Medicare's payment setting mechanism is one problem that really cries out for a solution. In 2007, I <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/05/more-on-disparities-between.html">called for</a> "an unbiased re-evaluation of the components of the RBRVS by people who are dedicated to doing it fairly, not benefiting one group of physicians, or the organizations that benefit from the increased use of procedures"; and "an unbiased investigation of what went awry with the process used by Medicare to determine physician payments."  Your heard it here first on Health Care Renewal.  It is nice to now have such distinguished company.  I urge our readers to consider the actions urged above.  True health care reform will require a transparent, honest, fair process for governments to decide on how they will pay for physicians' care and other health care services and goods.

Getting Out of Our RUC - "An Open Letter To Primary Care Physicians"

Since 2007, we have been writing about the secretive RUC (RBRVS Update Committee), the private AMA committee that somehow has managed to get effective control over how Medicare pays physicians. The R…

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07 Mar 2011

SGIM Urges "Chuck the RUC"

This week, <a href="http://www.sgim.org/">Society of General Internal Medicine </a>(SGIM) members received the 5 August, 2009, Update in Health Policy that urged we "chuck the RUC," (quoted in its entirety below, italics added for emphasis): <blockquote> Who will assign the value of primary care services? Chuck the RUC! How does Medicare determine physician payment rates? The answer to this question is a core element of the ongoing debate about health care reform. Changing how Medicare sets payment rates for physicians is especially critical since Medicare rates also guide the rates set by private insurers. Since 1992, Medicare has paid physicians according to the Resource Based Relative Value Scale (RBRVS), a fee schedule that multiplies relative values for physician services by a conversion factor to determine the amount of payment. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has historically used the Relative Value Scale Update Committee, or RUC, as the sole source of recommendations. This committee within the AMA performs broad reviews of the RBRVS every five years. Twenty three of the RUC's twenty nine members are appointed by major national medical specialty societies, including those that account for high percentages of Medicare expenditures for procedures. All meetings are closed and discussions are confidential. The over-representation of procedure-driven subspecialties and under-representation of generalist physicians in the RUC has contributed to the current undervalued cognitive services (especially for primary care) and over-valued reimbursement for procedures. In March 2007, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) identified the RUC process as a major reason for undervalued primary care services and a significant contributor to the crisis in primary care. MedPAC has recommended that an independent expert panel of economists, technology experts, physicians and private citizens be created to supplement the RUC's recommendations to CMS regarding fee schedules. Health reform discussions have included moving MedPAC into the executive branch and giving it authority to review and recommend Medicare payment policy, thus reducing the RUC's influence. Not surprisingly, both the AMA and the American College of Surgeons have opposed this proposal. Groups representing primary care physicians, including SGIM, are in favor of this proposal which could ensure fair and unbiased assignment of work RVUs to all the service codes used by physicians. We believe that this will correct the payment inequalities of the current fee scale and ultimately renew trainees' interest in primary care. In the coming weeks, SGIM may ask you to act on this issue and contact your legislators to urge them to support these transformative proposals for primary care. Please monitor your e-mail for action alerts and be prepared to act. </blockquote> We have previously posted (most recently <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/06/letter-from-ruc-and-my-reply.html">here</a> in considerable detail) about the perverse incentives given US physicians by the payment schedule dictated by the US Medicare system. These incentives have been largely responsible for the increasingly dire status of primary care/ generalist care in the US. Revisions to the Resource-Based Relative Value System (RBRVS) disproportionately reward physicians for performing procedures and diagnostic tests instead of talking with, examining, thinking about, diagnosing, recommending decisions for, and counseling patients. The US Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) uses the RBRVS Update Committee (RUC) de facto as its sole source for advice on revising the system. The RUC is dominated by representatives of medical societies whose members predominantly perform procedures and do diagnostic tests. The RUC is secretive. The identities of its individual members are difficult to ascertain. Its proceedings are secret. Thus, the RBRVS updating process run by the RUC is opaque, unaccountable, and not representative of patients and "cognitive" physicians. The result of this process has been perverse incentives that have driven up health care costs without obvious improvements in quality or outcomes. I applaud SGIM for being the first medical society to challenge how the RUC controls payments to physicians, and the perverse incentives the RUC process has generated. As the Update above says, meaningful health care reform in the US will not occur unless we address the perverse incentives that drive up costs without improving care.

