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A Case Demonstrating Links Between Poor Governance, Conflicts of Interest, and Excess Executive Compensation at a Hospital System

The Salinas Valley Memorial Healthcare System in California first appeared <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/05/severance-package-to-un-severed-ceo.html">on our radar</a> in 2011 for not only giving an improbably large severance package to its CEO, but doing so two years before he actually retired.   At the time, hospital "officials" gave the usual sorts of justifications we see for huge executive compensation packages.  They suggested the CEO is brilliant, in particular, "gifted and experienced," and that to retain him they needed to pay "private sector-level benefits."  Then <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/06/more-revelations-about-how-top-managers.html">it turned out</a> the system was rapidly raising the compensation of other executives while laying off employees who actually took care of patients.  A Government Audit Because the system, despite its title, is actually a local government agency, these controversies triggered not only outrage, but also a state audit.  The Los Angeles Times <a href="http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/09/local/la-me-hospital-spending-20120309">described</a> its results.  <blockquote>The audit found that the Salinas Valley Memorial Healthcare System regularly did business with firms that the board and top officials had financial stakes in — in some cases in apparent violation of state conflict-of-interest laws. The report stated that Salinas Valley lacks sufficient safeguards against making decisions that violate conflict-of-interest laws, and that the district therefore can't guarantee 'that it's board members and executives do not experience personal financial gain from its transactions with businesses.' The audit found 11 instances between 2006 and 2010 in which board members had reported economic ties — including stocks, salaries and other types of payments — to vendors with which the district did business. Not all the cases represented violations of conflict-of-interest rules, state auditors said, but in two cases they found that officials may have broken the law. One case involved former Chief Executive Samuel Downing, who had $50,000 in investments with 1st Capital Bank, an institution Salinas Valley and the executive agreed to deposit $1 million into. In another case, the hospital made $5.6 million in disbursements to Rabobank, where a board member, Harry Wardwell, serves as a regional president and receives a salary of more than $100,000, according to his most recent statement of economic interest.</blockquote> A San Jose Mercury News <a href="http://www.mercurynews.com/breaking-news/ci_20130426/svmh-audit-potential-conflict-interest-violations-referred-da">article</a> listed some other problems found by the audit: <blockquote>· Absence of a formal executive compensation policy despite paying its top administrators at the upper end of the industry scale. Downing received a nearly $5 million retirement payout, and other executives received generous pay topping out at $341,000 per year. The reported also cited supplemental pensions, which have been discontinued. · Violations of state open-meeting laws as the board approved executive pay. · Failure to ensure all employees who are required to file statements of economic interest had done so. · Absence of a duly approved, legally binding conflict of interest code, which must be approved by the county Board of Supervisors. The report noted the hospital board instituted a properly approved code in December. · Lack of proper documentation on the selection process for no-bid contracts, necessary to ensure the hospital gets the best value for its money. The report found only one of eight contracts reviewed during the audit included such documentation. · Need for better oversight of hospital funding of community events, including the rationale for why and how they benefit Salinas Valley Memorial, to adhere to the ban on making gifts of public money. The report found the board delivered $54,000 to California Rodeo Salinas without any evidence it had considered how it furthered its public purposes. </blockquote>Conclusions First, this case should not be viewed as an indictment of hospitals run by local governments.  Rather than indicating that bad behavior is particularly likely at such hospitals, the fact that questionable behavior came to light at such a hospital is more likely due to better regulation of such hospitals leading to more transparency about them compared to other hospitals.  The regulations and laws governing the operations of non-profit hospitals not run by government agencies, or for-profit hospitals vary from US state to state.  To my knowledge, rarely do states strictly regulate conflicts of interest affecting, or require much transparency about governance at hospitals that are not government run.  There is a similar lack of state regulation of for-profit hospitals, and federal regulation of either non-profit or for-profit in these areas.  Thus it is extremely rare to see an audit or report about any non-governmental hospital like the one about Salinas Valley Memorial Healthcare.  Without the greater transparency produced by such investigations, there is little data about whether the practices seen at Salinas Valley are common at other hospitals, be they government run, non-profit and private, or for-profit.    However, while this is just one case, it does allow an interesting comparison.  We have <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/09/more-repeats-of-talking-points.html">discussed</a> the usual "talking points" proffered by management and boards to explain outsized compensation packages in health care.  They often include statements about the brilliance of the executives in question, almost never with any supporting evidence, and the need to pay "market" rates.  Although these, and other talking points may seem implausible, they are hard to challenge, because hospital and other health care organizations are usually able to conceal the processes which actually lead to compensation decisions.  However, in this case there is documentation of problems with governance processes which may have plausibly enabled unjustified levels of compensation.  Failure to maintain processes to disclose and deal with conflicts of interest could increase the likelihood that conflicts would occur.  A board that included individuals who may have been personally profiting from their board membership might be inclined to go along to get along with the CEO.  Meeting in secret despite an open meeting law would prevent discovery of cronyism. This case therefore suggests that governance that lacks transparency, accountability and integrity may lead to self-interested, conflicted leadership that responds to perverse incentives.  Such leadership is likely to pay more attention to its own interests than the health care mission, short-changing patients' and the public's health. So once more with feeling.... health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research. On the other hand, those who authorize, direct and implement bad behavior ought to suffer negative consequences sufficient to deter future bad behavior. If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.

A Case Demonstrating Links Between Poor Governance, Conflicts of Interest, and Excess Executive Compensation at a Hospital System

The Salinas Valley Memorial Healthcare System in California first appeared on our radar in 2011 for not only giving an improbably large sev...

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Head of Lobbying Firm with Health Care Clients Walks Through Revolving Door into Executive Branch

