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Another Attempt to Show the RUC Behind the Curtain

In 2007, readers of the Annals of Internal Medicine could read part of the solution to a great medical mystery.(1)  For years, health care costs in the US had been levitating faster than inflation, without producing any noticeable positive effect on patients.  Many possible reasons were proposed, but as the problem continued to worsen, none were proven. Prices are High Because They are Fixed That Way The article in the Annals, however, proposed one conceptually simple answer. The prices of most physicians' services, at least most of those that involved procedures or operations for Medicare patients, were high because the US government set them that way. Although the notion that prices were high because they were fixed to be so high was simple, how the fixing was done, and how the fixing affected the rest of the health system was complex, mind numbingly complex. Perhaps because of the complexity of its implementation, the simplicity of the concept has not seemingly reached the consciousness of most American health care professionals or policy makers, despite the publication of several scholarly articles on the subject,.<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/RUC">efforts by humble bloggers such as yours truly,</a> a major journalistic expose, and recent congressional hearings.  The lack of discussion of this issue seemed to be a prime example of what we have called the <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/anechoic%20effect">anechoic effect</a>, that important causes of health care dysfunction whose discussion would discomfit those who are currently personally profiting from the current system rarely produce many public echoes.  (For a review of what is known to date about how the offputtingly named Resource Based Relative Value Scale Update Committee (RUC) works, and previous attempts to makes it central role in fixing what US physicians are paid public, see the Appendix.) The Washington Monthly Pulls Back the Curtain Now another attempt to pull back the curtain that hides the RUC was just made by the Washington Monthly.  A long, detailed, well-written <a href="http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/july_august_2013/features/special_deal045641.php">article</a> by Haley Sweetland Edwards went through the major points, and included some new discoveries.  She asserted: The RUC is Well Hidden <blockquote class="tr_bq">[The RUC is] probably one of the most powerful committees in America that you’ve never heard of.</blockquote> The RUC Fixes Prices <blockquote class="tr_bq">when a roomful of professionals from the same trade meet behind closed doors to agree on how much their services should be worth. It’s called price-fixing. </blockquote> The Government Enables the RUC to Fix Prices <blockquote class="tr_bq"> this kind of 'price-fixing' is not only perfectly legal, it’s sanctioned by the U.S. government. At the end of each of these meetings, RUC members vote anonymously on a list of 'recommended values,' which are then sent to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the federal agency that runs those programs. For the last twenty-two years, the CMS has accepted about 90 percent of the RUC’s recommended values—essentially transferring the committee’s decisions directly into law.</blockquote> The Government Fixed Prices are Endorsed by the Private Sector <blockquote class="tr_bq"> private insurance companies also use Medicare’s fee schedule as a baseline for negotiating prices with hospitals and other providers. </blockquote> The Price Fixing Drives Up Costs and the Use of Services <blockquote class="tr_bq"> So if the RUC inflates the base price Medicare pays for a specific procedure, that inflationary effect ripples up through the health care industry as a whole.</blockquote> These Incentives Cripple Primary Care <blockquote class="tr_bq"> These manipulated prices are also a major reason why specialists are in oversupply in many parts of the country, while a worsening shortage of primary care providers threatens the whole health care delivery system. </blockquote> These Incentives Benefit Big Corporations, not just Medical Specialists <blockquote class="tr_bq"> the incentives are perfectly aligned: ordering that extra test means more money for a doctor’s practice or hospital, more money for the labs, and often more money for the device makers and drug companies, too. (Oh, and, by the way, the device makers and drug companies are, not incidentally, major funders of the medical specialty societies whose members vote on the RUC.)</blockquote><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhHWzSplnD2du3x_SfpKZJ5CaSFXrAoZkdhDxue_1J1f0wQIAV2rbRMgDA-oHz01r7lgv341htPKIV2_EfPKtU_eEAzu6xAn9ZPSUdVYtqfaappwD18k5EziA-KfAvazcaaooKFrlj7doQ9/s1600/SpecialDeal(WashingtonMonthly0713).jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="195" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhHWzSplnD2du3x_SfpKZJ5CaSFXrAoZkdhDxue_1J1f0wQIAV2rbRMgDA-oHz01r7lgv341htPKIV2_EfPKtU_eEAzu6xAn9ZPSUdVYtqfaappwD18k5EziA-KfAvazcaaooKFrlj7doQ9/s320/SpecialDeal(WashingtonMonthly0713).jpg" width="320" /></a></div> [Art by Monte Wolverton for the Washington Monthly article] What to Do and What Will Happen? We previously wrote,  Economists have beaten us over the head with idea that incentives matter.  The RUC seems to embody a corporatist approach to fixing prices for medical services to create <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/perverse%20incentives">perverse incentives</a> for physicians to do more procedures, and do less conversing with and examining patients, examining the best clinical research evidence about their problems, and rigorously thinking about how best to help them.  More procedures at higher prices helps physicians who do procedures.  It may help even more the corporations that provide the devices and drugs whose use is necessitated by such procedures, and the hospitals who can charge a lot of money as sites for performance of procedures.  It may even help insurance companies by driving ever more money through the health care system, and thus allow rationalization for higher administrative expenses as a function of overall money flow. Yet incentives favoring procedures over all else may lead to worse outcomes for patients, and more costs to patients and society.  If we do not figure out how to make incentives given to physicians more rational and fair, expect health care costs to continue to rise, while access and quality continue to suffer. Ms Edwards ended her article with two specific suggestions: <blockquote class="tr_bq">take the process away from the control of the AMA and put it in the hands of a well-resourced group of experts under the auspices of the federal government. This might take the form of a panel of doctors employed by the government, or of an advisory committee of representatives of different medical societies but with greater representation of primary care doctors.</blockquote> Or <blockquote class="tr_bq"> get Medicare out of the business of funding fee-for-service medicine. </blockquote> I can only hope that the latest Washington Monthly article, which was accompanied by an <a href="http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/july_august_2013/editors_note/the_doctor_cartel_will_see_you045632.php">editorial</a> and a short first-hand <a href="http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/july_august_2013/features/a_day_in_the_life_of_a_primary045640.php">account</a> of how difficult is the lot of the modern primary care physician, will succeed in increasing awareness of the RUC and its essential role in making the US health care system increasingly unworkable.  