SGIM Urges "Chuck the RUC"

This week, Society of General Internal Medicine (SGIM) members received the 5 August, 2009, Update in Health Policy that urged we "chuck the RUC," (quoted in its entirety below, italics added for emph…

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07 Aug 2009

The RUCkus Continues: Former Medicare Administrator Calls the "RUC Process" "Incredibly Flawed," and the AMA Chair Says He's "Inaccurate"

We have posted frequently about the role of the RBRVS Update Committee (RUC) in fixing the rates at which Medicare pays physicians. These payment rates have been much more generous for procedures than for "cognitive" services, (that is, services including interviewing and examining patients, making diagnoses, forecasting prognoses, recommending tests or treatments, and counseling patients.) Several authors have suggested that how the RUC fixes payment rates is a major cause of the decline of primary care. (See our previous posts on this <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/03/on-disparities-between-reimbursement-of.html">here</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/12/is-sustainable-growth-rate-main-problem.html">here</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/05/payments-for-patient-centered-medical.html">here</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/07/can-we-fix-medicare-while-pretending.html">here</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/12/no-such-ruc-new-england-journal-takes.html">here</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/02/what-ruc-again-one-of-worlds-most.html">here</a>, and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/06/letter-from-ruc-and-my-reply.html">here</a> and important articles by Bodenheimer et al,[1] and Goodson.[2]) An Interview with a former Medicare administrator Health Affairs just published an interview(3) with Kerry Weems, a recent administrator of the US Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) under the Bush administration, who had some remarkable criticism for the RUC. <blockquote> Iglehart: The last question I wanted to ask you relates to the Specialty Society Relative Value Scale Update Committee [RUC] of the American Medical Association. The AMA formed the RUC to act as an expert panel in developing relative value recommendations to CMS. The twenty-nine-member committee essentially determines, through the relative values it establishes for the codes that form the basis of Medicare payments, how much doctors will earn from providing services to beneficiaries. In recent years the RUC has come under criticism based on the view that its specialty- dominated composition undervalues primary care services and, in some instances, overvalues specialty services. I have two questions, Kerry, regarding the RUC. You have been in government for twenty-six years; have you ever heard of an administration that has seriously questioned the RUC process, and whether CMS ought to somehow internalize it or delegate it to another body? Weems: I think there is a general consensus that the RUC has contributed to the poor state of primary care in the United States. In many ways the supposition behind the RUC process, behind the whole relative value scale, is incredibly flawed. It's an input measurement system, so it asks, What's the cost of my inputs, and that's how I'm going to price my outputs. It has no relationship to perhaps the market value of what you might buy. So because it's highly procedure based, it's prejudiced against just standard primary care evaluation and management [E&M] visits, because in an E&M visit it's hard to document what happens in the same way that it is when you remove a mole, or perform some other procedure. So the process itself is flawed. I don't think that we can make a change without a statutory change giving us the ability to do that. But it's something that is drastically needed. You know, it's funny that we talk about better coordination of care and creating the medical home. Well, the place where this can occur is in an E&M visit, which has been highly undervalued by the RUC. Iglehart: You say that the RUC process is seriously flawed and needs to be overhauled. Was there ever any discussion during the eight years of the George W. Bush administration about doing that? Weems: There were a number of discussions, but it's a hard nut to crack. Those discussions never ripened to the point where we could say we've got something better. Iglehart: But you'd anticipate under the Obama administration that those discussions will continue? Weems: Sure. And, you know, you can even see the early attempts at trying to crack that. Representative [Pete] Stark [D-CA] introduced last year the so-called CHAMP [Children's Health and Medicare Protection Act] bill, in which he proposed to develop a new payment approach that would have provided more money to primary care physicians. He split it up into several different categories. This probably wasn't the right approach, but again, he was trying to work through the problem, trying to provide more money for primary care. His heart was in the right place. </blockquote> There are a number of important points here. First, a former CMS administrator charged that the RUC has a substantial role in the decline of primary care in the US. Such charges have been made by well-reputed academics who have analyzed the role of the RUC from the outside. But as we have said before, aspects of what the RUC does are obscure, especially because the proceedings of RUC meetings are not made public. But now someone more directly involved has made the same charges. Second, a former CMS administrator has called the "RUC process ... incredibly flawed." Even the second Bush administration felt these flaws were sufficient to have "a number