A Washington Post <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obama-embraces-k-street/2012/03/06/gIQAR4ChvR_story.html">op-ed</a> described the latest case of a revolving door frequent flier, or perhaps frequent revolver, with health care connections. I will try to piece it together chronologically. The story revolves around one Steven Ricchetti. His earlier career trajectory was: <blockquote>Blue Cross Blue Shield, then the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, then the Clinton White House, then lobbying, then back to the Clinton White House, then more lobbying, this time starting Ricchetti Inc. with his brother, Jeff. (A call seeking comment from Ricchetti Inc. wasn’t returned.) </blockquote> Most recently, he "was tapped to be counselor to Vice President [Joseph] Biden." His recent clients were"Fannie Mae, General Motors, the American Hospital Association, and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/Eli%20Lilly">Eli Lilly</a>," obviously includeingtwo prominent health care organizations. Previously he had represented <blockquote>AT&T, Reed Elsevier, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/Pfizer">Pfizer</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/Sanofi-Aventis">Sanofi-Aventis</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/Siemens">Siemens</a>, Sirius XM, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/Amgen">Amgen</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/Boston%20Scientific">Boston Scientific</a>, America’s Health Insurance Plans, eBay, Dow Chemical, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, among others, according to the Center for Responsive Politics. Cumulatively, they paid Ricchetti and his firms millions.</blockquote> Eli Lilly, Pfizer, Sanofi-Aventis, Amgen, and Boston Scientific are obviously "pure" health care corporations. Reed Elsevier has a publishing subsidiary with important medical titles. <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/Siemens%20Healthcare">Siemens Healthcare</a> is an important part of that company. The links above are to our relevant posts about these firms, some of which describe various ethically questionable behavior. Note that Mr Ricchetti's appointment apparently circumvented the President's previous statement that "lobbyists 'will not run my White House.'" He <blockquote>achieved this feat — getting around the ban on lobbyists serving in the administration — by using one of Washington’s most-honored traditions: the loophole. Just as Obama won the presidency, Ricchetti de-registered as a lobbyist for his various clients. But he remained president of the lobbying firm that continued to work for many of those same clients, as well as a few more, such as the American Bankers Association. </blockquote> While Mr Ricchetti is no doubt an intelligent and hard-working man, could not someone who was not so strongly financially tied to the leadership of some of the US' most ppowerful health care corporations be found who was well-qualified for this position? Pending the answer to that question, which I do not expect to receive, this story becomes our latest example of the coziness between political and government leadership on one hand, and the leadership of large health care organizations, and those they choose as representatives. We have seen all sorts of permutations of revolving door stories involving people with strong ties to the largest health care organizations. The implication is that both health care's private sector and the government functions meant to provide or regulate health care do not operate at arms' length, and in fact seem to be run by a group of insiders who overlap both, and may be more attuned to their self-interest and patients' and the public's health. Health policy in the US has become an insiders' game. Unless it is redirected to reflect patients' and the public's health, facilitated by the knowledge of unbiased clinical and policy experts rather than corporate public relations, expect our efforts at health care reform to just increase health care dysfunction. Physicians, public health advocates, whatever unbiased health policy experts remain must educate the public about how health policy has been turned into a corporate sandbox. We must try to somehow activate the public to call for health care policy of the people, by the people, and for the people.

Head of Lobbying Firm with Health Care Clients Walks Through Revolving Door into Executive Branch

A Washington Post op-ed described the latest case of a revolving door frequent flier, or perhaps frequent revolver, with health care connec...

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Doctors and EHRs: Reframing the "Modernists v. Luddites" Canard to The Accurate "Ardent Technophiles vs. Pragmatists" Reality