Of course, such awareness may disturb the many people who are making so much money within the current system.  But if we do nothing about the RUC, and about the ever expanding bubble of health care costs, that bubble will surely burst, and the results for patients' and the public's health will be devastating. APPENDIX - Background on the RUC  We have <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/RUC">frequently posted</a>, first <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/03/on-disparities-between-reimbursement-of.html">here in 2007</a>, and more recently <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/07/primary-care-and-hc-renewal-ruc-kus.html">here,</a>  <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/06/ruc-off-new-england-journal-once-again.html">here</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/02/replace-ruc.html">here</a>, and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/03/getting-out-of-our-ruc-open-letter-to.html">here</a>, about the little-known group that controls how the US Medicare system pays physicians, the RBRVS Update Committee, or <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/RUC">RUC</a>. Since 1991, Medicare has set physicians' payments using the Resource Based Relative Value System (RBRVS), ostensibly based on a rational formula to tie physicians' pay to the time and effort they expend, and the resources they consume on particular patient care activities. Although the RBRVS was meant to level the payment playing field for cognitive services, including primary care vs procedures, over time it has had the opposite effect, as explained by Bodenheimer et al in a 1997 article in the Annals of Internal Medicine.(1) A system that pays a lot for procedures, but much less for diagnosing illnesses, forecasting prognoses, deciding on treatment, and understanding patients' values and preferences when procedures and devices are not involved, is likely to be very expensive, but not necessarily very good for patients.   As we <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/02/what-ruc-again-one-of-worlds-most.html">wrote before</a>, to update the system, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) relies almost exclusively on the advice of the <a href="http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/solutions-managing-your-practice/coding-billing-insurance/medicare/the-resource-based-relative-value-scale/the-rvs-update-committee.shtml">RBRVS Update Committee</a>. The RUC is a private committee of the AMA, <a href="http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/380/toptenthings.pdf">touted</a> as an "expert panel" that takes advantage of the organization's First Amendment rights to petition the government. Membership on the RUC is allotted to represent specialty societies, so that the vast majority of the members represent specialties that do procedures and focus on expensive, high-technology tests and treatments.   However, the identities of RUC members were opaque for a long time, and the proceedings of the group are secret.  As Goodson(2) noted, RUC "meetings are closed to outside observers except by invitation of the chair." Furthermore, he stated, "proceedings are proprietary and therefore not publicly available for review."   In fact, the fog surrounding the operations of the RUC seems to have affected many who write about it. We have posted (<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/12/is-sustainable-growth-rate-main-problem.html">here</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/07/can-we-fix-medicare-while-pretending.html">here</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/12/no-such-ruc-new-england-journal-takes.html">here</a>, and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/06/ruc-off-new-england-journal-once-again.html">here</a>) about how previous publications about problems with incentives provided to physicians seemed to have avoided even mentioning the RUC. Up until 2010, after the US recent attempt at health care reform, the RUC seemed to remain the great unmentionable. Even the leading US medical journal seemed reluctant to even print its name.   That <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/10/ruc-it-up-how-us-government-fixes.html">changed</a> in October, 2010.  A combined effort by the Wall Street Journal, the Center for Public Integrity, and Kaiser Health News yielded two major articles about the RUC, <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704657304575540440173772102.html">here</a> in the WSJ (also with two more spin-off articles), and <a href="http://www.publicintegrity.org/articles/entry/2571/">here </a>from the Center for Public Integrity (also <a href="http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2010/October/27/AMA-center-public-integrity.aspx">reprinted</a> by Kaiser Health News.) The articles covered the main points about the RUC: its de facto control over how physicians are paid, its "secretive" nature (quoting the WSJ article), how it appears to favor procedures over cognitive physician services, etc.   In 2011, after the "<a href="http://www.replacetheruc.org/">Replace the RUC</a>" movement generated some more interest about this secretive group, and its complicated but obscure role in the health care system, the current RUC membership was finally revealed.  It was relatively <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/04/rucing-about-conflicts-of-interest.html">easy for me to determine </a>that many of the members had conflicts of interest (beyond their specialty or sub-specialty identity and their role in medical societies that might have institutional conflicts of interest, and leaders with conflicts of interest).     Then that year a lawsuit was filed by a number of primary care physicians that contended that the RUC was functioning illegally as a de facto US government advisory panel.  It appeared that things might change.  However, it was not to be.  A judge <a href="http://careandcost.com/2012/05/19/medicare-physician-payment-the-rucs-hollow-victory/">dismissed the lawsuit</a> in 2012, based on his contention that the law that set up the RBRVS system prevented any challenges through the legal system to the mechanism used to set payment rates.  The ruling did not address the legality of the relationship between the RUC and the federal government.  The eery quiet then resumed, only punctuated briefly in early 2013, when a <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/01/us-senate-subcommittee-asks-what-ruc-is.html">Senate committee held hearings</a> with no obvious effect.       ADDENDUM (15 July, 2013) - see also <a href="http://brodyhooked.blogspot.com/2013/07/the-ruc-revisited-more-corruption-in.html">comments</a> by Dr Howard Brody on the Hooked: Ethics, Medicine and Pharma blog.   ADDENDUM (18 July, 2013) - see also <a href="http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2013/07/how-the-ama-engages-in-government-sanctioned-price-fixing.html">comments</a> by Yves Smith on the Naked Capitalism blog. References 1. Bodenheimer T, Berenson RA, Rudolf P. The primary care-specialty income gap: why it matters. Ann Intern Med 2007; 146: 301-306. (Link <a href="http://www.annals.org/content/146/4/301.full">here</a>.) 2. Goodson JD. Unintended consequences of Resource-Based Relative Value Scale reimbursement. JAMA 2007; 298(19):2308-2310. (Link <a href="http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/short/298/19/2308">here</a>.)