of discussions," but found "it's a hard nut to crack." Hence he said that although there is something fundamentally wrong with the "RUC process," the government could not easily fix it. Yet RUC leadership has repeatedly said that the RUC is merely a private advisory committee which gives recommendations to CMS using its rights to free speech and to petition the government. (Note also that above, Inglehart first said that the RUC was formed as "an expert panel" to make "recommendations." But then he said the committee "determines ... how much doctors will earn.") If the RUC is simply an advisory committee, and CMS did not like the advice the RUC was giving, why couldn't CMS leaders simply ignore the RUC? Weems' remarks do not make sense if the RUC is merely an outside private group providing advice. But they do make sense if the RUC is acting like a government agency. So this interview once again raises the question: why does CMS rely exclusively on the RUC to update the RBRVS system, apparently making the RUC de facto a government agency, yet without any accountability to CMS, or the government at large? A response by the Chair of the Board of the AMA Within days of this interview, Dr Rebecca Patchin, the Chair of the Board of Trustees of the American Medical Association (AMA), wrote a response to the Weems interview. (Amazingly, the response appeared as a <a href="http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2009/06/24/the-rucs-record-defending-primary-care/#more-1469">blog post </a>on the Health Affairs Blog.) First, she implied that a former CMS administrator did not know what he was talking about when it came to the RUC. <blockquote>In the interview, inaccurate statements were made about the role of the AMA/Specialty Society RVS Update Committee (RUC), which advises CMS regarding the relative levels of reimbursement for different medical procedures performed by physicians. </blockquote> Now I feel like I am in good company. The leaders of the RUC have charged that I made inaccurate statements about the RUC as well (see post <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/06/letter-from-ruc-and-my-reply.html">here</a>). However, Dr Patchin failed to identify any particular statements by Kerry Weems or his interviewer as inaccurate, much less provide any evidence to that effect. Note that while the RUC leaders also charged me with making inaccurate statements, they did not specify any particular statements as inaccurate, much less produce evidence in support of their contentions. Next, Dr Patchin wrote: <blockquote>Every time the RUC has been asked to review payments for E&M (evaluation and management) codes, the RUC has sent CMS recommendations that would lead to higher payments. </blockquote> This may be so, but it ignores an important issue. While the RUC may have made some recommendations to increase payments for cognitive services, it has made many more recommendations to increase payments for procedural services. Furthermore, while payments for individual procedures went up, and the volume of procedures also went up, the global budget for physicians' services, called the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR), resulted in across the board cuts. Since raises for procedures were larger and more frequent than raises for cognitive services, the net effect was that payments for procedures increased relative to cognitive services. Even more important, it begs that question: what has the RUC done at times when no one asked it "to review payments for E&M ... codes?" After all, the RUC leadership has argued again and again that it is only a private advisory committee (and see below for another such argument). As such, it should be able to choose how often it deals with payments for cognitive services. It should not have to wait to be asked to review them. So why wasn't the RUC reviewing these payments more frequently? Then, Dr Patchin reiterated: <blockquote>To clarify: The RUC makes recommendations to CMS, and then CMS makes its payment decisions. </blockquote> and again, <blockquote> Bottom line: the RUC makes recommendations, CMS makes payment decisions. </blockquote> This, once more, begs the questions. Why didn't the RUC make more recommendations to improve payments for cognitive services? Why doesn't CMS get recommendations about payments to physicians from sources other than the RUC? Why doesn't CMS make the process for setting physicians' payments, and updating and revising the RBRVS system more broad-based and transparent? Why did the administrator of CMS feel unable to change or ignore the "RUC process?" I don't have the capacity to find out the answers to these questions. Answering them might take some investigative reporting, or even a Congressional investigation. Given that physicians' payments are key incentives driving the health care system, and that payments favoring procedures are likely to be a major cause for rising volume and costs of procedures, which, in turn, is likely to be a major reason our health care system is so expensive, why do we know so little about how these payment rates are set? References 1. Bodenheimer T, Berenson RA, Rudolf P. The primary care-specialty income gap: why it matters. Ann Intern Med 2007; 146: 301-306. Link <a href="http://www.annals.org/cgi/content/full/146/4/301">here</a>. 2. Goodson JD. Unintended consequences of Resource-Based Relative Value Scale reimbursement. JAMA 2007; 298(19):2308-2310. Link <a href="http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/short/298/19/2308">here</a>. 3. Iglehart JK. Doing more with less: a conversation with Kerry Weems. Health Aff 2009; <a href="http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.28.4.w688/DC1">http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.28.4.w688/DC1</a>