One manner by which Healthcare's core values are usurped is via distortions and slander about physicians and other clinicians. At "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/02/health-it-ddulites-and-irrational.html">Health IT: Ddulites and Irrational Exuberance</a>" and related posts (<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/Ddulite">query link</a>) I've described the phenomenon of the: <blockquote>'Hyper-enthusiastic technophile who either deliberately ignores or is blinded to technology's downsides, ethical issues, and repeated local and mass failures.'</blockquote> I have called this personality type the "Ddulite", which is "Luddite" with the first four letter reversed. I have also pointed out that the two are not exact opposites, as the Luddites did not endanger anyone in trying to preserve their textile jobs, whereas the Ddulites in healthcare IT do endanger patients. Yet, in the 20 years I've been professionally involved in health IT, I have frequently heard the refrain, usually from IT personnel and their management, that "Doctors resists EHRs because they are [backwards, technophobic, reactionary, dinosaurs, unable/unwilling to change, think they are Gods, ..... insert other slanderous/libelous comment]. I've heard this at Informatics meetings, at medical meetings, at commercial health IT meetings (e.g., Microsoft's Health Users Group, and at <a href="http://www.himss.org/ASP/index.asp">HIMSS</a>), at government meetings (e.g., <a href="http://www.gs1.org/healthcare/about">GS1 healthcare</a>), and others. The summary catchphrase I've heard and seen (even in the comments on this blog) is that doctors are "Luddites" while IT personnel are forward-thinking, know better than doctors, and are "Modernists." This slander and libel of physicians and other clinicians needs to stop, and the entire issue needs to be reframed. Doctors are pragmatists. When a new technology is rigorously shown to be beneficial to patients, and (perhaps more importantly) rigorously shown not to be of little benefit or worse, significantly harmful, doctors will embrace it. There are countless examples of this that I need not go into. They also have responsibilities, obligations, ethical considerations, liabilities, and other factors to consider in their decisions: <blockquote><a href="http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pragmatism">Pragmatism</a> (Merriam-Webster): : a practical approach to problems and affairs <tried a="" and="" balance="" between="" pragmatism="" principles="" strike="" to=""> </tried></blockquote> The reality is not: <blockquote>Luddite doctors <---- are in tension with ----> Modernist IT personnel</blockquote> but is: <blockquote>Pragmatist doctors <---- are in tension with ----> Ardent technophiles (Ddulites) </blockquote> The technophiles' views may be due, on the one hand, to ignorance of medicine's true complexities and "innocent" overconfidence in technology. Unfortunately, it is a gargantuan leap of logic to go from "well, computers work in tracking FedEx packages and allowing me to withdraw money from my U.S. bank when I'm abroad, to "therefore with just a little work they will transform medicine." Anyone familiar with even the most fundamental issues in Medical Informatics is aware of this. (This is the problem with "generic management" of healthcare IT - healthcare amateurs are unfamiliar with these issues.) Due to the complex, messy social, scientific, informational, ethical, cultural, emotional and other issues relatively unique to medicine, that leap from banking/widget tracking/mercantile computing --> medicine is probably more naive than the leap in logic, for instance, that would have a person believe since a hot air balloon can go high in the sky, it can take a person to the moon, as I observed <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/01/wsj-waste-feared-in-digitizing-patient.html">here</a>. On the other hand the technophile's expressed views can also be a territorial ploy with full awareness of, and reckless disregard for, the consequences of technology's downsides. (The CIO where I was a CMIO was well-known to be an aficionado of Sun Tzu's "<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Art_of_War">Art of War</a>" in his corporate politics - the polar opposite of a 'team player.' I might add that the doctors were fully expected to be 'team players'.) Part of the struggle between the health IT industry and medical professionals has also been control of information flow about HIT. This has been brought to the fore by my observation of the almost uniformly negative comments on today's HIT at the physician-only site <a href="http://www.sermo.com/">Sermo.com</a>. Sermo is populated, I might add, not by computerphobes but by physicians in a wide variety of specialties using computers for social networking. These comments will hopefully soon be published. (They are not dissimilar to the many comments I reported in my Jan. 2010 post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/01/honest-physician-survey-on-ehrs.html">An Honest Physician Survey on EHR's</a>", although some might call the sponsor of the latter survey, <a href="http://www.aapsonline.org/">AAPS</a>, biased. I do not think the same can be said of Sermo.com, an open site for all physicians.) I have mentioned on this blog the numerous impediments to flow of information about health IT's downsides, and these impediments are well described, for example, in the Joint Commission Sentinel Events Alert on Health IT (<a href="http://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/18/SEA_42.PDF">link</a>), the FDA Internal Memorandum on H-IT Safety (<a href="http://www.scribd.com/huffpostfund/d/33754943-Internal-FDA-Report-on-Adverse-Events-Involving-Health-Information-Technology">link</a>) and elsewhere (such as at <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/02/updated-reading-list-on-health-it.html">link</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/healthcare%20IT%20safety">link</a>). The Institute of Medicine of the National Academies noted this in their <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/11/iom-report-on-health-it-safety-nix-fda.html">late 2011 study on EHR safety</a>: <blockquote>... While some studies suggest improvements in patient safety can be made, others have found no effect. Instances of health IT–associated harm have been reported. However, little published evidence could be found quantifying the magnitude of the risk. Several reasons health IT–related safety data are lacking include the absence of measures and a central repository (or linkages among decentralized repositories) to collect, analyze, and act on information related to safety of this technology. Another impediment to gathering safety data is contractual barriers (e.g., nondisclosure, confidentiality clauses) that can prevent users from sharing information about health IT–related adverse events. These barriers limit users’ abilities to share knowledge of risk-prone user interfaces, for instance through screenshots and descriptions of potentially unsafe processes. In addition, some vendors include language in their sales contracts and escape responsibility for errors or defects in their software (i.e., “hold harmless clauses”). The committee believes these types of contractual restrictions limit transparency, which significantly contributes to the gaps in knowledge of health IT–related patient safety risks. These barriers to generating evidence pose unacceptable risks to safety.[IOM (Institute of Medicine). 2012. <a href="http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/Patient%20Safety%20and%20Health%20IT%20prepub.pdf">Health IT and Patient Safety: Building Safer Systems for Better Care</a> (PDF). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, pg. S-2.] </blockquote> Also in the IOM report: <blockquote class="tr_bq">… “For example, the number of patients who receive the correct medication in hospitals increases when these hospitals implement well-planned, robust computerized prescribing mechanisms and use barcoding systems. But even in these instances, the ability to generalize the results across the health care system may be limited. For other products— including electronic health records, which are being employed with more and more frequency— some studies find improvements in patient safety, while other studies find no effect. More worrisome, some case reports suggest that poorly designed health IT can create new hazards in the already complex delivery of care. Although the magnitude of the risk associated with health IT is not known, some examples illustrate the concerns. Dosing errors, failure to detect life-threatening illnesses, and delaying treatment due to poor human–computer interactions or loss of data have led to serious injury and death.”</blockquote> I note that the 'impediments to generating evidence' effectively rise to the level of legalized censorship, as observed by Koppel and Kreda regarding gag and hold-harmless clauses in their JAMA article "<a href="http://jama.ama-assn.org/content/301/12/1276.extract">Health Care Information Technology Vendors' Hold Harmless Clause: Implications for Patients and Clinicians</a>", JAMA 2009;301(12):1276-1278. doi: 10.1001/jama.2009.398. Pragmatist physicians are quite rightly very wary of the technology as it now exists. Ultimately, even when information on HIT risks or defects does surface, it is highly inappropriately labeled as "anecdotal" (see <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/08/from-senior-clinician-down-under.html">this post on anecdotes</a> for why this behavior is inappropriate). This "anecdotalist" phenomenon occurs right up to the HHS Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT (ONC), as I described in my post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/04/common-sense-on-side-effects-lacking-in.html">Making a Stat Less Significant: Common Sense on 'Side Effects' Lacking in Healthcare IT Sector</a>" and elsewhere. Therefore, another part of reframing the pragmatism vs. technophilia issue is for clinicians to put an end to censorship of HIT adverse experiences. I have the following practical suggestions, used myself, to start to accomplish the latter goal. These suggestions are in the interest of protecting public health and safety: When a physician or other clinician observes health IT problems, defects, malfunctions, <a href="http://www.tinyurl.com/hostileuserexper">mission hostility</a> (e.g., poor user interfaces), significant downtimes, lost data, erroneous data, misidentified data, and so forth ... and most certainly, patient 'close calls' or actual injuries ... they should (anonymously if necessary if in a hostile management setting): (DISCLAIMER:  I am not responsible for any adverse outcomes if any organizational policies or existing laws are broken in doing any of the following.) <ul><li>Inform their facility's senior management, if deemed safe and not likely to result in retaliation such as being slandered as a "<a href="http://www.jpands.org/vol9no3/huntoon.pdf">disruptive physician</a>" and/or or being subjected to sham peer review (<a href="http://www.aapsonline.org/index.php/article/sham_peer_review_resources_physicians/">link</a>).</li></ul><ul><li>Inform their personal and organizational insurance carriers, in writing. Insurance carriers do not enjoy paying out for preventable IT-related medical mistakes. They have begun to become aware of HIT risks. See, for example, the essay on Norcal Mutual Insurance Company's newsletter on HIT risks<a href="http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/?loc=cases&sloc=norcal"> at this link</a>. (Note - many medical malpractice insurance policies can be interpreted as requiring this reporting, observed occasional guest blogger <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/Dr.%20Scott%20Monteith">Dr. Scott Monteith</a> in a comment to me about this post.)</li></ul><ul><li>Inform the Joint Commission (or similar national accreditor of hospital safety if not in the U.S.) via their complaint site at <a href="http://www.jointcommission.org/report_a_complaint.aspx">http://www.jointcommission.org/report_a_complaint.aspx</a> . Also consider writing the JC senior officers (<a href="http://www.jointcommission.org/about_us/joint_commission_officers.aspx">link to officer's list</a>), whose awareness of HIT issues I can personally attest to via our correspondences.</li></ul><ul><li>Inform the FDA (or similar healthcare regulator if not in the U.S.) via the FDA Medwatch Form 3500 reporting site at <a href="https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/medwatch/medwatch-online.htm">https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/medwatch/medwatch-online.htm</a>. An example of such an adverse event report I filed myself (when the involved hospital refused) is <a href="http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfmaude/Detail.CFM?MDRFOI__ID=1729552">at this link</a> in the FDA MAUDE (Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience) database.</li></ul><ul><li>Inform the State Medical Society and local Medical Society of your locale.</li></ul><ul><li>Inform the appropriate Board of Health for your locale.</li></ul><ul><li>If applicable (and it often is), inform the Medicare Quality Improvement Organization (QIO) of your state or region. Example: in Pennsylvania, the QIO is "<a href="http://www.qipa.org/Home.aspx">Quality Insights of PA</a>."</li></ul><ul><li>Inform a personal attorney.</li></ul><ul><li>Inform local, state and national representatives such as congressional representatives. Sen. Grassley of Iowa is aware of these issues, for example.</li></ul><ul><li>As clinicians are often forced to use health IT, at their own risk even when "certified" (<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/02/hospitals-and-doctors-use-health-it-at.html">link</a>), if a healthcare organization or HIT seller is sluggish or resistant in taking corrective actions, consider taking another risk (perhaps this is for the very daring or those near the end of their clinical career). Present your organization's management with a statement for them to sign to the effect of:</li></ul><blockquote>"We, the undersigned, do hereby acknowledge the concerns of [Dr. Jones] about care quality issues at [Mount St. Elsewhere Hospital] regarding EHR difficulties that were reported, namely [event A, event B, event C ... etc.] We hereby indemnify [Dr. Jones] for malpractice liability regarding patient care errors that occur due to EHR issues beyond his/her control, but within the control of hospital management, including but not limited to: [system downtimes, lost orders, missing or erroneous data, etc.] that are known to pose risk to patients. We assume responsibility for any such malpractice. With regard to health IT and its potential negative effects on care, Dr. Jones has provided us with the Joint Commission Sentinel Events Alert on Health IT at <a href="http://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/18/SEA_42.PDF" style="font-style: italic;">http://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/18/SEA_42.PDF</a>, the IOM report on HIT safety at <a href="http://www.modernhealthcare.com/Assets/pdf/CH76254118.PDF" style="font-style: italic;">http://www.modernhealthcare.com/Assets/pdf/CH76254118.PDF</a>, and the FDA Internal Memorandum on H-IT Safety Issues at <a href="http://www.scribd.com/huffpostfund/d/33754943-Internal-FDA-Report-on-Adverse-Events-Involving-Health-Information-Technology" style="font-style: italic;">http://www.scribd.com/huffpostfund/d/33754943-Internal-FDA-Report-on-Adverse-Events-Involving-Health-Information-Technology</a>. CMO __________ (date, time) CIO ___________ (date, time) CMIO _________ (date, time) General Counsel ___________ (date, time) etc."</blockquote><ul><li>If the hospital or organizational management refuses to sign such a waiver (and they likely will!), note the refusal, with date and time of refusal, and file away with your attorney. It could come in handy if EHR-related med mal does occur.</li></ul><ul><li>As EHRs remain experimental, I note that indemnifications such as the above probably belong in medical staff contracts and bylaws when EHR use is coerced.</li></ul> These measures can help "light a fire" under the decision makers, and "get the lead out" of efforts to improve this technology to the point where it is usable, efficacious and safe. -- SS