Another Attempt to Show the RUC Behind the Curtain

In 2007, readers of the Annals of Internal Medicine could read part of the solution to a great medical mystery.(1) For years, health care c...

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More Perversity on Health IT Risks, and ... EHR Sense from Nurses on "Nurse Talk", a Syndicated Radio Show

As I mentioned on July 2 <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/07/is-oncs-definition-of-significant-ehr.html">at this post</a>, in a June 25, 2013 Bloomberg News article "<a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-25/digital-health-records-risks-emerge-as-deaths-blamed-on-systems.html">Digital Health Records’ Risks Emerge as Deaths Blamed on Systems</a>" by technology reporter Jordan Robertson an EHR-harms case in which I am (unfortunately) intimately involved as substitute plaintiff is mentioned: that of the death of my mother. I'd previously written about EHR-related electronic encounters with truly perverse individuals at my Jan. 2010 post "More on Perversity in the Healthcare IT World: Is Meditech Employing Sockpuppets?" at <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/01/more-on-perversity-in-hit-world.html">http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/01/more-on-perversity-in-hit-world.html</a>. There were quite a few thoughtful comments in the reader comments of the June 25, 2013 Bloomberg article, but also the typical callous, incompetent and/or bizarre comments that an anonymous forum invites (really, semi-anonymous, as the website tracks IP's of commenters).  The anonymous comment below stood out from the rest as a worst-case example of perverse defense of health IT (it may have been removed by now): <blockquote class="tr_bq">Pharm Aid 1 week ago I'm surprised at the poor quality of reporting in this article.  First, Scot Silverstein has been on jihad against electronic medical records LONG before his dear mother passed away in 2011.  According to Silverstein's own website, he opposed EMRs back as far as 2009. Second, the article fails to mention Silverstein's conflict of interest here - he works in this space.  Essentially, Silverstein contacts a vendor of EMRs, offers his "consulting" services.  This totally smacks of a shakedown to me.  If they don't hire him, he criticizes them and claims they are killing people.  Don't take my word for it, check out his website and blog. Third, the number of medical errors from paper-based records is staggering.  According to a study from 7 years ago, a staggering number - 23% - of patients at one health system had medication errors attributed to illegible paper-based charts.  This is roughly consistent with other studies, including the epic IOM report on errors in medicine.</blockquote> Let me point out the perversities.  I am assuming the comment was not simply deliberately false character assassination and that the writer believed what he/she was writing - which if not, would show the industry's cheerleaders in an even worse light than if the assumption is the poster believes what he/she wrote: <ul><li>No expression of sympathy or remorse at my mother's death, whatever the cause.</li></ul><ul><li>Gross and almost humorously silly caricature of my "consulting" (which is as expert witness) and defamatory comments.</li></ul><ul><li>Gross mischaracterization of this blog and my Drexel Univ. healthcare informatics teaching site at <a href="http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases">http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases</a>.</li></ul><ul><li>A mysterious invocation of some unnamed article on paper records at one health system.   I note that N=1 for both the mysterious unnamed study and its subject institution, representing the absolute worst regarding drawing conclusions, especially conclusions that we need to spend hundreds of billions of healthcare dollars on what today is largely bad health IT (see definitions of good and bad health IT at the aforementioned Drexel site).</li></ul><ul><li>An apparent mischaracterization of the "epic" 1999 IOM report "To Err is Human"on errors in medicine (<a href="http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/1999/To-Err-is-Human/To%20Err%20is%20Human%201999%20%20report%20brief.pdf">http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/1999/To-Err-is-Human/To%20Err%20is%20Human%201999%20%20report%20brief.pdf</a>).  It's clear that many if not most medical errors have nothing whatsoever to do with documentation, either paper or electronic (I made that point at my Dec. 2010 post "Is health IT the solution to the wrong problem?" at <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-healthcare-it-solution-to-wrong.html">http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-healthcare-it-solution-to-wrong.html</a>).  From that 1999 IOM report's summary:</li></ul><blockquote class="tr_bq">... Among the problems that commonly occur during the course of providing health care are adverse drug events and improper transfusions, surgical injuries and wrong-site surgery, suicides, restraint-related injuries or death, falls, burns, pressure ulcers, and mistaken patient identities. </blockquote><ul><li> As to "[my] claims that EHRs are [injuring and] killing people", I merely report what others find - that still others deliberately dismiss (e.g., as "anecdotal") - or ignore. Just the latest example is the ECRI Deep Dive study (<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/02/peering-underneath-icebergs-water-level.html">http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/02/peering-underneath-icebergs-water-level.html</a>).  171 health information technology-related problems voluntarily reported during a nine-week period to the ECRI Institute PSO from just 36 hospitals.  Eight of the incidents reported involved patient harm, and three may have contributed to patient deaths, said the institute.  Other examples appear at HC Renewal.</li></ul> In summary, there is someone out there who reads Bloomberg and who either 1) supports health IT, but lacks empathy, lacks judgment, and lacks scientific and critical thinking skills or 2) is simply a confabulator and liar. Perversity regarding health IT needs sunlight - lots of it. ----------------------- Here's some of that sunlight in a talk program on "Nurse Talk", a nationally syndicated radio show by and for nurses. <blockquote class="tr_bq"><a href="http://nursetalksite.com/">Nurse Talk</a> is heard on the air in major metropolitan areas on both the West and East Coasts, and worldwide on the Internet, and has partnerships with the largest groups of nurses in the country. </blockquote> Listen to the July 3, 2013 program "RNs DeAnn McEwen and Michelle Mahon on Electronic Medical Records" at <a href="http://nursetalksite.com/2013/07/03/rns-deann-mcewen-and-michelle-mahon/">http://nursetalksite.com/2013/07/03/rns-deann-mcewen-and-michelle-mahon/</a>. -- SS