The RUCkus Continues: Former Medicare Administrator Calls the "RUC Process" "Incredibly Flawed," and the AMA Chair Says He's "Inaccurate"

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25 Jun 2009

A Letter from the RUC, and My Reply

The vast amounts spent in the US on health care have not translated into access for many patients, consistently excellent quality of care, and signiticantly improved outcomes. While we spend all this money, the primary care and generalist practitioners on the front lines are increasingly embattled and disgruntled, and their numbers are rapidly thinning. One problem may be the pattern of fees paid to physicians. Fees paid to physicians not only influence costs directly, but provide incentives for physician decision making about what tests and treatments patients receive. We have posted several times, most recently in February, 2009, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/02/what-ruc-again-one-of-worlds-most.html">here</a>, about how the US Medicare system sets fees paid to physicians. Since health care reform is now a hot topic in the US, there has been increasing discussion of the plight of primary care and generalist practitioners, but little consideration of how it arose. What we wrote in February was (with updated links): <blockquote> As we have discussed, the US Medicare system determines what it pays physicians using the <a href="http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/solutions-managing-your-practice/coding-billing-insurance/medicare/the-resource-based-relative-value-scale/overview-of-rbrvs.shtml">Resource Based Relative Value System (RBRVS)</a>. This system determines the pay for every kind of medical encounter according to a complex formula that is supposed to account for physicians' time and effort, physicians' practice expense, and the cost of malpractice insurance. The components of physicians' effort assessed are, in turn, technical skill and physical effort; the required mental effort and judgment; and stress due to the potential risk to the patient. To keep the system, which was started in 1990, current, requires addition of new kinds of encounters, which means encounters involving new kinds of procedures, and updating of the estimates of various components, including physicians' time and effort. To do so, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) relies almost exclusively on the advice of the RBRVS Update Committee (RUC). The <a href="http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/solutions-managing-your-practice/coding-billing-insurance/medicare/the-resource-based-relative-value-scale/the-rvs-update-committee.shtml">RUC</a> is a private committee of the AMA, touted as an "expert panel" that takes advantage of the organization's First Amendment rights to petition the government. Membership on the RUC is allotted to represent specialty societies, so that the vast majority of the members represent specialties that do procedures and focus on expensive, high-technology tests and treatments. However, the identities of RUC members are secret, as are the proceedings of the group. This opaque and unaccountable process has resulted in increases outstripping inflation in fees paid for procedures, while fees paid for "cognitive" medicine, i.e., for primary care, and for services that involve diagnosis, management of acute and chronic disease, counseling, coordination of care, etc, but not procedures, have lagged inflation. The effects of the RUC have been amplified by the unexplained tendency of commercial managed care and health insurance to track the RBRVS system when making their own payments to physicians. For further details about the RUC, see these posts on Health Care Renewal (<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/03/on-disparities-between-reimbursement-of.html">here</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/12/is-sustainable-growth-rate-main-problem.html">here</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/05/payments-for-patient-centered-medical.html">here</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/07/can-we-fix-medicare-while-pretending.html">here</a>, and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/12/no-such-ruc-new-england-journal-takes.html">here</a>) and important articles by Bodenheimer et al,(1) and Goodson.(2) By the way, why the US Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) relies de facto exclusively on the RUC to control the RBRVS system, and why the AMA made the RUC into a secret organization apparently beholden only to the organization's proceduralist members are unanswered questions. </blockquote> The next month, Dr William L Rich III, and Dr Barbary Levy, the Chair and Chair-Elect of the RUC, wrote me a letter to "point out several blatant inaccuracies within your blog entry that severely misrepresent the nature and work of the AMA / Specialty Society RVS Update Committee (RUC)." They then asked me to "retract or correct the inaccurate statements within the aforementioned blog immediately." However, the letter did not specify the supposedly inaccurate statements within the blog post. So, my email response noted that "the letter contains no detail about the alleged 'inaccurate statements.' If you define them, we will certainly consider your views." I never got a reply to this message, therefore thinking the matter to be closed, and I saw at that time no reason to make the exchange public. Apparently, the matter was not closed. A few days ago, two anonymous comments were appended to the post. They stated that my letter had appeared on the AMA web-site, <a href="http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/380/posesresponse.pdf">here</a>. So it is now public. The comments did not say, and I have so far not been able to find out when the letter was posted, and what its context is within the AMA web-site, including any indication that I had already replied to it in private. Despite these irregularities, however, given that the AMA apparently has chosen to make the letter public, I believe I ought to