Doctors and EHRs: Reframing the "Modernists v. Luddites" Canard to The Accurate "Ardent Technophiles vs. Pragmatists" Reality

One manner by which Healthcare's core values are usurped is via distortions and slander about physicians and other clinicians. At "...

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Increased Lab Ordering with EHR's?

ONC has once more proffered typical politically-motivated spin with regard to the Harvard study "Giving Office-Based Physicians Electronic Access To Patients’ Prior Imaging And Lab Results Did Not Deter Ordering Of Tests" that I wrote about at "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/03/another-health-it-mythbuster-doctors.html">Another Health IT Mythbuster: Doctors order more X-rays, not fewer, with computer access</a>." That study had the rather tame, reasonable conclusion: <blockquote> ... These findings raise the possibility that, as currently implemented, electronic access does not decrease test ordering in the office setting and may even increase it, possibly because of system features that are enticements to ordering. We conclude that use of these health information technologies, whatever their other benefits, remains unproven as an effective cost-control strategy with respect to reducing the ordering of unnecessary tests. </blockquote> The ONC response (posted <a href="http://www.healthit.gov/buzz-blog/meaningful-use/study-facts/">here</a> at present) to such a mild conclusion about an <a href="http://ctlab.org/documents/Hiding%20in%20plain%20sight.pdf">experimental</a> technology seemed very splenetic. As I mentioned at the aforementioned post, ONC has thrown good science under the bus before, for political purposes in my view: <blockquote>... On the other hand, coming from a political office that clearly does not understand how to conduct qualitative research and creates political promotion pieces masquerading as "research", such a statement is not surprising. See "ONC: "The Benefits Of Health Information Technology: A Review Of The Recent Literature Shows Predominantly Positive Results" <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/03/benefits-of-health-information.html">at this link</a>, where essential research methodologies were thrown under the bus for publication in Health Affairs. At least the deviations from rigorous research methodologies were admitted: <blockquote>“... Our findings must be qualified by two important limitations: the question of publication bias [e.g., bias in evidence selection - ed.], and the fact that we implicitly gave equal weight to all studies regardless of study design or sample size.”</blockquote> Unfortunately, the media, politicians, financial decisionmakers and others are likely not to really comprehend, in-depth, the full significance of that sentence.</blockquote> I am in the unfortunate situation of again having to stuff ONC's - um, stuff - back into the bull. First, hat tip to <a href="http://histalk2.com/2012/03/08/news-3912/">Histalk</a> where I found the link below: <blockquote> National Coordinator for HIT Farzad Mostashari, MD <a href="http://www.healthit.gov/buzz-blog/meaningful-use/study-facts/" target="_blank">takes issue</a> with the recently published <a href="http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/31/3/488.abstract" target="_blank">report</a> that found doctors with online access to patients’ charts ordered more tests. Mostashari disputes the study, which raised questions as to whether or not EHRs cut costs. Mostashari’s contends that the study was based on 2008 data and before the start of the Meaningful Use program and thus does not address certified EHRs’ capabilities for data exchange and clinical data support.</blockquote> The fatal passage in the linked ONC piece at <a href="http://www.healthit.gov/buzz-blog/meaningful-use/study-facts/">http://www.healthit.gov/buzz-blog/meaningful-use/study-facts/</a> is this: <blockquote>"Also, the study data were from 2008, before the passage of the HITECH Act and the linking of payment incentives to the meaningful use of EHRs."</blockquote> This seems a variation of the typical excuse-making in IT - "they were using v. 1.0; it's all fixed in the later version." The outcomes of (Orwellian-named) "Meaningful Use" (MU) have not been studied, to my knowledge. Futher, the criteria chosen for "Meaningful Use" were primarily best guesses as to what could be beneficial. ("Meaningful Use" should have been more accurately termed "good faith use.") Claiming that 2008 data on EHR-related test ordering is invalid because "Meaningful Use" was not in effect at the time is, in fact, jumping to an unsupported conclusion that "Meaningful Use" will counter whatever multiple medical/social factors caused the increased ordering in the first place -- because, of course, MU is "Meaningful" and deterministically guaranteed to work out, nationally, as planned, among all outpatient and inpatient settings. This seems a form of "<a href="http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/begging-the-question.html">begging the question</a>": <blockquote>Begging the Question is a fallacy in which the premises include the claim that the conclusion is true or (directly or indirectly) assume that the conclusion is true. This sort of "reasoning" typically has the following form. - Premises in which the truth of the conclusion is claimed or the truth of the conclusion is assumed (either directly or indirectly). - Claim C (the conclusion) is true. This sort of "reasoning" is fallacious because simply assuming that the conclusion is true (directly or indirectly) in the premises does not constitute evidence for that conclusion. Obviously, simply assuming a claim is true does not serve as evidence for that claim. This is especially clear in particularly blatant cases: "X is true. The evidence for this claim is that X is true." </blockquote> I note that the MU criteria are themselves evolving and not finalized. Making predictions about the future is the domain of fortune tellers with crystal balls, not scientists: <div style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgxfGRBku5tQcZH_CDtCrXbUMagZlCYUgLxzVa2C1w8EqImeOHTe22KGNDg2hLPZstTduSJyYJBs4CsxW1Ju8zrsP0cunQpDERfEQgbwPjmtR1jRchJrXu6RyAqGdIvIw4Henn5UqNvGrq_/s1600/crystal+ball.jpg"><img alt="" border="0" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5717930314388106274" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgxfGRBku5tQcZH_CDtCrXbUMagZlCYUgLxzVa2C1w8EqImeOHTe22KGNDg2hLPZstTduSJyYJBs4CsxW1Ju8zrsP0cunQpDERfEQgbwPjmtR1jRchJrXu6RyAqGdIvIw4Henn5UqNvGrq_/s320/crystal+ball.jpg" style="cursor: pointer; display: block; height: 136px; margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center; width: 205px;" /></a>Health IT WILL reduce costs and improve caregivers’ decisions and patients’ outcomes. It is written in the stars!</div> ONC seems to think it is capable of such certainty, as I wrote in mid-2010 at "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/07/new-england-journal-on-meaningful-use.html">Science or Politics? The New England Journal and "The 'Meaningful Use' Regulation for Electronic Health Records</a>": <blockquote> ... The widespread use of electronic health records (EHRs) in the United States is inevitable. EHRs will improve caregivers’ decisions and patients’ outcomes. Once patients experience the benefits of this technology, they will demand nothing less from their providers. Hundreds of thousands of physicians have already seen these benefits in their clinical practice.</blockquote> In its current piece, ONC goes on to state: <blockquote>Reducing Test Orders Is Not the Way that Health IT Is Meant to Reduce Costs The ultimate impact of EHRs on reducing cost will be through improvements in the coordination and quality of care, and the prevention of unnecessary and costly complications and hospitalizations. [Note the mysterious disappearance of the word "tests" - ed.] Providers who are embracing new delivery and payment models such as Accountable Care Organizations and Patient-Centered Medical Homes know that meaningful use of EHRs is a critical foundation for being able to improve quality while reducing cost.</blockquote> That is, simply, a lie. Reducing test utilization has long been claimed as a benefit of EHR's. For example, from <a href="http://www.healthit.gov/patients-families/benefits-health-it">http://www.healthit.gov/patients-families/benefits-health-it</a>: <blockquote> EHRs reduce unnecessary tests and procedures. Have you ever had to repeat medical tests ordered by one doctor because the results weren’t readily available to another doctor? Those tests may have been uncomfortable and inconvenient or have posed some risk, and they also cost money. Repeating tests—whether a $20 blood test or a $2,000 MRI--results in higher costs to you in the form of bigger bills and increased insurance premiums. With EHRs, all of your care providers can have access to all your test results and records at once, reducing the potential for unnecessary repeat tests.