More Perversity on Health IT Risks, and ... EHR Sense from Nurses on "Nurse Talk", a Syndicated Radio Show

As I mentioned on July 2 at this post , in a June 25, 2013 Bloomberg News article " Digital Health Records’ Risks Emerge as Deaths Blam...

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How's this for patient rights? Affinity Medical Center manager: file a safety complaint, and I'll plaster it to your head!

At my June 19, 2013 post "Affinity RNs Call for Halt to Flawed Electronic Medical Records System Scheduled to Go Live Friday" (<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/06/affinity-rns-call-for-halt-to-flawed.html">http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/06/affinity-rns-call-for-halt-to-flawed.html</a>) I noted what appeared to be an imperial hospital leadership recklessly and negligently ignoring their own nurses' concerns about safety of a new EHR system implementation. Now there's this at IndeOnline.com: <blockquote class="tr_bq">"Judge orders Affinity to bargain with union" <a href="http://www.indeonline.com/news/x1808710525/Judge-orders-Affinity-to-bargain-with-union?zc_p=1" target="_blank">(http://www.indeonline.com/news/x1808710525/Judge-orders-Affinity-to-bargain-with-union?zc_p=1</a>) <div class="float_l m5r dateline"></div><div class="float_l m5r dateline">CANTON (OH) — July 2, 2013</div>A judge ruled Affinity Medical Center violated federal labor laws and ordered the hospital to bargain with the registered nurses’ union and reinstate a nurse fired for union activity. Affinity says it will appeal the decision. National Labor Relations Board Administrative Law Judge Arthur Amchan issued a 36-page ruling Monday based on a hearings held April 29 through May 5 in Cleveland. The National Nurses Organizing Committee-Ohio, an affiliate of National Nurses United, filed several labor complaints against Affinity and its parent company, Community Health Systems. The complaints cited the hospital’s refusal to bargain with the union, which was certified last year. ... The judge ordered the hospital to reinstate Ann Wayt, an orthopedic nurse for 23 years, with back pay and restitution of benefit or pension losses, and withdraw efforts to have Wayt’s nursing license pulled by the Ohio State Board of Nursing. Wayt was fired in September and never had been disciplined before that month. “I was confident that the truth would come out,” Wayt said in a statement. “The judge has spoken for me. I want to thank the community, the nurses at Affinity, and the nurses across the country for their support.” The judge also ordered the hospital to stop firing, disciplining or otherwise discriminating against other registered nurses.</blockquote> Mentioned in the article is this: <blockquote class="tr_bq">The judge also ruled that the hospital must end threats and other acts of retaliation against nurses who submit objection forms to the employer documenting assignments they believe are unsafe. The hospital also must stop denying access to the hospital of union representatives ... Two weeks ago, nurses filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB after requesting that the hospital delay a launch of the new electronic health record system, citing inadequate training and short staffing.</blockquote> The nurses began to file objection forms related to the EHR. What really caught my eye was this: <blockquote>... In his ruling, the judge found one Affinity manager violated labor laws by threatening to plaster the objection forms on the forehead of any employee who submitted one. That same manager also began scrutinizing patient charts more closely, stated how much she would enjoy disciplining a prominent union supporter and retaliated against employees by reducing the number of nurses in the intensive-care unit [to make others work harder, patient safety be damned, apparently - ed.], according to the ruling.</blockquote> I dislike stating the obvious, but this manager, a clear bully, is a danger to patient safety and clinician esprit de corps, and needs - at best - sensitivity training, ethics education and perhaps a psychiatric exam. -- SS

How's this for patient rights? Affinity Medical Center manager: file a safety complaint, and I'll plaster it to your head!

At my June 19, 2013 post "Affinity RNs Call for Halt to Flawed Electronic Medical Records System Scheduled to Go Live Friday" ( h...

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55 of Medtronic's Best Hospital Friends, Including HCA, Settle for $34 Million