respond publicly. "Blatant Inaccuracies?" Dr Rich and Dr Levy wrote: <blockquote> We would like to take this opportunity to point out several blatant inaccuracies within your blog entry that severely misrepresent the nature and work of the AMA / Specialty Society RBRVS Update Committee (RUC). We request you retract or correct the inaccurate statements within the aforementioned blog immediately. </blockquote> First, as I noted above, the letter never specified which of my statements the letter writers considered "blatant inaccuracies." If there are any specific statements of fact in the post above (or any other post I write) that can be shown to be inaccurate, I will correct or retract them. However, I do not believe the letter by Dr Rich and Dr Levy demonstrated any particular statements of mine to be blatantly inaccurate. The Obscurity of the RUC Membership The letter stated: <blockquote> The RUC does not operate in the shadows. </blockquote> One of my major criticisms of the RUC was that it is opaque. Before I wrote my first post on the RUC, I tried to determine its membership by searching the AMA web-site, easily available AMA publications, and the web. I could find lists of past members, but no current list. In addition, I asked RUC staff by email whether they could provide me the list, or an easy way to access it. They would or could not do so, and the highest ranking staffer I contacted wrote, "we do not give out the RUC members' contact information. We attempt to shield the RUC from lobbying by industry or others." Only after these inquiries did I dub the RUC membership "secret." Dr Rich and Dr Levy suggested that it is not quite secret. It stated that "a list of the individual members of the RUC is published in the AMA publication, Medicare RBRVS 2009: The Physicians Guide." This publication is available from the AMA <a href="https://catalog.ama-assn.org/Catalog/product/product_detail.jsp?productId=prod1170041">here</a> for a mere $71.95. However, the book is not on the web, or in my local or university library, and I have no other way to easily access it. Additionally, although the letter stated, "any individual may solicit AMA staff directly or a specialty society to learn the names of the members of the RUC," the letter was not accompanied by any communication from AMA staff containing this information. Thus, to date, I still do not know who the members of the RUC are. If the letter authors had wanted to show that the membership of the RUC was not meant to be obscure, they could easily have sent me the list with their letter, appended a copy of the pages of the book which contained the list, or asked their staff to provide this information. They chose not to do so. So, while the RUC membership may not be exactly secret, it remains obscure, only barely public, and relatively inaccessible. The Secrecy of RUC Proceedings Furthermore, to support its contention that "the RUC does not operate in the shadows," the letter stated that <blockquote> any individual may attend a RUC meeting upon: (1) the invitation of and notification by a relevant specialty society; (2) an express invitation by the chair of the RUC; or (3) the approval of a written request to attend; and a review of conflicts and potential conflicts of interest. </blockquote> This does not mean that RUC meetings are open, or that their proceedings are public. Instead, as Goodson(2) noted, RUC "meetings are closed to outside observers except by invitation of the chair." Furthermore, he stated, "proceedings are proprietary and therefore not publicly available for review." The letter also personally invited me to attend "the next meeting of the RUC, which will take place April 23-26, 2009 in Chicago." In retrospect, this invitation did not appear serious, since it was never repeated or expanded after my email reply to the March letter. Nor did the invitation include any assurance that I could make anything about this meeting public. I had learned from a previous RUC attendee who will remain anonymous that attendees are obligated to sign non-disclosure agreements. Signing such an agreement might jeopardize my further ability to write anything of substance about the RUC. Furthermore, making all meeting attendees sign non-disclosure agreements effectively makes the meeting secret. The RUC and Primary Care Dr Rich and Dr Levy asserted that: <blockquote> Your publication irrationally and unreasonably paints the RUC as the perpetrator of all physician payment policies that have negatively affected primary care. </blockquote> Furthermore, they argued that the RUC has been good for primary care and cognitive practice: <blockquote> The RUC has made several recommendations that positively benefit cognitive and non-procedural physician specialties. </blockquote> My opinions about the RUC's influence on payments to physicians, and the decline of primary care and generalist and cognitive practice are hardly original. My previous posts were clearly based on evidence and discussion from references 1-4. Let me summarize these arguments, using direct quotes from these references, which perusal of the original articles would reveal are not taken out of context. Primary and generalist practice is threatened by the current payment system. From Bodenheimer et al(1): <blockquote> Incomes of primary care physicians are well below those of many specialists, and the primary care–specialty income gap is widening. ... the lower income of primary care physicians is a major factor leading U.S. medical students to reject primary care careers. Primary care practice is not viable without a substantial increase in the resources available to primary care physicians. </blockquote> From Goodson(2): <blockquote> Medicine's generalist base is disappearing as a consequence of the reimbursement system crafted to save it—the resource-based relative value scale. Current reimbursement incentives substantially favor procedures and technical interventions and offer financial advantages for expensive care, thereby encouraging specialty services. The continued and sustained