</blockquote> It is also another example of "moving the goalposts", a defense often used by those without a sound argument; by politicians; and sometimes by - scoundrels. (I observed another "moving of the goalposts" at my aforementioned post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/03/another-health-it-mythbuster-doctors.html">Another Health IT Mythbuster: Doctors order more X-rays, not fewer, with computer access</a>." In that post I observed Michael Furukawa, a health economist in the ONC office, stating that the researchers’ focus was not "deep enough" to support the study’s conclusions. He wrote: “The data are sound, the methods are appropriate, but the focus is limited,” he said. “They only looked at one piece of health IT.”) Well, yes, and the piece they looked at should set off red flags that the assumptions about health IT and savings might be erroneous - not generate excuses that the goalposts were too close, and need to be moved further away. This is not to mention that it appears most healthcare errors have little to do with documentation, as I outlined in my Dec. 2010 post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-healthcare-it-solution-to-wrong.html">Is Healthcare IT a Solution to the Wrong Problem?</a>" I particularly take issue with the ONC statement that: <blockquote> ... this was not a randomized trial, but an observational study (the National Ambulatory Medical Survey) that was not designed to answer the question of cost, or associations between EHRs and quality. As a result, many other variables that could affect physician behavior could not be examined in this study</blockquote> <div class="commentContent UIImageBlock_Content UIImageBlock_SMALL_Content" ft="{"type":33}">Yet in the aforementioned ONC "predominantly positive results" literature survey described <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/03/benefits-of-health-information.html">at this link</a>, ONC "implicitly gave equal weight to all studies regardless of study design or sample size." Their review thus included qualitative studies that were probably not meant to be evaluative, and observational studies subject to severe methodological bias, yet all were weighted equally. Further, studies contradicting the 'narrative' of health IT efficacy and beneficence such as in <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/02/updated-reading-list-on-health-it.html">this list</a> appear to have been excluded. This appears a prime example of, at best, "the pot calling the teakettle black", and raises doubts as to ONC's objectivity and perhaps even intellectual honesty. Of course, they are a political office with a mission, so perhaps this can be understood. (Not excused, but understood.) </div> ONC also views risk management-critical reports of health IT-caused harm as "anecdotal", a scientific and ethical faux pas (or is it willful blindness?) of major proportions. As I wrote at my April 2001 post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/04/common-sense-on-side-effects-lacking-in.html">Making a Stat Less Significant: Common Sense on "Side Effects" Lacking in Healthcare IT Sector</a>": <blockquote>... This view [of negative HIT reports being 'anecdotes'] extends all the way up to the Director of the Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT, who glibly stated per the Aug. 2010 Huffington Post Investigative Fund article <a href="http://www.iwatchnews.org/2010/08/03/7096/fda-obama-digital-medical-records-team-odds-over-safety-oversight">FDA, Obama Digital Medical Records Team at Odds over Safety Oversight</a> that FDA's own reports of health IT related injuries and deaths were “anecdotal": <blockquote>ONC director Blumenthal, the point man for the administration, has called the FDA’s injury findings “anecdotal and fragmentary.” He told the Investigative Fund that he believed nothing in the report indicated a need for regulation.</blockquote> Those "injury findings" appear in an FDA Internal Memo made available by the aforementioned Huffington Post Investigative Fund and archived at the following link: <blockquote><a href="http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/Internal-FDA-Report-on-Adverse-Events-Involving-Health-Information-IT.pdf">Internal FDA memorandum on HIT risks</a> (PDF) to Jeffrey Shuren MD JD (Director, Center for Devices and Radiological Health). Health Information Technology (H-IT) Safety Issues. "This is an Internal Document Not Intended for Public Use." Feb. 23, 2010. (My description/summary of the memorandum is at my Aug. 2010 post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/08/smoking-gun-internal-fda-memorandum-of.html">Internal FDA memorandum of Feb. 23, 2010 to Jeffrey Shuren on HIT risks. Smoking gun?</a>")</blockquote></blockquote> The definitive take-down of the "anecdote" canard is <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/08/from-senior-clinician-down-under.html">at this link</a>. One could wonder if a criteria for work at ONC is a <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/02/health-it-ddulites-and-disregard-for.html">Ddulite</a> disposition ('Luddite' with first four characters reversed): <blockquote>Ddulites: Hyper-enthusiastic technophiles who either deliberately ignore or are blinded to technology's downsides, ethical issues, and repeated local and mass failures.</blockquote> Instead of logical fallacy and "spin", perhaps the ONC would be better served by sponsoring some (independent, objective) researchers to actually conduct research supporting their claims about the effects of the "Meaningful Use" program. Finally, perhaps ONC should ask my mother what she thinks about EHRs. She has specially-acquired firsthand expertise. They can find her <a href="http://www.foresthillsshalom.com/dm20/en_US/locations/03/0355/index.page">here</a>. -- SS Addendum 3/9/12: At my Feb. 2011 post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/02/does-emr-facilitated-upcoding-formely_15.html">Does EHR-Incited Upcoding (Also Known as "Fraud") Need Investigation by CMS, And Could it Explain HIT Irrational Exuberance</a> " is another side effect on costs of EHR's in inpatient settings, specifically, the ED. -- SS Addendum 3/11/12: Another article in 2010 by Himmelstein, Woolhandler & Wright had reached related conclusions: <a href="http://www.amjmed.com/article/S0002-9343%2809%2900816-X/abstract"></a> <blockquote><a href="http://www.amjmed.com/article/S0002-9343%2809%2900816-X/abstract">Hospital Computing and the Costs and Quality of Care: A National Study</a> David U. Himmelstein, MD, Adam Wright, PhD,Steffie Woolhandler, MD, MPH <div class="center noMargin"><a class="button floatLeft" href="http://www.blogger.com/article/S0002-9343%2809%2900878-X/abstract" id="prevArticle"></a>The American Journal of Medicine <a href="http://www.amjmed.com/issues?issue_key=S0002-9343%2809%29X0020-3">Volume 123, Issue 1</a> , Pages 40-46, January 2010</div> Background Many believe that computerization will improve health care quality, reduce costs, and increase administrative efficiency. However, no previous studies have examined computerization's cost and quality impacts at a diverse national sample of hospitals. Methods We linked data from an annual survey of computerization at approximately 4000 hospitals for the period from 2003 to 2007 with administrative cost data from Medicare Cost Reports and cost and quality data from the 2008 Dartmouth Health Atlas. We calculated an overall computerization score and 3 subscores based on 24 individual computer applications, including the use of computerized practitioner order entry and electronic medical records. We analyzed whether more computerized hospitals had lower costs of care or administration, or better quality. We also compared hospitals included on a list of the “100 Most Wired” with others. Results More computerized hospitals had higher total costs in bivariate analyses (r=0.06, P=.001) but not multivariate analyses (P=.69). Neither overall computerization scores nor subscores were consistently related to administrative costs, but hospitals that increased computerization faster had more rapid administrative cost increases (P=.0001). Higher overall computerization scores correlated weakly with better quality scores for acute myocardial infarction (r=0.07, P=.003), but not for heart failure, pneumonia, or the 3 conditions combined. In multivariate analyses, more computerized hospitals had slightly better quality. Hospitals on the “Most Wired” list performed no better than others on quality, costs, or administrative costs. Conclusion As currently implemented, hospital computing might modestly improve process measures of quality but does not reduce administrative or overall costs.</blockquote> -- SS