The case of the over-marketing of Kyphon's kyphoplasty device (look <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/05/corporate-integrity-agreement-for.html">here</a>) just got more complicated, and now appears to have involved an amazing number of players. The State of Play  As reported by the AP (<a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/justice-department-55-hospitals-reach-34-million-settlement-over-medicare-fraud-claims/2013/07/02/3d3d2356-e34e-11e2-bffd-37a36ddab820_story.html">via</a> the Washington Post), <blockquote class="tr_bq"> Fifty-five hospitals in 21 states have agreed to pay $34 million to the U.S. government to settle allegations that they used more expensive inpatient procedures rather than outpatient spinal surgeries to get bigger payments from Medicare, the U.S. Justice Department said Tuesday. The settlement involves kyphoplasty procedures used to treat spinal fractures usually caused by osteoporosis. It can be done as an outpatient procedure, but he Justice Department said the hospitals performed the surgeries as inpatient procedures to increase Medicare billings.</blockquote> The current media reports provided little detail about the allegations, but did note that this case has been litigated for a while, <blockquote class="tr_bq"> A similar settlement was reached last year, when 14 hospitals agreed to pay a settlement of more than $12 million. And in 2008, the Justice Department agreed to a $75 million settlement with Medtronic Inc.’s spine business. The government was investigating allegations that Kyphon, a company that had been acquired by Medtronic Spine in 2007, advised hospitals to do inpatient kyphoplasties to bulk up their Medicare payments.</blockquote> The Players Per the AP, there were quite a few <blockquote class="tr_bq">In the latest settlement, the largest payments are being made by Atrium Medical Center of Middletown, Ohio, which will pay $4.2 million; Mount Sinai Medical Center in Miami, $1.8 million; Altru Health System of Grand Forks, N.D., $1.5 million; Cedars Sinai Medical Center in Los Angeles, $1.5 million; Wayne Memorial Hospital in Goldsboro, N.C., $1.3 million; Trover Health System of Madisonville, Ky., $1.2 million; The Queen’s Medical Center in Honolulu, $1.1 million; and Des Peres Hospital in suburban St. Louis, $900,000. Several multi-hospital organizations agreed to settlements, including: —Twenty-three hospitals with <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/HCA">HCA Inc</a>. of Nashville, Tenn., paying a total of $7.1 million. —Six hospitals with Lifepoint Hospitals Inc. of Brentwood, Tenn., $2.5 million. —Five hospitals with Trinity Health of Livonia, Mich., $3.9 million. —Four hospitals with Morton Plant Mease BayCare Health System of Clearwater, Fla., $2.4 million. —Three hospitals with Baptist Memorial Hospital-Golden Triangle of North Columbus, Miss., $1.8 million. —Two hospitals with Bayhealth Medical Center of Newark, Del., $1.1 million.</blockquote> A Modern Healthcare <a href="http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20130702/NEWS/307029967/55-more-hospitals-settle-in-kyphoplasty-overpayment-cases">report</a> noted that the leadership of HCA, the hospital system with the largest liability, made it out to all be a misunderstanding, <blockquote class="tr_bq">Hospital executives say the allegations are prompted by  unclear Medicare rules on when spinal-surgery patients should be held overnight. And they note that even though the whistle-blowers and the government are targeting hospitals, the decision to admit patients is usually dictated by the treating physician. 'We are pleased to see new clarification of industry care standards, which help physicians make decisions regarding kyphoplasty patients,' HCA spokesman Ed Fishbough said in an e-mailed statement Tuesday. 'We are confident as a result that this issue has been resolved.'</blockquote> However, the case appears to be more complicated than that. What Really Happened, and Who Benefited? In fact, we <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/05/corporate-integrity-agreement-for.html">discussed</a> the Medtronic settlement in 2008.  At that time, a New York Times <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/23/business/23device.html">article</a> described the government's allegations about what went on this way, <blockquote class="tr_bq">A unit of Medtronic defrauded Medicare of hundreds of millions of dollars, according to a civil lawsuit that was unsealed Thursday and simultaneously settled with the Justice Department. Two insiders had said Kyphon, which Medtronic acquired in 2007, improperly persuaded hospitals to keep people overnight for a simple outpatient procedure to repair small fissures of the spine. Medicare then reimbursed the hospitals much more generously than it otherwise would have for the procedure, which was developed as a noninvasive approach that could usually be done in about an hour. By marketing its products this way, Kyphon was able to artificially drive up demand among hospitals, bolstering its revenue and driving up its stock price. Medtronic subsequently bought the company, its competitor, for $3.9 billion, greatly enriching Kyphon’s senior executives. </blockquote> Furthermore, <blockquote class="tr_bq"> The scheme at Kyphon was based on Medicare’s practice of reimbursing hospitals more for complex inpatient back surgery than for outpatient care. The two whistle-blowers, Charles M. Bates and Craig Patrick, said Kyphon had deliberately urged doctors to admit patients overnight, knowing the admissions were unnecessary. Hospitals saw the overnight admissions as a way to raise revenue, the two said, and bought Kyphon’s products, even though they were expensive, starting at $3,500 to repair one spinal fissure. The hospitals could recover the cost through the improper reimbursements for overnight stays. Kyphon sold so much equipment this way that at one point it enjoyed a 90 percent profit margin, according to the two insiders, both of whom worked in sales positions. The former employees said the scheme began in 1999, when Kyphon’s products first came to the market. Kyphon’s rapid sales growth and profitability eventually gave rise to a patent dispute with Medtronic, which was dropped when Medtronic acquired it. The acquisition richly rewarded Kyphon’s shareholders, particularly its top executives. The company said its top 15 executives stood to receive about $145 million by cashing in their options and restricted stock.</blockquote> Note that at that time, Medtronic leadership, whose decision to purchase of Kyphon would end up so enriching Kyphon executives, seemingly had no worries, <blockquote class="tr_bq">A  spokeswoman for Medtronic, Marybeth Thorsgaard, said the company had known Kyphon was under investigation when it made the acquisition. She said it knew that Kyphon’s marketing strategy was being challenged, and took the risk of litigation into account. 'There were no surprises,' she said.</blockquote> I can find no public record that any individual who authorized, directed, or implemented the arrangements above that lead to huge overcharges to Medicare, and huge revenues to Kyphon and the hospitals was subject to any negative consequences.  As noted above, it appears that the executives who lead Kyphon at the time it was acquired by Medtronic made substantial amounts of money apparently attributable to this scheme to allegedly "defraud Medicare of hundreds of millions of dollars" (as it was described above in the New York Times).  Using the public record available on the internet, I tried to see how the top three Kyphon executives are doing now.  It appears they are not doing badly, and remain influential in health care.  According to its <a href="http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1123313/000119312507096257/ddef14a.htm">2007 proxy statement</a>, just before Kyphon was bought out, its CEO was Richard W Mott.  As best as I can tell, <a href="http://people.equilar.com/bio/richard-mott-alfred-university/salary/525993#.UdRnh6zNrrI">per Equilar,</a> he currently runs a consulting firm (Walkabout Consulting LLC), and was previously chairman of <a href="http://www.linkedin.com/company/photothera">PhotoThera</a>, which just went out of business.  Kyphon's chief science officer was  Karen D Talmadge, PhD, who is now on the <a href="http://www.diabetes.org/about-us/board-of-directors/karen-d-talmadge.html">board of directors of the American Diabetes Association,</a> and is also "Chair of the Board of Directors of Gynesonics, and serves on the Boards of Directors of Amplyx Pharmaceuticals, Velocity Pharmaceutical Development and Venous Health Systems."  Kyphon's chief operating officer was Arthur T Taylor, who is now on the <a href="http://www.providencemt.com/board-directors">board of directors of Providence Medical Technology</a>. The CEO of Medtronic at the time it bought out Kyphon, and the CEO of HCA at the time the arrangements began appear not to be doing badly either.  The CEO of Medtronic at the time it acquired Kyphon was Arthur D Collins Jr, who is now on the boards of directors of Boeing, Alcoa, and US Bancorp, also, according to his <a href="http://www.boeing.com/boeing/corp_gov/board_directors.page?">Boeing biography,</a> he is a senior adviser to Oak Hill Capital Partners, and is on the Board of Overseers of the Wharton School.  The CEO of HCA at the time of its arrangement with Kyphon began was Dr Thomas Frist Jr, who is currently <a href="http://www.forbes.com/profile/thomas-frist-jr/">on the Forbes list of billionaires</a> at number 262 in the world, with a total worth estimated at $4.3 billion. Summary In retrospect, this case allegedly involved arrangements between Kyphon, a device company, and multiple hospitals to increase the revenue of all parties by billing the US government for unnecessary hospitalizations occurring after the use of a device made by Kyphon.  The arrangements appeared to have been particularly lucrative for Kyphon's executives after a larger device company, Medtronic, chose to buy Kyphon. Medtronic ultimately paid a large fine and entered into a corporate integrity agreement nine years after the arrangements began.  Now fourteen years after the arrangements began, at least some of the hospitals involved have also paid fines.  The former Kyphon executives who benefited the most seemingly paid no penalties, nor seemingly did any managers of Medtronic or the hospitals who might have gotten larger compensation because of all the revenue that these arrangements generated.     So initially, the big losers from this complex dance were the US government, and ultimately US tax payers.  Some patients may have also paid out of pocket for unnecessary services and thus lost money too.  Whether some patients suffered due to adverse effects of unneeded procedures was not clear.  Much later, Medtronic and some of the hospitals involved did pay big fines and thus lost some money.  However, it does not appear that they paid anything like what they made from the original scheme, and their payments were delayed for years.  However, the insiders who personally made a lot of money never apparently paid anything later.  So, this case appears to be a vivid example of how such insiders can walk away with piles of money from the misbehavior of their own corporations, while others pay the price. Many of those of us of a certain age were brought up on myths that ultimately the good guys win and the bad guys lose.  We would all like to believe that the "arc of the moral universe ... bends toward justice."  History and this recent example suggest that it may not do so without our active intervention.  In health care, as we have said many times (look <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/legal%20settlements">here</a> for examples), when bad behavior occurs within a large health care organization, rarely are the insiders who authorized or directed it, and who had the most to gain from the behavior ever made to suffer any negative consequences.  As long as health care leaders have such impunity, expect them to continue to personally profit from unethical behavior.  As a result, expect health care costs to continue to rise as quality and access get worse and worse. True health care reform.needs to make health care leaders accountable, and especially accountable for the bad behavior that helped make them rich.