incentives for medical graduates to choose higher-paying specialty careers and for those physicians in specialty careers to increase income through highly compensated professional activities have been associated with the dwindling of the generalist workforce. The lack of incentives for medical graduates to choose generalist careers in internal medicine, family medicine, and pediatrics has had a profound effect on the workforce mix and, ultimately, US health care expenditures. </blockquote> The RUC has been the major influence on the physician payment system leading to these problems. From Bodenheimer et al(1): <blockquote> In summary, the RUC process favors increases in procedural and imaging reimbursement for 3 reasons: specialty society influence in proposing RVU increases, the specialist-heavy RUC membership, and the desire of RUC specialists to avoid increases in evaluation and management RVUs. With their ability to create new codes and influence RVU updates, many procedural specialists can influence fees in a way that observers find to substantially overvalue procedural and imaging services. Moreover, high fees may encourage physicians to increase the volume of profitable services, leading to even higher income gains and greater spending growth. </blockquote> From Goodson(2): <blockquote> The RUC has powerfully influenced CMS decision making and, as a result, is a powerful force in the US medical economy. Furthermore, by creating and maintaining incentives for more and more specialty care and by failing to accurately and continuously assess the practice expense RVUs, the decisions of CMS have fueled health care inflation. Doing so has affected the competitiveness of US corporations in the global market by contributing to years of double-digit health care inflation that have consistently increased the costs of manufacturing and business in the United States over the last decades. The current mechanism fails to provide sufficient checks and balances and is skewed and dysfunctional. The resource-based relative value scale system originally developed to achieve full value for cognitive services currently threatens the sustainability of the generalist base. As a result, a large portion of the population will lose access to the continuous and personalized care provided by generalist physicians whose repertoire of clinical skills and interventions coupled with access to specialty and diagnostic services are essential for ensuring efficient and effective health care delivery. </blockquote> Dr Rich and Dr Levy are entitled to their opinions, but I would argue that there is considerable evidence and opinion suggesting that the current dysfunctional physician payment system is a major cause of the decline of primary care and cognitive practice, and simultaneous rise in health care costs and decline in health care access in the US. Furthermore, there is also considerable evidence and opinion suggesting that the RUC has singular responsbility for the dysfunctionality of the payment system and how it is skewed in favor of procedures as opposed to cognitive services and primary care. Summarizing: the Opacity of the RUC, and its Negative Effects on Primary Care and Cognitive Services So, I stand by my statement that the RUC process is opaque. Instead of saying "the identities of RUC members are secret, as are the proceedings of the group," I would be willing to now say, "the identities of the RUC members are obscure and difficult to ascertain, and the proceedings of the group are secret." That is not much of an improvement. If the RUC leadership wants to make its membership transparent, all it needs to do is post it on the web. If it wishes to make its proceedings transparent, all it needs to do is publish them as well. If it makes such changes, I would happily and publicly applaud them. If the RUC leadership wants to show that their members are not influenced by individual conflicts of interest, transparency about the committee's membership would inspire more trust than making the information as obscure as possible. Furthermore, there may be more reason to be concerned about the effects of institutional rather than individual conflicts of interest on the RUC. Most RUC members appear to represent specialty societies. Rothman et al claimed that industry funding of professional medical societies is "pervasive."(5) If the RUC leadership wants to show that their committee as a whole is not affected by institutional conflicts of interest of its specialty societies, it ought at least to disclose the relationships of those societies and their leaders with companies that stand to profit from increasing utilization of the specific services whose use is influenced by the incentives which the RUC largely determines. Finally, if there is a "wedge between cognitive and procedural specialties" it was driven a long time ago, particularly by a payment system that progressively favored the latter over the former, and by a bureaucratic burden that fell disproportionately on the former. But blaming the messenger is a time-honored, if not necessarily honorable tactic. References 1. Bodenheimer T, Berenson RA, Rudolf P. The primary care-specialty income gap: why it matters. Ann Intern Med 2007; 146: 301-306. Link <a href="http://www.annals.org/cgi/content/full/146/4/301">here</a>. 2. Goodson JD. Unintended consequences of Resource-Based Relative Value Scale reimbursement. JAMA 2007; 298(19):2308-2310. Link <a href="http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/short/298/19/2308">here</a>. 3. Ginsburg PB, Berenson RA. Revising Medicare's physician fee schedule - much activity, little change. N Engl J Med 2007; 356: 1201-1203. 4. Newhouse JP. Medicare spending on physicians - no easy fix in sight. N Engl J Med 2007; 356: 1883-1884. 5. Rothman DJ, McDonald WJ, Berkowitz CD et al. Professional medical associations and their relationships with industry: a proposal for controlling conflict of interest. JAMA 2009; 301: 1367-1372. Link <a href="http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/301/13/1367">here</a>.