Increased Lab Ordering with EHR's?

ONC has once more proffered typical politically-motivated spin with regard to the Harvard study " Giving Office-Based Physicians Electr...

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EHR Musings From a Pediatrician

I am reproducing with the author's permission a post from <a href="http://www.sermo.com/">Sermo.com</a>. The author is a pediatrician. Sermo is a physician-only online community. Emphases mine: <blockquote>EHR Musings March 06, 2012 Author Specialties: Pediatrics Let me preface my comments by saying that I LOVE TECHNOLOGY. I am a geek at heart and live to use all kinds of gadgets. I was actually looking forward to going EHR. These comments apply to someone with an existing mature practice that needs to be converted to EHR. For a doc starting out new, things are infinitely simpler. I am a Pediatrician in solo practice. <div class="user_content post_body hideOverflow tiny_mce_reset" id="body_post_123161"> It has been 6 months since we started using [EHR name redacted - ed.] and dove all in to the EHR realm. They have not been a happy 6 months. I am working a lot more and enjoying it less. My days do not end with the last patient, far from it. This is my opinion: Pros: 1) You can always find the chart. 2) In the case of [EHR name redacted - ed.], since it is web based, I can work at home and access records from anywhere. It is also free and never has to be updated. 3) At the end of the day I remember the patients better. I can also send messages to the staff within the EHR for follow up calls, things I might have forgotten , etc. That is pretty much it. Cons: 1) Documenting will add 1-2 hrs to your day. Since a lot of the documenting consists of templates you or the EHR created, it results in charts that all look very similar and there is a tendency to overdocumenting. I daresay it gets in the way of patient care. 2) You will have to drastically change your workflow. If you walk in the room with a laptop or tablet, you will wind up interacting with the tablet and not the patient. If you jot down notes, and then go out of the room to chart or look up things in the chart you will walk 10 miles a day and take up precious minutes. 3) I actually find it harder to keep track of things as growth charts, immunization records, prior labs, previous medical diagnosis and things I need to follow up. Why? Because I now have 2 charts for each patient. The new electronic chart and the digital copy of the paper chart. In the case of newborns things are better because there is no old record. 4) Once you sign a chart it is often impossible to add a note to some parts of the chart to explain an error. For example if the MA switches the weight and the height and I do not notice prior to signing, the growth chart looks like a roller coaster and I can't change it. Then there are the quality of life issues. I no longer have any time to do anything out of the office at lunch time. It is usually spent finishing the "documenting" from the AM so I don't have as much to do at the end of the day. I get frustrated by the inability to come up with a better workflow after 6 months. I have tried various different methods and none seem better than the other. Then there is the issue of the e prescribing. Any of you that are doing this can "attest" ( nice play on words ) to the fact that you can write 5 paper prescriptions in the time you can do an e Rx. E prescribing would be a cinch in rural Arkansas, where your patients have only 4 Pharmacies to choose from. In Orlando with a 300 pharmacies or so, and dealing with young parents of kids it is a nightmare. They change pharmacies more often than I change clothes in a week. They tell you to send it to one pharmacy and later complain because they made a mistake and gave you the wrong pharmacy. It is such a hassle for the staff, that they beg me to give them paper scripts so they don't have to deal with the calls. Notice I have not said anything about the Rx's that never reach their destination ! BTW, if and when I receive the incentive money I will know that I have earned every penny of it and then some. If you are still reading at this point, you can tell I AM PRETTY FRUSTRATED. And we all owe this to those wonderful folks in Washington DC whose lives are devoted to coming up with ideas to mess with our lives even more. ARGH !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! I would love to hear comments. Just venting has made me feel better. Of course it is now 10:50 EST and I have 7 more charts to do. </div></blockquote> I post this with no additional comments. -- SS

EHR Musings From a Pediatrician

I am reproducing with the author's permission a post from Sermo.com . The author is a pediatrician. Sermo is a physician-only online c...

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Using a "Professionalism" Initiative as a Speech Code to Punish Students' Criticisms of Administrative Authority?