55 of Medtronic's Best Hospital Friends, Including HCA, Settle for $34 Million

The case of the over-marketing of Kyphon's kyphoplasty device (look here ) just got more complicated, and now appears to have involved a...

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Is ONC's definition of "Significant EHR Risk" when body bags start to accumulate on the steps of the Capitol?

In a June 25, 2013 Bloomberg News article "<a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-25/digital-health-records-risks-emerge-as-deaths-blamed-on-systems.html">Digital Health Records’ Risks Emerge as Deaths Blamed on Systems</a>" by technology reporter Jordan Robertson (<a href="http://go.bloomberg.com/tech-blog/author/jrobertson40/">http://go.bloomberg.com/tech-blog/author/jrobertson40/</a>), an EHR-harms case in which I am (unfortunately) intimately involved as substitute plaintiff is mentioned: <blockquote class="tr_bq">When Scot Silverstein’s 84-year-old mother, Betty, starting mixing up her words, he worried she was having a stroke. So he rushed her to Abington Memorial Hospital in Pennsylvania. After she was admitted, Silverstein, who is a doctor, looked at his mother’s electronic health records, which are designed to make medical care safer by providing more information on patients than paper files do. He saw that Sotalol, which controls rapid heartbeats, was correctly listed as one of her medications. Days later, when her heart condition flared up, he re-examined her records and was stunned to see that the drug was no longer listed, he said. His mom later suffered clotting, hemorrhaged and required emergency brain surgery. She died in 2011. Silverstein blames her death on problems with the hospital’s electronic medical records. “I had the indignity of watching them put her in a body bag and put her in a hearse in my driveway,” said Silverstein, who has filed a wrongful-death lawsuit. “If paper records had been in place, unless someone had been using disappearing ink, this would not have happened.”</blockquote> How can I say that?  Because I trained in this hospital and worked as resident Admitting Officer in that very ED pre-computer.  The many personnel in 2010 who were given the meds history by my mother and myself directed it not to paper for others to see, but to /dev/null. Why can I say that?  Because the hospital's Motion for Prior Restraint (censorship) against me was denied outright by the presiding judge just days before the Bloomberg article was published (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prior_restraint">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prior_restraint</a>): <blockquote class="tr_bq">Prior restraint (also referred to as prior censorship or pre-publication censorship) is <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Censorship" title="Censorship">censorship</a> imposed, usually by a government, on expression before the expression actually takes place. An alternative to prior restraint is to allow the expression to take place and to take appropriate action afterward, if the expression is found to violate the law, regulations, or other rules. Prior restraint prevents the censored material from being heard or distributed at all; other measures provide sanctions only after the offending material has been communicated, such as suits for <a class="mw-redirect" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slander" title="Slander">slander</a> or <a class="mw-redirect" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libel" title="Libel">libel</a>. In some countries (e.g., <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_the_United_States" title="Law of the United States">United States</a>, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Argentina" title="Constitution of Argentina">Argentina</a>) prior restraint by the government is forbidden, subject to certain exceptions, by a <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution" title="Constitution">constitution</a>. Prior restraint is often considered a particularly oppressive form of <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Censorship" title="Censorship">censorship</a> in Anglo-American jurisprudence because it prevents the restricted material from being heard or distributed at all. Other forms of restrictions on expression (such as actions for <a class="mw-redirect" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libel" title="Libel">libel</a> or <a class="mw-redirect" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slander_and_libel#Criminal_libel" title="Slander and libel">criminal libel</a>, <a class="mw-redirect" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slander" title="Slander">slander</a>, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defamation" title="Defamation">defamation</a>, and <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contempt_of_court" title="Contempt of court">contempt of court</a>) implement criminal or civil sanctions only after the offending material has been published. While such sanctions might lead to a <a class="mw-redirect" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chilling_effect_%28term%29" title="Chilling effect (term)">chilling effect</a>, legal commentators argue that at least such actions do not directly impoverish the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marketplace_of_ideas" title="Marketplace of ideas">marketplace of ideas</a>. Prior restraint, on the other hand, takes an idea or material completely out of the marketplace. Thus it is often considered to be the most extreme form of censorship.</blockquote> The First Amendment lives. (I wonder if it irks the hospital that they cannot perform <a href="http://www.aapsonline.org/index.php/article/sham_peer_review_resources_physicians/">sham peer review</a> upon me now that the censorship motion is denied.  Sham peer review is a common reaction by hospital executives to "disruptive" physicians, but I have not worked there since 1987 and I no longer practice medicine.) In the Bloomberg story Mr. Robertson wrote: <div style="margin-left: 40px;">... “So far, the evidence we have doesn’t suggest that health information technology is a significant factor in safety events,” said Jodi Daniel (<a href="http://www.healthit.gov/newsroom/jodi-daniel-jd-mph">http://www.healthit.gov/newsroom/jodi-daniel-jd-mph</a>), director of ONC’s office of policy and planning. “That said, we’re very interested in understanding where there may be a correlation and how to mitigate risks that do occur.”</div> In my opinion this statement represents gross negligence by a government official.  Ms. Daniel is unarguably working for a government agency pushing this technology.   She makes the claim that "so far the evidence we have doesn't suggest significant risk" while surely being aware (or having the fiduciary responsibility to be aware) of the impediments to having such evidence. From my March 2012 post "Doctors and EHRs: Reframing the 'Modernists v. Luddites' Canard to The Accurate 'Ardent Technophiles vs. Pragmatists' Reality" at <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/03/doctors-and-ehrs-reframing-modernists-v.html">http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/03/doctors-and-ehrs-reframing-modernists-v.html </a> (yes, this was more than a year ago): <blockquote class="tr_bq">... The Institute of Medicine of the National Academies noted this in their <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/11/iom-report-on-health-it-safety-nix-fda.html">late 2011 study on EHR safety</a>: <blockquote>... While some studies suggest improvements in patient safety can be made, others have found no effect. Instances of health IT–associated harm have been reported. However, little published evidence could be found quantifying the magnitude of the risk. Several reasons health IT–related safety data are lacking include the absence of measures and a central repository (or linkages among decentralized repositories) to collect, analyze, and act on information related to safety of this technology. Another impediment to gathering safety data is contractual barriers (e.g., nondisclosure, confidentiality clauses) that can prevent users from sharing information about health IT–related adverse events. These barriers limit users’ abilities to share knowledge of risk-prone user interfaces, for instance through screenshots and descriptions of potentially unsafe processes. In addition, some vendors include language in their sales contracts and escape responsibility for errors or defects in their software (i.e., “hold harmless clauses”). The committee believes these types of contractual restrictions limit transparency, which significantly contributes to the gaps in knowledge of health IT–related patient safety risks. These barriers to generating evidence pose unacceptable risks to safety.[IOM (Institute of Medicine). 2012. <a href="http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/Patient%20Safety%20and%20Health%20IT%20prepub.pdf">Health IT and Patient Safety: Building Safer Systems for Better Care</a> (PDF). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, pg. S-2.] </blockquote> Also in the IOM report: <blockquote class="tr_bq">… “For example, the number of patients who receive the correct medication in hospitals increases when these hospitals implement well-planned, robust computerized prescribing mechanisms and use barcoding systems. But even in these instances, the ability to generalize the results across the health care system may be limited. For other products— including electronic health records, which are being employed with more and more frequency— some studies find improvements in patient safety, while other studies find no effect. More worrisome, some case reports suggest that poorly designed health IT can create new hazards in the already complex delivery of care. Although the magnitude of the risk associated with health IT is not known, some examples illustrate the concerns. Dosing errors, failure to detect life-threatening illnesses, and delaying treatment due to poor human–computer interactions or loss of data have led to serious injury and death.”</blockquote></blockquote> I also noted that the 'impediments to generating evidence' effectively rise to the level of legalized censorship, as observed by Koppel and Kreda regarding gag and hold-harmless clauses in their JAMA article "<a href="http://jama.ama-assn.org/content/301/12/1276.extract">Health Care Information Technology Vendors' Hold Harmless Clause: Implications for Patients and Clinicians</a>", JAMA 2009;301(12):1276-1278. doi: 10.1001/jama.2009.398. FDA had similar findings about impediments to knowledge of health IT risks, see my Aug. 2010 post "Internal FDA memorandum of Feb. 23, 2010 to Jeffrey Shuren on HIT risks. Smoking gun?" at <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/08/smoking-gun-internal-fda-memorandum-of.html">http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/08/smoking-gun-internal-fda-memorandum-of.html</a>. I also note this from amednews.com's coverage of the ECRI Deep Dive Study (<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/02/peering-underneath-icebergs-water-level.html" target="_blank">http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/02/peering-underneath-icebergs-water-level.html</a>): <div style="margin-left: 40px;">... In spring 2012, a surgeon tried to electronically access a patient’s radiology study in the operating room but the computer would show only a blue screen. The patient’s time under anesthesia was extended while OR staff struggled to get the display to function properly. That is just one example of 171 health information technology-related problems reported [voluntarily] during a nine-week period [from 36 hospitals] to the ECRI Institute PSO, a patient safety organization in Plymouth Meeting, Pa., that works with health systems and hospital associations in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee and elsewhere to analyze and prevent adverse events. Eight of the incidents reported involved patient harm, and three may have contributed to patient deaths, said the institute’s 48-page report, first made privately available to the PSO’s members and partners in December 2012. The report, shared with American Medical News in February, highlights how the health IT systems meant to make care safer and more efficient can sometimes expose patients to harm.</div> One wonders if Ms. Daniels' definition of "significant" is when body bags start to accumulate on the steps of the Capitol. I also note she is not a clinician but a JD/MPH. I am increasingly of the opinion that non-clinicians need to be removed from positions of health IT leadership at regional and national levels. In large part many just don't seem to have the experience, insights and perhaps ethics necessary to understand the implications of their decisions. At the very least, such people who never made it to medical school or nursing school need to be kept on a very short leash by those who did. -- SS