A Letter from the RUC, and My Reply

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10 Jun 2009

"A Vested Economic Interest" in the Outcome of the Battle Over Angioplasty

Re: <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2005/02/interesting-report-from-boston.html">my discussion earlier </a>of price versus value, see <a href="http://www.boston.com/news/globe/health_science/articles/2005/02/13/small_hospitals_battle_for_right_to_do_angioplasties/">this article in the Boston Globe </a>about how community hospitals are battling for authorization to do angioplasty in the Boston area. (Regulations now prevent hospitals who don't have facilities to do coronary artery bypass grafts from doing angioplasty, based on the concern that such hospitals would be unable to cope with acute adverse events from the procedure.) The chief of interventional cardiology at the Beth Israel Deaconess Hospital said, "we have to realize that we have a vested economic interest in the outcome [of the debate about which hospitals can do angioplasty]" He then noted that about 40% of the $17K - $20K that hospitals get from Blue Cross for the procedure is profit. This is an example of how insurance and managed care companies do not have a clear idea of the actual costs of an imporant, expensive service they pay for. Whether they have a better idea of its value to the patient is questionable. Rather than leaning on primary care physicians to reduce utilization of such expensive services, wouldn't it make more sense to bargain down the hospital's profit margins to something less than 40%?

"A Vested Economic Interest" in the Outcome of the Battle Over Angioplasty

Re: my discussion earlier of price versus value, see this article in the Boston Globe about how community hospitals are battling for authorization to do angioplasty in the Boston area. (Regulations no…

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13 Feb 2005

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