The original impetus to set up <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/">Health Care Renewal</a> was increasing evidence of external threats to physicians' professional values.  So it seemed to me that renewed interest in addressing professionalism in academic medicine might lead to more attention to these threats, and perhaps even real challenges to them.  Instead, most academic professionalism initiatives seem to have steered away from this contentious area.  Worse, at times the academic medical concept of professionalism has been turned on its head.  A Dispute Among Students at University of California - Davis A recent <a href="http://thefire.org/article/14251.html">post</a> in the Torch blog from our friends at FIRE (the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education) provided a graphic example.  The case involved an apparently trivial dispute among two medical students: <blockquote>[University of California - Davis medical student Curtis] Allumbaugh's ordeal began after he emailed the 'med2014' mailing list (or 'listserv') on July 19, 2010, regarding a party he was organizing. The listserv was widely used for a variety of non-academic purposes. Allumbaugh's email provided the address of the party, detailed the available space, and listed the variety of alcohol that would be available at the party. The email noted that others had signed up to bring snacks and mentioned that some things were still lacking for the party, such as music, fruit juice, and beer. Prior to Allumbaugh's message, others had sent similar emails using the same listserv about their own parties, such as a 'kegger' one student called 'CAMP MED.' On July 20, 2010, a second-year student emailed Allumbaugh, notifying him that she had 'been placed on the class of 2014's listserve' and had monitored the class email. She criticized Allumbaugh's email for placing 'a heavy emphasis on alcohol.' In response, Allumbaugh emailed her directly on July 21, calling her a 'busy body' and telling her, 'You should really just mind your own business and let our class be.'</blockquote> Note that the second-year student's email (available <a href="http://thefire.org/article/14238.html">here</a>) carried a suggestion that she had some sort of authority to monitor the extra-curricular actions of first year students as manifested on the list server, and perhaps even punish them for perceived misconduct: <blockquote>I can tell you that as MS2s, we work and play hard, but we do it responsibly and always in the forefront of our minds we remember what image we are portraying in public and through the messages we send. I'd hate to see any one of you 2014ers get into any trouble right before you start an amazing period of your life.</blockquote> Note that the exchange between the two students did not occur in an academic or clinical setting, and it was never clear why the second year student was "placed on" the list server, or why she should have any authority over the Allumbaugh. . The School Administration Invokes "Professionalism" The medical school saw fit to cast Allumbaugh's actions as violations of the school's standards of professionalism: <blockquote>As a result of this email exchange, Associate Dean of Student Affairs and Graduate Medical Education James Nuovo sent Allumbaugh a letter on September 14, 2010, citing him for 'failing to demonstrate the highest standards of civility and decency to all' and 'failing to demonstrate courtesy, sensitivity and respect.' On November 3, 2010, Allumbaugh received a letter from the SOM Committee on Student Progress, punishing him with academic probation for the rest of his time in medical school and requiring him to undergo a psychological assessment to determine whether he was 'fit' to continue in medical school. Finally, on November 19, 2010, SOM changed its rules to force all medical students to abide by the Principles of Community or else face academic probation. </blockquote> The result was a series of interventions by FIRE: <blockquote>In response, FIRE wrote UC Davis Chancellor Linda P.B. Katehi on August 3, 2011, noting that enforcing professional standards in truly professional settings differs greatly from enforcing workplace standards in other settings such as private conversations. FIRE also noted that it is blatantly unconstitutional to police student speech under the UC Davis Principles of Community because such a 'civility' policy violates the First Amendment right to freedom of speech when it is given disciplinary force. </blockquote> When that letter had no effect, it took threats of litigation for the medical school to suspend Allumbaugh's punishment more than one year after it began: <blockquote>SOM Associate Dean of Curriculum and Competency Development Mark Servis replied to FIRE on August 10, 2011, defending the policy. FIRE responded on November 23, 2011, reminding Katehi that 'violating well-established law regarding the First Amendment rights of students at public universities leaves you at risk of losing qualified immunity, thereby opening you and other administrators to personal liability' for the deprivation of students' First Amendment rights. Servis again defended the policy in a reply on December 5, 2011. Finally, on February 16, 2012, the Committee on Student Progress notified Allumbaugh that his probation had been dropped, but persisted in requiring him to adhere to the Principles of Community. </blockquote>Note that Associate Dean <a href="http://thefire.org/public/pdfs/6d24a77115edf335c1cb2b1d1a737622.pdf?direct">Servis' letter</a> stated that the email sent to Allumbaugh by the second year student was "a genuine suggestion of concern and an offer of albeit unsolicited friendly advice."  Thus, Servis seemed unaware that it could have been interpreted as an assertion of authority and a threat of punishment ("I'd hate to see any one of you 2014ers get into any trouble.") Dean Servis also defended the use of probation to punish a student for failing to "work effectively with classmates." Yet the dispute that had nothing to do with (academic or clinical) work, and only involved a single student from another class.  Why that student was not equally to blame was not clear, unless it was because she had been granted special authority by the administration to monitor the actions of less senior students.  The implication appears to be that the punishment was in defense of a student who had been granted special authority by the administration, and hence was ultimately in defense of the administration's power.  Summary In this case, the medical school's professionalism policy seemed to be used by the administration primarily to control students' speech outside of the academic and clinical setting. Furthermore, the student's main offense seemed to be failure to kowtow sufficiently to another student who by implication had been given some sort of authority by the administration.  What the two students' dispute had to with professionalism is not  apparent. On one hand, this seems like a case in which a speech code was mainly used to defend administrators from criticism and challenge. On the other hand, this speech code was cloaked in the mantle of professionalism.  So this case seems to be an example of a professionalism initiative used as an excuse for the leadership to maintain its power. It is beyond ironic that while this was going on, the University of California - Davis, and its Chancellor Linda Katehi were becoming briefly infamous for another effort, a more violent one, by the administration to prevent criticism and challenge. Chancellor Katehi had authorized university police to "clear" student demonstrators from an "occupation" of the campus which was protesting, among other things, rising tuition and economic inequality, and in doing so, the police used pepper spray on unarmed students (see <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/11/uc-davis-pepper-spray-case-as.html">this post</a>.) There are a lot bigger threats to physicians' and other health care professionals' professionalism than medical students' sarcasm or even rudeness in disputes about alcohol served at off-hours parties. Since many of these threats also generate personal benefits to academic leadership, it may not be much of a surprise that they have received little attention.  (See the list of threats appended below.  Note that we have discussed two of these threats in the specific context of the University of California - Davis.  <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/08/university-leaders-goal-taking-new.html">Here</a> we noted that Chancellor Katehi seemed to be re-imagining her medical school as a biotechnology company.  <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/11/john-wiley-and-sons-director-apologizes.html">Here</a> we noted that Chancellor Katehi was also on the board of a company with a medical education and communication company subsidiary.) However, while they remain unaddressed, I submit that using "professionalism" to cloak increased social control of students to prevent them from looking too closely at what academic administrators are doing will eventually backfire.  === ADDENDUM: List of Threats to Professionalism Instead, to really uphold professionalism, we need to defend it from its real threats, as listed in my <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/12/lancet-emphasizes-threats-to-academic.html">2010 post</a>: <ul><li>Abandonment of traditional prohibitions of the commercial practice of medicine - In the US, a Supreme Court decision was interpreted to mean that medical societies could no longer regulate the ethics of their members.  Until 1980, the US American Medical Association had  ruled that the practice of medicine should not be "commercialized, nor treated as a commodity in trade."  After then, it ceased trying to maintain this prohibition.  The result was increasing, now rampant commercialization.  See posts  <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/12/relman-in-jama-on-threats-to-physicians.html">here</a> and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2009/06/why-did-us-physicians-give-up-their.html">here</a>.</li><li>Making money takes precedence over education -  A recent survey showing that more than half the faculty at multiple US medical schools felt they were valued more for how much money they brought in than their teaching or patient care abilities (<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/12/american-medical-schools-are-only-in-it.html">here</a>), confirming previous anecdotal reports (see <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2007/04/medical-schools-to-faculty-show-me.html">here</a>).  </li><li>The medical school re-imagined as a biotechnology company -  In 2000, a Vice President of the American Association of Medical Colleges(1) wrote that research universities must respond to "societal demands that they become engines of economic development…."  Many universities now defend lax conflict of interest policies with similar arguments.  For more details, go <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/11/who-you-gonna-call-how-should-young.html">here</a>.</li><li>Faculty become employees of industry - For numerous examples of this and other kinds of conflicts of interest, go <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/conflicts%20of%20interest">here</a>.  A survey by Campbell et al suggested that approximately two-thirds of medical academics get significant payments from industry.(2)</li><li>Academics become "key opinion leaders" paid to market drugs and devices - Marketers regard "key opinion leaders" as salespeople who appear more credible because of their professional guise.  See anecdotal evidence <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/key%20opinion%20leaders">here</a>.  </li><li>Control of clinical research given to commercial sponsors - A study by Mello et al showed how universities' grant administrators are willing to sign contracts giving commercial sponsors control over key aspects of human research studies.(3)  See post <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2005/05/troubling-study-of-contracts-between.html">here</a>. </li><li>Conflicts of interest allow manipulation and suppression of clinical research - Commercially sponsored research design, implementation, and dissemination are often <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/manipulating%20clinical%20research">manipulated</a> to favor the sponsor's interests.  When such manipulation fails to produce favorable results, the results may simply be <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/suppression%20of%20medical%20research">suppressed</a>.</li><li>Academics take credit for articles written by commercially paid ghost-writers - Such <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/ghost%20writing">ghost-writing</a> is often part of organized <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/stealth%20marketing">stealth marketing</a> campaigns.  </li><li>Whistle blowers are discouraged, or worse, and academic freedom is damaged.  Discussion of some examples of what may happen to whistle blowers is <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/whistle-blowers">here</a>.  The survey mentioned earlier (<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/12/american-medical-schools-are-only-in-it.html">here</a>) showed that about one-third of faculty fear they may be punished for speaking  out.  </li><li>Leadership of academic medical centers by businesspeople - <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/ill-informed%20management">Ill-informed management</a> may result from leaders who have no background or training in actual health care.  </li><li>Leaders of teaching hospitals and universities become millionaires -  A recent example is <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/08/more-hospital-ceos-join-millionaires.html">here</a>, and more may be found <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/executive%20compensation">here</a>.  Leaders of academic medical centers and the parent universities of medical schools often make more than $1 million a year in the US.  When such amounts are in play, executives may focus more on short-term measures that lead to even more pay than on upholding the mission.  </li><li>Medical school leaders become stewards (as members of boards of directors) of for-profit health care corporations - A recent example is <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/12/duke-divinity-students-protest-pay-of.html">here</a>, and a summary of how we discovered this phenomenon in 2006 is <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2006/03/new-species-of-conflict-of-interest-in.html">here</a>.   The conflict of interest is severe because directors of for-profit corporations are supposed to have unyielding loyalty to the interests of the corporation and its stockholders, although they are frequently accused of acting mainly as cronies of the top hired executives (see <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/07/new-york-times-reports-university.html">here</a> and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/01/one-small-step-towards-reducing.html">here</a>).</li><li>Leaders of failed finance firms become stewards of academic medicine - We have found numerous examples, recently <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/04/failed-leaders-of-citigroup-as-leaders.html">here</a>, <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/04/wamu-worry-more-overlaps-between.html">here</a>, and <a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/03/members-of-board-of-now-bankrupt-lehman.html">here</a>, of top executives and/or board members of the finance firms who helped bring on the global financial collapse also being trustees of medical schools, academic medical centers, or their parent universities.  Such "stewards" may bring to the academic environment the "greed is good" culture now pervasive in finance.  </li></ul>References 1. Korn D. Conflicts of interest in biomedical research. JAMA 2000; 284: 2234-2237. Link <a href="http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/284/17/2234">here</a>. 2. Campbell EG, Gruen RL, Mountford J et al. A national survey of physician–industry relationships. N Engl J Med 2007; 356:1742-1750. Llink <a href="http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsa064508">here</a>. 3. Mello MM, Clarridge BR, Studdert DM. Academic medical centers' standards for clinical-trial agreements with industry. N Engl J Med 2005; 352: 21.  Link <a href="http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/short/352/21/2202">here</a>.