Is ONC's definition of "Significant EHR Risk" when body bags start to accumulate on the steps of the Capitol?

In a June 25, 2013 Bloomberg News article " Digital Health Records’ Risks Emerge as Deaths Blamed on Systems " by technology repor...

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Pfizer May No Longer be Able to Delay Paying Its Asbestos Claims of Nearly $1 Billion

Pfizer, which claims to be the "world's largest research-based pharmaceutical company," is one step closer to paying a nearly one billion dollar settlement of legal claims of harms due to the asbestos products it used to manufacture. Pfizer Settles - More or Less - Some of its Asbestos Liability Most people would not think of Pfizer as a producer of asbestos.  However, the back-story, as <a href="http://www.philly.com/philly/business/20130627_Drug-maker_Pfizer_fails_to_escape_costly_asbestos_case.html">reported</a> in the Philadelphia Inquirer, and as we discussed <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/01/curious-case-of-pfizers-asbestos-claims.html">here</a> in 2011, is that <blockquote class="tr_bq">Pfizer used to have a minerals, pigments and metals division and, in 1968, it bought Quigley Company Inc., which made insulation for heavy industry. Quigley's Insulag contained asbestos.</blockquote> So, <blockquote class="tr_bq">Quigley stopped production at its facility in Old Bridge, N.J., in 1992.  When it filed for bankruptcy in 2004, Quigley faced more than 160,000 lawsuits, most related to asbestos product liability.</blockquote> By apparently holding out the legal fiction that Quigley was an independent entity, Pfizer seemed to use to use the bankruptcy filing to delay making any payment of these claims, most of which likely involved illnesses due to asbestos exposure.  As the Inquirer article said, <blockquote class="tr_bq">Pfizer has spent the nine years since arguing that bankruptcy law protects it from such lawsuits.</blockquote> notwithstanding the fact that Pfizer itself is hardly bankrupt. But now, as Bloomberg reported (<a href="http://www.theday.com/article/20130627/BIZ03/306279581/1044">via</a> the New London [CT] Day), <blockquote class="tr_bq"> Pfizer Inc.'s non-operating Quigley Co. won permission to end almost nine years in bankruptcy under a plan that resolves most asbestos claims against the former insulation maker and its parent, the world's largest drugmaker. U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Stuart Bernstein in Manhattan Wednesday approved a Chapter 11 plan under which Pfizer will contribute assets worth $964 million. He rejected a prior plan almost three years ago, saying Pfizer was improperly using Quigley's bankruptcy to shield itself from asbestos claims.</blockquote> Note that Pfizer has consistently argued that it should bear no responsibility for the effects of the asbestos made by its subsidiary: <blockquote class="tr_bq">'Pfizer has never been found derivatively or directly liable for injuries allegedly caused by Quigley's asbestos- containing products,' [Pfizer spokesman Christopher] Loder said.</blockquote> <div id="r1PostCPBlock" style="background-color: white; border: medium none; color: black; left: -99999px; overflow: hidden; position: absolute; text-align: left; text-decoration: none;">Pfizer used to have a minerals, pigments and metals division and, in 1968, it bought Quigley Company Inc., which made insulation for heavy industry. Quigley's Insulag contained asbestos. Read more at <a href="http://www.philly.com/philly/business/20130627_Drug-maker_Pfizer_fails_to_escape_costly_asbestos_case.html#AltGBB8oXa8YPkAC.99" style="color: #003399;">http://www.philly.com/philly/business/20130627_Drug-maker_Pfizer_fails_to_escape_costly_asbestos_case.html#AltGBB8oXa8YPkAC.99</a></div>Furthermore, <blockquote class="tr_bq">Pfizer has said throughout the case that it never made or sold Quigley's products and it doesn't have liability for them. Asbestos, once widely used as an insulator, was later shown to cause cancer.</blockquote> Convenient Fictions This case received little notice in 2011 and is receiving little notice now, and mainly for its business implications.  Yet the reporting does suggest  dots to connect to reveal some larger hypocrisies. Dedicated to improving health and well being? Pfizer asserts <a href="http://www.pfizer.com/about/history/history.jsp">on its website</a> that it <blockquote class="tr_bq">has remained dedicated to discovering and developing new, and better, ways to prevent and treat disease and improve health and well being for people around the world.[italics added]</blockquote> Yet despite this supposed dedication to health and well-being, it has long delayed any possible compensation to people who may have acquired severe, if not fatal disease from contact with one of its products. As per Bloomberg, note the examples of <blockquote class="tr_bq">people like Brenda Hagerich, 62, of Hot Springs, Ark., may get payments on their claims. Hagerich, whose father died in 1999 of mesothelioma, said she has been waiting for a second distribution of a $125,000 payment.</blockquote> Ownership without responsibility According to current media reports,  Pfizer attorneys repeatedly contended that because Quigley was a subsidiary of Pfizer, Pfizer could not be held accountable for its actions.  Yet Pfizer owned, and presumably thus gained all revenue from and chose the leadership of Quigley.  At best, maintaining this fiction seems heartless given Pfizer's stated interest in peoples' "health and well being." Who knew asbestos was dangerous? The current reports seem to imply that Pfizer's accountability should be mitigated because at the time it acquired Quigley, no one knew that asbestos was hazardous.  The Bloomberg report stated, <blockquote class="tr_bq">Quigley made asbestos-containing products from the 1940s to the 1970s, including Insulag, a powdered insulation. Pfizer, based in New York, bought the company in 1968.</blockquote> But, <blockquote class="tr_bq">Pfizer has said throughout the case that it never made or sold Quigley's products and it doesn't have liability for them. Asbestos, once widely used as an insulator, was later shown to cause cancer.</blockquote> The last sentence implies that asbestos was only shown to cause cancer after Pfizer acquired Quigley in 1968.  However, this suggests a lack of knowledge of medical history. In fact, evidence that asbestos was dangerous would have been readily available in 1968. Pulmonary asbestosis was recognized in 1927.(1, noted in 2).  Furthermore, by 1952, as per Dr Richard Doll(3), <blockquote class="tr_bq">The majority of workers (cited by Hueper, 1952) consider that a causal relationship between asbestosis and lung cancer is either proved or is highly probable and the reality of the relationship was agreed at the recent International Symposium on the Epidemiology of Lung Cancer.</blockquote> Doll reported further data in 1954 and concluded, <blockquote class="tr_bq">lung cancer was a specific industrial hazard of certain asbestos workers....</blockquote> Summary So while Pfizer officials ought to have known that in 1968 it was acquiring a company that made products that likely caused lung cancer, for more than 40 years, they have managed to stall payments to now mainly the heirs of people who acquired severe disease due to those products.  This clearly suggests that in this matter the company leadership has consistently put its revenue ahead of its ostensible dedication to peoples' health and well being.  Then again, this is hardly the first example of dubious ethical conduct by Pfizer.  See <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/01/pfizers-pfourteenth-settlement-small.html">this post </a>for a list of the 14 legal settlements of allegations of misconduct made by Pfizer since 2000, only one of which was related to the current case. Furthermore, dedication to short-term revenue over everything else has resulted in huge wealth for Pfizer's hired managers.  <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20130314-712087.html">Per</a> the Wall Street Journal, only the latest example is, <blockquote class="tr_bq">The total 2012 compensation for Pfizer Inc. (PFE) Chief Executive Ian C. Read was valued at $25.6 million, up 2.5% from 2011, as the drug maker hit two out of three key financial objectives last year.  Mr. Read's compensation was based partly on the company exceeding targets for total revenue and adjusted earnings-per-share, while missing its target for cash flow in 2012, Pfizer said in a proxy statement filed Thursday with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.</blockquote> Presumably, the total revenue target would have been a bit lower if Pfizer had managed to set aside assets to pay the asbestos related claims discussed above in 2012 rather than in 2013. This relatively <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/anechoic%20effect">anechoic</a> example shows how hollow ring most of the claims by leaders of big health care organizations that they value patients' and the public's health.  That may be convenient public relations puffery, but again and again the bottom line seems to matter more to them.  We have shown numerous examples of <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/mission-hostile%20management">mission-hostile management</a>, and of leaders <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/executive%20compensation">compensated outrageously</a> out of proportion to their contributions to patients' and the public's health.  Thus, why should health care professionals, or patients believe that anything they do puts patients ahead of money? As we have said so often, health care professionals and society at large needs to hold large health care organizations' leadership accountable for their missions, and push out leaders who put their own pocketbooks and their organizations' revenue ahead of patients' and the public's health.  References 1.  Cooke WE.  Pulmonary asbestosis.  Br Med J 1972; 2: 1024. 2.  Hasan FM, Nash G, Kazemi H. Asbestos exposure and related neoplasia: the 28 year experience of a major urban hospital.  Am J Med 1978, 65: 649-654. Link <a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/707524">here</a>. 3.  Doll R. Mortality from lung cancer in asbestos workers.  Br J Indust Med 1955; 12: 81-86.  Link <a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1035472/">here</a>.