Using a "Professionalism" Initiative as a Speech Code to Punish Students' Criticisms of Administrative Authority?

The original impetus to set up Health Care Renewal was increasing evidence of external threats to physicians' professional values. So ...

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ECRI Institute's Top Health Technology Hazards for 2012

In my Dec. 2010 post "<a href="http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2010/12/ecri-healthcare-it-in-top-ten-health.html">ECRI: Healthcare IT In Top Ten Health Technology Threats to Patient Safety</a>", I wrote that: <blockquote>The <a href="https://www.ecri.org/About/Pages/default.aspx">ECRI Institute</a> is an independent, unbiased, evidence-based healthcare research, information, and advice provider. They have been in operation for more than 40 years and are one of only a handful of organizations designated as both a Collaborating Center of the World Health Organization and an Evidence-Based Practice Center by the U.S. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. ... (from WSJ) For the fourth year running, the nonprofit ECRI Institute has put together a list of what it judges to be the top ten health technology hazards on which health-care facilities should focus their efforts. ... #5 Data loss, system incompatibilities and other health IT complications: Problems with electronic-health records and other health IT systems can lead to problems including lost data, the need for repeat testing and even patient injury or death.</blockquote> From <a href="http://www.medscape.com/features/slideshow/tech-dangers?src=mp&spon=38">Medscape</a> (account required), here is ECRI's #6 on the list of top technology threats for 2012: <blockquote>Failing to Pay Sufficient Attention to New Device Connectivity Medical technology and information technology (IT) can create risks. Hazards can arise from software problems, interoperability between systems, and poor network performance. Problems could create a domino effect, in which changes to one component of the system affect the operation of another. Potential problems also include issues about wireless networks, cybersecurity, and software upgrades. "Hospitals must stay on top of routine updates," says Keller. ECRI's recommendations: Make sure that hardware and software changes, security changes, and planned maintenance are approved and implemented in a controlled manner. Because IT help desks are usually the first point of contact for problems with health IT, provide the help desk team with education, training, and clear escalation procedures.</blockquote> I would add "Failing to Pay Sufficient Attention to New Health IT Defects" to the list. -- SS

ECRI Institute's Top Health Technology Hazards for 2012

In my Dec. 2010 post " ECRI: Healthcare IT In Top Ten Health Technology Threats to Patient Safety ", I wrote that: The ECRI Insti...

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