Pfizer May No Longer be Able to Delay Paying Its Asbestos Claims of Nearly $1 Billion

Pfizer, which claims to be the "world's largest research-based pharmaceutical company," is one step closer to paying a nearly ...

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Shut Up and Sell - the Corporate Physician's New Motto?

Evidence has been seeping into public view about the extent physicians who sign up to <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/corporate%20physician">take care of patients as corporate employees</a> give up their professionalism. Shut Up... In April, 2013, Medscape published an <a href="http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/781964">article</a> whose striking title was "Can You Speak Out Without Getting Fired or Being Labeled a Troublemaker?"  The answer was basically "no." <blockquote class="tr_bq">Physicians often see problems at their workplaces relating to patient quality of care, financial practices, mistreatment of staff, and other issues. But as more doctors take jobs as employees of hospitals, medical groups, and other large organizations, they increasingly face the same dilemmas as millions of other working stiffs. When they come across actions or policies that they don't think are right, they have to decide whether it's worth it to speak out and get labeled as a troublemaker -- or perhaps even get fired.  Across the country, a growing number of physicians are indeed losing their jobs -- and often their hospital staff privileges -- after protesting employment conditions. Such complaints may involve patient quality-of-care problems, short staffing, misallocation of funds, improper financial incentives, fraud and abuse, discrimination, overuse or withholding of medical services, or other misconduct, say organized medical groups, employment attorneys, and physician recruiters.</blockquote> Of course, physicians swear oaths to put the needs of their individual patients first, and doing so within a large organization might well involve protesting conditions and practices that may affect the quality of care or even endanger patients.  But woe unto physicians who try to fulfill their professional responsibility when doing so goes up against the top executives to whom the physicians must now report. <blockquote class="tr_bq">'We were naive when we went into this,' says Maria Rivero, MD, who with her professional colleague and significant other Derek Kerr, MD, filed administrative complaints against their long-time hospital employer in 2010. 'We thought if we just brought it to people's attention, they would fix the problem and leave us alone. But if you blow the whistle on high-level executives, you need to prepare to be harassed and lose your job.'</blockquote> Even working within the system to fix problems can lead to big trouble, <blockquote class="tr_bq">Still, the formal professional approach doesn't always work either. Cloyd Gatrell, MD, an emergency physician who was employed by EmCare, says that he and his wife Kathryn, a nurse, voiced concerns and presented data to executives at Carlisle Regional Medical Center in Pennsylvania in 2008 and 2009 on what they saw as inadequate nurse staffing levels that endangered patients. After getting no results, Dr. Gatrell contacted the state health department, prompting a state inspection that found insufficient staffing. In 2010, he was fired by EmCare at the request of the hospital, according to his 2011 lawsuit against the hospital and EmCare claiming violation of whistleblower protection laws. His wife was fired earlier, and she sued separately. The hospital issued a statement declining comment on the litigation. 'We're supposed to be advocates for patients, but being employed puts us in a precarious position in taking a position on patient interests that's against what the hospital administration favors,' says Dr. Gatrell, whose suit is in the discovery stage. 'I think a physician still has that responsibility.'</blockquote> Physicians who sign contracts with corporate employers, perhaps thinking that they will have less bureaucracy with which to contend and a more certain salary than they did in private practice, seem blissfully, or willfully unaware that those contracts may take away their ability to control their practices and stand up for their patients. <blockquote class="tr_bq">Still, federal and state whistleblower laws only provide protection from retaliation for physicians in certain situations, such as those employed by public entities or those who complain about civil rights violations or Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse. Otherwise doctors may have to rely on contract provisions or on state employment law, which may not offer much protection. [An anesthesiologist on the AMA Board of Trustees and his hospital system's board,] Dr. Annis says that the AMA's new statement of principles for physician employment -- which asserts that physicians should not be retaliated against by their employers for speaking out on patient care issues -- provides support for doctors when they raise legitimate professional concerns with their employers. He says it's best for physicians to work through their medical staff organization. But Dr. Gatrell points out that the AMA statement explicitly accepts that physician employment contracts may allow hospitals to strip doctors of their medical staff membership and clinical privileges at the same time they are terminated, known as a 'clean sweep' clause. 'If that's accepted by the AMA, the rest of the principles protecting physicians are meaningless," he argues. "If physicians can be fired without cause and then automatically lose their medical staff membership and its due process protection, how many will dare be a patient advocate?' Some experts advise physicians not to sign employment agreements with such onerous provisions. But others say that physicians often have little leverage to remove them. 'It's not an equal negotiating table,' says Dr. Gatrell, who's now working for a small urgent care practice.</blockquote> A May, 2013 <a href="http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/782136">article</a> again in Medscape about the "4 Top Complaints of Employed Doctors," explained why physicians often see a lot they could or should protest to assure the quality of their patients' care, <blockquote class="tr_bq"> Some doctors report that hospital administrators treat them with a lack of respect. One female doctor said, also on condition of anonymity, that her biggest challenge on her job was 'how to handle nonphysician high school grads bossing you around when they function as your 'superiors' in your employer's organization. They manage their insecurities by bullying physicians and through passive aggressiveness, but always seem to gain the upper hand with those at the top.'</blockquote> These are the sorts of brilliant administrators often hired by brilliant top executives, maybe at a cheap price to keep the bottom line and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/executive%20compensation">executive compensation</a> healthy..  Furthermore, given that as we have discussed, "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/financialization">financialization</a>" of hospital management often puts a bigger priority on short-term revenue than on quality care, as per one senior physician, <blockquote class="tr_bq"> 'physicians are being increasingly targeted when they get in the way' of hospitals' agendas</blockquote> To make more money faster, many hospital systems now seem to want physicians to only make referrals for lucrative tests and treatments within the system, even if some patients might be better served elsewhere, <blockquote class="tr_bq">The AMA recently issued guidelines for physician employment stating that 'a physician's paramount responsibility is to his or her patients.' Employers should not retaliate against physicians for asserting their patients' interests, according to these guidelines. 'In any situation where the economic or other interests of the employer are in conflict with patient welfare, patient welfare must take priority,' the AMA says. The guidelines also call for employers and employed physicians to disclose to patients any agreements or understandings they have that restrict, discourage, or encourage particular treatment or referral options. Nevertheless, employed physicians are often expected to refer patients within their own groups and send tests to a hospital laboratory or imaging center. Hospitals may tell employed surgeons which kinds of joint implants to use, and according to a New York Times article even whether to implant defibrillators in Medicaid patients. It's unclear how often any of this is disclosed to patients. 'What we doctors say is that we're ethically bound to our patients because we took an oath, and that's what our license is based on,' says Linda Brodsky. 'But many hospitals say, 'No, you're employed here, and what we say goes.'</blockquote> Note that so far there seems to be little evidence that the AMA guidelines about physician employment are being honored other than in the breach.  It is also disappointing that the leadership of the medical society that represents internists seems so unworried, <blockquote class="tr_bq"> David L. Bronson, MD, President of the American College of Physicians, disputes Brodsky's assertion that hospitals tend to squelch doctors who criticize leadership for policies that they believe harm patient care. In fact, he says, healthcare organizations may identify outspoken physicians as potential leaders, 'as long as they're collaborative and trying to solve problems, and not just be a thorn in the side of everyone they know. Organizations are looking for physician leaders, and physicians who can collaborate and not just be adversarial can go far inside organizations.'</blockquote> I would guess, having seen so many examples of <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/generic%20management">generic management</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/mission-hostile%20management">mission-hostile management</a>, management that seems more <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/financialization">focused on the money than patient care,</a> and management that seems to be able to <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/executive%20compensation">make itself rich</a> without evidence that it has done anything noteworthy to uphold hospitals' clinical missions, that hospital systems that promote physicians who are willing to speak out against hired executives are vanishingly rare. And Sell In June, 2013, Beckers Hospital Review published an <a href="http://beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-physician-relationships/teaching-doctors-how-to-sell.html">article</a> suggesting that now hospitals are going beyond just pressuring employed physicians to refer potentially profitable patients within the system, and now are pressuring physicians to act as salespeople to their colleagues, <blockquote class="tr_bq"> A few hospitals are beginning to train their employed physicians to "sell" the hospital, which involves asking referring doctors in the community to send patients their way....  the pressure to bring doctors into sales is mounting.</blockquote> The author, the former publisher of Modern Healthcare, made a remarkable argument based on a definition that seems wildly optimistic, <blockquote class="tr_bq"> Customer service lies at the core of salesmanship. The Business Dictionary defines salesmanship as satisfying customer needs through a sincere and mutually beneficial process aimed at a long-term relationship.</blockquote> Of course, skeptical physicians used to exposure to the sales tactics pharmaceutical and device companies use (look <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/05/fool-me-once-shame-on-you-fool-me-twice.html">here</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/03/what-drug-reps-really-care-about.html">here</a>, and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/04/more-about-cynical-world-of-drug-reps.html">here</a>,  for example) might wonder why the author did not discuss such marketing tactics as the employment of half-truths and biased information, and the use of emotional appeals to trump reason and logic. That the author was serious was shown by his list of seven pointers for hospitals seeking to transform its employed physicians into marketers. Of course, physicians who are already "key opinion leaders" employed by drug and device companies, whose marketing executives may think. that "key opinion leaders were sales people for us," (see <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2008/06/key-opinion-leaders-were-sales-people.html">this post</a>), might not be fazed by now being asked to market their own hospital.  Never mind about Principle II of the <a href="http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/principles-medical-ethics.page?">AMA Code of Ethics</a> <blockquote class="tr_bq">II. A physician shall uphold the standards of professionalism, be honest in all professional interactions, and strive to report physicians deficient in character or competence, or engaging in fraud or deception, to appropriate entities.</blockquote> The Moral of the Story We have previously discussed various aspects of the travails of the brave new world of the <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/corporate%20physician">corporate physician</a>.  Physicians and other health professionals who sign on as full-time employees of large corporate entities have to realize that they are now beholden to managers and executives who may be <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/mission-hostile%20management">hostile to their professional values</a>, and who are subject to <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/perverse%20incentives">perverse incentives</a> that support such hostility, including the potential for huge <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/executive%20compensation">executive compensation</a>.  Physicians seem to be willing to sign <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/contracts">contracts </a>that underline their new subservience to their corporate overlords, and likely trap them within <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/confidentiality%20clause">confidentiality clauses</a> that make blowing the whistle likely to lead to extreme unpleasantness. It is disappointing that even medical societies that ostensibly support physicians' professional values have been afraid to warn against such employment, or do much to help physicians trapped within it. Physicians who go to work for big corporations have to realize that they may be forced to put corporate executives' vested interests ahead of their patients.  Patients whose physicians work for big corporations must realize that their health care will now be corporate, with all that entails.   As I have said before, we need to challenge the notion that direct health care should ever be provided, or that medicine ought to be practiced by for-profit corporations. I submit that we will not be able to have good quality, accessible health care at an affordable price until we restore physicians as independent, ethical health care professionals, and until we restore small, independent, community responsible, non-profit hospitals as the locus for inpatient care.

Shut Up and Sell - the Corporate Physician's New Motto?

Evidence has been seeping into public view about the extent physicians who sign up to take care of patients as corporate employees give up ...

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